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ABSTRACT
Current research indicates that global companies still struggle in integrating 
managerial know-how well. The academic literature addresses the 
importance of information technologies (ITs) and socio-cultural aspects in 
organizations. This research looks at the managerial level to explore the 
ways in which executives leverage management information and knowledge 
in strategizing activities with regards to information systems (IS). Two 
problems are identified: first, a predominant view on IS as ITs, and as 
separate entities from strategizing with a typical response being a call for 
‘strategic alignment’; second, a predominant rational view on the manager.
Based on two qualitative case studies, the IS strategizing framework 
(Galliers & Newell 2003) will serve the sense-making process with specific 
consideration given to exploration and exploitation strategies, and socio- 
technical elements of an information infrastructure (II). Interpretivism and 
the hermeneutic circle guide the analysis of empirical findings from 
interviews and observation.
Key findings reveal the prevalence of subsystems among senior managers 
with the ambidextrous use of deliberate and emergent IS to achieve 
efficiency and flexibility (Galliers 2007). The ontological assumptions of the 
‘involved manager’ (Introna 1997) are used to explain the prevalence of 
subsystems and reveal attributes of ambidextrous managers (O’Reilly & 
Tushman 2004). The study implies that IS and strategic actors’ involved 
mindsets are immanent to the strategizing process. Secondary findings 
show organizational implications of managerial subsystems to lead to 
widening cross-cultural gaps and political tensions. The study suggests 
conceptualizing IS as immanent to managerial knowledge work processes 
with deeper consideration to the human agent as the involved manager.
Enhancements to the framework are proposed to include the ontological 
assumptions of the involved manager, which explain the use of IS as a 
result of an already involved IS mindset of the ambidextrous manager. 
Further research is suggested to test the findings across various cultural and 
organizational contexts.
4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION FORM.................................................................................................. 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................. 3
ABSTRACT.........................................................................................................................4
1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................... 10
1.1 Research Motivation..........................................................................................11
1.1.1 Problem Domain -  The Practice....................................................13
1.1.2 Problem Domain - The Literature.................................................18
1.1.3 Emerging Issues for Research........................................................ 19
1.2 Research Design & Objective ........................................................................21
1.2.1 Defining Key Terms........................................................................ 22
1.2.2. Choices of Methodology and M ethod............................................ 26
1.2.3 Empirical W ork.............................................................................27
1.2.4 Expected Contributions............................................................... 27
1.3 Thesis Structure................................................................................................. 28
2 STRATEGIZING & STRATEGIC ACTORS................................. 30
2.1 Perspectives on Strategy...................................................................................31
2.1.1 Strategy as Process: Deliberate and Emergent Views..................33
2.1.2 Strategizing as Decision-Making................................................. 36
2.1.3 Decision-Making as Problem Solving & Sense-Making.............38
2.2 Managerial Information & Knowledge...........................................................43
2.2.1 Managerial Work & Management Information...........................43
2.2.2 Knowledge-based Capabilities..................... .................................50
2.3 Perspectives on Strategic A ctors.................................................................... 53
2.1.1. Managerial Mindsets..................................................................... 53
2.1.2. Alternative Perspectives on the Manager.................................... 58
Chapter Sum m ary............................................................................................. 64
3 INFORMATION SYSTEMS......................................................... 66
3.1 Strategic Information Systems....................................................................... 67
3.1.1. Culture.........................................................................................70
3.1. Enabling Context...............................................................................................72
3.1.1. The Role of Technology.............................................................. 74
3.1.2. Social Networks...........................................................................77
3.1.3. Information Systems and Knowledge Strategies........................ 83
3.2. Ongoing Learning and Organizational Memory...........................................85
3.3.1 Organizational Memory............................................................... 86
Chapter Summary.............................................................................................. 88
5
4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY 90
4.1. Theoretical Framework & Research O bjective.......................................... 90
4.1.1 Understanding IS Theory in Context.......................................... 95
4.2. Philosophical Assumptions................................................................................98
4.2.1. Ontology & Epistemology............................................................ 98
4.2.2. Interpretivism & Hermeneutic Inquiry....................................... 102
4.2.3. Mode of Analysis.......................................................................... 106
4.3. Research Strategy ...............................................................................................I l l
4.3.1. Data Collection.............................................................................. 112
4.3.2. Qualitative Interviews.................................................................... 113
4.3.3. Observation.................................................................................... 114
4.3.4. Potential Challenges...................................................................... 117
Chapter Summary..............................................................................................118
5 BACKGROUND TO CASE STUDIES........................................... 119
5.1. Overview of the Empirical Work..................................................................... 119
5.1.1. Case Selection...............................................................................122
5.1.2. Gaining Access..............................................................................124
5.2. Case Studies: Initial Empirical M aterial........................................................127
5.2.1. Hydro Power Company .............................................................. 128
5.2.2. Private Client Services..................................................................137
5.3. Overview of Initial Findings ...........................................................................144
Chapter Sum m ary............................................................................................. 146
6 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS............................................................... 147
6.1. Revisiting the Fram ew ork................................................................................ 148
6.2. Main F indings.....................................................................................................154
6.2.1. Case 1: H P C ................................................................................. 154
6.2.2. Case 2: PCS...................................................................................173
6.3. Summary of the Findings ................................................................................186
6.3.1. Supporting Theories......................................................................189
7 ANALYSIS & DISCUSSIONS.........................................................192
7.1 Analyzing the Case Com panies.......................................................................194
7.1.1. HPC-Analysis.............................................................................. 195
7.1.2. PCS -  Analysis ............................................................................205
7.1.3. Reflecting on Both Cases..............................................................211
7.2. Information Systems in Strategizing.............................................................. 216
7.2.1. Decision-making & Information Systems.................................... 217
7.2.2. Ambidextrous IS-Business Strategizing........................................ 221
7.2.3. Strategic Actors.............................................................................. 227
7.2.4. Summary....................................................................................... 245
7.3. Unintended Consequences............................................................................... 246
7.3.1. Managerial & Organizational Disintegration...............................247
7.3.2. Wider implications ......................................................................251
6
7.3.3. Towards Integration.................................................................... 260
7.4. Summary & Implications............................................................................... 266
8 CONCLUSIONS............................................................................273
8.1. Thesis Overview & Contributions................................................................ 273
8.1.1. Contributions to Theory and the Framework............................282
8.1.2. Contributions to Methodology...................................................288
8.1.3. Contributions to Practice............................................................289
8.2 Challenges & Limitations .............................................................................. 292
8.2.1 Limitations due to Theory and Methodology............................. 292
8.2.2 Limitations in Conducting the Empirical W ork.........................296
8.3 Conclusions & Suggestions for Further R esearch...................................... 298
APPENDIX............................................................................................ 305
A. Overview of Preliminary Research & Case S tudies.................................. 305
B. Pilot S tudies.....................................................................................................306
C. HPC Case S tudy............................................................................................. 309
D. PCS Case S tudy...............................................................................................310
E. Interview Questions & G uides..................................................................... 313
REFERENCES.................................................................................... 322
7
TABLE OF FIGURES
CHAPTER 1
Figure 1.1: General scope of the research..............................................................................17
Figure 1.2: Key research components....................................................................................22
Figure 1.3: The structure of the thesis.................................................................................. 29
CHAPTER 2
Figure 2.1: Tacit and explicit knowledge................................................................................51
Figure 2.2: Characteristics of the three approaches to making decisions.............................. 54
Figure 2.3: Two ontological views on the manager............................................................... 60
CHAPTER 3
Figure 3.1: Distinction between IS/ IT strategy .................................................................68
Figure 3.2: Knowledge Network Reference Model............................................................. 78
Figure 3.3: Two approaches to Knowledge Management Strategy..................................... 84
CHAPTER 4
Figure 4.1: Illustrating the research context........................................................................ 91
Figure 4.2: Theoretical framework - IS strategizing framework;......................................... 92
Figure 4.3: Key components of analysis ............................................................................. 93
Figure 4.4: Four paradigms of social research....................................................................102
Figure 4.5: The hermeneutic circle.....................................................................................107
Figure 4.6: Summary of chapter 4 ...................................................................................... 118
CHAPTER 5
Figure 5.1: Overview on the empirical w ork ...................................................................... 120
Figure 5.2: The case companies.......................................................................................... 121
Figure 5.3: Details of the Case Companies.........................................................................127
Figure 5.4: Traditional business strategy............................................................................. 130
Figure 5.5: From control to drift - Phases of a strategizing process..................................130
Figure 5.6: Scope of servicing and managerial w ork..................................................   131
Figure 5.7: Steps of new business strategy.......................................................................... 132
Figure 5.8: Intentions of the new business strategy............................................................132
Figure 5.9: Evaluation Criteria -  H P C ................................................................................133
Figure 5.10: Initial findings -  H P C ......................................................................................134
Figure 5.11: Knowledge work at PCS................................................................................. 139
Figure 5.12: Areas of expertise -  PCS.................................................................................140
Figure 5.13: Initial findings -  PCS ..................................................................................... 142
Figure 5.14: Common characteristics of both case companies..........................................143
Figure 5.15: Differences in their IS and infrastructures......................................................144
Figure 5.16: Sample of knowledge w ork.............................................................................146
CHAPTER 6
Figure 6.1: IS strategizing framework................................................................................150
Figure 6.2: Exploitation and exploration-based IS ............................................................. 151
Figure 6.3: Common base for case analysis.........................................................................152
Figure 6.4: The IS strategizing framework in the research context................................... 152
Figure 6.5: Interrelated Trio: The dynamic interaction between collaborative
business strategizing, organizational IIs, and IS .............................................153
8
Figure 6.6: Overview of initial findings - H P C ..................................................................187
Figure 6.7: Overview of initial findings - PCS.................................................................... 188
Figure 6.8: Supporting concepts and theories....................................................................189
Figure 6.9: Initial interpretations......................................................................................... 170
CHAPTER 7
Figure 7.1: Structure of the arguments (Preview)................................................................193
Figure 7.2: Structure of lrguments.....................................................................................215
Figure 7.3: Representation of the findings and basis for interpretation.......................... 216
Figure 7.4: Suggesting link between the two forms of IS strategies.................................. 223
Figure 7.5: Alternative interpretation................................................................................. 236
Figure 7.6: Two ontological views on the manager........................................................... 237
Figure 7.7: Intentionality and comportment....................................................................... 240
Figure 7.8: Overview of the arguments ............................................................................. 268
Figure 7.9: View on IS, strategizing and strategic actors as parts of the same
involvement whole............................................................................................ 271
CHAPTER 8
Figure 8.1: Subsystems as a result of ambidextrous use of IS and involved mindsets 280
Figure 8.2: Towards an ambidextrous view.........................................................................284
Figure 8.3: Suggested extension of the framework: the ambidextrous manager................286
Figure 8.4: Summary of contributions................................................................................ 303
APPENDIX
Table A-l: Overview of the Empirical Work 2001-2006....................................................305
Table A-2: HPC List of Interviewees................................................................................. 309
Table A-3: PCS List of Interviewees.................................................................................. 310
Table A-4: PCS Sources of Empirical Material ..................................................................311
9
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Research Motivation and Scope..........................................................................11
1.1.1 Problem Domain -  The Practice...................................................... 13
1.1.2 Problem Domain - The Literature.....................................................18
1.1.3 Emerging Issues for Research............................................................ 19
1.2 Research Design & Objective ............................................................................21
1.2.1 Defining Key Terms............................................................................ 22
1.2.2 Choices of Methodology and M ethod................................................ 26
1.2.3 Empirical W ork...................................................................................27
1.2.4 Expected Contributions...................................................................... 27
1.3 Thesis Structure................................................................................................... 28
This chapter introduces the dissertation by providing a 
background on the problem domain in theory and practice. It 
outlines the research design and states the objectives.
1 INTRODUCTION
This research investigates the ways in which senior managers at two global companies 
leverage information and knowledge in competitive strategizing. In this context, Galliers 
and Newells (2003) IS strategizing framework is used in two case studies to explore the 
role of information systems (IS) in achieving efficiency and flexibility in strategizing. The 
thesis argues that the strategic information systems (SIS) literature tends to underplay the 
situated involvement of strategic actors in how IS may be leveraged. This under-researched 
element significantly influences the dynamics of a number of other factors, which affect 
how IS are leveraged in strategizing. To this end, supporting theories on human agency are 
considered with a view to contributing to a richer understanding of the relationship 
between actors and IS in competitive strategizing. Furthermore, the study sheds light on 
how managerial and organizational contexts reinforce one another in the shaping of 
unintended consequences. First, this chapter provides a background to the problem 
domain in practice and highlights relevant debates in the current literature. The research 
objective and design are then presented The final section outlines the expected 
contributions and the structure of this thesis.
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1.1 RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND SCOPE
This research stems from the intellectual curiosity to explore how experienced managers in 
global organizations leverage information and knowledge in strategizing processes. This 
subject has been under ongoing debate across multiple disciplines, e.g. strategic 
management, organizational theory and information systems (IS) (Sabherwal & Chan 2001; 
Hoskisson et al 1999; Porter & Millar 1985; McFarlan 1984; Wiseman 1985; Venkatraman 
et al 1993; Weick 1995; Wemerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Davenport & Prusak 1989; 
Mintzberg 1978; Argyris & Schon 1978; Walsham 1993; Earl 1989; Galliers 1991; Galliers 
& Sutherland 1991; Ciborra 1994). There are, however, several shortcomings in the 
literature and a multitude of practical challenges concerning the role of IS in strategizing. 
The IS literature tends to propose ways to exploit the value of IT as a strategic opportunity 
to create competitive advantage (e.g., Porter & Millar 1985). This tendency depends on the 
conceptualization of IS, which affects how IS are used in business strategizing. Generally, 
there has been a gap in perspectives between academic literature and practitioners in how 
IS may serve managers in strategizing. Despite advancements in ICTs and the pool of 
available literature, practitioners criticize IT as providing ‘cookie-cutter’ solutions, and the 
literature as being ‘too theoretical’ in assisting in the solution of their problems.
There appears therefore to be an opportunity to re-examine such challenges in the real 
world. A journey through the literature and a preliminary investigation revealed the need 
for research from different perspectives. A major challenge has been to translate the many 
concerns from the boundary-less practice into conceptually distinct domains in the 
literature. This thesis attempts to provide a richer understanding of some of the real world 
problems on solid conceptual grounds. As a result, it is hoped to encourage different 
thinking and bring practitioners closer to possible solutions. So, some key questions 
include:
• Given the advancements in ICTs and the growing uncertainties of competitive 
environments, how much do IS influence the jobs of top managers?
More specifically:
• How much are top managers, or key decision makers, able to influence the 
usefulness of systems in leveraging information and knowledge in their particular 
context?
• How much do decision makers include centrally available IS in their practice-based 
strategizing?
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• Are companies, which provide their top managers with management IS (MIS) and 
ICTs able to compete more effectively and efficiently compared to those that do 
not have them?
These questions will be unfolded into key concepts IS, human agents and strategizing, 
where their dynamic relationships will be explored from competing perspectives. The key 
concepts will be defined and discussed in the literature review chapters (chapters 2 and 3), 
and then brought together into a cohesive and integrative framework in chapter 4. The 
framework will be applied across two companies in practice to gather new insights.
The general scope of competitive strategizing in this research is well represented by the 
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Wemerfelt 1984), which argues that competitive 
advantage (Teece et al 1997) may be created through path-dependent internal processes on 
the organizational, managerial and technological levels. Here, what determines sustainability 
of competitive advantage stems from the dynamic nature of firms’ core competencies (Lei 
et al 1996) and strategic flexibility (Hitt et al 1998; Sanchez & Heene 1997). The 
assumptions behind many of the arguments in this thesis stem from the knowledge-based- 
view (KBV) of the firm (Grant 1996; Spender & Grant 1996), which conceptualizes firms 
as heterogeneous and bearers of tacit, social and path-dependent knowledge (Kogut & 
Zander 1992). This tacitness and social complexity is an important determinant of a firm’s 
competitive advantage, since knowledge is seen as transient and a core ingredient of 
ongoing learning and innovation (Nonaka 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). Specifically, 
this tacit dimension of knowledge (Polanyi 1966) has made the study of strategy and IS 
complex. Tacit knowledge is linked to personal knowledge (ibid). Thus, a central and 
intrinsic argument in this thesis is Polanyi’s assertion that we know more than we can tell’ 
(Polanyi 1966: 4). Information and knowledge are seen as distinct constructs, since there is 
always a certain level of interpretive ambiguity due to specific contexts and individual 
perspectives (i.e. Zack 1998). Therefore, knowledge-based thinking is argued to be 
important for understanding a number of central topics in the strategizing process.
Furthermore, the research concerns the interaction between managerial and organizational 
levels, viewing them as overarching and mutually reinforcing. The organizational level 
concerns the firm’s information and knowledge platform embedded within socio-technical 
structures and processes. The managerial level concerns managerial use of IS and focuses 
on more micro-level knowledge work processes (Mintzberg 2000; Wilson 2003).
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Section 1.2.1 outlines the definitions on the key terms, whose underlying assumptions are 
discussed in more detail in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 discusses the assumptions taken on 
strategizing, management information, and knowledge in this research. Chapter 3 reviews 
the literature on IS and wider organizational consequences of the use of IS in organizations. 
The use’ of information and knowledge through IS includes the gathering, creation, 
sharing and transfer thereof. A holistic view is taken, where IS may or may not include 
information technologies (IT). Chapter 3 also reviews socio-technical elements of 
information infrastructures (IIs), which facilitate an enabling context for strategizing. 
Notably, while appreciating the conceptual distinctions of information and knowledge, they 
will be used interchangeably to refer to the kinds of information and knowledge managers 
use in their strategizing context.
1.1.1 Problem Domain -  The Practice
The job of top managers has become increasingly uncertain. According to Beck (2000), 
uncertainties and challenges have always existed, yet they have changed form and intensity. 
For example, the elements of managers’ work that may be exposed to risks and hazards 
have widened, requiring these executives to be more prepared to respond to a wide array of 
uncertainties and unintended consequences while having to meet conflicting demands. The 
struggle is exacerbated where local demand and global visions intersect and require a 
platform for efficient knowledge transfer and responsiveness (Grant 1996; Subramaniam & 
Venkatraman 2001). Organizational collaborate arrangements have been put in place to 
reduce uncertainties and pressures and enable greater speed and transparency. On the 
supply side, in an attempt to capitalize on this need, ICT provides tools to facilitate 
decision making and global collaboration.
The broader research motivation stems from the question: How do senior managers juggle 
conflicting demands posed by internal corporate environments and by external competition 
in their everyday strategizing? More specifically, what is the role of IS therein? To what 
extent are IS used, in what form and ways? The literature emphasize the strategic 
importance of IS to multinational corporations (Matsumoto & Wilson 2004), for example 
to support the transfer of knowledge and expertise, global efficiency and local 
responsiveness (ibid.). Specifically, the SIS literature argues that IS considers the choice of 
system applications to be delivered to the business (Orlikowski 1996), whereby IT 
represents the choice of technical platform that delivers system applications. While some
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institutions have already developed a global IS, others have been less agile (Matsumoto & 
Wilson 2004).
At the same time, managers tend either to be skeptical in adopting ICTs in strategy, or they 
embrace them, but then gradually drift away towards more informal means to organizing 
management information (Land 1991). The consequences of such drift are not to be 
neglected on the organizational level. Assuming they drift from formal systems towards 
other informal means (ibid.), which cannot be centrally controlled and monitored, the 
managerial know-how remains hidden from the organization as a whole or gets lost when 
individuals leave. Thus, with increased mobility of knowledge workers and low retention 
levels, there are challenges in building cohesive organizational learning and memory (Walsh 
& Ungson 1991). In this context, many organizations adopt even more IS to address 
particular issues (Matsumoto & Wilson 2004). Hence, sophisticated structures of 
information processing and communication mechanisms have been suggested and 
commercialized to alleviate the problems of knowledge dispersion and potential loss 
(Boland & Tenkasi 1995). However, the strategic applicability of ICTs has faced 
controversies in terms of efficiency and flexibility. When corporations integrate business 
processes with external partners, suppliers and customers, unforeseeable demands have to 
be considered that are difficult to control. Business units require ICT to deliver services 
with the flexibility to accommodate unforeseen circumstances. Hence, the strategizing jobs 
of managers face increasingly conflicting elements, such as in achieving economies of scale 
through centralization while remaining responsive to business needs (Gupta 1987).
Overall, despite advancements in ICTs, organizations still struggle with leveraging IS (Weill 
& Broadbent 1998; Sauer & Willcocks 2002; Tinaikar 2006). This is the point of departure 
to refer to some examples from the preliminary investigation conducted during the earlier 
stages of this research to examine the scope of the problem domain in practice.
Preliminary Investigation
Due to the broad nature of the topic, it is appropriate to present three real case scenarios 
from practice as an opening case for this investigation. As part of a preliminary research, 
the researcher held a number of conversations with experienced managers and conducted a 
series of semi-structured interviews with senior managers in companies with global 
presence (see Appendix for a list of the companies). The section below presents a series of 
concerns that the individuals expressed. Due to the limited space, the most relevant
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comments are selected as an opening case for further investigation that follows in this 
study. The comments come from two consultants at a global strategy consulting firm, 
several top managers at a global IT and Engineering Firm, and a director of the Human 
Resources division at a global Petrochemical Company.
Problem  scenario 1: strategizing a ctivities and IS  
Strategy consultants had an interest in better understanding the IS needs of strategizers in 
their everyday decision-making across various industries and cultures. While the IT industry 
offers many ‘solutions’, the consultants were well aware of the managers’ frustrations with 
these applications. The consultants wanted more solid academic research. They saw a wide 
gap between research which is seen as ‘too academic’ and the ‘cookie-cutter solutions’ 
provided in the commercial sphere..
Contributions from these discussions include how managers in two different cultures use IS in competitive 
strategizing. New insights may also he gained by combining perspectives from recent business management 
literature with appropriate philosophical underpinnings. Attention will be given to the socio-technical 
organizational context and hcrwmanagers from German and US operating units operate in this system.
Problem scenario 2: Knowledge sharing and transfer for ongoing learning 
A key concern of an HR director at a global petrochemical company was to find a way to 
foster ‘continued development and distribution o f tacit knowledge within and between teams' and to find 
means for the organization to capture the ‘collective tacit knowledge o f the team as a whole’ in 
decision making processes. Few efforts have been made in the literature to examine the 
influence of organizational mechanisms on knowledge sharing within multi-national 
companies (Foss & Pedersen 2002). Traditional ways of transferring knowledge have been 
rotations of knowledge workers, exchange and training programs. But knowledge transfer 
poses a continuous challenge, the more so in attempting to harness IS as a component of 
firms’ core capabilities.
This scenario is considered because it is linked to the managerial level concern from scenario 1. 
Contributions may relate to hone managerial knowledge may be shared and transferred through an enabling 
context.
Problem scenario 3: Environments o f constant change 
At the IT and engineering firm, conversations were held with executives whose 
responsibilities were within the scope of business development. Decisions involved how to
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allocate resources throughout the global offices. Surprisingly, none of the interviewees 
showed interest in utilizing IS tool or knowledge management systems. They showed 
scepticism towards most commercialized ICTs. They seemed rather burdened by the 
monetary and time investment. The board of executives was undergoing political 
challenges, which may have affected their perceptions towards IS. One member of the 
strategy team emphasized that IT systems may provide useful tools on the operational level 
with predictable nature of work. However, not so much to the task of devising strategies 
and making decisions in environments with uncertain elements: ‘the problem is that I don’t 
know what I don’t know’ (strategy team member) -  if one does not know what he needs to 
know, then systems, regardless of their sophistication, may not be able to be leveraged. 
Hence, weaknesses are not always on the part of systems, but also on the side of the 
human agents and the contextual requirements.
Contributions may spring from a closer examination o f the use o f IS as an embedded part o f managers’ 
strategizing work as opposed to a study o f IS and strategy in vacuum. The role o f personal knoudedge is 
emphasized
The overall concerns were non-ICT related. Most interviewees believed that the IT 
industry is competitive enough to provide them with a wide range of options. The most 
frequent questions: How do I find out what I do not know?’, and ‘how can I know more 
of that which is not known to everyone else?’ A major dilemma in all cases has been coping 
with the daily emergence of challenges from external changes and organizational politics 
that affect information interpretation, sense-making and attitudes towards decisions. It is 
argued that these have a strong influence on what choices are made and what is given 
priority (Wilson 2003). On the one hand, environmental changes and emergence of new 
demands raise issues that require flexibility and responsiveness of IS (Brynjolfsson & Hitt 
2000; Hitt et al 1998). On the other hand, in order to maintain control over the course of 
decisions, top-down IS are used to monitor progress, measure performance, and maintain 
authority. A continuous challenge has been to put an order, a structure, or a system around 
tacit knowledge while conforming to top-down impositions of organizational II. While top- 
own corporate-driven coordination systems may provide a supportive platform, they are 
also seen as vehicles to reinforce centralized surveillance.
The above arguments encouraged the researcher to follow up on the topic more rigorously. 
Of course, these questions cannot be fully answered, but academic research can usefully 
inform the debate. Furthermore, there is an interesting connection behind the three
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scenarios, which may be explored in a way as to addressing the underpinnings of the 
problem scenarios. The following questions arise:
• How do managers leverage IS in their strategizing activities in terms of exploitation 
and/or exploration strategies?
• Are corporate IS and personal knowledge perceived as ‘aligned’, ‘embedded’, or 
‘integrated’ (as each introduces different assumptions)?
• How are corporate infrastructures organized/designed to support strategizing 
activities, and are they perceived as being supportive at all?
The general scope of research is illustrated below:
Human Agents in 
the Organizational 
Context
Information 
Systems & 
Resources
Figure 1.1: General scope of the research: Human agents in the organizational context and 
IS resources re-enforcing interaction
This research attempts to introduce a new perspective to an established debate by:
• Taking a neutral view on strategizing, IS, and the human agent; in other words, to 
be open as to deliberate versus emergent strategies, not to conceive IS as ‘SIS’, and 
not to confine ourselves to viewing strategizers as rational decision-makers.
• Choosing a theoretical framework, which allows the flexibility to explore the 
dynamic interaction among IS and strategizing activities; and to account for those 
elements in the strategizing process that have an effect on decisions, i.e. emerging 
unintended consequences
• Choosing a research methodology that keeps a critical eye on the interview data 
collected instead of accepting it as the ‘truth’.
Before embarking on the research design, a brief overview of how the literature has been 
addressing the problem domain.
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1.1.2 Problem Domain -  The Literature
The problem domain has been well-documented in the IS literature in terms of strategic 
alignment of organizations’ systems and IT with business strategies for some two decades 
(Earl 1989; Henderson & Venkatraman 1991). An important component in competitive 
strategizing has been argued to be having efficient and effective global communications to 
exhibit responsiveness to markets, transfer of learning, and managing change (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal 1989). The importance of information sharing to business strategizing success has 
been addressed (Lee & Whang 2000) along the lines of creating a flexible information 
infrastructure (II) to guide workers in new competitive environments (Porter & Millar 1985; 
Powell et al 2004; Galliers 1993). The role of an enabling II has been suggested to help 
knowledge workers through decision-making processes and implement their business 
strategies (Alavi & Leidner 1999; Galliers 2004).
Creating a ‘strategic alignment’ between a firms’ IS and business strategy is well argued and
critiqued in the literature (Galliers & Newell 2003, Ciborra 2000, Earl 1996). The term is
also known as ‘integration’ (Weill & Broadbent 1998), a ‘bridge’ (Ciborra 1997), ‘linkage’
(Henderson & Venkatraman 1989), to name a few. According to Cross (2000: 36):
Information and communication technologies are driving managers to rethink and 
reshape their business strategies, their use of technology, relations with suppliers 
and customers. The convergence of new technological hypercompetitive markets 
and ‘heat-seeking’ financial and human capital that quickly lead to new and 
untested business models now threatens a number of traditional business and 
processes.
Despite the widespread acceptance of business and IT alignment concept, it is not 
adequately clarified in literature. There have been problems in terms of underlying 
assumptions of strategic alignment on theoretical and methodological grounds (Hackney et 
al. 2000). The first problem starts with strategy itself. The ambiguous nature of the strategy 
process itself makes it difficult to study. The process of strategy is conceived as emergent 
(Mintzberg & Waters 1985) and continually changing (Pettigrewl985, Hamel 1996). This 
emergent nature introduces a host of unintended consequences (Robey & Boudreau 1999) 
that cannot be accounted for. These arise as a result of organizational dynamics and 
turbulent external environments. The tradition of strategic alignment is in the design school 
(Chandler 1962; Ansoff 1965; Porter 1980), which takes a positivist and rational view of 
strategy.
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Furthermore, it is argued that although there are some examples of enablers and inhibitors 
of alignment (Luftman 1996; Bum 1993), there is little about the impacts of misalignment 
on the firm (Avison et al. 2004). There is literature that asserts that IS alignment is not the 
real issue because IS are pervasive in business and should not be regarded as separable 
from business strategy (Smaczny 2001). Smaczny uses the term ‘fusion’ to describe the 
integration of IS and business strategies. Advocates to strategic alignment assume that IIs 
can be deliberately aligned with the emerging needs of management (Maes 1999; Ciborra 
1997; Galliers & Newell 2003). For these reasons, the concept has even been argued to be 
inexpedient (Maes 1999). Smaczny (2001) claims that there are no studies showing how 
organizations actually achieve alignment and even goes as far as questioning whether 
alignment is the right way to look at the issue. Critics argue that modes of alignment 
assume organizations are based on mechanistic principles, that strategy is a structured 
process and human thinking and actions are controllable concepts. They argue that in an 
era which is dominated by uncertainty and the need for flexibility, strategizing is ‘messy’ 
and an articulation of the strategic intent is difficult (Ciborra 1997). A planning-oriented 
approach to business objectives may not be the most suitable way to look at the issue.
A remaining problem is that challenges of competitive business environments cannot be 
met with more technological support systems and communication tools. Even though 
there are plenty of attempts to ‘fit’ or ‘align’ technologies with business strategies (e.g., 
Venkatraman et al 1993), still there are internal and external dynamics that lead to 
unintended consequences and drift, and affect the effectiveness of ICTs in strategies 
(Ciborra 2000; 1999). The next section makes explicit the need for this research.
1.1.3 Emerging Issues for Research
It is somewhat paradoxical that the more the postmodern society advances its information capabilities and
technobgcal competencies, the more sustainable business advantages seem to rely on raw human talent and
cultural values. (Morosini 2000:259)
There is little literature which takes into account influencing factors of the organizational 
milieux that shape IS. Context includes elements that are difficult to understand and 
categorize, e.g. elements of culture, attitudes, moods, incentives, reward systems, politics, 
and so on. Often, despite advanced IS and clear strategies, a major source of uncontrollable 
consequence comes from knowledge workers themselves. Arguably, they may rely too 
much on ICTs in their work at the cost of considering the intervening elements of the 
environment, or they may misuse the system by intentionally deceiving and distorting
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information - as in engaging in rent-seeking behavior (Mudambi & Navarra 2004; Foss & 
Pederson 2004). Nevertheless, assuming it was possible to devise the right strategies, to 
adopt the right technologies and to align these in the right way, still there is the human 
agent in the game that has a key role to play. While the socio-technical view is a step 
further to addressing IS requirements in organizational reality, it tends not to account for 
the complex role of the human agent in the strategizing process. Additionally, there has 
been reliance on quantitative measures of outcomes, which lead to results that have limited 
applicability across different contexts (i.e. Mingers 2001). A source of frustration among 
practitioners has been the difficulty to communicate management specific information and 
knowledge in a way that is interpreted by the receiver the way they were meant to be 
understood (Maes 1994). Among others, different mindsets affect communication across 
cultural contexts and may turn misinterpretations to unnecessary conflict (Whitley & 
Introna 1996). While the knowledge-based view (KBV) of the firm and managerial 
capabilities (Teece et al 1997) address the human side of the equation, their influence in 
business strategizing and IS has been largely under-developed. Most studies have focused 
on organizational and analytical levels with limited focus on the micro-level strategizing (i.e. 
manager’s ability to leverage IS in a useful manner as suggested by Fardal, 2007).
Emphasis on the contextual nature of decision-making has been made by Mintzberg (1978), 
Isenberg (1987) and Mintzberg and Waters (1983) to further highlight the role of the firm’s 
implicit or tacit knowledge acquired throughout its history, and which it is not explicitly 
aware of. But little attention has been given to this area in the IS literature that also 
considers the human agent and their approaches to strategizing. Specifically, this thesis 
challenges the underlying assumptions of the rational top manager who is in control of 
strategic intentions by reflecting on an alternative ontological position of the manager, 
arguing that agents in organizations are bound to situations that are influenced by cultural 
political and power-behavioural factors (Mintzberg 1987; Pettigrew 1987; Prahalad & 
Hamel 1990). Whether it is technology that acts on organizations, or humans that 
determine how technology is used, is a long-standing debate in the IS literature (Mumford 
2000). A common element that has been covered by the literature to facilitate an enabling 
context has been culture, such as a knowledge sharing culture (Nonaka 2000; Alavi & 
Leidner 2001; Davenport & Prusak 1998). In terms of creating an enabling context, 
literature considers the relationship between business strategies, IS and culture as a way to 
create superior performance (Shore & Venkatachalam 1995). However, few researchers 
have looked into how cross-cultural thinking about strategizing may influence the dynamics 
of knowledge sharing and transfer in decision making (Courtney 2001).
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The arguments in this section set the context in which IS are studied This is the point of 
departure to set out the research objective and design.
1.2 RESEARCH DESIGN & OBJECTIVE
This section outlines the research objective and design. Decisions had to be made in 
regards to the theoretical framework, methodology and empirical work. The interest of 
this research is to explore the ways in which IS are used by senior managers in the process 
of strategizing to gain competitive advantage. Notably, there is an attempt to bridge 
strategic management and IS literature. The purpose of the strategy literature is to inform 
the context of IS and the factors that may influence its study. A question that has been 
debated in the IS literature is, how are managers able to use IS to be efficient and respond 
quickly to changing environments (Galliers 2000)? - hence, the question of achieving 
efficiency and innovation (Clark & Staunton 1989; March 1991; McElroy 2000).
The concern is not to see how IT may help to formulate grand strategic plans, but rather to 
examine strategizing as an ongoing process with the role of IS therein. This invites a 
holistic interpretation of IS in strategizing with a multi-disciplinary approach. While key 
concepts are based on the IS literature (e.g. Earl 1989, 1993, 1996; Weick 1995; Checkland 
1981; Galliers 2001; Galliers & Newell 2003; Whitley & Introna 1996; Introna 1997; 
Ciborra 1997; Walsham 1993; Pettigrew 1985; Whittington 1993; Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995; 
Von Krogh et al 2000), the integration of relevant thinking from Strategy and 
Organizational Sciences (e.g. Leavitt 1965; Mintzberg 1973, 2000; Mintzberg & Waters 
1985; Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996; Prahalad & Hamel 1990; Child 1972; Miller & Friesen 
1984; Eisenhardt 1989a/b; Senge 1992; Hammer 1990; McFarlan 1984; Morton 1991) 
provide valuable insights. Hence, the research appreciates the interconnectivity of the 
different theoretical disciplines to account for the interdependence of processes in practice.
Research Objective
The objective is to explore the ways in which managers use IS to leverage information and 
knowledge in strategizing in the face of complex environments and uncertainties. The 
study looks at the organizational socio-technical context and the nature of managerial 
work. Specifically, IS are investigated from both a deliberate and emergent strategy 
perspective. The IS strategizing framework is used as a sense-making device to navigate the 
case studies.
21
Dichotomies along the 
strategizing continuum 
(cf. Mintzberg & Waters 1985):
Deliberate Strategizing 
and/or 
Emergent Strategizing
Organizational Socio-Technical Context
Top-Down IS Approach
IT, Data, Systems, Standards, 
Sourcing, Forums, Documents
Dynamic integration and 
interaction of organizational IS 
resources and managerial 
knowledge in decision-making
Bottom-Up IS Approach 
Negotiation, perception 
management, firm culture, 
management styles & mindsets
Figure 1.2: Key research components: strategizing, IS approaches, and strategic actors, 
corresponding to the conceptual framework (see chapter 4)
The research refers to Galliers and Newell’s (2003 and the recently amended version in 
2007) IS strategizing framework, which is seen as relevant in addressing the range of issues 
this research is concerned with. It is important to note that while the research refers to ‘the 
theoretical framework’, it is by no means thought to be a model or framework in its 
traditional sense. But rather it should be seen as a useful sense-making devise (Weick 1995) 
to guide the exploration process and inform the empirical work. It invites the opportunity 
to gather data in the real world while keeping a solid theoretical grounding. At the same 
time, the findings may provide arguments, which would suggest an expansion of the 
framework to incorporate key lessons and suggest areas for further research. It is hoped 
that it will help make sense of the problem situation in relation to its contextual forces that 
shape IS. More importantly, it does not rule out the consideration of emerging elements by 
setting rigid criteria. Chapter 4 justifies this choice in more detail.
1.2.1 Defining Key Terms
Before embarking further, it is necessary to explicitly outline the researcher’s position on 
the key terms used throughout this thesis. Detailed discussion is provided in the literature 
review chapters.
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In this research, strategizing will be examined within a competitive context. When the 
research talks about competitive strategizing, it refers to everyday managerial processes, 
where managers find themselves involved in competing in their environment to close a deal 
and build their business. The meaning of competitive is implicit to the organizational 
climate in which managers ponder. The climate is characterized by high levels of 
uncertainty and unpredictability, fast changes in terms of human agents (i.e. mobility and 
unpredictable behavior of participants within and across business units) and relevant 
technologies, information overload as well as the changing meaning of already existing 
information, which changes the strategic relevance of information. As a result, these are 
seen as shaping the direction of strategizing in organizations.
Before considering the role of IS in strategizing, first it is necessary to understand the 
requirements of strategizing processes in their particular context. Throughout this thesis, 
strategizing will be viewed as processual (Pettigrew 2003b) and emergent (Mintzberg 1987; 
Galliers 2004; Ciborra 2002), thus strategizing and organizing (Whittington 1993). Hence the 
term ‘strategizing’ is preferred to ‘strategy’ (Mintzberg 1987; Galliers 2004; Ciborra 2002). 
Here, ‘process’ implies that human agents are involved in decision-making, sense-making 
and sense-giving, problem-solving, and negotiating (Weick 1995; Wilson 2003). This 
process is assumed to involve various types of information, knowledge, as well as 
competing interests for resources, all determining the manner in which IS are used 
Generally, the goal of IS is seen to facilitate making decisions faster and more effectively 
(Eisenhardt 1989b) by gathering, creating and sharing information and knowledge in more 
efficient ways.
As a further note, the strategic planning literature distinguishes between long-range 
strategic and short-range tactical (Mintzberg 1994). It is necessary to acknowledge that 
tactics, referring to the details of things, is irrelevant to the emergent view on strategizing 
and in the context of this exploratory research. Specifically, the very meaning of emergent 
strategizing suggests that one can never be sure in advance what is a strategy or tactic 
(Mintzberg 1994), or in this research, what is strategizing or ‘tacticizing’. According to 
Rumelt, ‘one person’s strategy is another’s tactics -  that what is strategic depends on where 
you sit’ (1979: 197). Furthermore, the temporal aspect implies that what seemed tactical 
yesterday may not be so tomorrow (Mintzberg 1994). Thus, the term tactical will not be 
relevant to the goal of this thesis, which, as it will be unveiled, puts into question the very 
nature of strategy as practice and the attribute of IS, action, or decisions. An alternative
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view will be proposed based on a traditionally competing ontology, which will form the 
main theoretical contribution of this thesis.
In this context of strategizing, the research examines the use of information, knowledge 
and relevant systems by human agents as a way to shape their journey towards a desired 
goal. The process towards a desired goal is seen as thinking, sensing and doing of work ‘in- 
order-to’ manifest desired perception into reality. The term information is defined as a 
message that is communicated between a sender and a receiver to change the way the 
receiver perceives something (Sanchez 2001). According to Davenport et al (1998), data 
becomes information when the sender adds meaning by contextualizing, condensing or 
categorizing it. More specifically, this research refers to managerial information (Introna 
1997), which may be conceived as ‘management understanding in-the-world, in-order-to 
get the job done’ (Introna 1997: 156). Knowledge is a far more complex concept and is 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3. Knowledge will be regarded as transient and a core 
ingredient of ongoing learning and innovation (Nonaka 1994; Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). 
Specifically, the research keeps a curious eye on the meaning of the term tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi 1966), a phenomenon which has made the study of strategy and IS interesting and 
complex. Tacit knowledge will be linked to personal knowledge (ibid.) and a central and 
intrinsic argument in this thesis is Polanyi’s assertion that we know more than we can tell* 
(Polanyi 1966: 4). Nevertheless, information and knowledge have a certain level of 
interpretive ambiguity due to specific contexts and individual perspectives (i.e. Zack 1998). 
Notably, what is most relevant to this research is the use of managerial information and the 
more tacit and personal dimension of knowledge by human agents while they are involved 
in strategizing. Hence, the focus will be on the use, not as much on the content. Here, 
Bladder (1995) provides supportive taxonomies such as knowing, embedded and 
encultured, which will be especially insightful points of departure towards a holistic 
understanding in the analysis. In this context, the goal of information systems (IS) is seen 
as a tool to support human agents in forming more effective decisions and actions more 
efficiently (Eisenhardt 1989b). This means gathering, creating and sharing information and 
knowledge in a more efficient manner, taking into account internal and external influencing 
factors. The research does not assume IS to be strategic in themselves.
Nevertheless, this research puts forward the interrelation between strategizing, the human 
agent, and management IS. The field of IS is viewed as multi-disciplinary and with multiple 
focus (Ciborra 2004). The analysis examines the use of IS in strategizing by considering the 
relevance of phenomenological assumptions to a research field saturated with paradigms
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advocating the rational school of thought. Throughout the thesis, the justification for the 
‘how’ (the why behind the how) will shift from the what’ (i.e., IS) towards the who’ (i.e., 
human agent), in order to explain the why’ (i.e., the ways IS are used in strategizing). While 
the who’ component becomes relevant towards the latter part of the thesis, it is necessary 
to introduce the different views earlier in the thesis in chapter 2. In this research, the who’ 
will be referred to as the human agent, the strategizer, or the strategic actor, 
interchangeably. These will be experienced or senior managers and business developers in 
large organizations, who have considerable responsibility and authority over their decisions, 
actions and their use of IS. Notably, this definition differs from the more general IS-user in 
the IS literature, where her/his primarily role is within the realm of IT, e.g. the IS 
developer, Chief Technology Officer (CTO), or Chief Information Officer (CIO) (e.g., 
Earl 1989; 1993; 1996). The differences lies in that the manager is not obliged to use 
management IS, where as CTOs, Engineers or administrators may be dependent on the use 
of IS/IT due to the nature of their work.
Specifically, the assumptions behind the human agent are discussed from traditionally
competing perspectives, including Mintzberg’s (1971; 19980; 1983; 1985; 2000) analysis on
the manager and managerial work, as well as Heideggerian phenomenology (1962; 1988)
based on Introna’s (1997) interpretation (see chapter 2). While their underlying
philosophies appear to be in conflict at first, this research will show the value from
conceiving them as complementary by analysing different ontological positions. Specifically,
the meaning of the human agent is well depicted by Ciborra (2004: 19):
Human existence is an essential ingredient of what information is, how the life- 
world gets encountered, defined, and reshuffled, and -  last but not least -  how 
technology gets used everyday.’
Nevertheless, the role of the human agent will be shown to have a far more central and 
multi-dimensional impact on the usefulness of IS in the organizational dynamics than 
discussed in the mainstream IS literature.
Two other key terms that will be used frequently are ‘ambidextrous’ and ‘immanent’ (see 
chapter 2). The former is used in reference to the ‘ambidextrous strategizing’, a way to 
articulate the simultaneous use of tools as well as two modes of ‘being’ that have been 
considered as competing in the traditional research i.e. deliberate IS versus emergent IS 
strategies, dwelled versus intent (as of strategizing), rational versus involved (human agents). 
The term ‘immanent’ is a philosophical reference used by Chia and Holt’s (2006) discussion 
on strategy as dwelling. Chapter 2 reviews the underlying assumptions in detail.
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1.2.2 Choices of Methodology and Method
The choice of methodology inevitably determines the ways in which data are interpreted 
and analyzed. Empirical studies in strategizing and IS face contradictory pressures (Balogun 
et al. 2003). While recent European thinking has been more receptive to developing a 
holistic view on IS (Mingers 2001), the paradigm in IS research has been largely influenced 
by US business school and consulting practices. These take a predominantly IT-based view 
on IS and positivistic methodologies take centre stage. Although empirical studies based on 
quantitative data have been fruitful, they are as valuable as they are related to the specific 
context and under the set of assumptions they were studied. On the other hand, the social 
study of IS considers IS in the realm of social systems, where the distinctive nature of 
knowledge involves intangible and unobservable complexities. At the same time, 
quantitative methods to measure data become very difficult (Godfrey & Hill 1995) because 
they have the tendency to separate the problem from its wider context (Hackney et al. 2000) 
and so pose analytical limitations to inquiry.
This research appreciates phenomena in their wider context and finds interpretivism as 
particularly valuable to allow new understanding to emerge. Hence, qualitative case study 
methods are seen as being most appropriate to account for more subjective and 
unobservable factors in organizations (Collis 1991; Hitt et al. 1998). The aim is not to 
provide a solution, but to use the opportunities interpretivism provides to shed light on a 
subject which has traditionally been associated with the rational school of thought. 
Specifically, interpretivism allows the incorporation of philosophical conceptual 
underpinnings, which will be especially helpful to our analysis. The hermeneutic circle is 
especially powerful in creating an interpretive feedback process between the practice and 
the theoretical framework, whereby relevant literature informs the process. Hermeneutic 
techniques helped to identify and describe issues associated with the use of organisational 
knowledge at the strategic level (Alavi & Leidner 1999; Nonaka 1994).
The methods to collect the empirical data are qualitative interviews and observation. The 
analysis was based on interpretive and hermeneutic analysis (Gadamer 1975; Boland 1991). 
Document research was also conducted, not as the primary method, but during the early 
stages to learn about the organizations and the way they do business. While the majority of 
interviews are semi-structured, these include opportunistic unstructured and conversations. 
Nevertheless, the research methodology will be justified in chapter 4 and methodological 
limitations will be discussed in chapter 8.
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1.2.3 Empirical Work
The empirical work considers two case studies. These are different in many regards, such as 
their industries, elements of their IIs, and predominant forms of IS. The common ground 
on which they are selected is their competitive business strategy in business development. 
The comparison draws attention to the relationship between IS and business strategizing, 
specifically with regard to exploitation and exploration approaches to strategies and using 
IS. In case study 1, a hydro-power generation company, the researcher conducted 
interviews at the German and USA locations. While not a cross-cultural study, those 
elements that influenced the use of IS included cross-cultural differences. In case study 2, a 
private bank based in the US, data collection methods included observation. The nature of 
investigation in this case was more situated and more involved in the day-to-day 
strategizing processes on the managerial level. The consideration of different contexts was 
not meant to establish generalizations, but to explore the components of the theoretical 
framework across contexts. This was an attempt to find out about differences and 
similarities in the ways in which strategic actors engage in strategizing through IS (e.g. 
Eisenhardt 1989b). The researcher believes that it is through comparison, where finer 
distinctions in the exploration process emerge.
1.2.4 Expected Contributions
This thesis is one of the first detailed applications of the IS strategizing framework in 
managerial strategizing across two cultural contexts. As a result, the strengths and 
weaknesses of the framework will be revealed in the process, albeit these will be specific to 
the particular context of this research. Furthermore, the use of interpretivism, through the 
hermeneutic circle, will be especially powerful in drawing meaning from the empirical 
findings, and reflecting back on the framework to potentially incorporate extensions.
Section 1.1 outlined some concerns from the preliminary investigation to identify potential 
contributions to practice. The following was found to interest senior managers the most:
• What do managers really need in terms of IS to get their jobs done and remain 
flexible, considering the conflicting demands? (Strategy Consultant, UK; IT & 
Engineering Firm, U K );
• Why is it difficult to share knowledge organization-wide? To what extent could 
centralized IS help to capture managerial know-how for ongoing organizational 
learning? (Global Petrochemical Company, Netherlands);
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• What hinders the openness to share knowledge and collaborate? (IT & Engineering 
Firm, UK).
While the IS strategizing framework will be used as the primary lens, supporting theories 
from the literature will inform the hermeneutic process in reaching deeper levels of 
understanding. To this end, the direction of this research will address the following:
• Potential limitations underlying the assumptions of strategic alignment;
• The consideration of the human agent from alternative perspectives to the rational-
view: the analysis will carefully introduce the integration of a different ontology as a 
way to understand the essence of the problem domain;
• The research does not attempt to draw a distinct line between the concerns of
organizational versus managerial levels, but rather will leave room to consider
emerging topics as of unintended consequences that may affect the use of IS.
While this research is not aimed to answer to a specific question, it aims to provide new 
understanding of the underlying issues to a complex problem, which has been extensively 
researched but not fully understood. More specifically, the findings will suggest a shift of 
focus from IS resources towards the usefulness of existing IS, i.e. the ability of human agents 
to make any IS useful while pondering in their competitive context. It is in this spirit where 
the research tales am involved perspective on strategizing and the use of IS therein. 
Chapter 8 will reveal interesting implications to the field of management IS (MIS) and 
strategic IS (SIS). For example, future research may re-examine the strategic attribute of 
SIS from an involved perspective to determine how IS may be developed or managed in a 
way to become more useful to strategizing senior managers.
1.3 THESIS STRUCTURE
The thesis is organized in eight chapters (see figure below). Following this introductory 
chapter, the next two chapters attempt to establish the context for the research framework, 
which is introduced in chapter 4. Chapters 2 and 3 examine relevant concepts from the 
strategic management, information systems and organizational theory literature. While 
chapter 2 discusses concepts in relation to the managerial level, e.g. strategizing, decision­
making and management information, chapter 3 reviews the literature in information 
systems to set the organizational context within which strategizing takes place. Chapter 2 
makes explicit relevant complexities and embeddedness of information and knowledge 
processes in managerial strategizing processes. Chapter 3 looks at organizational
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collaborative arrangements by reviewing IIs and underlying components such as ICTs and 
culture, and how these relate to organizational learning and memory. Chapter 4 synthesizes 
the concepts to portray a coherent picture of what the thesis is about and reveals the 
chosen epistemology in the form of the IS strategizing framework. Furthermore, the 
chapter justifies the choices of methodology and methods.
Having introduced the context, the framework, and methods of inquiry, chapter 5 will give 
the background to the two case studies, and chapter 6 presents the findings. A critical 
analysis is conducted in chapter 7, where the findings are related to the literature. With the 
help of supporting concepts, the chapter points out how the analysis may contribute to the 
conceptual framework. Chapter 8 concludes and reflects on the overall process, outlines 
contributions of this study and suggests areas for further research.
Chapter 2 Chapter 3
Chapters 5 & 6
Analysis & 
Discussions of the 
Chapters 7 Case Studies
Conclusions, 
Extensions to the 
Framework & 
Suggestions for 
Further Research
Figure 13: The structure of the thesis
The IS 
Strategizing 
Framework & 
Methodology
. . IS in the
Strategizing Organizational
& Strategic Sw  Socio-
Actors Technical
Context
Chapter 4
Case Study 2 
Background & Empirical 
Data: PCS
A US subsidiary
Case Study 1 
Background & Empirical 
Data: HPC
Units in Germany & US
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This chapter reviews the literature on the concepts that set out the context 
o f this research. These are strategizing, management information and 
knowledge, and human agents.
2 INTRODUCTION
The research explores the ways in which IS are used by managers in competitive 
strategizing. IS are seen as vehicles through which management information (MI) and 
knowledge may be leveraged. The premise of this literature review chapter is that in order 
to understand the role of IS in strategizing; first, an understanding of the nature of 
managerial work should be established. Data, MI and knowledge are regarded as 
ingredients of managerial work. The purpose of this chapter is to define these key 
concepts. Chapter 3 will then discuss how an enabling context through information 
infrastructures (IIs) and information systems (IS) many support the dynamics of the 
concepts explained in this chapter.
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2.1 PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGY
Strategy has been approached from several theoretical traditions in how it may impact the 
ability of firms and managers to gain sustainable competitive advantage (Porter 1980; 
Kogut & Zander 1992; Penrose 1959; Chandler 1962; Pettigrew 1985; Prahalad & Hamel 
1990; Wemerfelt 1984). Perspectives range from the classic industrial economics to more 
integrative perspectives on emerging issues (Heracleous 2003; Carpenter & Sanders 2007). 
The implication of each perspective leads to different conclusions. Generally, two common 
theoretical conceptualizations in the literature are the exploration versus the exploitation 
strategies based on the top-down versus bottom-up tradition. Notably, there has been 
limited empirical investigation of the interaction between the two, and more specifically, their 
integration (He & Wang 2004).
Competitive strategy is concerned with matching internal capabilities of a company and its 
external environment (Porter 1996; Wemerfelt & Kamani 1987; Hoskisson et al 1999). The 
general position of this research is in the resource-based view of the firm (RBV) (Grant 
1991; Barney 1991; Teece et al. 1997), which implies that the sources of competitive 
advantage reside within organizations. There are many views on what these sources are. 
Barney (1991), for example, groups resources into physical, human and capital categories 
and talks about imitability, obtaining tangible or intangible resources that are not easily 
imitated by other firms. Grant (1991) added to these technological, financial, and 
reputational resources. Unlike resources, capabilities are based on developing, carrying, and 
exchanging information through the firm’s human capital. Concepts such as ‘core 
competence’ (Hamel 1991), ‘capabilities-based competition’ (Stalk et al. 1992), and 
‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece et al 1997; Nonaka 1994) emphasize human capital as being of 
strategic importance to firm behavior and performance (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Lado 
& Wilson 1994; Teece et al 1997; Pfeffer 1998). The RBV argues that organizations should 
develop core competencies, which are rare and difficult to imitate (Prahalad & Hamel
1990). Capabilities refer to a firm’s capacity to deploy resources, usually in combination, 
using organizational processes, to affect a desired end (Amit & Schoemaker 1993). Teece 
(1992) defines capabilities as a set of differentiated skills, complementary assets, and 
routines that provide the basis for the firm’s capacities in a particular business.
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Besides developing unique internal resources, the literature argues that the RBV needs to 
also consider the external environments (Amit & Schoemaker 1993). According to Porter 
(1991: 108): resources are only meaningful in the context of performing certain activities to 
achieve certain competitive advantages’. He suggests that the competitive value of 
resources can be enhanced or eliminated by changes in technology, competitor behavior, or 
buyer needs which an inward focus on resources will overlook (ibid). Along these lines, 
more recent views on strategy center on the ‘dynamic strategy’ concept (Carpenter & 
Sanders 2007). It is argued that strategy needs to embrace the rapidly changing macro 
environments of globalization and technological advances. The underlying assumption is 
that change is inevitable and strategy must thus be flexible in its formulation and 
implementation in order to take account of a firm’s changing situation in the dynamic 
environment.
These assumptions affect the conceptualization of the practice of strategy on the 
managerial level. Mintzberg (1980, 1994, 1975) reviews fads and fixes of various schools of 
thought in strategy. Notably, a traditional approach has been to conceive the practice of 
strategy as conscious and analytic. The emphasis here is on strategy fcmruiatkn, according to 
Mintzberg (1980), where strategies are structured processes of conscious rigorous analysis 
based on models and data. They are ‘top-down’ and control-oriented because the 
formulation starts at the top of managerial pyramid with senior managers canying 
responsibility for its implementation and execution. The aim is to keep models explicit, 
structured and simple. Examples of such models are the value chain, the strategy-structure 
relationship, and the Boston Consulting Group matrix. They are each based on classical 
notions of rationality (diagnose, prescribe, implement), where the structure of an 
organization follows the formulation of a strategy, hence, separating action from structure. 
However, the top-down approach is criticized to have led to short-lived competitive 
strategies (Mintzberg 1980) and to failure from conception to execution of those strategies. 
This called for considering some of the taken-for-granted factors endemic to organizational 
life, such as muddling through and the evolutionary nature of decision-making processes, 
which influence the success of strategy ((Tsoukas & Chia 2002; Orlikowski 2000; Feldman 
2000; Ciborra 1994). Along these lines, Mintzberg (1990) attributed the failure of top-down 
strategies to the following.
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First, the explicit and rational views on strategy assume the environment is constant and 
predictable, and events happen sequentially. This implies that a deliberate implementation 
is possible. This, above all, neglects the role and interaction of human agents in the strategy 
process and managerial work. Strict adherence to rigidity hinders flexibility, learning, 
adaptation and opportunism. Second, the conventional one-way relationship perspective 
that structure follows strategy disconnects the human agent, i.e. the strategist, from 
organizational reality and assumes no connection between structure, strategy and 
behavioral processes (Weick 1979). It conceives strategy in a vacuum, where the role of 
personal references, mindsets, cultural biases, power and politics are undermined as major 
influencing factors of the strategy process (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). Third, Mintzberg 
criticizes the deliberate thinking and intentional processes as being unrealistic, and 
addresses the complexities inherent to the process of strategy formation across various 
situations and contexts (Mintzberg & McHugh 1985). These arguments lead the way to 
think of strategy as a process in which multiple factors from internal and external 
environments constantly and continuously interact and influence each other. The next 
section reviews the process-view on strategy.
2.1.1 Strategy as Process: Deliberate and Emergent Views
While this chapter attempts to position the research in the literature, it should be 
acknowledged that strategy is paradigmatically diverse and empirically complex (Pettigrew 
1992). The topic of strategy relates to our investigation in looking at how conditions of 
success and failure emerge or are created in a certain way to improve performance, i.e. 
through corporate information and knowledge resources. This concerns the interaction of 
multiple internal and external factors and resources in the process of strategy. Within an 
integrative view on strategy, the underlying assumptions of the process-based view seem 
suitable in informing the scope of his research (e.g. Quinn 1980; Mintzberg 1978, 1994; 
Pettigrew 1985, 2003b). Thus, strategy will also be referred to as strategizmg and orgamzmg 
(Whittington 1993). The remaining of this section will expand on this choice. Advocates 
take into account organizational realities such as cultural factors, the dominant 
management paradigm, political inertia, and environmental surprises that may lead to 
sudden shifts in goals and plans (Argyris 1982; Bateson 1972).
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According to Pettigrew (2003b), the strategy of an organization is the result of a process 
embedded in a context. Here, he emphasizes on the effect of contextual factors that lie at 
the heart of strategy processes. Specifically, the role of power and politics are viewed to 
have major impacts on future outcomes, which shape strategy (Pettigrew 1985, 1992, 
2003b). Wilson (2003.) argues that strategy is mixture of social and economic processes, 
where organizations assimilate and process information. These influence the ways in which 
people and organizations interpret their environments, the way they imitate or differentiate 
themselves from others, and they way they leam. This research assumes that management 
information (MI) and knowledge are embedded within these processes, so are the human 
agents. Mintzberg and Waters (1995) argue for strategy as a process of continuous learning 
and knowledge acquisition. Mintzberg and McHugh (1985) suggest conceiving strategy as a 
continuum, where at each end there are deliberate and emergent approaches. The types of 
strategies that fall along this continuum, starting from the deliberate to the emergent, are 
presented as planned strategy, entrepreneurial, ideological, umbrella, process strategy, 
unconnected strategies, consensus strategy, and imposed strategies. While a detailed 
discussion of each of these concepts is not relevant to this research, accepting the range of 
possibilities and perspectives is important.
Along these lines, Mintzberg and McHugh (1985: 161) define strategy as ‘a pattern in a 
stream of decisions or actions’. This conceptualization sprung from their exploration of the 
interplay between pirns and intentions, and what actually happens in practice. Here, they refer 
to deliberate as intentions realized, and to emergent as patterns realized despite or in the absence o f 
intentions. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) view the fundamental difference between deliberate 
and emergent strategies as follows: while the former focuses on direction and control (see 
section 2.1), where messages from the environment tend to be blocked out, the latter 
portrays the opposite extreme. It is not to say that emergent strategies correspond to chaos 
or are out of control, but rather they are characterized by a state of unintended order in 
which emergent patterns may come to change the intentions of managers in organizations, 
who are open to leam, and are flexible and responsive in behavior (Mintzberg & Waters 
1985). Furthermore, emergent strategies involve some degree of tinkering, or brimlage (Levi- 
Strauss 1966), which encourage learning from the bottom, or from people at the operations 
level, who combine and apply known tools and routines to solve new problems. This leads 
to the notion of strategic learning (e.g. Sanchez & Heene 1997), where strategy is seen as a 
process of learning and of taking action in search of patterns and consistency.
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A few words on the notion of bricolage (Levi-Strauss 1966): the term stems from 
Anthropology and describes the characteristic patterns of mythological thought. In IS, 
Ciborra (1993, 1994, 1997) uses the concept frequently to describe the ways in which 
strategic information systems (SIS) can lead to competitive advantage over a period of 
time. Bricolage is based on tinkering and learning by doing, leading to an incremental 
increase of the actor’s and organization’s competencies (Nelson & Winter 1982). Tinkering 
may allow strategies to evolve from the bottom-up by leveraging tacit knowledge and 
specific values deeply rooted in organizational culture (Ciborra 1993). There is no specific 
model available, only local cues from a situation are trusted and exploited in a somewhat 
blind and unreflective way, aimed at obtaining ad hoc solutions by applying heuristics 
rather than high theory. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) showed that even when plans were 
present, most of the time it was bricolage that led managers to new ideas.
The rationale behind this dichotomy is that deliberate and emergent strategies can be 
regarded as two legs attached to the same body. It would be rather unrealistic to find 
perfect forms of either strategy (i.e. purely deliberate or purely emergent), rather, it can be 
expected to find both aspects of deliberate and emergent strategies in practice, with 
tendencies towards either direction. However, if we were to consider purely deliberate 
strategies, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) argue that three conditions must prevail: first, 
there have to be precise intentions in the organization, where they are articulated in a 
concrete level of detail. Then, assuming that ‘organization’ means collective action, then 
there has to be no doubts as to whether the intentions were ‘organizational’. Last, the 
collective intentions should be realized exactly as intended, which assumes no interference 
from external forces, and an environment which is either fully predictable, benign, or under 
control. However, decisions are subject to unintended outcomes which may be beneficial 
or hindering. It might be noted, in passing, that the concept of unintended consequences 
has been well established in sociology since Merton (1968).
For purely emergent strategies to exist, there must be consistency in action over time, or, 
there must by order in the absence of an intention, as Mintzberg and Waters (1985) put it. 
It is necessary ‘to direct in order to realize intentions, while at the same time responding to 
an unfolding pattern of action’ (ibid: 271). There is evidence for a positive correlation 
between an increasing level of complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty, and the diffuseness 
of decision-making as more special and interest groups get involved (March & Olsen 1976;
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Hickson et al 1986). Accordingly, an increasing number of interest groups lead to an 
increased chance for overt ‘political’ behavior. Related to this line of thinking is the use of 
power in decision-making (Pettigrew 1992; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki 1992; Pfeffer 1981). 
Mintzberg and Waters conclude that the degree to which deliberate and emergent strategies 
occur and the nature of their interplay depends on various contexts and different 
circumstances.
The discussion of strategy as a process set the context in which strategic actors leverage 
MI, knowledge and systems. Specifically, decision-making was mentioned as a part of 
strategizing. The next section expands on strategizing as a process of decision-making.
2.1.2 Strategizing as Decision-Making
As of the discussion above, it is sensible to view strategizing as a process of sense- and 
decision-making (Weick 1995; Mintzberg & Waters 1985; Wilson 2003). Here, strategy is 
defined as a handful of decisions, which drive or shape most of a company’s subsequent 
actions (Mintzberg & Waters 1985; Coyne & Subramaniam 1996). Specifically, decisions 
are a mixture of processes by which social and economic organizations assimilate 
information, interpret their environments, and differentiate themselves from others 
(Wilson 2003). Furthermore, decisions are often based on conflicting information (Green 
et al. 1999) and influenced by individual biases, negotiation and political games (Bennett 
1998). Hence, decisions are also discussed as instruments of conflict and consciousness as 
embedded in social relations (March 1994). So, it sounds sensible to agree that decision­
making processes should be based on adaptation and learning (Fiol & Lyles 1985) to leave 
room for potential errors, and for flexibility to enable the incorporation of unexpected 
changes (Ciborra et al 1992).
The study of decisions has never been easy. As it has been the case with strategy in the 
literature, the range of ambiguity that surrounds the content, context and process of 
decision-making has made its study difficult. For example, well-known literature includes 
the work of Barnard (1938) on The Functions o f the Executive, March and Olsen (1976) on 
ambiguity and choice in organizations (e.g. Mintzberg 1987, 1978; Mintzberg & Waters 
1985; Pettigrew 1985, 1987, 1989). On the two poles of decision-making, there is the
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rational positivistic approach of weighing facts, and the more normative approaches that 
rely on experience, tacit knowledge, subjective judgments and intuition.
Generally, strategic decisions have been regarded as essentially intentional, purposeful and 
goal oriented. Traditionally, organizational theory has taken the mechanistic view that 
decision precedes action, with social systems being structured and intended human 
behavior being carried out in an orderly chain of events. Simon (1972), and Cyert and 
March (1963) subsequently developed an image of organizations based on assumptions that 
man was rational, but was limited by the complexity of the actual situation of decision­
makers, i.e. models of bounded rationality (Simon 1972). An interesting perspective was 
presented by Nicolaides (1960: 173), who implies that some decisions may turn out to be 
artificial constructs:
Organizational decision is in reality a constellation or a galaxy of numerous 
individual decisions’, some of which are ‘registered’ in the book of the 
organizational activities, while others remain hidden in the inner sanctum of the 
human psyche. ‘When and where a decision begins and ends is not always clear.
The general problem associated with decisions in organizational contexts is the mechanistic 
image of decision-makers, which is still prevalent -  assuming a top-down and structured 
progression from the point a decision to its implementation and outcome. This implies a 
direct relationship between an intention and following through that plan in action. 
However, Mintzberg et al (2000) argue that strategy becomes more of an emergent 
phenomenon when patterns or consistencies are realized despite, or in the absence of, 
intentions. They acknowledge in their later work that they were in fact not studying streams 
of decisions, but o f actions, since actions are the traces left behind in organizations. This 
argument was based on the assumption that if an organization did something, it must have 
decided on it previously, hence, assuming that decisions inevitably lead to actions. There 
may be a decision without subsequent action, i.e. when a central decision is subverted by 
others in the organization so there is no action taken. Also, decisions are difficult to 
identify because sometimes they just do not exist (Mintzberg & Waters 1990).
In a study, Mintzberg and Waters (1990) tried to track back an action to where it 
originated, namely to a point of decision. However, it led to nowhere and no one, because 
it turned out that over a period of time a group of individuals speculatively shared their 
work and improvised in the midst of multiple decisions and activities, which then may have 
snowballed into a visible engagement and developed its own momentum. In effect, it
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would be labeled as a ‘decision’, which emerged from various levels, units and purposes 
over some time. They argue that this is an example of social systems acting without 
consensus (ibid).
We argued that decision-making is subject to specific assumptions, and that any 
assumptions are bound to a variety of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity. In an 
exchange of view between Mintzberg, Waters, Pettigrew, and Butler (1990), Butler 
disagrees with Mintzberg and Waters (1985) for defining strategy as ‘a pattern in a stream 
of decisions [because] strategy must surely involve a degree of intention to act, a kind of 
plan which is to be put into effect’ (Butler 1990: 15). After all, the concept of strategy 
originated from the study of military campaigns and was translated into the business arena. 
At the same time, Mintzberg and colleagues acknowledge that their definition may appear 
controversial because the term is always defined formally with regard to intention. They 
infer that if strategy was only in regard to intention, then one would study perceptions, 
devoid of behaviour (Mintzberg & McHugh 1985). It is rare for a commander to say what 
his strategy is before a strike. Were a military commander asked what his strategy is, he 
could not say what will exactly happen and would say ‘I can only tell you after the battle’ 
(ibid). Does that mean there is no strategy? Or is the emerging events a strategy in itself? In 
retrospect, it is possible to reconstruct a strategy by looking at the decisions made along the 
way, and the actions taken by a general over time. As Butler (1990) notes, such a scenario 
would imply that the decision process would not be dependent variable, but would become 
an independent variable, where decision processes are tracked back to see whether there 
was a plan, or an intention in the first place. Here, process would become an explanation of 
strategy.
At the same time, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) acknowledge the limitations of studying 
the process of strategy in terms of the multiple units and levels of analysis, and encourage a 
wider perspective to account for the variety of ways strategies actually take shape under 
changing circumstances.
2.1.3 Decision-Making as Problem-Solving & Sense-Making
Another relevant way to look at decision-making is Wilson’s (2003) view on actions, which 
implies that there may be actions and there may be outcomes, but as previously discussed,
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there is no definite linear link between the two variables. In this light, Wilson (2003) talks 
about the polar opposites of planning versus chaos (see outline below; ibid: 393). The 
planning perspective assumes a direct relation between the problem to be solved and the 
decision taken. Chaos assumes the environment is complex and makes no such linear 
assumption. These are two ‘ideal types’ and one should not assume one or the other. 
Rather, both happen to differing extents, depending on multiple factors. The strength of 
each view may become relevant to understanding the ways towards strategizing in our case 
companies, and in relation to the role of IS.
Planning
• Analyze and codify complex problems
• Question and challenge current practice
• Involve others and create higher levels of ownership
• Communicate as fully as possible
• Set up key performance indicators by which progress can be monitored and judged.
Chaos
• Avoid over simplifying the process
• Avoid means-ends errors
• Appreciate more fully the role of politics and influence where different stakeholders try to 
influence the decision process and its outcomes in ways conducive to their interests
• Think creatively around complex problems
• Avoid thinking solely in linear sequences and appreciate that it is sometimes useful to take 
actions off at a tangent
• Appreciate the influence of the context in which strategic decision making takes place.
The chaos perspective views firms as ‘anarchy’ or a system with chaotic tendencies. Here, 
there is no way managers can fully understand and control internal processes due to 
unforeseen circumstances and actions that arise unexpectedly. As a result, actions do not 
lead to expected outcomes. The main components of a decision-making process (problem, 
solution, participants and choice situations) interact with a range of other factors a long the 
way in an unpredictable manner. For example, participants may move in and out of the 
decision-making (every entrance is an exit elsewhere) in a discontinuous manner, or fight 
for the right to become involved but never exercise their influence (Wilson 2003).
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A key insight from these perspectives is that individual managers have different approaches 
to making sense of problems, of interpreting information and applying their knowledge. 
Thus, decisions have also been discussed in the frame of sense-making and a series of 
mental activities consisting of scanning, interpreting and acting (Weick 1995; Daft & Weick 
1984; Milliken & Lant 1990). Sanchez (2001) defines sense-making as the process of 
perceiving events and forming expectations about the significance of current events based 
on their similarities or differences with the past. According to Sanchez, the essential 
building blocks of organizational sense-making processes consist of data, information, 
knowledge, learning and interpretive frameworks. For example, the process of sense- 
making involves gathering and interpreting data to create information that is used to form 
meaningful relationships in an organization. Data are referred to as qualitative or 
quantitative descriptions of events, or selective representations of events, which are always 
incomplete. In organizational contexts, data helps to make objectively correct decisions. 
Too much data, however, makes it harder to identify make sense of the data that matters 
(Davenport & Prusak 1998). Data do not have inherent meaning and do not provide 
interpretation (ibid). At the same time, it is through a comparison between data that 
meaning is derived, as well as through the metrics used to make those comparisons.
According to Sanchez (2001), the data entering an organization are influenced by the 
interpretive frameworks that determine which events are noticed and how they are 
represented. Interpretive frameworks are existing set of beliefs about causal relationships as 
to which events are drawn in the sense-making process. Managers’ interpretive frameworks 
influence what draws their attention and what is dismissing i.e. acting as a cognitive filter. 
When that which is noticed appears to be consistent with our beliefs about causal 
relationships, then we modify our beliefs to become more consistent with our observation 
of the events and hence make the events more understandable’. Hence, the interpretive 
framework is conceived as both the means for and the result of our sense-making (Sanchez 
2001).
Information is associated with the meaning that is imputed to some data when it is 
evaluated in an interpretive framework (Sanchez 2001). It is a message that is 
communicated between a sender and a receiver to change the way the receiver perceives 
something. According to Davenport et al (1998), data becomes information when the 
sender adds meaning by contextualizing, condensing or categorizing it. Following the
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argument that decisions involve sense-making, and making sense of the world is 
predominantly subjective, the key analytical construct is interpretive (Wilson 2003). Wilson 
argues that in order to understand the process of decision-making, we need to uncover 
how individuals interpret and define their world. Therefore, a theory of decision-making 
becomes a theory of interpretation (ibicl). This is a key assumption the research adopts 
when analyzing the case studies in chapter 7.
In this light, Weick (1995) points to the inter-subjective nature of interpretation, where 
thinking and acting are merged between individuals. He argues that inter-subjectivities, 
such as using the term we believe’ and ‘I believe’, are not just created by social structures, 
but created and maintained by a shared level of social reality over time, shaping the 
boundaries around decision-making. The inter-subjectivities involved in the process of 
decision-making become embodied in structures over time, such as networks or in roles 
(Wilson 2003). Here, events will follow regardless of the individuals in the story, or ‘plot’. 
These events have a powerful influence on building organizational memory (OM) (Walsh 
& Ungson 1991) and also on building managers’ interpretation of the environment and the 
knowledge acquired through experience (Bladder 1995). Furthermore, Cohen et al (1972) 
demonstrate how these plots may shape decision-making by reversing the problem- 
solutions sequence, where ready-made solutions are designed for problems that have not 
yet occurred. When it comes to decision-making, these generic subjectivities have an 
influence on whether the thinking behind coming to a decision is based on looking 
backward on what happened, or looking forward. Having said that, Pettigrew (1985) argues 
that whether choice behavior is described as problem-solving, decision-making, or strategy 
formulation, is merely a reflection of the socio-political context, i.e. the deeper contextual 
forces. He goes on to argue that words do matter, as they set out the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions that lead to a way of thinking and open or close doors to 
other fields of study. He proposes decision-making to be understood as a continuous 
process in context, inferring that variability in the content and context of decisions shape 
the decision process (Pettigrew 2003).
On the other hand, Hickson et al (1986) focus on a different unit of analysis, on the 
decision episode rather than context. They claim that it is the politically of what is under 
decision that matters: ‘to know the process, first know the complexity of the problems and 
the politicality of the interests’ (ibid: 241). Pettigrew counter argues episode or events as the
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unit of analysis in that they limit themselves to snap-shot time-series data, and fail to 
consider the holistic and dynamic processes through which changes happen. He 
encourages a contextualist analysis (Pettigrew 1985), which considers the interdependencies 
between socioeconomic context, features of intra-organizational context and interest-group 
behavior over time. While Mintzberg et al. (1976) argue that the ways in which decisions 
are made in organizations vary, it is possible to draw upon patterns of these variations to 
show that some decisions can be made in similar ways. An important aspect to note is that 
decisions that are made in a context also help to influence the context for future decisions. 
For example, the output from decision 1 forms part of the input for decision 2 (Butler
1991). Meyer and Scott (1983) address this by explaining the setting of the ‘rules of the 
game’ under which decisions take place, how these are reinforced by successive decisions 
and how a performance gap between expected and actual performance might force a 
change to the rules (Butler 1991).
Furthermore, Regner (2003) distinguishes between ‘peripheral’ and ‘central’ strategic 
contexts and argues that the closer to the edges of corporate reach strategy-making gets (in 
terms of market and knowledge), the more it is characterized by heuristic and explorative 
activity. In contrast, strategy-making in the centre is characterized by deductive, well- 
defined representational methods. This is because decision-makers at this level analyze 
local conditions in terms of their being conspicuous to organizational aims and try to frame 
these as to fit with a ‘represented’ view of organizational objectives (ibid). Regner (2003) 
asserts that while deliberate strategic planning is most prevalent in the centre, decision­
makers at the periphery develop a growing phronetk awareness of the demands of new 
markets through direct local engagement. Hence, on this level, strategy is seen as more 
emergent and is rooted in the non-deliberate practical coping, in local improvisation.
Thus far, this chapter has reflected on various perspectives on strategy. Strategy has been 
viewed as the process of decision-making with respect to interpreting information and 
making sense of ambiguities in the strategizing work. The consideration of dichotomies of 
strategy and decisions making (i.e. mechanistic and deliberate versus emergent and ongoing 
learning) have implications on the key assumptions behind strategic actors. This section 
concludes by acknowledging that the attempt to narrowly define aspects of strategy also 
constrain its study. There are multiple factors that make up strategy in organizations, and 
decision processes and actions are part of the same explanation. Relying entirely on
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individual concepts and defining the entire concept from that view would limit our 
understanding of behavior. Hence, while a process-based view is taken, the research does 
not take an absolute view and is open to new perspectives as they emerge. The next section 
reviews the ingredients of decision-making in the scope of managerial work.
2.2 MANAGERIAL INFORMATION & KNOWLEDGE
Strategizing was discussed as a process of decision- and sense-making. What go into 
managerial decisions are data, information and knowledge. This section explains what is 
meant by managerial information (Ml) and knowledge in the context of managerial work.
2.2.1. Managerial Work & Information
Traditionally, the IS literature has defined information and knowledge based on the IT- 
based conceptualization of IS. These definitions have been drawn from business 
management models and frameworks. Such assumptions imply a linear progression of 
decision-making, i.e. starting with defining a problem, then diagnosing it, designing a 
solution, making a final decision, and leading to action. Furthermore, there is still a 
prevalent Tayloristic view on phenomena. For example, Tayloristic school of thought views 
the manager as the master of the ship, the person who engages in planning, organizing, 
staffing, coordinating, controlling and leading (Fayol 1949: 43). One implication of the 
assumption behind the rational view is that other topics related to the manager will be 
interpreted in the same positivistic manner -  i.e. management IS (MIS) - and hence, 
conclusions will be according to those assumptions. The same applies to how the concept 
of MI, systems and IS have been interpreted in the literature. Advocates (Simon 1979; 
Thierauf 1987) to that view take the assumption that all management activities imply 
decisions, where MIS support these activities, i.e. those of planning, organizing, staffing, 
and controlling. The overlying principle is that if decisions are supported by MIS, then 
management is successful (Intronal997).
Below are some traditional definitions of MIS:
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Effective management information systems allow the decision-making (i.e. the manager) 
to combine his or her subjective experience with computerized objective output to 
provide meaningful information for decision making. They make use of interactive 
processing whereby query capabilities can be used to obtain desired information for 
decision-making (Thierauf 1987: 22)
MIS provide information that is useful in making decisions. This information is designed 
to support effective planning and control of business activities. Information that is 
provided by a management information system is often produced from data that are 
aggregated, summarized, and presented in such a way as to be of value to managers for 
decision making purposes. (Schultheis 1989: 55).
The objective of an MIS is to provide information for decision making on planning, 
initiating, organizing, and controlling the operations of the sub-systems of the firm and to 
provide a synergistic organization in the process (Murdick 1990: 3)
The assumptions behind the rational views are put in question in the context of the 
interpretive research. Introna (1997) notes a tendency towards an implicit acceptance of 
Tayloristic dualism, and an acceptance of decision-making as the a priori basis, management 
action. Taylorist dualisms separate thinking from doing for the sake of gaining control. This 
control is achieved by ‘capturing’ data and ‘creating’ data systems for filtering and 
surveillance. Hence, the manager must use data in thinking to make rational decisions. 
Introna (1997) implies that this dualism led to the emergence of the idea of the rational 
manager, which saw decision-making as a central management activity. This portrays a 
narrow understanding on the nature of the agency, on information and managerial work. 
Assumptions of the ‘rational manager’ may be appropriate for stable times and 
environments with a set of predictable or fixed parameters affecting strategizing activities. 
Where there is certainty and stability, a conception may turn to a decision and to action 
without interference. However, such stable contexts may not come with emerging 
opportunities for growth or more promising directions.
These traditional views largely ignore the inherent complexities and ambiguities of the real 
world and are simplistic in today’s dynamic environments. In search of a more realistic 
picture of managerial work, Mintzberg (1980, 2001) challenges such conventional views by 
emphasizing the emergent and bottom-up properties of the strategizing process. Mintzberg 
(1971, 1975, 1980, 2000) implies that due to the unrelenting pace, the variety and 
discontinuity of the nature of managerial work, there is no real science behind the doing. 
Contrary to conventional thought, he claims (ibid: B97):
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... He [the manager] has been unable to understand work, which has never been 
adequately described, and he has poor access to the manager’s information, most of 
which is never documented.
Mintzberg (1980) identifies the main characteristics of managerial work (173):
• Managers typically spend brief periods of time on fragmented activities, and are frequently 
interrupted
• Managers tend to direct their attention to concrete issues and to the most current 
information, rather than to reflective planning
• Managers spend one-third of their total time communicating with outsiders and one-third to 
a half of their time communicating with subordinates
• Managers conduct two-thirds of their communication orally, mostly by telephone or 
unscheduled meetings
• Most of the working day is devoted to interaction with people.
Furthermore, research by Sayles (1979: 12) confirms Mintzberg’s characteristics about 
managerial work
• Most of the working day is devoted to interaction with people.
• There is sporadic, impromptu and unplanned contact, jumping from issue to issue and 
between different people.
• Decisions are often the product of complex negotiations, extending over time and 
involving many interesting parties.
• The multiplicity of goals identified by different groups and people are often conflicting, 
even contradictory, and priorities often vary.
• Results are often the product of many uncontrolled variables which are slow to emerge and 
difficult to predict.
• Problems and activities of the manager are often discontinuous and fragmented with no 
clear beginning or end.
Most interestingly, Sayles implies that irrespective of country or level, all studies on 
manages seem to produce the same result. This will be especially interesting to keep in 
mind in this research, as one case study is conducted in the German and US operating units 
of a company. The following summary of Mintzberg’s (1980) view on the manager and the 
characteristics of the work are especially relevant to kernel of this thesis (In Introna 1997: 
25):
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We find the manager, particularly at senior levels, is overburdened with work. With 
the increasing complexity of modem organizations and their problems, he is 
destined to become more so. He is driven to brevity, fragmentation, and 
superficiality in his tasks, yet he cannot easily delegate them because of the nature of 
his information. And he can do little to increase his available time or significantly 
enhance his power to manage. Furthermore, he is driven to focus on that which is 
current and tangible in his work, even through the complex problems facing many 
organizations call for reflection and a far-sighted perspective.
These characteristics are significant to consider because, assuming they are somewhat an 
accurate representation of the managerial work, it helps the researcher to identify the forms 
of information and knowledge in the work processes, and more specifically, the manner in 
which they are leveraged through IS. This understanding will have implications on the use 
of IS in practice, and conceptualization of IS in theory.
To characterize managerial activities more precisely, Mintzberg (1980: 169) uses the notion 
of roles’. According to his empirical studies, Mintzberg (1971) implies that managers 
perform ten basic roles, which he categorizes in three groupings (ibid: B97):
• The interpersonal role: manager as external liaison and leader
• The inforrmtkn processing role, manager as center of the organization’s IS
• The decision making role, manager at the heart of the system by which organizational 
resource allocation, improvement and disturbance decisions are made.
The information processing role comprises of three roles, where the manager serves as the 
‘nerve center\ the focal point for the movement of information. The other two refer to 
simple transmission of that information. The following has been extracted from Whyte’s 
study (1955:187):
Since interaction flowed toward [the leaders], they were better informed about the 
problems and desires of group members than were any of the followers and 
therefore better able to decide on an appropriate course of action. Since they were in 
close touch with other gang leaders, they were also better informed than their 
followers about conditions .... Moreover, in their positions at the focus of the chains 
on interaction, they were better able than any follower to pass on to the group 
decisions that had been reached
This describes the manager emerging as ‘nerve center’ of internal information, where he may 
not know the details of every function, but is the information generalist who knows more 
about the total organization than other members. Specifically, due to the management 
status he may have unique access to a variety of external knowledgeable outsiders, who are 
nerve centers’ at other organizations (Mintzberg 1971). Given this position, MI is said to
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be a special kind, where the manager does not hesitate to by pass formal channels to gather 
it, most of which have not become substantiated facts.
Furthermore, the manager has the role to disseminate information to subordinates for 
making decisions. The nature of this information is usually of factual and value nature 
(ibid). Hence, a crucial part of this role is to integrate the interests of the general 
organizational preferences with those of the subordinates as a guide to decisions. The 
manager acts here as the spokesperson to transmit this information to influencers and 
other interested parties about his plans (Mintzberg 1971). In the decisional role, so Mintzberg, 
the manager is assumed to have the understanding of complex situations and take 
responsibility for the organization’s actions. Here, he emerges as a key figure in the making 
of significant decisions in his organization.
Another role of the manager is the disturbance handler. While the entrepreneur role deals with 
voluntary change, this role deals with corrections which the manager is forced to make. 
This happens in circumstances, where disturbances emerge in the organization through a 
stimulus that cannot be handled routinely by a specialist in the system. Hence, it becomes 
the job of the manager as a generalist to assume responsibility for dealing with the stimulus 
(Mintzberg 1971). In one of his studies, Sayles implies the following (1964: 162):
The achievement of this stability, which is the manager’s objective, is a never-to- 
be-attained ideal. He is like a symphony orchestra conductor, endeavoring to 
maintain a melodious performance in which contributions of the various 
instruments are coordinated and sequenced, patterned and paced, while the 
orchestra members are having various personal difficulties, stage hands are 
moving music stands, altering excessive heat and cold are creating audience and 
instrument problems, and the sponsor of the concert is insisting on irrational 
changes in the program.
Sayles (1964) makes a note on the balance that managers try to maintain between change 
and stability. The notion of MI from Introna’s (1997) interpretation is congruent with 
Mintzberg’s picture of managerial work. To this end, Introna (1997) suggests that MI is a 
far richer and more implicit concept and argues that there is a lack of fundamental thinking 
about information as a phenomenon in-the-world. Below is a summary of his interpretation 
of what MI entails in the world of the manager (ibid: 158-9):
47
• MI is always already understanding
- To be informed is to be-in ( involved) in an involvement whole in which the
report is always already significant
• MI is part of doing
- MI can never be abstracted from the context of doing.
• MI is always already located, it is contextual, historical and perceptual
- Information cannot be severed from its context, there is no such thing as 
understanding from the outside. Meaning is already located within the 
involvement whole
- Wittgenstein argued that we cannot transfer language from one language game to 
another, or from one form of life to another. It must be appropriated within its 
culture, tradition and communicative context.
- We understand each other because we already share a history, a context and a 
perspective, a form of life. There cannot be any sense of an a-historical transfer of 
understanding from the world of the operations to the world of the management
• MI exists in the world of the manager
- MI is the know-how of decisions and actions in the fragmented and erratic world 
of the manager
- MI may become available in coping and in less than ideal forms
• MI is never complete
- Managers are constantly working out the possibilities of the data they are 
confronted with.
- They are always already in the hermeneutic circle, always interpreting, always 
striving for room for maneuver. As comportments shift new possibilities come up.
- There is no final context, the job is never complete.
• MI can never be located in time and space.
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• MI is the management understanding
Understanding that emerges from sense making in the world
Referring to Foucault (1977) that everything is already interpretation. This views
understanding as the situated appropriation of communicative acts available to the
manager;
It is ‘a know-how-to that draws upon the sense and significance located in the 
always already present involvement whole’.
Decisions and actions do not flow from understanding. The manager is required to 
first understand and then act
Hence, ‘decisions and action are the reification of understanding, which is a 
primordial already present know-how’
• Management understanding is autopoietic
This is based on distinction making (internal coherence) and distinction relating 
(structural coupling). The former is a tacit process based on doing or using to 
establish difference. It is unthought, where distinctions emerge as the knowing 
that is also a doing.
These become part of the social change when languaged.
• MI is in-the-world
This implies that management understanding is always already present in the 
network
of power, which makes it simultaneously local, unstable, and diffuse.
Understanding is located in doing of everyday as part of the manager’s involvement 
in-the-world
• MI is an in-order-to get the job done
This point implies claims that managers do not execute plans, but rather, their 
primordial mode of existence is getting the job done using MI. No single 
information text will lead to insight, the manager will draw on whatever is available.
Notably, his claim comes from a phenomenological standpoint and may be counter argued 
from different ontological positions. His arguments are based on the following definition 
(ibid: 156):
Management information is management understanding in-the-world, in-order-to
get the job done.
Introna’s argument regarding the lack of fundamental understanding of MI lays out the 
motivation of this research to interpret MI and knowledge in managerial work with 
different assumptions than those presented by the mainstream IS literature. Now, 
knowledge has been an even less clear concept than MI, because of its implicit nature. The 
next section sheds light on how this ambiguous concept has been discussed in the literature 
within the scope of this research.
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2.2.2 Knowledge-based Capabilities
The knowledge-based view of the firm conceptualizes firms as bearers of tacit, social and 
path-dependent organizational knowledge (Hitt at al 1998). It assumes knowledge to have 
economic and strategic implications for the firm (Grant 1991), and views knowledge as the 
organizational asset that enables sustainable competitive advantage (Alavi & Leidner 1999). 
The premise has been to build ‘distinctive’ capabilities’ through specialized knowledge to 
ensure sustainable competitive advantage (Drucker 1995). Specialized knowledge and 
activities are seen to set the basis of a platform, which collectively create organizational 
capabilities (Grant 1996). Andreu and Ciborra (1996) argue that what makes the capabilities 
unique is the high dependence of organizational context and specific organizational 
routines in the path-dependent learning process. In other words, because knowledge 
emerges through the process of learning, it is embedded in organizational routines. 
Therefore, it has a strong tacit dimension, which makes it difficult to imitate and change 
(Nelson & Winter 1982; Grant 1991). The difficult-to-imitate nature of tacit knowledge is 
distinguished from other resources because it is protected by knowledge barriers, similar to 
those that are protected by property rights and exclusive ownership capital (Teece 1998; 
Zack 1999).
Koontz (1964) depicts managerial knowledge as ‘the art of getting things done through and
with people’ (1964: 15). Davenport and Prusak (1998) provide a pragmatic working
definition’ that is relevant to the scope of this thesis (1998: 5):
Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and 
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new 
experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds of knowers. In 
organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but 
also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms.
In the literature (e.g. Davenport & Prusak 1998; Hansen et al 1999; Alavi & Leidner 2001; 
Earl 2001) and practice, a dominant tendency has become to manage this knowledge and 
become knowledge creators rather than processors of information, and to create a 
knowledge base’ (Johnston & Vitale 1988). In order to understand the process of 
managing knowledge, according to Sanchez (2001), first we must identify the various forms 
of knowledge in an organization. For example, the literature distinguishes between ‘explicit’ 
and ‘tacit’ knowledge (i.e. Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). Explicit knowledge is argued to be 
based on formal models and embedded in procedures, documents and databases may be
50
transferred with reasonable accuracy (Hustad 2004). On the other hand, tacit knowledge is 
referred to as mental models and experiences of individuals, which is difficult to 
communicate on a similar accuracy level (Bourdreau & Couillrd 1999). Tacit knowledge 
involves a cognitive and a technical element, both of which are important in the process of 
knowledge sharing (Nonaka 1994). The former refers to the idea that by creating and 
manipulating analogies in their minds, people build working ‘mental models’ of the world 
in the form of schemata and paradigms to provide a perspective of their world. These 
mental models, paradigms, perspectives, beliefs, and viewpoints, help human beings create 
sense-making analogies to relate to the real world (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 60).
Tacit knowledge has been at the centre of debate in recent years because of its intangible 
and context-specific nature, which may provide the highest potential for competitive 
advantage. The sharing and transfer thereof has been particularly difficult on the strategic 
level, where the level of tacitness of everyday knowledge tends to be higher than on the 
operational level. The more implicit knowledge becomes, the more it is influenced by the 
informal influencing factors such as cultures, paradigms and ways of thinking. Hence, the 
accurate communication of that knowledge will depend increasingly upon the manner in 
which it is communicated, not just the content of the knowledge. On the other hand, the 
phenomenological perspective views knowledge as deeply embodied and embedded in our 
body, practices, as well as in institutions and material structures (Hanseth 2004). Hanseth 
(2004) views knowledge as Being highly embedded in a complex web of relationships and 
dependencies, where it is difficult to change one part without the other’ (2004: 110). 
Polanyi (1966) defines knowledge as ‘an activity which would be better described as a 
process of knowing’. Furthermore, Heidegger (1962) illustrated knowledge through Dasein 
(‘being’) to bring the relationship between knowledge and action closer.
Overall, knowledge is defined to be context-specific and anchored in the beliefs and 
commitment deeply rooted in individuals’ value systems. As opposed to information, 
knowledge may be seen as a cognitive process of interactions of the individual’s internal 
believes, perceptions, ‘instinct’, and sense the market ‘climate’ (Nonaka et al 1994). Nonaka 
and Takeuchi (1995) argue that knowledge is created through the dynamic process of social 
interactions in specific contexts at specific times. Further conceptualizations of knowledge 
include Bladder’s (1995) five types of knowledge: embrained, embodied, encultured, 
embedded, and encoded. Embrained knowledge refers to individual conceptual skills or
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cognitive abilities, where as embodied is the ability to carry out specific actions. Achieving a 
shared understanding in groups and organizations describes the encultured knowledge. 
Encoded is the explicit knowledge represented in the written language, such as books and 
digital information from data bases and web sites. This thesis will frequently refer to 
embodied and embedded types of knowledge, while the other will be implicitly referred to. 
Furthermore, an integrated perspective considers tacit and explicit as mutually constituted 
and dismisses a total separation since tacit knowledge is a necessary component of all 
knowledge (Tsoukas 1996).
Part of the controversy lies in the differences between philosophical and more pragmatic 
perspectives on knowledge. What philosophy attributes to tacit knowledge does not make 
it easy for practitioners to create ways in leveraging it for competitive advantage. More 
specifically, the term tacit knowledge originates from Polanyi (1958), who describes it as 
‘hidden’: We know more than we tell’ (1973). He argues that tacit knowledge involves the 
process of comprehension, which is largely an inexpressible process. Polanyi (1958) defines 
tacit knowledge as an act of comprehension, which is achieved through the process of 
creating knowledge of the world via ‘indwelling’.
Notably, Polanyi’s argument takes place in a philosophical perspective. Polanyi speaks of 
tacit knowledge as Personal Knoudedge (1966), which is part of the human agent. Wilson 
(2002) suggests the use ‘implicit’ knowledge as a more appropriate term when speaking of 
knowledge which is normally not expressed, but is expressible. It is that which may be 
taken for granted in actions but is shared among people with common experience or 
culture. For example, the knowledge of ‘how things are done here’ may be communicated, 
shared and taught. This is the point of departure to reflect more on the human agent to 
understand better the nature of knowledge, its embedded-ness and use in strategizing 
processes. This will bring us closer to understand how IS are (or may be) used to turn this 
ambiguous concept into potential competitive advantage.
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2.3 PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC ACTORS
Managers need not onty specialized knoidedge, but they need wisdom, 
vdiido is the aMitytoweave knoidedge together andmake use o f it’
-Mintzberg (2001)
A richer understanding of human agency is important because the purpose of IS, simply 
said, is to serve human agents to work more effectively and efficiently. Most research on 
the role of human agency has been predominantly from a positivistic tradition, viewing IS 
and the human agent as separate entities. Further, IS has been predominantly IT-oriented 
and the human a rational and deliberate agent. The relevance of this section to this thesis is 
that in order to achieve a richer conceptualization of IS in the context of strategizing, one 
needs to understand the world of the manager. The work by Gosling and Mintzberg (2003) 
and managerial mindsets, and the work by Chia and Holt (2006) and Introna (1997) based 
on phenomenological assumptions provide some competing, but especially interesting 
views on the human agent.
2.3.1 Managerial Mindsets
This section makes reference to the work of Gosling and Mintzberg (2003), and Mintzberg 
and Westley (2001) on managerial thinking and mindsets in strategy making. As a general 
note, the term mindset refers to an attitude, or ways of thinking. Managerial mindsets 
resulted from their work, where they found that certain qualities would make managers 
more effective in dealing with everyday strategizing work. There, Mintzberg and Westley 
(2001) proposed two other forms of decision-making in addition to the rational model, or 
‘thinking first’, to use their term. These are labeled as ‘seeing first’ and ‘doing first’. The 
assumptions behind the term ‘thinking first’ are in line with the traditional view on 
deliberate decision-making that has been discussed throughout this chapter. The ‘thinking 
first’ assumes that managers apply rational thinking first before any other approach (ibid).
A general problem with rational approaches is that once deliberate decisions are made, 
some new event forces a reconsideration of that decision, leading to new insights, and a 
new decision. This process of continuous re-consideration of deliberate decisions repeats 
itself, and by the time of execution, the original decision is hard to track back. As a result, 
they propose two other approaches to strategizing. The argument for ‘seeing first’ implies 
that understanding is not only conceptual, but also visual, a significant element to consider
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when looking at decision-making theory (ibid). This implies that decisions are driven as 
much by insight as they are by thought. At the same time, in order to trust insight, or 
vision, decisions require a certain experience and confidence, as well as the authority to 
elaborate on a subject vision that is not based on logic entirely, or hard facts. Moments of 
illumination happen in a visual form, where the person has a tacit grasp of a way forward in 
her/his mind -  something that would take a long time to explicitly express it in words. This 
tacit process of discoveiy is also informed by the Gestalt psychology (Wallas in the 1920s). 
Envisioning or thinking of the ‘solution’ depends on the context and may not occur to 
every experienced manager. To those that neither applies, the seeing or the thinking, as 
Mintzberg and Westley put it, they just get on with it and do ‘something’ and the thinking 
could follow’ (ibid: 91).
The term ‘doing first’ comes from organizational theory, where Weick (1979, 1995) 
theorized this process as enactment -  selection -  retention. A relevant reference to this 
discussion is his work on sense-making in organizations. In this context, it highlights how 
the creation of reality occurs when people make retrospective sense of their past situation. 
Weick makes reference to ambiguity and uncertainty in the sense-making process. In 
relation to ‘doing first’, Mintzberg and Westley (2001) imply that effective managers know 
that sometimes it makes sense to act (first) and experiment in order to think. O f course, 
while this behavior occurs to everyone in situations of uncertainty, doing ‘the doing’ 
skillfully as to learning what the core competencies are in order to extract and repeat them 
in the future may not be as common. This argument suggests that engaging in ‘thinking 
first’ as it is in formalized strategic planning may in fact discourage learning and the core 
competencies may not be discovered.
Mintzberg and Westley (2001) correlate the three terms to the conventional views of 
science, art and craft, where the first is primarily verbal and prefers facts, the second is 
visual and prefers ideas, and the third is visceral, preferring experience:
I l f f j  f'T=l
Science Art Craft
Planning, Visioning, Venturing,
Programming Imagining Learning
The Verbal The Visual The Visceral
Facts Ideas Experiences
Figure 2.2: Characteristics o f the three approaches to making decisions (Mintzberg & 
Westley 2001)
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While it is not the purpose of this research to explicitly apply these in the case studies, it is 
useful to keep them in mind and how they may affect the manner in which information 
and knowledge are used in strategizing.
In a later work, Gosling and Mintzberg (2003) focus more on the cognitive aspects of 
human agents and propose several managerial mindsets under five categories. This work 
was in response to observing managerial concerns about how to reconcile contradictory 
demands in managerial work and strategic decisions. Some of these contradictions are, for 
example, demands of being global and local, to collaborate and compete, and to ‘make the 
numbers’ while nurturing the people. While these may not seem unusually new, the 
challenge of being or acting in ambidextrous (O’Reilly & Tushman 2004) manners in 
strategizing, to meet deliberate demands while coping with emergent needs, on a 
continuous basis, is a challenge that has not been sufficiently addressed in the literature -  
particularly from the perspective of the strategic actor.
Mindsets refer to a set of attitudes, or directed consciousness, towards self, the world, and 
the constituents. These are influenced by many factors such as personal frame of reference, 
experiences, education, functional background, and other personal attributes have 
significant effects on their decisions and action. The dominant and combination of various 
mindsets has implications on the ways in which knowledge is used and decision processes 
handled in various circumstances and contexts. Gosling and Mintzberg (2003) introduce 
their work with an emphasis on synthesis of mindsets, rather than their separation. The 
reason that this might become significant to this research is that different mindsets 
determine the assumptions behind interpretation of information and sense-making. There 
seems to be little research which associates mindsets (as of attitudes) with the use of IS, 
and how IS are shaped in strategizing processes.
Gosling and Mintzberg argue that the problems that most managers in organizations face 
are a result of either too much action and little reflection, or too much thinking and slow 
response to changes. This becomes especially problematic when the differing attitudes 
happen among functions or business units, for example, where the marketing department is 
swift in creating new strategies but the sales force is slow in execution. Gosling and 
Mintzberg claim that the effectiveness of managers is somewhere in between action and 
reflection: ‘action without reflection is thoughtless; reflection without action is passive’ 
(ibid: 56). They suggest in order dealing with contradictions in the everyday strategizing
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work, managers should apply a combination of different mindsets according to the 
situation. Below is an outline of the mindsets, which will be kept in mind during the case 
studies as to how these are related to the use of IS in strategizing.
The reflective mindset: Managing self The Latin word for reflect’ is
to refold, meaning that attention turns inward to see better the outer world in order to 
perceive a familiar thing in a different way. This mindset argues that managers should stop 
and think, and reflea upon their relationship with the world. Only by refleaing and 
digesting the events that happen to us can one create lessons learned and turn them to 
experiences. This allows one to see Toth ways’, inside our own world and the outside 
world This way, the ‘refleaive manager’ can increase the chances of creating vision. This 
may be conceived as consciously painting a picture of the past experiences stroke by stroke 
(Gosling & Mintzberg 2003). This implies that the person creates a healthy respea for 
history, and one ‘must appreciate the past in order to use the present to get a better future’ 
(ibid: 57).
The analytic mindset: Managing organizations The analytic mindset
decomposes complex phenomena and breaks them into its constituent parts. This attitude 
towards the world suggests ‘let loose’ (cf. the Greek root of the word am- meaning up and 
layein meaning ‘loosen’). Whenever one adopts this mindset, one does not see people as 
individuals, rather one sees things from the outside and from above (e.g. viewing them as 
systems of organization power and communication). They view themselves as on top of 
the organization, making complex decisions, being involved in the coordination of all kinds 
of subsystems and networks, with the only object being to meet bottom line goals. While 
this may be important, so is the management of organizational and social complexities in 
order to maintain the capacity to take consistent aaion.
The worldly mindset: Managing context This implies a certain attitude
towards the over-used and often misconceived term of globalization, misconceived because 
the concept encourages certain assumptions of the world that may lead to homogeneous 
behavior. At a distance, it may imply that the world is uniform, enabling generalizations to 
be made about markets, values, and praaices. It assumes that the world is converging 
towards a common culture, and that the global headquarters are responsible for local 
consequences. However, and paradoxically, the more we connect with the rest of the
56
world, the more we realize different cultures, circumstances, ways of thinking and 
interpreting. Consequently, the overuse of ‘becoming global’ may have the implication that 
decisions are based on assumptions that there are homogenous world views. Hence, the 
term worldly’ instead of ‘globally’ may be used to consider assumptions of a richer and 
realistic world, which has different cultures, different ways of doing things, and different 
local political and economic consequences (Gosling & Mintzberg 2003: 58). This 
perspective encourages an exploratory mindset, which brings one closer to the context and 
helps to develop more realistic assumptions about the world.
The collaborative mindset: Managing relationships Recent rhetoric from 
the management literature views collaborative mindsets as the commitment to manage 
relationships among people in teams, projects, and across division and alliances. The 
emphasis shifts from top-down management to a more engaging, worldly, fostering, 
collaborative and less controlling approach. Leaders are those who foster an environment 
where knowledge sharing can flourish, helping ‘to establish the structures, conditions, and 
attitudes through which things get done’ (ibid: 60). The emphasis is on networks, social 
systems, teams, alliances and knowledge work. Those who attempt to manage relationships 
from the ‘top’ are outside of the knowledge network. To create a collaborative 
environment, one should manage from the inside, bottom-up, and allow responsibility to 
flow naturally among self-managing teams.
The action mindset: Managing change This is about developing sensitive 
awareness of the changes in the terrain and orchestrating the process towards a direction. 
The overemphasis on change has forced managers to focus on what is changing instead of 
what is not, on continuous action rather than reflection on consequences. The implication 
of this ‘obsession’ with change (ibid: 61) creates a world for the manager that is in constant 
flux and urgency. This view shapes the assumptions on which decisions are based. The 
challenge lies in managing continuity rather than change: knowing what needs to be 
changed, mobilizing energy round those things, and maintaining the rest. This implies the 
balance between exploration for new opportunities and exploitation of current capabilities. 
Action-oriented management of change is Cartesian, where top management formulates 
carefully planned deliberate strategies and systematically implements those through a 
sequence of decisions. These are clear and bold, calculating, and based on facts. Although 
many managers oppose this mechanistic and rationalistic view, some tend to behave
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differently in action. Is it because they do not know how to manage otherwise (lack of 
training or habits), or the context and structure within which they make decisions does not 
allow room for a reflective mindset and collaborative action.
In conclusion, the unstructured and indirectly linked elements (i.e. behavioral aspects) that 
are inherent to strategizing require the human agent to adopt multiple mindsets in the 
coping with the world. While the arguments in this section are rooted in the strategic 
management literature, the next section will shed light on an alternative ontology based on 
the ‘being’ mode of the manager in the world This philosophical angle will be profoundly 
different from the previous discussions, yet somehow complementary on a deeper level. It 
is this contrast, which is argued to be intriguing in supplementing the interpretive process 
of this research, rather than adhere to either the strategic management or the philosophical 
point of views.
2.3.2 Alternative Perspectives on the Manager
Thus far, the thesis has been interested in looking at the interrelations between strategizing, 
IS, and human agents. This section offers an alternative understanding of the human agent 
in the hope to shed a different light on their relationship with IS within the strategizing 
context. While the previous section referred to characteristics close to the conscious 
manager, this section introduces concepts underlying the ‘involved manager’ (Introna
1997). This notion is based on the seminal work of Heidegger and Polanyi, based on the 
conceptualization by Introna (1997). Notably, since this study is not rooted in 
phenomenology, any interpretation will be within the scope of Introna’s and Chia and 
Holts’ conceptualization. Further, the involved manager is interesting in relation to the 
previous discussion on managerial mindsets. They are not meant to be compared to each 
other (as the mindsets were not meant to be analyzed on the philosophical grounds), but 
rather each of them provide a different understanding on the human agent in praxis that we 
like to keep in mind.
Strategizing as Dwelling
The mainstream IS literature speaks of the manager as the strategic thinker and deliberate 
user of strategic IT, who engages in effective and efficient problem solving. S/he can take
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calculated risks and be in control of activities through the exploitation of IT. Chia and Holt 
(2006), however, argue for a relaticml re-conceptualization of human agency rather than an 
institutional or entity-oriented term (Cooper 2005). The premise behind their argument is 
that when actors deliberately engage in strategic activities, there is actually a more basic 
‘dwelling’ mode from which the strategy emerges in a non-deliberately way through 
everyday practical coping. Here, the agent and their strategies are ‘simultaneously co­
constructed relational^ through direct engagement with the world they inhabit’ (ibid: 637).
Strategy from the dwelling perspective does not require an intention or purposeful goal- 
orientation. Rather, they view strategic ‘intent’ as irrmment in every adaptive action (ibid). 
They argue that observed consistencies in actions can be explained through a modus operandi, 
an internalized disposition to act in a manner congruent with past actions and experiences. 
This will turn out to be a significant point when we examine the relationship between 
strategizing and the use of IS in practice. Chia and Holt argue: ‘Explaining strategy in 
dwelling terms enables us to understand how it is that actions may be consistent and 
organizationally effective without (and even in spite of) the existence of purposeful strategic 
plans.’ (ibid: 635). Within this context, practices are conceived as identity forming and 
strategy setting activities in which events and meaning compose one another (Schatzki 
2005). Furthermore, the supporting argument implies that practices are learnt from others, 
where individually administered learnings occur through an ongoing sensitivity to what 
other practitioners are doing (Barnes 2001: 26).
The conceptualized of agency and action revolve around the term ‘relationality’ (Cooper 
2005) from social theory, which is used as a way to theorize towards new paradigms of 
understanding and as fundamental explanatory basis of social phenomena. Relationality 
refers to the methodological priority given to relationships and action. Here, individual and 
organizational entities are seen as ‘manifestations of a latent movement which is distinct 
from any aggregative sum of parts’ (Cooper 2005: 1693-1698). In other words, 
relationalism is used to conceptualize strategy as dwelling by acknowledging the latent 
primacy of relations and practices over the individual or organization. Chia and Holt (2006) 
use relationalism to explain human actions in terms of a ‘mindless’ practical coping, a state 
of self absorbed involvement with the world which precedes any mental content, reflection 
or symbolic representation. Along this line, it is argued that over time, a certain consistency
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of action emerges despite the lack of intention or an overall plan (Chia & Holt 2006). 
Hence, they put action and interaction at the centre of social analysis.
The Involved Manager
In this context, the manager is believed to always already be involved in-the-world The 
underlying assumptions behind this ontological position are discussed by Introna (1997). 
The character of ‘involved’ (versus ‘rational’) are related to Heideggerian ontology of Bang 
and Time (1962). Some of the relevant concepts underlying this ontology are reviewed in 
this section, notably, only within the scope of this research. The table below compares the 
different underlying assumptions of the manager:
Involved Manager Rational Manager
Mode of being Available Occurrent
Comportment Getting the job done Effectiveness and 
efficiency
Purpose o f information Sense (re)making and 
alliance building
Decision-making and 
problem solving
Action imperatives Local logic and ‘bricolage’ Plan and control
Doing-thinking Thinking then doing
Opportunistic Calculated and reasoned
Knowledge resources Tacit knowledge Representations
Key assumptions Thrown-ness Autonomy
Networks Linearity
Figure 23: Two ontological views on the manager (Introna 1997: 173)
The two modes of ‘being’ underlying the dichotomic view on the manager are based on 
Heidegger’s concepts ‘availableness’ and ‘occurrentness’. In terms of strategy, these related 
to ‘dwelling’ (based on ‘availableness’) -  and to ‘building’ of strategy (based on occurrent) 
(Chia & Holt 2006; Introna 1997). The involved manager provides an interesting 
ontological position to the knowledge work of strategic actors. The concept assumes that 
managers’ actions and decisions are inseparable and cannot be understood by isolating 
them (Introna 1997). They find themselves thrown (see definition below) in a world from 
which they cannot escape. The prime knowledge resource is applied tacit knowledge in order 
to make sense of the world and in getting the job done, through bricolage (cf. Levi- 
Strauss), that is. It is within the doing where the manager thinks. The involved manager 
also understands that at any moment opportunities may change the whole moves and rules 
of the game, hence, it is less likely s/he can think strategically and take calculated risk. 
Furthermore, s/he assumes that the probability of expected and unexpected outcomes of
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every decision is unknown, and that any unexpected outcome changes the assumptions of 
the initial action or decision.
The analysis is rooted in Heideggerian (1962, 1988, 1992) views and is congruent with the 
philosophical notions of Polanyi’s personal knowledge’ (1958) and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics (1977). Below is a review of the relevant concepts underlying the involved 
manager as of their interpretation by Introna (1997). But first, it should be reassured that 
the researcher appreciates the complexity and depth of each of the Heidegger’s concepts 
mentioned in this research. However, a discussion of the deeper philosophical 
underpinnings would go beyond the scope of this thesis.
Dasein, or being-in (the world), refers to the existence of the manager in the world 
Heidegger (1962: 67) states that ‘the ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence’. In other words, 
since we do not doubt our own existence and know that we are, there is an element of is- 
ness to our being (Introna 1997: 28); we are always already involved in the world Hence, 
ontologically, the manager may be viewed as Dasein, and always already Evolved in the 
world The emphasis on ‘in’ implies that when the manager is in-volved in the world, s/he 
is immersed and cannot step out, or step back. There is a more primordial, or an existential 
sense, of ‘in’. This ontic mode of existence in the world implies that we are already 
concernedly absorbed and immersed in the world Hence, being in the world is a sense for 
our existence in the world, a being who already understands itself. However, it understands 
itself only in the sense of knowing what it means to be ‘in’ and does not imply that it is a 
self-conscious subject. This being is always already available and ready-to-hand (Introna 1997: 
28). Furthermore, Dasein implies that we are in the world by inhibiting, or dwelling in it 
such that ‘is is no longer an object or us but becomes part of us and pervades our relation 
to other objects in the world’ (Dreyfus 1991: 45).
Dasein conceives decisions and actions as always already based on prior involvement whole. 
The involvement entails that managers cannot distance themselves from the problem 
situation in order to understand their problems- understanding is achieved while being 
involved in the world. The involvement whole is explained in terms of a set of already there 
relationships (Introna 1997), where systems, people and elements from the context 
introduce relationships which makes any specific involvement significant and creates this 
‘for-the-sake-of-which’ or ‘in-order-to’. This humanistic perspective is not ‘what is and
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what is not’, but rather an inauthentic mode of understanding, on its own home-ground as 
being-in-the-world (ibid: 27).
Zuhanden (Ready-to-hand) Zuhanden implies that the world is available, or 
ready to hand. More specifically, the ways in which human agents interact with the world in 
their directedness is with that which is nearest in our everyday existence. Heidegger (1962) 
calls the things we use in the world Zeug, or equipment. We use such equipment as these 
by ‘manipulating them and putting them to use’ (ibid: 95). This equipment is described as 
‘something-in-order-to’ (ibid: 97). This is directly relevant to Polanyi’s work on the 
embodiment of tools, discussed below. Zuhanden is related to the managers’ work in that 
in the everyday dealings and coping, mangers’ concerned involvement with the things 
around them they create the possible clearing within which the thing reveal themselves in 
their use. It is through ‘that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to 
use’ (ibid: 95).
Verhalten Existentialists imply that we are directed in our being in the world, or 
we comport (Verhalten) ourselves towards beings. Heidegger (1988:58) states: 
‘comportments have the structure of directing oneself toward, of being directed toward’. In 
other words, we exist in such a way that is always already with other beings. If so, then the 
manager does not think about the world and then formulates objectives (intentions) to 
direct actions in that world (Introna 1997) because the manager is always already ‘directed’ 
in the world. Introna argues that the notion of objectives becomes merely a construction to 
articulate comportments which already exist in action.
Thrownness With the concept of being always already in the world, Introna (1997) 
adds Heidegger’s notion that man is thrown in the world. The concept of thrownness 
implies that we do not have a choice in choosing the circumstances and environment in 
which we are bom. We are thrown in this world and the aim of Dasein is to resist the forces 
of ‘they’ and strive to be authentic. How is this related to the decision-maker, or 
strategizer? Thrownness refutes the concept that individuals can rationally select ends and 
means to achieve objects. It also refutes that we can make right decisions at the right time, 
or be at the right place at the right time. This has tremendous implications on the ways in 
which strategizing may be interpreted. Since one is always in an inseparable relationship 
with the world, and always already involved in the whole, thrownness will turn indecision
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into decision, inaction into action (ibid). Throwness also opposes the belief that in order to 
achieve a purpose, one only needs to make the right decisions at the right time (ibid). The 
choice over decisions and choosing the right time is not possible because one is always 
already in an inescapable relationship with the world At the same time, Heidegger does not 
imply that we are guided by some outside force. Thrownness does not have a teleological 
connotation, but rather all it implies is that one cannot step outside a situation one is 
already in to change something of the whole, if one is already an embedded part of that 
whole.
Personal Knowledge
The IS literature recognizes that personal knowledge is at the heart of what managers do 
(Introna 1997). Polanyi’s (1966: 1973) personal knowledge may be drawn upon to reflea on 
the tacit dimension of the strategizing work as actors interaa with the wider socio-technical 
and political environment. Expanding on earlier seaions, the notion of tacit knowledge 
implies that aaions are based on that knowledge, which is personal, or embodied Polanyi 
uses the idea of subsidiary and focal awareness in explaining the notion of tacit knowledge. 
Basically, in performing a task, there are certain aspects of the task that are in the 
foreground (focal) and some that are in the background (subsidiary) of our awareness. For 
example, when one is entering a room, the room and the intention for entering are the 
focal awareness, and the door and its opening are tools that one needs to use in order to 
enter are in the subsidiary awareness (Introna 1997). Since these tools are in the subsidiary 
awareness, one is usually not consciously aware of them because they are mere vehicles, 
with the focus being directed to just entering the room -  the focal awareness. These two 
levels of awareness are said to be mutually exclusive, meaning that one can focus on one at 
a time.
Polanyi (1973: 59) states that ‘our subsidiary awareness of tools can be regarded ‘as the a a  
of making them form a part of our own body ... we pour ourselves out onto them and 
assimilate them as part of our existence’. This leads to the notion of embodiment of tools 
(Polanyi 1973), which implies that we are subsidiarily aware of something, i.e. the tools one 
draws upon to enter the room, when it is a part of us, an extension of our body, or when it 
is embodied (Polanyi 1973) -  similarly, feel in the a a  of walking, or hands in the a a  of 
touching. The implications of the embodiment are that it contradias the belief that knowing 
is a rational a a  where one builds frameworks and applies them as procedures for aaions,
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decisions and judgments (Introna 1997). Rather, it is the attempt to gather certain 
particulars as extensions of our body, such that they become an embedded part of our 
subsidiary awareness to build a coherent focal entity. Nevertheless, ‘until this [the notion of 
personal knowledge] is addressed information systems will never become part of the 
manager’s body, judgments or aaions’ (ibid: 40).
Relating the abovementioned concepts to the manager have significant implications on the 
ways in which IS are conceptualized in strategizing. Some interesting questions arise in 
regards to the purpose of strategizing, which may be too complex to be addressed in the 
scope of the thesis, yet will be kept in mind. For example, if the manager is a prisoner to 
the organizational whole (i.e. information infrastructure (II)) and finds it impossible to set 
goals, then what is strategizing for? How may one leverage IS, if strategic aaors are 
imprisoned within the II? If one cannot consciously use the right information and leverage 
resources, and that at the right time, then how can the strategic aaors behave 
competitively? It is hoped to unveil these questions in this research process.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter set out the context of this research by refleaing on strategizing, MI, 
knowledge, and the human agent from competing perspeaives. The purpose of this 
discussion has been to provide solid conceptual grounds for an unbiased view on 
strategizing and human agents. The strategic aaor was discussed from the ‘rational’ view, 
the expert, the ‘master of the ship’, who efficiently and effectively meets objeaives and 
always strives to outperform. At the same time, this section argued that human agents are 
merely prisoners to their own existence, and cannot choose ‘the right mindset at the right 
time’ in strategic decisions. Nevertheless, these views, although they might seem 
contradiaing at first, help the research process in adopting a more critical view.
Seaion 2.1 positioned the thesis in the process-view on strategy, hence strategizing. More 
importantly, it made explicit the debate on deliberate versus emergent approaches to 
strategy, where it was argued that the desire to consolidate the two approaches is a major 
challenge in organizations. The underlying assumptions of strategy (as of top-down or 
bottom-up) will have implications on the manner in which strategic actors use IS.
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Section 2.2 discussed the constituent parts of strategizing, i.e. MI and knowledge as main 
ingredients of the process. This overview served as a background to the discussion that 
follows in chapter 3 on various aspects of an II as well as various strategies towards IS in 
the context of managerial strategizing work.
The last section reviewed the human agent from business-oriented literature as well as a 
more philosophical-oriented view. The latter perspective challenged the positivist-based 
view on strategizing and actors. Indisputably, different ontological views result in different 
interpretations of reality.
While this discussion seemed to have only emphasized the differences of perspectives on 
the concepts, the actual motivation of this research is to suggest that most of these 
competing perspeaives on strategizing and the human agent may indeed be 
complementary; in other words, we understand them better only when we consider them as 
parts of the same involvement whole. It is hoped to suggest a new angle to view these well- 
established concepts by showing their integrative nature, rather than their separation. The 
next chapter embraces the organizational context in terms of their socio-technical IIs and 
various approaches to information system (IS).
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This chapter reviews key information systems concepts 
in the wider organizational socio-technical context.
3 INTRODUCTION
While chapter 2 addressed the ■what’ (process of strategizing), the why’ (effective and 
efficient decision-making), and the ‘who’ (strategic actors), this chapter concerns the 'how3 in 
terms of the role of IS in the wider organizational context. The multi-disciplinary view 
towards IS invites the inclusion of socio-technical elements of an information 
infrastructure (II). This is argued to provide the context for information and knowledge 
sharing, ongoing learning (OL) and the shaping of organizational memory (OM). 
Organizational culture is also seen as an important influencing element.
An examination of IS in strategizing leads us to refer to deliberate versus emergent uses of 
IS. This topic has been widely discussed in the strategic IS (SIS) literature. Hence, it is 
necessary to introduce the arguments that the SIS is making on IS. While there is an 
attempt to discuss the elements in a linear fashion, the interconnectedness of themes may 
bring up topics whose interrelationships are explored in an intermingle fashion.
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3.1 STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS
A major area in IS has been how to achieve competitive advantage through the strategic 
application of ICTs (Porter & Millar 1985; Barney 1991; Grant 1996a; McFarlan 1984; 
Ciborra 1994). Specifically, the knowledge-based competition encompasses the idea of 
using knowledge as sources of differentiation (Marchand 1998; Grant 1996). The 
ambiguous and intangible nature of knowledge makes its use and management more 
challenging than data and information (cf. chapter 2). Davenport and Prusak (1998) argue 
that information and knowledge are not only embedded in organizations in the form of 
documents or repositories, but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and 
norms. The critical question is how organizations should organize themselves to employ 
existing and new information and knowledge to learn effectively and adapt to changes.
The desire for strategic differentiation concerns the development of resources that are 
valuable, rare (Porter & Millar 1985; Barney 1991), imperfectly imitable, with no 
strategically equivalent substitutes (Andreu & Ciborra 1996). Ciborra (1997) suggests that 
companies should make use of their distinct characteristics, unique sources of practice and 
knowledge so that imitation becomes harder. However, not all managers understand the 
dynamics involved in the flow of information through the organization, and how this 
affects decision-making at higher levels. Especially at global organizations, this is a major 
aspect that requires investment of time, attention, financial recourses, and teamwork of 
experts.
The SIS planning literature argues that the application of IS and technologies may be 
directed towards meeting business objectives as a way to potentially create competitive 
advantage (Earl 1989; Sanchez & Heene 1997; Winter 1988). Specifically, this idea led to 
the notion of ‘strategic alignment’ of an organization’s systems and IT strategies with its 
business strategies (Henderson & Venkatraman 1993; Venkatraman et al 1993; Kearns & 
Lederer 2000). According to Henderson and Venkatraman (1993), the concept of linkage 
has been historically invoked as a metaphor to argue for the integration of business and 
information technology strategies. This implies that competitive strategies and 
organizational infrastructures should ‘fit’ the external and internal factors influencing the 
firm (Chandler 1962, Child 1972, Porter 1980).
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Earl (1989, 1993, 1996) distinguishes between IT and IS strategies. While the former 
focuses on information and systems requirement to meet business objectives, the latter is 
concerned with specifying the technology and delivering relevant applications. Earl argues 
that IS strategy can be conceived as business-led and demand driven, essentially a ‘top- 
down’ process. He argues that IS strategy should be the concern to top managers, not just 
to the IT division. Conversely, IT strategy is seen as a ‘bottom-up’ process, where it is 
more technologically- and supply- driven. This implies that IT strategy depends on the 
already existing IT infrastructures and it is much more within the province of the IT 
directors. The aligning of these IS/IT strategies with business strategies have been 
prophesized to positively influences IS effectiveness (Porter 1991; Porter & Millar 1985; 
Galliers 1991; Ciborra 1997) and to improve business performance (Weill & Broadbent
1998). Conversely, the lack thereof will lead to a failure to leverage IS and hamper 
performance.
IT Infrastructure, IS 
applications and 
services
IS Strategy (What?)
Business-driven
Top-down
Demand-oriented
IT Strategy (How?)
IT-focused
Bottom-up
Supply-oriented
Information and IS 
services requirements
Figure 3.1: Distinction between IS / IT  strategy (Earl 1989)
At the same time, Earl points out some implications that arise in the attempt to align these 
strategies. With regards to the notion of achieving a ‘fit’ between IT strategy and business 
strategy, some IS researchers suggest that it is not appropriate to assume the IS strategic 
alignment will improve IS effectiveness and organizational performance (Hackney et al 
2000). For example, Hackney and colleagues point out a flaw in assumptions that IS/IT 
and business strategies can be aligned in the first place. First, most of the difficulty arises 
from the very nature of strategy itself. Chapter 2 noted strategy as emergent (Mintzberg & 
Waters 1985) and continually changing (Pettigrew 1985). IS strategies are also seen as being 
on-going and processual (Galliers 2004; Ciborra 1997). Conversely, IT applications require 
a strong element of stability and predictability (Hackney et al 2000). Hence, since IT 
strategies are relatively fixed and IS strategies are not, there have been difficulties in
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applying prescriptive IT approaches to a strategic IS and business alignment. The complex 
and diverse nature of the strategy process makes it difficult to achieve an alignment with IT 
strategies in the continuously evolving business environments. Another assumption that 
underlies the strategic alignment is that IS strategy and business strategy are seen as 
different and separate entities. As Hackney and colleagues (2000: 8) put it, IT is seen as 
something which is ‘bolted on’ as opposed to an integral part of business strategy. A 
challenge here lies in providing a transparent relationship between the two, where systems 
are developed at the center of the business.
They further point out an irony around the supply oriented application of strategic IS. 
While strategic IS planning encourages (or assumes) organizational integration, the end 
result is more often a reactive one, to coordinate what results have been achieved rather 
than a proactive one, reaping the rewards of synergy from the integration of business 
processes. Instead of the IT allowing business strategies to flourish, often, it is the IT that 
takes the dominant role and sets the rules. According to Hackney and colleagues, the 
challenge is that the IS/IT strategy itself must be dynamic in order to be congruent with 
the needs of a business strategy. Consequently, if IT systems are not flexible enough they 
will impose constraints to the business strategy process itself, leading to restrictions rather 
than competitive advantage. For example, the adoption of Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) models requires the organization to adapt business strategies to ‘fit in’ with the 
technological infrastructure of i.e. SAP packages. Here, SAP is the component that defines 
the business model and the decision making process in order to fit in the model (Galliers & 
Newell 2003; Newell et al 2003). On a positive note, since ERP are indeed setting the rules 
for how business strategy and the associated IS/IT are to be set, they may provide stability 
to organization.
The implications are often due to the assumption that implementing appropriate IT will 
automatically lead to competitive advantage. When all organizations join the bandwagon, 
however, IT becomes a commodity and as a result, these organizations would need IT for 
mere survival instead of exploiting it for competitive advantage (ibid). Having said that, 
technology, by itself, does not create sustainable competitive advantage (Galliers 1991). 
Hackney and colleagues (2000) argue that it is the process capabilities that should be 
strategic to business, not IS per se.
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To this end, IS perspectives take into account the significance of people as key players in 
the ever-changing socio-economic and technologically environments (Bostrom & Heinen 
1977). The socio-technical approach (Mumford 2000; Monteiro & Hanseth 1996) implies 
that over time, the dynamic interplay between culture and technology should result in a 
socio-technological system that produces certain attitudes and behavioral patterns towards 
organizational knowledge stored in them in different cultures (Ciborra & Andreu 2001; 
Desouza & Evaristo 2003; Davenport & Prusak 2000). Viewing IS as a socio-technical 
phenomenon has implications on the understanding of organizational dynamics and 
associated activities, people, technologies, networks and cultures.
3.1.1 Culture
Culture plays a major role in how information is interpreted, shared, stored as memory, and 
reused in decisions at globally operated organizations. There are many studies on cultural 
influences on organizational processes, and on the way in which people use IS in 
organizations (e.g. Orlikowski 1992). Two main cultural classifications are especially 
emphasized in the literature: organizational culture and national culture. For example, 
Gannon (1994) found that 25 to 50 percent of an employee’s behavior is culturally 
determined. Schein (1985) defines culture as a learned way of perceiving, thinking and 
feeling about problems that is transmitted to organizational members. A widely used 
definition of culture in the IS literature is Hofstede’s (1991) collective programming of the 
mind Hofstede (1980, 1991) asserts that there are several shared values, beliefs and norms 
that are culture specific (ibid). These determine the managerial paradigm, which influence 
decision-making and strategizing styles.
Trompenaars’ work (1993) also identifies a linkage between national culture and how 
decisions are made and at what level in the organization. Generally, whereas cultures that 
are more collectivistic in nature tend be more attached to their roots and rely more on 
other people’s past memories about decisions and experiences, individualistic cultures tend 
to thrive on uncertainty and in starting afresh (Bendixon 1998; Schein 1994).
Hofstede (1991) studied cultural factors that may affect organizational infrastructures 
cross-nationally. When the same information is transmitted between cultures, or even 
within the same culture, some of the details and context of various decisions may likely be
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dropped or changed to suit the telling (Walsh & Ungson 1991). The ability to provide 
meaningful interpretations for patterns of ambiguous information has become ever 
important in the complex multi-cultural organizational context. Hofstede (1980) suggests 
four factors, which may affect values: individuality, masculinity/femininity, uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance. He concluded that to understand why managers make 
decisions affecting the design of organization infrastructures, uncertainty avoidance and power 
distance were important factors (Harvey 1997; Png et al 2001).
Uncertainty avoidance is referred to the extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguous 
situations and have created infrastructures to avoid these situations. These people are said 
to have high needs for security and a strong believe in experts. Hofstede (1980) found that 
this behavior is also prevalent in Germany. Power distance refers to the extent to which less 
powerful members accept the power distributed unequally. High power distance cultures, 
such as France, South Korea and India, organizations tend to have more pyramidal 
structures with focus on task specialization and technical expertise. These are further 
characterized as high level authority centralization and minimal us of IT for information 
sharing. Conversely, cultures with low level of power distance prefer decentralization of 
authority, heavier use of IT for information access, and flatter structures.
Nevertheless, a major challenge lies in creating a knowledge platform and the environment 
in which managers are capable and willing to openly share. Besides different managerial 
mindsets and cultural values, a major challenge in IS lies in reconciling different IS 
strategies, i.e. exploitation and exploration, through knowledge integration. Part of this 
challenge concerns the transferability of knowledge, not only information (Grant 2002). 
This is significant in designing an IS and enabling information infrastructures (IIs). Most 
literature and practice, however, have focused largely on managing explicit knowledge 
(Grover & Davenport 2001). One way is to create collaborative information and 
knowledge infrastructures (Davenport & Prusak 1998, Alavi & Leidner 1999, Mentzas & 
Apostolou 1998). The remaining of the chapter addresses how a context of collaboration 
may emerge with appropriate mechanisms.
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3.2 ENABLING CONTEXT
The IS literature talks about ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ approaches to managing information and 
knowledge context (e.g. Hlupic et al. 2002). The former assumes that knowledge can be 
captured and stored in the organization’s structure and technological systems. The softer 
approaches view organizations as social systems, and claim that knowledge is embedded 
within human minds, with growing attention to social networks and organizational culture, 
i.e. knowledge worker’ (Drucker 1995), ‘social capital’ (Davenport & Prusak 1998), and so 
forth. This section will reflect on both approaches as to how to create the organizational 
environment conducive of knowledge sharing and transfer.
The literature discusses different levels of knowledge transfer: between individuals, from 
individuals to explicit sources, from individuals to groups, between groups and from the 
group to the organization (Alavi & Leidner 2001). There are also various communication 
channels: formal, informal, and personal (context-specific transfer) and impersonal 
(transfer through knowledge repositories) (Baladi 1999). The transfer, sharing and use of 
knowledge takes another dimension of complexity in a global context where cultures and 
attitudes to information and knowing are different (Walsham 2001).
Galliers and Newell (2003) argue that creating conditions for emergence and ongoing 
learning appear to hold considerable promise for successful knowledge sharing. Knowledge 
sharing (Hansen 2002; Hansen et al 1999; Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995) is the exchange of 
tacit and explicit knowledge between individuals, groups, departments, and organizations. 
The premise refleas Polanyi’s (1973) argument that there are many things we do not know 
that we know’. Considering that managers know more than they can say (Polanyi 1966), 
organizations seek to create the contextual requirements that lets them say most of what 
they know. Berger and Luckmann (1967) acknowledge that the climate (i.e. historical 
context) and social context play a major role in influencing people’s judgments, behavior, 
and attitudes from which they construa social knowledge as a reality (Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995). Similarly, the concept of bricolage (Ciborra 1992) and improvisation (Orlikowski
1996) imply the same message and that participation and inclusiveness are key to 
information and knowledge sharing processes.
72
The process of integrating and sharing knowledge requires an infrastructure of 
organizational formal and informal processes. Infrastructures are often experienced as big, 
heavy, invisible and stable (Hanseth 2004). Ciborra (2000) defines IIs as ‘integrated sets of 
equipments, systems, applications, processes, and people dedicated to the processing and 
communication of information’ (Ciborra 2000, p.l). Ciborra and Hanseth (2000) describe 
II as puzzles of interdependence and interweaving of people, systems and processes that 
set the culture bed of infrastructure. Furthermore, Hanseth (2004) argues that 
infrastructures are networks of knowledge, where knowledge is complex, entangled and 
intertwined with many other entities within a large and heterogeneous network. He uses the 
Internet as a paradigm example to illustrate knowledge as a network. The Internet is seen 
as a huge number of computers linked together. As the technology is used more in a variety 
of ways, it matures and grows and becomes more attractive to more users. With more 
users, new ways of employing the technology are discovered, even more users are attracted. 
Over time, users’ requirements and needs change and new features are added to the 
technology (i.e. the Internet). Due to the large scale, the link between them and the 
richness of data, standards are seen as crucial (ibid).
Hanseth (2004) describes all networks (knowledge, technology, organizational structure, 
work processes and activities) as interdependent and linked together into ‘an 
interdependent and interconnected network having an enormous inertia’ (ibid: 111). 
Gradually, network transforms into an infrastructure that supports large numbers of 
activities for ever growing users across the world (ibid). Hence, overt time, changing 
paradigms lead to new infrastructures and new standards. He views an infrastructure as a 
standardized network that plays the role of shared resources for supporting a wide range of 
activities for a community (ibid).
In order to facilitate a supportive infrastructure for organizing and sharing knowledge, 
many companies integrate their knowledge and embrace building social networks, 
knowledge management, and OM systems (Alavi & Leidner 1999; Walsh & Ungson 1991; 
Jennex & Olfrnan 2002). Early adopters followed approaches with varying emphasis on 
technology, cultural, organizational and managerial issues (Mentzas et al 2001). Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) argue that the key building blocks of a socio-technical infrastructure 
that enables a knowledge sharing environment are structure, IT and cultural issues with 
emphasis on processes, people and leadership. Additionally, Hiebeler (1996) highlights the
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role of leadership and measurements. Leadership from senior managers is seen as the 
engine for providing leadership, structural arrangements, and encouragement in bringing 
people together, reward them for sharing knowledge, and provide metrics to demonstrate 
the value added.
The discussion around knowledge as infrastructure regards it as highly systemic, where 
individual pieces are linked together into complex structures in various ways. The systemic 
aspect, or the structural characteristic of knowledge, plays an important role in knowledge 
processes (ibid). Advocates to the structure-based perspective argue that successful 
management of organizational knowledge is subject to organizational design and 
supportive structures. Organizational structure refers to the grouping of accountabilities 
that define the position and relationship between members of the organization (Saint-Onge
1996). Organizational forms range from hierarchical bureaucracy, meritocracies, to matrix, 
flat, networked, or virtual, each with either centralized or decentralized governance 
approaches. Consequently, organizations whose strategy, processes, and culture are based 
around their structure take different approaches to managing their information and 
knowledge flow. Most of the existing literature agrees that the traditional bureaucratic, 
hierarchical model of organizations is ill-suited to harnessing tacit knowledge, learning, and 
innovation (Quinn 1992; Grant 1996). Instead, an organic model based on decentralized 
problem solving, horizontal coordination and cross-functional team working is advocated 
as the most appropriate organizational form for the creation of tacit knowledge and 
learning (Lam 1998).
The next two sections refer to ITs and social systems for creating an enabling context.
3.2.1 The Role of Technology
Most information and knowledge infrastructures have been based on IT tools to take care 
of knowledge processes, with Online Technologies (OT) being the most widely used 
technologies, i.e. the Internet and Intranets (Haldin-Herrgard 2000; Walsham 2001). Some 
other tools include Management Information Systems (MIS), Decision Support Systems 
(DDS) and Executive Information Systems (EIS). In response to the demands of the 
knowledge economy, however, the IT-market developed new technologies such as 
Knowledge Management Systems (KMS), Organizational Memory Information Systems
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(OMIS), and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems to creating, integrating, 
organizing and sharing organizational ‘knowledge’, besides ‘information’ or ‘data’ (Alavi & 
Leidner 1999). Such systems may prove more fruitful for information that is more 
technical and objective in nature (i.e. engineering drawings, financial information), rather 
than tacit and experience-based knowledge.
At the same time, digital systems have gained considerable criticism. There are at least two
main challenges concerning IT-based infrastructures. First, IT strategies can be imitated by
competitors, which pose additional IT risks, insecurity, and dependence on the IT industry.
Also, there are limits of codification strategies (Walsham 2001). Codified information has
less competitive value than the tacit knowledge of social actors as a source of innovation
and knowledge creation. Another criticism revolves around the intangible nature of tacit
knowledge and the attempt to objectify and codify it into IS. Critics argue that tacit
knowledge is embedded in contexts of social action and objectifying and storing it in
repositories takes away its inherent value (Marshall & Brady 2001). How useful will that
knowledge be once it has been converted? Are ICT systems capable of capturing and
diffusing the tacit value of knowledge and provide them to decision makers? According to
Galliers and Newell (2003:165):
Current emphasis on the strategic importance of knowledge is not necessarily best 
met through the development of ever-more sophisticated IT solutions that can 
encourage the sharing, creation and storage of knowledge.
This research advocates that the knowledge that differentiates companies from one another 
is mostly tacit in nature and embedded within human minds, processes, relationships, 
services and products. Ciborra and Hanseth (2000) acknowledge that the obsession with 
top-down control of IIs leads businesses to the actual drifting of the infrastructure itself. 
This has to do with the complexity of the internal context, business processes and 
practices, as well as the changing external environment. Assuming that IS were that 
advanced, the reliance on ICTs may lead to an ‘easy way out’ attitude and prevent top 
managers to remain innovative, open minded, or reflective. Once managers have 
acquainted themselves with those tools, they may not question the underlying assumptions 
of that knowledge output because of time pressure and forgotten personal memory about 
the purpose of that knowledge. Such criticism focuses on a lack of interpretative 
conceptualization of inter-subjective understanding of tacit knowledge and its embedded­
ness in contexts of social action (Marshall & Brady 2001).
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Communication is a complex and multi-dimensional process and tacit knowledge can be 
shared most effectively in the real world (as opposed to virtual) to achieve an interpretation 
and mutual understanding (Walsham 2001). Specifically, Schramm (1955) refers to 
communication as the process of establishing a commonness or oneness of thought 
between a sender and receiver. Here, the processes entail tacit knowledge, experience and 
the intelligence for know-what, know-how, know-when, and know-who to exploit on 
certainties and at the same time maneuver around instabilities, and fast changing internal 
and external environments.
Moreover, communication involves the sharing and transfer of knowledge among cultures 
(Soley & Pandya 2003). Critics argue that they offer limited capabilities when it comes to 
communication of knowledge between different locations that involve some level of 
tacitness. Cross-cultural involves the interaction of people, who have different approaches 
to sense-making and sense-giving (Walsham 2001), and whose tacit knowledge has been 
developed differently (Hustad 2004). Hence, cultural differences should be taken seriously 
in matters of information and knowledge use; specifically, in decision-making processes, 
where sense-making and frames of references are mirrored in people’s interpretation and 
communication. On this cross-cultural level, Soley and Pandya (2003) state that computer 
mediated communication (CMC) technology may in fact increase cultural differences and 
set greater communication barriers, as people from different nations have different ways of 
interpreting messages. ICTs do not fill the gap of knowledge communication in 
organizations, especially not multi-nationally. Hiebeler (1996) points out that approximately 
80 percent of the largest spenders on IT are not politically ready for knowledge sharing 
technologies.
To ensure long-term success and consistency, it is argued that organizations need to use IS 
where technology is more ‘human-centered’ (Hiebeler 1996). The effectiveness of IT tools 
not only depends on additional skills and literacy, but also on a suitable social structure and 
fit with the business strategy (among others). Hence, a primary goal of an information and 
knowledge infrastructure strategy should be to create a social structure which enables the 
process of learning for continuous improvement (Morosini 2000). The next section 
considers some relevant aspects of social networks.
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3.2.2 Social Networks
Advocates to the social dimension (e.g, Mitchell 1983) have argued that networks are a 
form of organizational structure because they are socially constructed and have boundaries. 
They are viewed as a specific set of linkages among a defined set of actors to interpret their 
social behavior. In this context, the term ‘network’ refers to human interaction in social 
settings (cf. also Hanseth).
Boisot (1998) illustrates the concept of the social embeddedness of knowledge, where 
behavior and institutions are affected by networks of social relations (Granovetter 1985). 
At the epistemological level, the notion underlines the tacit nature of human knowledge 
and the dynamic relationship between individual and collective learning. At the 
organizational level, it focuses on how the firm’s context and organizing principles shape 
the social structure of coordination, the behavioral routines and work roles of 
organizational members. According to Lam (1998), the structure of coordination 
determines the capacity of the organization in integrating different types of knowledge and 
shapes the nature of the social relationships. Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) phrase this 
idea in building an effective ‘social ecology’. They refer to organizations as social systems, a 
comprehensive whole in which various interdependent elements interact with one another, 
rather than a random collection of isolated elements.
The discussion around creating a network of communities has led to several ideas and 
concepts, such as communities of knowing (Boland & Tenkasi 1995), communities of 
practice (Wenger 1998), communities of practitioners (Bladder 1995), and micro­
communities of knowledge (Von Krogh et al 2000). The commonality of these concepts is 
that all consist of members who want to share information, insight and experience about 
the area of their expertise and of common interest. For example, creating communities of 
special expertise (Wenger & Snyder 2000) may bring the knowledge bearers and seekers 
closer so that they can exchange knowledge and use the right expertise in their decision 
making.
Hustad (2004) refers to creating ‘communities of knowing’ to help global firms reproduce 
their core competencies and corporate identity regardless of geographical distance and 
cultural differences (Boland & Tenkasi 1995: 55). This is not an easy task, however; ‘global
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contexts increase the complexity and difficulties to apply appropriate corporate and local 
management policies suitable to a global workforce’. The organization’s governance 
structure, its social structure, as well as IT infrastructures have considerable influence on 
building networks for effective knowledge strategies.
The following section will reflect on an integrated framework developed by the University 
of St. Gallen’s research competency center (Back et al 2007). This framework will be 
illustrated (as related to this thesis) to consider some of the issues in relations to enabling 
socio-technical environments. The purpose of such systems is to foster knowledge sharing, 
efficient learning, and effective strategizing. The Knowledge Source Competency Centre has been 
pursuing extensive research with industry on developing an integrated approach to 
information and knowledge networks. Based on a ‘Reference Model’ (below), it shows a 
way to analyze companies’ approaches to capture, accumulate and share knowledge. The 
figure below illustrates suggested key elements in building a knowledge network (ibid).
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Figure 3.2: Knowledge Network Reference Model. Source: Knowledge Source St. Gallen, 
Competency Centre (Back et al 2007)
Knowledge Networks are conceptualized on three levels: (i) facilitating conditions for 
social relationships to take place, (ii) knowledge work processes in terms of actors and their 
relationships, and (iii) knowledge network architecture as tools for building social 
relationships. The Reference Model is an example of the components, and specifically their 
relationships, involved when organizations consider creating conditions for knowledge 
sharing.
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The first level, facilitating conditions, implies that knowledge work processes take place in a 
cross-divisional and dynamic manner. In order to develop high performing Knowledge 
Networks, they have to be synchronized by facilitating conditions on the structural (e.g. 
organizational structures) and cultural (e.g. corporate culture) dimensions. In order to 
facilitate that, there are enabling and inhibiting environments for crating and transferring 
knowledge. This leads to the second level, knowledge work processes, which refer to the 
capturing, transferring, sharing, using, and creating knowledge (ibid). At this point, 
knowledge should not be managed per se, but rather it needs to be connected to business 
drivers. Finally, the Knowledge Network architecture comprises of the tool-set within 
social relationships that actors use in work processes. Organizational tools consist of roles 
and ICTs, e.g. groupware-enabled data warehouse, to improve work processes.
The premise for these tools is to facilitate knowledge transfer, sharing and creation. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that with socialization in small groups the quality of 
information sharing becomes higher and more outcome driven than in larger groups. This 
is due to the larger number of participants and broader areas of focus, where the accuracy 
of the information shared may drift and become not as useful to individual participants 
specific needs. In practice, the manner in which such a Knowledge Network may be 
constructed will depend on knowledge processes. Knowledge processes, however, are 
dictated by the business strategy. Hence, there is an effort (at least conceptually) to align 
business strategies with knowledge networks of an organization. Nevertheless, social 
systems are neither mechanistic nor rational. The effort for more integrated and 
streamlined infrastructures is a continuous challenge. According to Garvin (1997: 20), ‘if 
people don’t want to share, they are not going to do it even if you have the best technology 
in the world. People won’t share if they don’t see what’s in it for them.’ The highly 
context-specific and time-sensitive nature of knowledge makes it difficult to be objectified 
and converted into codifiable formats. The next sections shed light on elements of an 
enabling social system as a way to facilitate knowledge sharing and organizational ongoing 
learning.
In environments of uncertainty and discontinuous change, a climate of organization-wide 
participation and collaborativeness are the first steps towards creating willingness of 
members to share their knowledge (Gupta & Govindarajan 2000). The IS literature 
identifies determining factors that may enable the context for knowledge sharing and
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transfer between actors in organizations. Many researchers claim that organizational culture 
provides the enabling context for teamwork, knowledge sharing, continuous collective 
learning and the cultivation of collective intellectual capital (Davenport et al 1998, Alavi & 
Leidner 1999). The link with culture implies that the values and beliefs that organizational 
members practice should create openness and trust that will strongly influence their 
communication (Gruber 2001). Further to this note, Hamel (2000) argues that the 
penetrability of the social context among strategic actors is perceived as important in 
determining the degree of openness and trust.
Stata (1989) defines openness as the partners’ willingness to put all the cards on the table 
and eliminate hidden agendas. Badaracco (1991) states that openness is paramount in 
knowledge sharing. A lack of openness would be seen as a major constraint in hampering 
learning the knowledge embedded in the culture of the organization, specifically in the 
minds of senior/experienced managers. A perceived lack of openness would lead to 
deteriorating level of trust among actors (Davenport & Prusak 1998). The channels 
through which actors interact have large implications for the perceived openness among 
companies (Von Krogh et al 2000). For example, the richness of media determines the 
extent to which knowledge is successfully transferred (ibicl). Media richness is discussed in 
two dimensions: the variety of cues the medium can convey and the rapidity of feedback it 
can provide (Daft & Huber 1987). When actors face ambiguous situations, face-to-face 
interaction presents the least possibility of misinterpretation of a message. According to 
Trevino and colleagues (1987: 557): Meaning must be created and negotiated as individuals 
look to others for cues and feedback to help interpret the message’.
Studies of organizational culture view organizations as epistemological systems (Nonaka
1994), or a shared meaning system, where the organization learns, changes, and evolves 
through social interactions. Because of the implicit nature of the culture element, it tends 
to be taken for granted in practice. According to Saint-Onge (1996), an organization’s 
culture is a powerful determinant and shaper of the businesses strategies adopted. 
Literature treats culture as a set of behavior that is a visible manifestation of mental 
assumptions (Schein 1990). Johnson (1992) defines culture as being manifested in rituals 
and routines, stories, myths and symbols, power structures, organizational structure, and 
control systems. According to Schein (1990: 111):
80
Culture can defined as a pattern of basic assumptions, invented, 
discovered, or developed by a given group, as it learns to cope with its 
problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked 
well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, is to be taught to new 
members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to 
those problems.
Here, the process of knowledge sharing is determined by values embedded in the social 
structure of organizations. Since values are part of tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995), and tacit knowledge is unique to each and every individual, people ‘see’ things 
differently in the same context and organize their perceptions by their values (Davenport & 
Prusak 1998).
Knowledge sharing takes place when there is a principally similar understanding of the 
same concept between the exchange agents. It must be expressed in words or symbols that 
are common to the social domain of both employees (Zeleny 1989). What provides the 
means for common understanding is a common mental framework and mindset that leads 
to the use of a ‘common language’ (Nonaka 1994). This may happen consciously and 
purposefully, or accidentally (Davenport & Prusak 1998; Hamel & Prahalad 1989).
Skyrme and Amidon (1997) recognize that changing and managing people’s behaviors by 
implementing a knowledge sharing culture represents a major challenge (Desouza & 
Evaristo 2003). It is not sufficient to simply connect people with information by means of 
technological or social mechanisms, but to develop a synergistic environment conducive to 
individual knowledge sharing. To this end, Morosini (2000) states that the main challenge 
of global knowledge coordination is to recognize the diverse backgrounds of organizational 
members and to facilitate the necessary infrastructure for effective communication between 
all managerial and organizational levels. Following this premise, he introduced five 
elements that are important in enabling the context for knowledge sharing: social players, 
social networks, open business values, Gnostic rituals, guiding myths. These are briefly 
mentioned below as a general reference.
Social players are referred to as a company’s employees, customers, suppliers, 
allies, as well as competitors and other key stakeholders. Morosini (2000) argues that 
companies should identify key social players and build a team of leaders who proactively 
reinforce learning throughout the organization. There is agreement in the management 
literature that knowledge sharing and organizational learning requires continuous attention
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from senior management. Gilbert (2000: 112) argues that the design, creation and 
maintenance of a ‘learning architecture’ are the job of the CEO. All together, this may be 
easier said than done. Organizations are complex systems, where the intentions and actions 
of players are not always predictable or visible, making the job of the CEO that much 
harder.
Social networks are primarily human-driven and IT-enabled. Examples range 
from informal networks to pass on information to project teams, to occasional formal 
work group meetings, and communities of practice (e.g. Wegner & Snydner 2000), where 
the goal is to build and exchange knowledge interactively. Networks are important 
mechanisms to create and maintain relationships between members for knowledge transfer 
and learning processes. Even if social players possessed high personal market value in 
terms of skills and experience, they would not contribute to organizational learning if they 
do not share their expertise.
Although networks facilitated through IT can be valuable to some degree, tacit knowledge 
and experience is best shared in regular social settings. Nevertheless, companies should 
strike a balance between IT-enabled and human-enabled networking according to needs 
and relevance. The effective use of social networks requires a certain supportive attitude to 
share their knowledge openly instead of having competitive behavior and retaining their 
information for their own good.
Open business values (OBVs) implies that social players ‘share, enact and 
communicate to others basic principles of behavior which encourage learning, sharing of 
information and transparent communication’ (2000: 250). Interestingly, most successful 
companies are very explicit about communicating the desired company values throughout 
the firm. OBVs can be reinforced by creating the suitable mentality and action-oriented 
communication through company-wide practices and personal development as part of 
internal knowledge management strategy.
Gnostic rituals refer to specific formalized actions that continuously reinforce 
organizational values. Morosini (2000) argues that these should be unique to organizations 
and difficult to replicate or transfer. Some examples are personnel development programs, 
rotations, performance evaluation practices and international assignments, regular 
meetings, and other communication mechanisms. It is believed that systematic routines for
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measuring the performance of groups are fundamental to uncover opportunities to share 
knowledge and best practice (Gupta et al. 2000). Many companies rely on group-based 
incentives to encourage eagerness for proactive sharing. These formalized measurement 
routines are in line with the organization’s culture and the underlying values.
Guiding myths are related to the drivers of organizational culture and the
elements that give organizations a collective identity and sense for self-perception. Guiding
myths are defined as (Morosini 2000: 256):
...the origin of every Gnostic ritual...a collection of heroes, metaphors, 
events and expressions that express uniquely a company’s historic raison 
d’etre, the essential elements of its founding leaders’ visions of the future, and 
its particular legacy of values and lasting contributions.
Morosini (2000) claims that these principles have proven to be main ingredients for 
success over time, which tend to become symbols of success and become engraved in the 
organization’s memory that affect its vision for the future. For example, they are used to 
continuously fill the employees’ minds with success stories and legacies to create guiding 
myths (ibid).
The next section synthesis our discussion so far by shedding light on some of the strategies 
to IS and knowledge in the literature.
3.2.3 Information Systems and Knowledge Strategies
This section provides examples of two approaches towards managing and organizing 
information and knowledge, keeping in mind the exploration and exploitation strategies. 
They are discussed in relation to process- and product-based approaches (Mentaz 2001), 
and personalization and codification (Hansen et al 1999).
The process-centred approach is characterized as being people-driven and treats knowledge 
as a social communication process. Knowledge is closely tied to the person who developed 
it and is shared mainly through person-to-person contacts. IT tools are viewed as 
interactive and used in the communication process. This is also referred to as the 
personalization’ approach (Hansen et al. 1999). On the other hand, the product-centred 
approach is described as document-driven and focuses on knowledge artefacts, their
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creation, storage and reuse in computer-based corporate memories. This is also referred to 
as the ‘codification’ approach by Hansen et al (1999), as illustrated below:
Codification Personalization
Provide high quality, reliable and 
fast IS implementation by reusing 
codified knowledge
Competitive strategy
Analytically rigorous high level 
problems solving by channeling 
individual expertise
Reuse Economics: large teams; one­
time investment in knowledge asset 
for future reuse
Economic /  Business 
Model
Expert economics: small teams work 
towards creating unique and customized 
solutions
People-to-Documents: e-document 
systems codify, store and 
disseminate knowledge
KM strategy
Person-to-Person: develop networks for 
linking people so that tacit knowledge 
can be shared
Invest heavily in IT, the goal is to 
connect people with reusable 
codified knowledge
IT
Invest moderately in It, the goal is to 
facilitate conversations and the 
exchange of tacit knowledge
Train people in groups and though 
computer-based distance learning. 
Reward people for using and 
contributing to document databases
Human Resources
Unique recruiting and training through 
one-on-one mentoring. Reward people 
for directly sharing knowledge with 
others
Figure 33: Two approaches to Knowledge Management Strategy (Hansen et al 1999)
While Hansen et al (1999) refer to this conceptualization as ‘knowledge management 
strategies’, this research finds the classification of the two approaches useful in relating 
them to the theoretical framework (see chapter 4). Hence, the table will be revisited in later 
chapters. Further to Hansen et al (1999) argument, due to the different nature of problems 
and cases in different sectors, i.e. each offering different solutions, the process of managing 
and (re)using information and knowledge becomes different. For example, companies that 
sell standard solutions which require tapping into their existing codified knowledge stored 
in knowledge networks and repositories to retrieve solution based information. Other 
companies, which sell tailored solutions, require networks that are person-to-person to 
create a solution for highly specific client problems. For example, the codification strategy 
is more relevant to the software industry, where practices are on the operational rather than 
the strategic level. Due to the relatively low context dependence, their experiences are 
easier to categorize and formalized into explicit formats. Although they also stress social 
networks, the use of advanced IT-based systems is seen as more appropriate to capture and 
disseminate knowledge. Management tends to be centralized and connections are primarily 
established through large central organizations (i.e. knowledge centers) that synthesize and 
distribute the firm’s knowledge. These examples become relevant later on in this research.
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Similarly, Sarvary (1999) talks about the bottom-up, decentralized, and the top-down, 
centralized approach. The former approach is typical in firms that have loose coordination 
of processes and operate in self-organized teams to tackle problems. Again, this is because 
of the context-dependent nature and strategic orientation of their work that surrounds a lot 
of the tacit knowledge and experience, which cannot be codified. Hence, due to the 
complexity of high-level management decisions, solutions and problems are best 
approached by focusing on connecting people more efficiently, rather than focusing on 
synthesizing knowledge. An advantage of centralized systems is the visibility of knowledge 
inflow and the opportunity for visionary breakthroughs. Disadvantages include the high 
expenses associated with ICT tools, the problem of measuring the real benefits, high 
monitoring costs, and lack of tight control over processes. These investments in large are 
based on ‘faith’ and are therefore risky (Sarvary 1999). Another challenge is building an 
explicit culture that fits the organizational knowledge network structure. Decentralized 
systems, however, tend to be self-regulatoiy because the culture necessary to support these 
networks tends to evolve from the very philosophy of the system (ibid).
The premise of creating an information and knowledge infrastructure is that the ways in 
which knowledge is used and shared shape organizational memory (OM), and therefore 
may influence future decisions. A critical concern for practitioners remains how to 
institutionalize individual tacit knowledge to secure the intangible assets that otherwise 
would remain hidden (Zack 1999). In relation to this concern, the next section discusses 
organizational learning and memory.
3.3 ONGOING LEARNING & ORGANIZATIONAL MEMORY
The concept of organizational learning (OL) is based on the work of Argyris and Schon 
(1978) and Senge (1990). The literature on OL (Levitt & March 1988) specifically 
emphasizes the importance of tacit knowledge in collective learning (Nonaka & Takeuchi 
1995; Spender & Grant 1996), which seeks to understand the nature of knowledge and 
organizational learning from a pluralistic epistemological perspective. According to Choo 
(1998), organizations create, organize, and process information to generate new knowledge 
through learning. These activities should enable organizations to develop new capabilities,
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products and services and improve organizational processes. Continuous learning plays an 
important role in the process of creating organizational knowledge (Hiebeler 1996).
Ongoing learning depends much on the flow of knowledge between individuals, teams and 
subsidiaries. The cognitive view on OL emphasizes ‘mental models’ (fohnson-Laird 1983), 
where individuals create and manipulate analogies in their minds. What seems to matter is 
not ‘reality’ but perceptions of reality (Baets 1998). According to Senge (1990), mental 
models are deeply held internal images and represent a person’s view of the world (see also 
chapter 2). Senge relates the process of individual knowledge creation, mental models and 
learning to organizational knowledge creation (also Nonaka et al 1994), corporate mental 
models, and organizational learning.
In order for knowledge flows to be effective, the ‘absorptive capacity’ of the subsidiary 
becomes crucial (Mudambi & Navarra 2004). Cohen and Levinthal (1990) refer to this as 
the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, and to use it for 
commercial value. Advocates of more holistic approaches (e.g. Levitt & March 1988; 
Senge 1990; Popper & Lipshitz 2000) argue that given the appropriate culture and reward 
system, combined with suitable infrastructures, innovation by tinkering is created which 
leads to improved experimentation, knowledge sharing, and OL may flourish. Tinkering, or 
the bottom-up approach to knowledge transfer may be effective, however, it has been a 
great challenge in practice. Galliers (1993) points out the difficulties and consequences of 
tinkering for strategic gains and argues for appropriate mechanisms to permit the ideas 
initiated at the base to reach the top of the hierarchical structure.
3.3.1 Organizational Memory
Competitiveness and learning require communication among members of the organization, 
improved dissemination of knowledge among its members (Kogut & Zander 1992), and 
knowledge integration (Grant 1996) across departments, business units and internal 
boundaries. Retaining organizational knowledge becomes especially important to decision­
makers when industry turn-over is high and individuals leave the company, along with all 
the information, skills, contacts, and tacit knowledge that they possess (Weick 1995). OM 
concerns how to collect, store, and provide access to experience, skills and know-how. It
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implies that stored information from an organization’s history can be brought to bear on 
present decisions (Walsh & Ungson 1991). OM is not studied in isolation or within a single 
division, but part of the whole organizations with all the dynamics and uncertainties of 
social reality.
Notably, Walsh and Ungson (1991) distinguish between decision information and memory 
and note that both can be mistakenly interchanged in the context of acquisition and 
retrieval. Decision information refers to ‘cues perceived by individuals as reducing 
equivocality’ (Shannon & Weaver 1949), where as memory refers to stored information 
about a decision stimulus and response that comes to bear on present decisions (ibid). 
They state that the difference between information and memory lies in their temporal 
qualities, as well as their uses in organizations (ibid). Advocates of OM emphasize the 
benefits of using already established resources in making more effective decisions. It has 
been argued that the ‘past events, promises, goals, assumptions, and behaviors’ that are 
stored in the organization’s memory (March & Olsen 1976: 62-3) may shape future 
decisions. Walsh and Ungson (1991) argue that OM is most beneficial when it is integrated 
in decision-making processes in a balanced, purposeful, controlled and conscious manner. 
Neustadt and May (1986) suggest that OM can be most helpful in early stages of decision­
making, however, when the similarities and differences of past and the present are being 
assessed.
At the same time, there are sufficient opposing arguments that view memory as a ‘pest’ 
(Weick 1979a: 221) and discourage its use in present decisions to avoid re-occurrence of 
past errors. Opponents emphasize the potential constraining role of OM, especially in the 
early stages of decision-making processes, where it may create biases around idea 
generation, situation evaluation and making strategic choices (March 1978; Nystrom & 
Starbuck 1984; Weick 1979). More specifically, OM has been criticized for inhibiting OL by 
promoting a habit or culture of single looped learning, by which the status quo is 
maintained (March 1978; Argyris & Schon 1978). On the individual level, Argyris and 
Schon (1978) among others, argue that individuals in an organization retain information 
based on their own direct experiences and observations and interpret it according to their 
own assumptions (Brief & Downey 1983), values (Beyer 1981), and articulated beliefs 
(Sproull 1981). Walsh (1988) notes that individuals create belief structures in an 
information environment, where these often blind them from making decisions that lead to
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organizational effectiveness. Similarly, Nystrom and Starbuck (1984: 53) warn that potential 
‘encased learning’ produces ‘blindness and rigidity that may breed full-blown crises’. 
Kantrow (1987) argues that that the biases and blindness created by seeing the present and 
future through the understanding of past may create a corporate tradition, constraining 
new problem definition, alternative generation, evaluation and decision choices.
On the other hand, while reliance on the past may produce blinding encased learning, a 
cautious appreciation for the past can enhance the vision of a current decision situation. 
When new decisions can be imbued with the tradition and legitimacy of the past, they are 
less likely to be rejected (Kantrow 1987). Recognizing this, Wilkins and Bristow (1987: 227) 
imply to ‘learn to change by honoring the past’. Hence, re-using information from OM has 
a significant bearing on future decisions -  for the better or worst.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
The aim of this chapter has been to introduce key concepts in the IS literature with regards 
to creating an enabling context for knowledge sharing and transfer. It was pointed out that 
what leads to exploit an IT opportunity is not only technological feasibility, but moreover, 
the prevailing internal competences, management culture and experience through non- 
technological means (Hackney et al. 2000; Galliers 2007).
Organizations were described as dynamic human activity systems, which encompass data, 
information, knowledge, IT and social systems. These activity systems become complicated 
when it is experience-based personal knowledge that is being used, organized and shared. 
The nature of IIs was discussed from a socio-technical perspective with an emphasis on 
social systems as a key enabling element to facilitate effective knowledge sharing. It was 
argued that a critical enabling factor is to create a knowledge sharing context through 
appropriate infrastructures supported by knowledge networks, technologies, culture and 
leadership (e.g. Walsham 2001; Hanseth 2004; Galliers 2004; Boland 1995). Moreover, it 
was argued that the exploitation and exploration of organizational knowledge for effective 
decision-making requires an integrated and interactive approach, whereby ICTs may act as 
powerful, however not sole, facilitators.
The final section reflected on organizational learning and memory in how they may 
influence decision-making process. OM was discussed as useful depending on the type of 
knowledge, the organizational context and purpose. It was argued that architectural 
requirements for building a knowledge infrastructure should only be regarded as enabler of 
a greater context of a knowledge sharing culture. This chapter also pointed out that 
organizational challenges with regards to using information and knowledge have not 
disappeared with advanced ICTs, but rather evolved to different kinds of challenges that 
need to be coped with. Recognizing this has larger implications on IS in the manner in 
which they are perceived, used, and managed.
The next chapter introduces the conceptual framework in this research and outlines the 
methodology
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This chapter introduces the theoretical framework and outlines the 
methodology. Interpretivism and the hermeneutic circle are used 
as away to reach explanation. Qualitative methods of data collection 
are interviews and on-site observation at two case companies.
4 INTRODUCTION
The first section of this chapter introduces the theoretical framework. The methodology 
section follows, which outlines the philosophical underpinnings of this research. The final 
section describes the data collection methods and addresses some of the associated 
challenges.
4.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK & RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to explore the ways in which managers leverage 
management information (MI) and knowledge through various forms of IS in everyday 
strategizing processes. The IS strategizing framework (Galliers & Newell 2003) is chosen as 
a suitable conceptual framework to guide the research process. The theoretical framework 
(see figure 4.2) captures recent developments in strategic management and strategic IS (SIS) 
thinking. This will be applied in the context of competitive strategizing at two global
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companies. The main components of the framework that are considered in this research 
have been discussed in chapters 2 and 3. These are the (i) approaches towards IS, in terms 
of exploitation and exploration strategies, and the (ii) socio-technical elements of 
Information Infrastructures (II) of organizations. While the human agent is not an explicit 
part of the framework, it will become an important part of the research as we shall see. 
Notably, the research refers to the human agent also as ‘strategic actors’, ‘strategizer’, or 
managers/advisors (in reference to the case studies). Below is an illustration of how 
chapters 2 and 3 set the background to the theoretical framework:
Arrows indicate 
The use/flow of 
information & 
knowledge by 
human agents in 
strategizing
Strategizing 
process & 
Human agents 
(cf. Chapter 2)
IS & II 
Socio-technical 
context 
(cf. Chapter 3)
Figure 4.1: Illustrating the research context - Information and knowledge flow between 
strategic actors and various forms of organizational information systems
Chapter 3 positioned the human agent in the socio-technical organizational system, an 
environment in which social networks, information, knowledge and technological 
platforms, and political inertia interact and shape one another (Ciborra 1994; Star & 
Ruhleder 1996). The chapter made special reference to the role of ICTs and social 
networks and how these may influence the ongoing learning and memory of organizations. 
Organizational culture was discussed as an important element of the shaping of OM. The 
purpose of an enabling II was to create greater efficiency and effectiveness (Newell et al 
2003; Adler et al 1999; Daft 1998) in decision-making processes. To this end, exploitation 
and exploration IS and knowledge strategies (Zack 1999) were mentioned as ways to 
organize, share and transfer MI and knowledge.
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ON-GOING 
LEARNING & REVIEW
Figure 4.2: Theoretical framework - IS Strategizing Framework (Galliers & Newell 2003)
The research conceives organizations as holistic, dynamic, and interactive. In this context, 
the framework argues for building a collaborative environment with the support of internal 
and external arrangements. Collaborative arrangements are seen to have socio-technical 
characteristics. These are suggested to provide an enabling environment in which 
information and knowledge may be leveraged to help create competitive advantage 
(Galliers & Newell 2003). The collaborative nature of strategies implies that, overtime, the 
boundary of the organization becomes increasingly porous due to continuous interactions 
between internal and external collaborations, e.g. business alliances and virtual partnerships. 
The framework addresses fast changing internal and external environments with the 
‘change management strategy’ component. This particular component will be considered as 
an implicit and inevitable part of IS and strategizing processes, rather than a direct study 
thereof. Furthermore, while the framework has originated from the SIS literature, this 
thesis is not about SIS. It is about exploring how various forms of IS (which may or many 
not include strategic IS) are used in strategizing. Nevertheless, it will be seen in the case 
studies.
92
The table below outlines the key components used to reach explanation:
IS strategizing in the context of 
business strategizing
Exploitation/Deliberate view 
Exploration/Emergent view
Use of different forms of IS in the process of decision 
making and business strategizing
Organisational Information 
Infrastructures
Collaborative communication arrangements in the 
socio-technical environment of a global organization, i.e. 
presence of ICTs and social systems in which data, 
information and knowledge are embedded.
Strategizers /  Strategic Actors
Not explicitly illustrated by the 
framework
Consideration of human agency, i.e. senior managers 
engaging in the strategizing aspects of business 
development with possible cross-functional and cross- 
cultural interactions
Figure 4.3: Key components of analysis
The framework views IIs as platforms with socio-technical properties that help to provide 
an enabling environment. The concept of II was discussed in chapter 3 with emphasis on 
the need for efficiency as well as flexibility to cope with conflicting demands, unpredictable 
business environments and fast changing information and knowledge requirements 
(Galliers 2004). Furthermore, the framework accounts for the dichotomy 
exploration/exploitation strategies. The exploitation strategy addresses deliberate 
approaches to IS as an attempt by managers to impose rules and ‘best practice’ on the 
organization to revolutionize work processes. Examples are based on the Porterian school 
of thought and similar top-down perspectives, where firms embrace technological systems 
based on Web technologies to integrate information across platforms. In deliberate terms, 
functions are organized around ICT ‘solutions’ to include a large variety of systems, such as 
Internet, corporate intranets, extranets, and browsers to data warehouses, software filters 
and agents. The assumption is that making knowledge widely accessible allows managers to 
cope with rapid change, turnover, customer integration, and other business purposes (Alavi 
& Leidner 1999). The notion of knowledge is regarded as a competitive intangible resource 
that, if used judiciously, could lead to competitive advantage (Zack 1999). A widely 
discussed example are Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, which have been 
argued and marketed as assisting in integrating knowledge about business processes across 
functions, units and locations for greater efficiency. Zack (1999) notes that, in practice, 
most such initiatives are viewed primarily as IS projects. Thus, the literature treats IS, 
knowledge management systems (KMS), and organizational memory (OM) systems as 
separate, this research may use them interchangeably.
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Conversely, the exploration strategy emphasises human-driven processes and takes a 
bottom-up perspective on strategy and IS. For instance, it looks at organizational learning 
(OL) as insights, ideas and learnings emerging from ongoing re-evaluation and review of 
the external environments and internal capabilities. The purpose of process outcomes is to 
achieve efficiency by reducing problem-solving time and faster delivery (Alavi & Leidner 
1999). The focus is how to combine and use resources and the learnings already embedded 
in the routines. According to Andreu and Ciborra (1996), the interplay between resources, 
routines and capabilities is very rich and complex, which makes the process of strategy one 
which cannot be necessarily planned deliberately. Thus, the framework assumes strategy to 
have the following characteristics (Galliers & Newell 2003):
• Ongoing and processual
• Dependent on learning from ‘below’ as well as from outside or above
• Dependent on tinkering and improvisation
• Ready to learn from or respond to the emergent and unintended consequences of 
strategic decisions.
The theoretical framework will be used to identify:
• Distinctive approaches to using IS, i.e. with regards to exportation and exploration
• Elements of socio-technical IIs in the case companies
• The inter-relationships of IS, elements of the II, and the context of business 
strategizing.
Moreover, this research is interested in the dynamic interaction between human agents in 
the strategizing process and the role of IS. A further aim is to try to identify potential 
strengths and shortcomings of the framework within the scope of this research, and so 
suggest contributions towards richer conceptualization. As mentioned before, the 
framework is not seen as a theoretical ‘model’ to be tested in practice with dependent and 
independent variables. Rather, it will be used as a conceptual guide, which the researcher 
uses to explore established theories, as well as emerging phenomena from the case studies. 
In summary, The IS strategizing framework was chosen because it illustrates an appropriate 
balance of theoretical richness as well as flexibility to consider emerging phenomena. The 
analysis of IS is based on the interaction between strategizing managers’ knowledge work and 
organizational socio-technical context. This is because the thesis assumes that meanings are 
embedded within their own context and that the interpretation of phenomena is due to
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differing world views and paradigms. Hence, systems are tackled in their broader sense, 
which include ICTs, people, and processes, tangible and intangible resources. Having 
introduced the conceptual framework and made explicit the components that we choose to 
focus on, the next section will justify how the use of the framework and the underlying 
concepts may guide the research process.
4.1.1 Understanding IS Theory in Context
Theory is both a way of seeing and a way of not seemgf
■ Walsham (1993)
This thesis explores relevant theories and different scenarios from two case studies to
explain how and why things happen (Gregor 2006). Hence, theory is used as a way to
make explicit that which exists in the real world but was not looked at from a certain mind
frame. For the purposes of this research, a theory is defined as ‘an artefact in that it is
something that could not exist in the real world without human intervention’ (ibid: 619).
An appropriate understanding of the field of IS is argued by Lee (2001: iii):
Research in the information systems field examines more than just the 
technological system, or just the social system, or even the two side by side; in 
addition, it investigates the phenomena that emerge when the two interact.
Thus, the IS discipline is at the intersection of knowledge of the properties of physical 
objects and knowledge of human behaviour (Gregor 2006). In order to understand IS, 
theory helps us to link the natural and social worlds with the artificial world of human 
constructions (ibid). IS are of interest because information handling activities in 
organizations are undertaken by and for people to support of the tasks they set out to 
achieve (Avgerou & Comford 1993). An inherent problematic in the study of IS, however, 
has been that literature tends to understand the world of the manager and that of the 
systems separately, and then establish a fit between the two (see ‘strategic alignment’ 
discussion in chapters 1 and 3). A general premise of this thesis is to challenge this 
assumption by arguing that as long as one conceives these worlds as separate and studies 
them as separate entities, any attempted effort to fit these worlds through strategic IS will 
be problematic (Tinaikar 2006). It further argues that in the context of strategizing, synergy 
between IS and managerial activities may be achieved then, when IS and the strategizing 
processes are viewed as one integrated whole (one world), where human agents use 
information and knowledge interchangeably between various approaches.
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There are numerous ways in which the theoretical framework may be utilized, depending 
on many things, such as the goal of the researcher. One familiar way is to test the extent to 
which IS and business strategies are aligned in practice as part of a strategic IS planning. 
Conceptually, once again, the question arises as to what exactly a ‘strategic alignment’ is. 
The framework invites an opportunity to explore that area further. Another approach 
would be to investigate the elements of an organization’s II for an enabling context to 
support business strategies, or for an appropriate architecture to accommodate various the 
IS. After ah, even the most suitable IS may be wasted if they are not an integral part of a 
socio-technical network. Nevertheless, much depends also on the functionality of IS and 
their specific purpose. Nevertheless, while the IS strategizing framework is used as a sense- 
making device to view the world in a certain way (Klein & Myers 1999), there is no 
conscious attempt to ‘test’ the framework in order to prove or disapprove any established 
conceptualization. The ‘testing’, of any framework may reveal different outcomes when 
applied across different contexts and with different underlying assumptions. In fact, the 
search for an absolute is not congruent with an interpretivist’s world view. The point is not 
to find a solution or to generalize, instead, the framework will be used to appreciate some 
objectivity in the chaotic world, and to identify general domain of interest. Within this 
domain, assumptions are taken to question conventional notions and make new room for 
insights. Hence, the researcher takes a neutral stance to see things as they are, and then 
refleas on alternative perspeaives in terms of ‘what if, using supportive theoretical 
concepts and findings from the praaice.
4.1.1.1 Explanation
This process of researching and interpreting is guided by the goal of reaching a richer 
explanation. Explanation could also be labelled as theory for understanding, as the 
emphasis is on how the world may be viewed in a certain way, and on making explicit how 
things are or why they are as they are (Gregor 2006). Explanation as theory corresponds 
well with the views of theory in the interpretivist paradigm (Klein & Myers 1999) and 
hermeneutic approaches (Denzin & Lincoln 1994). Explanation seeks to distinguish the 
what, how, why, when and where, but does not seek to predict with any precision and there 
are no testable propositions (Gregor 2006). Here, scenarios from interpretive case studies 
provide alternative explanations for research phenomena, to confirm relevant theories and 
to extend the framework in an attempt to spur interest in future research in this area. The
96
means of representation for explaining research phenomena are by words (i.e. interview 
quotes), diagrams and tables.
A primary construct of theory for explanation in IS research is usually technology with 
various conceptions and structural features of the organization, i.e. roles, rules and 
resources. This research tries to seek explanation not of specific objective constructs, such 
as a technology, but of the dynamic interaction between the socio-technical organization, the 
available IS, and the strategic actors within their human subjectivity. The relationship 
between these is seen as such that strategic actors (as part of the social-technical 
organization themselves) struggle to find, access, create and manage information and 
knowledge resources in ways as to, or appearing to, being competitive in their businesses. 
Nevertheless, the boundaries between distinct research topics become more blurry once 
the observation starts in practice. So this research might touch upon interrelated issues 
such as OM, culture and politics, as appropriate. In order to be able to seek constructive 
explanation from this dynamics, a multi-theoretical and multi-methodology approach is 
necessary. This allows the complexity of the real world dynamics to be appreciated and 
addressed, and recognizes that subjects cannot be held constant to be studied while the 
world around them changes.
The approach of a purist would be to adopt a single theory or philosophy and see the 
world through that lens in creating and building knowledge. An underlying belief of this 
research, however, is that adhering to a single paradigm may also hinder one from not 
seeing other phenomena that may be as important in understanding the context. Even if 
the literature is confident of the merits of a certain approach, there have been difficulties in 
translating theories into actual day-to-day working practices in organizations across the 
world that apply IS strategies (Avgerou & Comford 1993). This has also raised questions in 
methodologies to study IS in organizations. In line with Walsham’s statement (1993): 
‘Theory is both a way of seeing and a way of not seeing’, this research argues that a multi­
paradigm approach is not only interesting but necessary in order to capture the 
undercurrents of the socio-technical and changing socio-political world. While not 
everything can be captured by a single researcher, suitable research methods go a long way. 
The rest of this chapter elaborates on the methodology of this research and the research 
strategy.
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4.2 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS
This research takes a qualitative paradigm to inquiry. The advantage of qualitative research 
is multifold. Here, the researcher appreciates the opportunity to incorporate and reflect on 
various complexities of organizations as they emerge from social, technical, cultural and 
political systems for a holistic understanding. There are various philosophical perspectives 
which can inform qualitative research. For example, qualitative research can be positivist, 
interpretive or critical (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991). The contribution to the body of 
knowledge depends considerably on the ontological and epistemological positions taken, as 
well as the respective methodology chosen to approach an enquiry. Methodology refers to 
the specific manner in which the empirical work is conducted. The basic philosophical 
principles behind the research dictate the methodology (Antill 1991). The rest of this 
section addresses these issues.
4.2.1 Ontology & Epistemology
There are a number of predominant frameworks used in IS research that address the 
researcher’s philosophical foundation. Ontology comprises of the researcher’s foundational 
beliefs about the real’ world in which she pursues a scientific investigation. Typically, 
researchers accept a chosen ontology as given reality and do not question the underlying 
assumptions on which they base their interpretation, or rationalization, of the world. In 
other words, any chosen ontology determines that which comprises one’s ‘real’ world and 
affects what one seeks to observe. Subsequently, the reasoning process and the conclusions 
drawn are affected accordingly. While ontology concerns our basic assumptions about the 
world, epistemology is the branch of philosophy which informs us about the knowledge 
and how human beings obtain and validate their knowledge in terms of ‘how we come to 
know’ (Hirschheim 1992). It is sometimes defined as the theory or science of knowledge 
(Lee 1991); however, the meaning of ‘theory’ here may be controversial as any ‘theory’ 
itself depends on other factors.
The underlying philosophical assumptions greatly affect the beliefs about the relationship 
between theory and practice. Frequently, conducting IS research has been framed in terms 
of distinctions between ‘positivist’ and ‘interpretivist’ paradigm (Orlikowski & Baroudi 
1991). Other distinctions concern qualitative versus quantitative methods, objective versus
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subjective (Burrell & Morgan 1979), taking an outsider (etic) or an insider (emic) 
perspective, nomothtic (concerned with the discovery of general laws) versus idiographic 
(concerned with the uniqueness of things), aimed at prediction versus explanation, as 
pluralism (Mingers 2001), as integrating approaches (Lee 1991), and so forth. It should be 
noted that there is considerable disagreement as to whether they are distinctively opposed 
or whether they can be used within one study. Lee (1991) addresses that while these are 
philosophically distinct; the distinctions are not always clear cut in the practice of social 
research. For example, the same ontology can lead to more than one epistemology and the 
same epistemology may have more than one methodology (Lee 1991). Likewise, positivist 
ontology may use mathematical reasoning as well as qualitative processes. This research 
regards the dimensions ontology, epistemology, methodology, and method as a heuristic 
device rather than a rigid set of definitions.
Nevertheless, this range of perspectives has not been as evident in the IS research as it is in
some other disciplines. In their study, Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) found that much IS
research reflects a positivistic orientation. The positivist tradition is rooted in natural
sciences and is identifiable where there is evidence of formal propositions, quantifiable
measures of variables, hypothesis testing, and the drawing of inferences about phenomena
from a selected sample (ibid). This dominance of positivism has substantially limited what
aspects of IS phenomena have been studied, and most of all, how they have been studied.
This exclusive perspective on the world has implications not only on theory and the
understanding of IS, but also on the practice of IS work. According to the authors (ibid: 7):
The findings of information systems research fiker into the practitioner 
community and are used as prescriptions for action. Restricted research, thus, has 
far-reaching consequences.
Positivism has shown its shortcomings in the multi-disciplinary field of IS. A number of 
researchers have indicated the application of positivism to research on social phenomena is 
problematic (Galliers & Land 1987; Lincoln & Guba 1985; Weick 1984). When textual data 
are quantified, the understanding of a phenomenon from the point of view of the 
participants and its particular social and institutional context is largely lost (Kaplan & 
Maxwell 1994). More specifically, Angell and Smithson (1991: 35) argue that ‘the dynamic 
and ambiguous complexity of an organization cannot be just reduced to simplistic data 
structures which imply a tidy and convenient homogeneity in organizations that is just not
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there’. Along these lines, Walsham (1993) highlights the limits in the understanding of IS in
organizational contexts (ibid: 4-5):
Much of this (the existing) literature refleas a rational-economic interpretation of 
organisational processes, and a positivist methodology which is based on the view 
that the world exhibits objeaive cause-effea relationships which can be 
discovered, at least partially, by structured observation. Many researchers have 
noted the limitations of such approaches ... (the) style of research being proposed 
... (involves) broadly interpretive methods of research, aimed at producing an 
understanding of the context of the information systems, and the process whereby 
the information system influences and is influenced by its context.
Positivist researchers believe that scientific inquiry is ‘value-free’ (McCarthy 1978: 139) and 
do not get involved in the moral judgement or subjective opinions. It is this philosophical 
debate about the value-ladenness of assumptions, approaches, data, theories and 
explanations that positivists do not engage in (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991). On the other 
hand, interpretivists argue that the very distinction between fact and value in itself is value 
judgement (Weber 1949). Social constructionism (Berger & Luckman 1967) relates what 
science has characterized as objeaive faas to the processes of social construction with the 
goal to show the reverse, that it is the human subjeaivity that has imposed itself on those 
facts we take to be objeaive. Adherents of social construaionism claim that the elements 
that we accept as forming part of the real world do not have to be visible, tangible and 
purely objeaive. Rather, our shared beliefs, social structures and culture, despite of being 
invisible and subjeaive, form entities of social objeas and hence are real for humans 
beings -  just as any other aspeas in the physical and natural world
Interpretive studies take a nondeterministic perspeaive on the world with the goal to 
increase understanding of the phenomenon within their cultural and contextual situation. 
Interpretivist researchers assume that people create their own subjeaive meanings to things 
as they interna with the world around them (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991). Schultz (1962) 
conceptualizes the subjea meanings as meanings constmaed by the human subjeas in the 
social setting, which the social scientist seeks to explain. So when the interpretivist 
researcher studies phenomena, she tries to access these meanings that participants assign to 
things. It is important that the phenomenon is examined in its natural setting and from the 
perspeaive of the participants. We can conclude that while in natural sciences the 
researcher and phenomenon of study exists independently, this cannot be asserted in social 
sciences. Giddens (1987: 19) notes that unlike in natural sciences, in social sciences there is 
no way of keeping the concepts, theorise and findings of the researcher ‘free from
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appropriation by lay actors’. As the goal of IS research is to inform the practice of IS in 
organizations, the researcher and the phenomenon cannot exist independent of one 
another. In IS management, Baroudi (1985) argues that there is a reciprocal and reflexive 
relationship between IS research and social reality. As a result, claims of objectivity and 
value-neutrality in IS research, according to Orlikowski and Baroudi, may be misleading.
This research is an exploratory investigation into the ways in which strategizing is pursued 
via IS. The study of the interrelation between IS, strategic actors and the strategizing 
context calls for philosophical assumptions and a methodology, which do not reject the 
inter-subjectivity of the chaotic and ambiguous social world, nor completely abolish 
objectivity and structured thinking. Having said that, the reasoning process that 
interpretivism offers is believed to be most appropriate. Here, the structured yet flexible 
framework will guide the researcher through the maze of subjectivity in the socio-political 
and culturally diverse world, while the emergence of new phenomena and re-iterative 
interpretation will keep the assumptions of the framework in check. Hence, the use of the 
IS strategizing framework along with interpretivism is seen as a powerful way to reach new 
explanation and understanding.
While the positivist searches for factual and objective situations and events, the 
interpretivist seeks a velatiuist understanding of phenomena. The researcher does not 
assume that reality is objectively given, where she can apply measurable instruments to test 
theory in an attempt to predict phenomena in the future. No specific expectation or 
assumption is adopted as to the existence of certain technologies, social systems, or any 
other component. There are no predefined dependent and independent variables. The 
focus is on the full complexity of human sense-making as situations emerge (Kaplan & 
Maxwell 1994).
To illustrate the position of this research more explicitly, we refer to the frequent cited 
work of Burrell and Morgan (1979), who suggest four paradigms for the analysis of social 
theory.
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The Sociology of Radical Change
Radical Radical
Humanist Structuralist
SUBJECTIVE Interpretivist Functionalist OBJECTIVE
The Sociology of Regulation
Figure 4.4: Four paradigms o f social research (Burrell & Morgan 1979)
The framework is based on two fundamental dichotomies which have been discussed. The 
first is the ontological distinction between objective and subjective realities, and the second 
between those who view the world as conflict and pursue radical change versus those who 
see the world as table and pursue a path of regulation. In accordance with this framework, 
this research takes a subjectivist view and is located within the interpretivist paradigm. The 
researcher seeks ‘explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity 
... and understanding of the subjectively created social world ‘as it is’ in terms of an 
ongoing process’ (ibid). Hence, the underlying epistemology, which guides the research will 
that of interpretivism. To that end, the theoretical framework will serve as a conceptual 
sense-making vehicle to the research enquiry in the hope that this would help 
understanding the whole somewhat better. The aim is not to build generalizations, but to 
try to explain a particular comer of the world in a reasonable way based on choice of 
theory and methodology and the ways in which they are applied. Neither is the aim to find 
causal relationships in order to predict future behaviour. The remainder of this section will 
expand on the underlying philosophical assumptions.
4.2.2 Interpretivism & Hermeneutic Inquiry
This research is positioned within the interpretivist paradigm and uses hermeneutic inquiry 
as a research method. Interpretive research methods have been increasingly used by the IS 
community (Walsham 1995b) to understand human thought and action in social and 
organizational contexts in order to create insights into IS phenomena (Klein & Myers 
1999). The assumption of the interpretive researcher is that reality is accessible only 
through social construction such as language, consciousness and shared meanings (Myer
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1997). Examples of an interpretive approach to qualitative research include the work of 
Boland's (1991) and Walsham (1993), for example. According to Walsham (1993: 4-5), 
interpretive methods of research in IS are ‘aimed at producing an understanding of the 
context of information systems, and the process whereby the information systems 
influences and is influenced by the context.’
Klein and Myer (1999) suggest a set of principles for the conduct of interpretive research
which will be covered in this section. According to Schwandt (1994: 118), the interpretivist
tradition steers the researcher towards:
Understanding the complex world of lived experience from the point of view of 
those, who live it. This goal is variously spoken of as an abiding concern for the 
life world, for the emic point of view, for understanding meaning, for grasping the 
actor’s definition of a situation, for Verstehen. The world of lived reality and 
situation-specific meanings that constitute the general object of investigation is 
thought to be constructed by social actors.
What is crucial in this process is that the social scientist has to gain access into the social 
actor’s understanding of the world through fieldwork in order to create this Verstehen. The 
research then has to indirectly encourage social actors to reflect and discover their own 
meanings. What sets it apart from positivism is that it takes account of social life by 
drawing upon taken-for-granted beliefs and practices and tries to articulate them in order to 
provide an understanding of these actions. Traditionally, interpretivism takes the 
ontological view that social reality is a product of processes by which human actors 
negotiate the meanings of actions and situations. These processes of interpretation 
represent human experience and the skilled accomplishment of grasping the social world 
Its epistemology implies that knowledge is derived from everyday concepts and meanings, 
where the researcher enters the social world (e.g. through participation observation) in 
order to grasp the socially constructed meanings and reconstruct them in a social scientific 
language.
The intellectual tradition of this approach lies within hermeneutics, sociology and
phenomenology. From this paradigm, knowledge takes the following perspective (Guba &
Lincoln 1994: 113):
Knowledge consists of those constructions about which there is a relative 
consensus (or at least some movement towards consensus) among those 
components (and in the case of more arcane material, trusted) to interpret the 
substance of the construction. Multiple “knowledges” can coexist when equally 
competent (or trusted) interpreters disagree.
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The interpretive school of thought challenges the more conventional and objeaive 
thinking that promotes key success factors, fixed ‘best practices’, and ‘cookie-cutter’ 
models of competition by illustrating the rather uncertain, intermingled, and dynamic 
faaors of organizational life, work processes, and knowledge activities. The assumption of 
interpretivism in social research is that data are not just sitting out there to be gathered. 
The so called ‘facts’ may be produced as part and parcel of the social interaaion of the 
researcher with the world. The interpretive approach sees the world as something that can 
only be interpreted, never fully specified or reduced to theories (Galliers 1991). This 
approach is appropriate because IS include people, which capture the variability and 
psychological opaqueness of the human mind and intentions (ibid). The interpretive effort 
lies in making sense of the whole by exploring the parts and the dynamic relationship 
between the organization and IS components. In this research, the ‘whole’ represents the 
wider socio-technical context through the organizational II, which is composed of ‘parts’ 
such as IT, social systems, roles and skills. Human agents are the active ‘parts’, which 
interaa with and within the whole’ and hold incomplete and contradictory views on many 
issues.
Another aspea that this research appreciates is that the hermeneutic task encourages the 
researcher to bring out any tension between the text and the context instead of covering 
them up (Gadamer 1977). This is congruent with the study of strategizing and the strategic 
aaor in various contexts, e.g. different origins and seaors. The aim is not as much to study 
the particular case company, human agents, or a technical artifact, as it is to try to make 
sense of the manners in which strategic actors with substantial corporate responsibilities 
engage in daily decisions in their respeaive circumstances. As a result, the research will take 
an open attitude while taking a critical stance on the data colleaion and analysis.
A major philosophical base of interpretive research is hermeneutics (Boland 1985). 
Hermeneutics can be treated as both underlying philosophy and mode of analysis (Bleicher 
1980). As a philosophy, it provides the grounding for interpretivism (Klein & Myers 1999). 
As a mode of analysis, it provides an approach to understand textual data. While the 
researcher understands the depth and breadth of this philosophy, this section only captures 
a limited view on it. Generally, hermeneutics is derived from the Greek word 
‘hermeneuein’ (meaning to ‘interpret’) and its derivate ‘hermeneia’ (meaning 
‘interpretation’). In sociology, it was most heavily influenced by German philosopher
104
Gadamer and his teacher Heidegger. Although, like most other approaches, there are 
multiple perspectives, it may be generally described as ‘the theory or philosophy of the 
interpretation of meaning’ (Bleicher 1980: 1). In sociology, this is described as the 
interpretation and understanding of social events by analyzing their meanings to the human 
participants and their culture.
Hermeneutics is primarily concerned with the meaning of a text or text-analogue, such as 
any human artifact, action, organization or culture (Myers 1997). The goal is to achieve 
human understanding. Schleiermacher (1799-1834) conceived hermeneutics as being the art 
or science of understanding. Specifically, he stressed the importance of the interpreter in 
the process of interpretation and argued that the interpreter’s understanding of text is a 
necessary stage to its interpretation. This understanding involves knowledge on the part of 
the interpreter of the historical context of the text and the psychology of the author. It 
differs from other interpretive schools in that it emphasizes the importance of the content 
and the form of any given social behavior. The central principle is that it is only possible to 
grasp the meaning of an action or statement by relating it to the whole discourse or world­
view from which it originates, i.e. seeking meaning in context (Klein & Myers 1999). Any 
action isolated from its original context is seen as meaningless, which implies that the what, 
when, and how does not matter as long as we do not know the why and for what purpose. 
For instance, the action of putting a piece of paper in a box is meaningless unless we know 
that it happens in the context of, say, a democratic election (ibid).
Nevertheless, most theories in epistemology tend to be largely speculative. Although 
epistemologies are necessary to research, it can be argued that most of them are imposed 
upon the world are artificial constructions of some philosopher’s speculations as to how 
researchers must obtain and validate their knowledge. In many instances, the 
epistemological philosopher has some agenda where he is deconstructing the world and 
presenting it as set of confusing phenomena as to creating a mass of epistemological 
pedantry. To create order and logic from this chaos, she then applies her own lens (or 
Weltanschauung). Nevertheless, although a healthy scepticism allows for an interesting critical 
analysis of various philosophies, a key task is to find the most appropriate philosophical 
epistemology that suits the objeaive and context of one’s particular research.
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In this thesis, strategizfyg, strategizer and IS are examined in a relatively new light. The 
philosophy of hermeneutics is seen as a suitable paradigm for understanding the process of 
using IS in strategizing. While hermeneutics as philosophy will be used to a limited yet 
relevant extent, the mode of analysis does involve hermeneutic techniques (Gadamer 1975; 
Boland 1991, etc.) to identify and describe the issues associated with the use of knowledge 
on a strategic level. This will be explained further in the next section.
4.2.3 Mode of Analysis
Qualitative modes of analysis are often concerned with verbal or written textual analysis
(Myers 1999). A primary mode of analysis in this research is hermeneutics within the
interpretivist approach (Boland 1991; Lee 1994; Myers 1999). In IS research, hermeneutics
can be used to study the nature of information and IS (Klein and Hirschheim 1983).
Hermeneutics is suitable because its underlying assumptions match those of the research
enquiry as portrayed by Taylor (1976: 153):
Interpretation, in the sense relevant to hermeneutics, is an attempt to make clear 
to make sense of an object of study. This object must, therefore, be a text, or a 
text-analogue, which in some way is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly 
contradictory -  in one way or another, unclear. The interpretation aims to bring to 
light an underlying coherence or sense.
Hermeneutic techniques have contributed to the identification and description of the issues 
associated with the use of organizational knowledge at the strategic level (Alavi & Leidner 
1999; Nonaka 1994). Boland (1991) was one of the first to suggest the use of hermeneutics 
as a means of looking at the sense-making process in IS (Myers 1994). Lee (1994) studied 
the richness of email communications in organizations by drawing upon hermeneutics to 
explore the wider social and political context within which email communication took 
place. By doing so, he was able to show the complex world of social constructions 
revolving around the use of email communication.
4.23.1 Hermeneutic Circle
A fundamental concept in hermeneutic philosophy is that of the hermeneutic circle (Myers 
1999). It refers to the dialectic between the understanding of the text as a whole and the 
interpretation of its parts (Gadamer 1977: 117). Hermeneutics is concerned with the basic 
question: what is the meaning of this ‘text? (Radnitzky 1970: 20). For interpretive case
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studies in IS, the ‘text’ is social and political action, whereby notes, interviews and 
documents record the views and perceptions of actors to describe certain events (Myers 
1999). This material is recorded, explained and interpreted through the theoretical 
framework and supporting theories. Here, prejudices (Vorurteile), assumptions and 
preconceptions are also put to test in the iterative process presented by the hermeneutic 
circle.
CONTEXT
Project
Initial prejudices
Ofunderstanding
Reiterative 
Process of 
Interpretation & 
Understanding
Figure 4.5: The hermeneutic circle (Gadamer 1989) Source: Introna (1997: 65)
Gaining understanding is a reiterative process, which is created by moving ‘constantly from 
the whole to the part and back to the whole’ (Gadamer 1977: 117). This process indicates 
that neither the parts nor the whole in isolation can be understood without reference to 
one another. Notably, the ‘whole’ implies that text must be understood as it is found in its 
cultural, historical and literary context. The circle implies that the researcher projects 
significance on the text and allows the text to inform their initial understanding of the 
world. In the pursuit of creating a new sense of the world, we continually adjust our point 
of view within our own tradition and try to connect new findings into a new whole. Hence 
the reiterative process of projection and movement between text (the part) and context (the 
whole) creates the possibility for new explanation and understanding.
When the process is applied to dialogue, each participant injects a new perspeaive and 
engages in understanding a text by means of the hermeneutic circle. Hermeneutics assumes 
that the researcher’s presuppositions affect the gathering and analyzing of data through the 
ways in which questions are posed to informants and the ways in which responses are 
understood (Bleicher 1980). Hence, as the data affect the analysis, also the analysis affects
107
the data. Likewise, the writing up is an iterative process in which data are constantly 
revisited. In the course of interpretation, the interpreter continuously revisits the real world 
in an attempt to create a bridge between what is already known and what is still unknown. 
The researcher compares different texts with one another (e.g. statement of interviewees 
with that of a written document) and also looks for variations or consistencies among the 
informants’ statements and with the relevant literature. Understanding becomes more 
apparent as the whole is continually revised in reinterpreting the parts and the absurdities, 
contradictions and oppositions no longer seem strange, but make sense (Myers 1994). 
Exercising this task in the context of the whole provides the researcher with new 
references and examples to draw upon in the search for new meaning.
In this hermeneutic circle, meaning is created when the interpreter brings to bear her own
perspectives and prejudices (Vorurteilej of the world Prejudices here do not have a negative
sense; rather Gadamer sees these as the initial understanding of the researcher, which is
changed into a new understanding once a new interpretation is reached. According to
Gadamer, we cannot simply forget or hold blind to our own Vorurteile of the world;
however, what we can do is to remain open to the other person or text. By accepting our
pre-judgments and being open, we can create new understanding. We can only create new
understanding based on what we already know (Gadamer 1989). Therefore, the
hermeneutic task is the process of using our own biases and at the same time anticipating
the possibility that the text may challenge these fore-meanings (Introna 1997). According
to Gadamer (ibid: 238):
The hermeneutically trained mind must be sensitive to the text’s quality and 
newness. But this kind of sensitivity involves neither ‘neutrality’ in the matter of 
the object nor the extinction of one’s self, but the conscious assimilation of one’s 
own fore-meanings and prejudices. The important thing is to be aware of one’s 
own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to 
assert its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.
The process of bridging the alien with the known is referred to as appropriation (Ricoeur 
1979). Hermeneutic philosophers suggest that we only come to a meaning if we 
appropriate the meaning of text for ourselves and make it our own. This act of 
appropriation is essential for understanding to take place (Myers 1999). A practical 
component of this process is the notion of Erlebrns, or lived experience, which is a key 
concept for Gadamer (1989). Erlebnis refers to the significant whole within which the parts 
reside. According to Hegel (In Gadamer 1989: 318): ‘the principle of experience contains 
the infinitely important element that, in order to accept a content as true, the man himself
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must be present or, more precisely, he must find the content in unity and combined with 
the certainty of himself. This experience may be conceived as difficult and painful to go 
through where the person, with an element of disillusionment, has to remain open to all 
possibilities in order to learn. Crucial to this Erlebnis is the openness of the researcher to all 
possibilities. This implies a certain not-ness, that the interpreter is open to experiencing 
something that was not assumed it would be. Only this way it is possible to overcome the 
subjectivity of the researcher herself and open a space within which interpretation becomes 
possible.
Along these lines, Gadamer argues that hermeneutic understanding is rooted in Praxis and 
Phrmesis (ibid). Praxis is referred to as informed practice rather than an antithesis of theory. 
It is conceived as being inseparable from action; as being able to play the game rather than 
knowing the rules of the game. To Gadamer, it is the Praxis component which is most 
important layer of meaning and only with this element would theory and methodology 
make sense. Furthermore, hermeneutics is rooted in Phrmesis (practical wisdom), which is 
required in order to achieve understanding (Gadamer 1989). Phrmesis is a form of reasoning 
that involves a distinctive mediation between the universal and the particular (Bernstein 
1983), for example perceiving what is at stake in a given situation. Or, according to Hoy 
(1978: 58), it combines the generality of reflection of principles with the particularity of 
perception into a given situation. It is through fusing the Phrmesis and Praxis that makes it 
possible to create understanding. As an entry point, one starts with initial pre-judgments of 
the world. As the researcher exposes herself to the lived experiences of the real world 
context through Erlebnis, she remains open to new worldviews through that Erlebnis, 
providing the referential whole to allow the interpretation to be significant. In this process, 
Phrmesis is critical, that is, the researcher’s ability to separate the essential from the non- 
essential as to translating from the universal to the particular.
The object of the interpretive effort is one of attempting to make sense of the organization, 
where human agents are confused, incomplete, and have contradictory views on issues 
such as ICTs, IS strategies, the meaning of information, relationship between people, and 
the manners in which knowledge is shared, for example. The empirical work is conducted 
across two case studies. In the context of this research, the use of hermeneutic concepts is 
part and parcel of the hermeneutic tradition, and will be crucial to forming an 
understanding of this ‘messiness’. Similarly, and although the components of analysis have
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been identified as those portrayed by the IS strategizing framework, the researcher is open 
to perceive other emerging elements in the world that interact with individual parts of the 
framework and as a result change the dynamic interaction among them as a whole. As a 
result, the principles of hermeneutic philosophy and the approach of hermeneutic circle as 
a mode of analysis are seen to be invaluable given the nature of the topic, the objective of 
the research, and the background of the researcher.
At the same time, and like any other method, there are several shortcomings in using 
interpretivism which come to light depending the particular research and researchers. In 
general, interpretivist approaches assume that competent social actors engage in a 
continuous monitoring of their conduct. There certainty is more to reality than is expressed 
in the language of social actors, of which the social scientist should be aware. Inherent to 
the interpretation process is the commitment to be continually challenged by the text and 
not jump into premature conclusions. Once the researcher is not open she falls into 
subjectivity. Furthermore, intererpretivism fails to acknowledge the role of social structures 
that produces social interaction, particularly divisions of interest and relations of power 
(Mingers 2001, 2003). Although the researcher tried to be aware of potential interaction of 
these power relations while conducting the empirical work, these could not be explicitly 
captured to be reflected in the sense-making process. Possible structures of conflict in 
social-technical relations may have been completely ignored had the interpretivist been 
conservative. These and further limitations of methodology will be addressed in chapter 8.
Despite potential shortcomings, interpretivism has a major strength which other research 
approaches dismiss; namely, the richness and depth of exploration will result in sufficient 
details for the reader to grasp the idiosyncracies of the situation (Myers & Avison 2002). 
The next section will outline the methods chosen for gathering the empirical data which 
will be interpreted within the hermeneutic circle.
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4.3 RESEARCH STRATEGY
This thesis is based on two interpretive case studies that consider the domain of 
strategizing. Strategizing is understood as a process made explicit through decisions, sense- 
making and judgement-making in the every day chaotic and messy world of upper 
managers working in global companies. Given this complex and ambiguous nature of the 
inquiry, any chosen research method influences the way in which data is collected.
This research chooses qualitative case studies as an empirical inquiry. Data collection 
methods include semi-structured qualitative interviews and observation across two main 
case studies. Case studies are one of several ways in doing qualitative research, and one of 
the most common qualitative methods used in IS (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991; Alavi & 
Carlson 1992). As with philosophical assumptions, case study research can be positivist 
(Yin 2003), interpretive (Walsham 1993), or critical. The philosophical assumptions behind 
the case studies are interpretive. Furthermore, case studies may be used to describe a unit 
of analysis (e.g. the study of a particular organization) or to describe a research method 
Since the object of our interest is not a specific technology, strategy, or organization, this 
research is concerned with case study as an interpretive research method.
The case study method is well-suited because interest has shifted to organizational rather 
than technical issues in the study of IS in organizations (Benbasat et al 1987). Yin (2003) 
defines the scope of a case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. While not everything can be captured, 
qualitative case studies permit a better understanding of organizational complexity from an 
insider’s viewpoint (Mitchell 1983), and allow the formulation of a more holistic 
perspeaive of the phenomena being studied (Van Maanen 1979). The aim here is to see the 
whole’ picture, by investigating the constituent ‘parts’ with respea to their interaaion in 
their respeaive context. Therefore, case study research provides a suitable grounding to 
explore some of the influencing faaors that interaa with the research objea and shape its 
behavior. Having introduced the philosophical assumptions and research method, the next 
section outlines the ways data were colleaed.
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4.3.1 Data Collection
First, while this thesis refers to the word ‘data’ frequently, it should be acknowledged that 
there has been a potential unease attached to the term ‘data collection’ for interpretivist 
researchers. Since the term implies positivistic assumptions that ‘data’ exists independent of 
the observer, which can be ‘collected’ from the outside world, goes against the beliefs of an 
interpretivist, a more suitable term may be ‘empirical materials’ (Myers 1999). Nevertheless, 
while the researcher may speak of ‘data’, the assumptions are that of ‘empirical materials’.
Data collection techniques vary largely in the literature (e.g. Denzin & Lincoln 1994; Miles 
&Huberman 1984; Rubin & Rubin 2005; Silverman 1998). Yin (2003) suggests six sources: 
documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant observation, and 
physical artifacts. Written data sources may include published and unpublished documents, 
company reports, memos, letters, reports, email messages, faxes, newspaper articles and so 
forth. It is difficult to choose the number and depth of sources in an interpretive research, 
since findings may emerge from various places in an unstructured way. The variety and 
depth of each source influences the nature of data, its interpretation and conclusions 
drawn, as each may shed a different light on the same reality.
This research finds interviews, documentary materials (as of the written sources) and 
observations as suitable sources to explore the practice. Walsham (1995) argues that 
interviews are important for data gathering in a qualitative case study, as they help the 
researcher to capture the richness of context and identify differences in informants’ beliefs 
and perceptions. According to Rubin and Rubin (2005: vii), interviews are like night 
goggles ‘permitting us to see that which is not ordinarily on view and examine that which is 
looked at but seldom seen’. Combining interviews with written sources and observation 
allow the researcher to make explicit certain elements that the other might not have 
identified, or captured in a different light (i.e. in different contexts).
Hence, the researcher leverages the opportunity to go back and forth between the 
components and the findings of each method in an attempt to look for confirmation or 
discrepancies in the processes of understanding. For example, the first case study was 
heavily based on interviews and less observation, whereas the second case involved 
relatively more observation than interviews. While interviews allow the researcher to
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explore the areas that can be expressed in words by informants, observation informs the 
researcher about the aspects that cannot be easily articulated by words, or are taken for 
granted. The strength and shortcomings of each are elaborated below.
4.3.2 Qualitative Interviews
Interviews are one of the major methods for gathering data in qualitative research (Myers 
& Newman 2007). In unstructured and semi-structured interviews, the researcher prepared 
a set of questions, or an incomplete script, to serve as a guide during the interview process. 
The incomplete script gave the researcher flexibility to improvise during the investigation 
and allowed her to become more receptive to new cues and emerging phenomena to 
control the direction of the process (ibid).
To prepare for semi-structured interviews in this research, ten pages of questions, notes 
and themes were prepared as areas for investigation. The questions were designed as to 
reflecting the key literature and components of the IS strategizing framework. During the 
interviews, the framework was a helpful guide to navigate an array of topics without losing 
sight of the bigger picture. Prior to interviews, the researcher provided the informants with 
her research proposal and explained her role. While the majority were cooperative, there 
were some who were more reserved and less participative in an open discussion. The range 
of different perceptions is due to many reasons, for example the individual’s position in the 
company and potential political tensions in their circumstances, their functional 
responsibilities and their particular interest to the research questions, and so on. Notes 
were taken at all interviews; perceptions and apparent body language of respondents were 
also noted.
Having said that, qualitative interviews present many difficulties, pitfalls and challenges that 
have been taken for granted by many researchers. The researcher faced some of the pitfalls 
in the beginning and during the interview process. For example, being rather overambitious 
at the start, the focus was more on the responses/data rather than on the process itself. In 
the process of the fieldwork, the researcher’s sensitivity matured in learning how to manage 
the interview process better, how to fine tune the questions, and how to ask them to 
enhance the chances for getting higher quality of responses from the interviewees, although 
in an interpretive research, ‘higher quality’ in itself is a subjeaive statement. Myers and
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Newman (2007) point out nine of potential pitfalls: level of entry, artificiality of the 
interview, lack of trust, lack of time, elite bias, Hawthorne effects, constructing knowledge, 
ambiguity of language, and communication problems. Although the researcher is aware of 
all of the above, this section will expand upon those that were encountered
With most researchers in IS and strategy, the first challenge in collecting data is finding 
access to suitable companies and the level of entry. The level of entry is a crucial step to the 
researcher (Buchanan & McCalman 1988). If the researcher’s entry point is at a lower level, 
it may be difficult to interview senior managers at a later date. There were many attempts 
to access senior managers in various global companies. However, most of the initial 
contacts were at the middle level and there was no way any insider could break through the 
gatekeepers of the corporate hierarchy and ask senior managers for such a favour.
Once access was achieved, there was the challenge of managing the interviewees and the 
interview process itself. Myers and Newman (2007) talk about the difficulty of building 
trust and interrogating a stranger to form opinions under time pressure. Web and 
colleagues state that interviews ‘intrude into the social setting they would describe, they 
crate as well as measure attitudes, they elicit atypical roles and responses, they are limited to 
those who are accessible and will cooperate ... ’ (Webb et al 1966). Most often, the 
interviewer is a stranger who intrudes into existing social settings, unaware of potential 
tensions among the people and unfamiliar with the culture, and constructs a stage upon 
which the researcher and the expert play their roles. Interviewing strangers poses 
difficulties in that noting perceptions and reactions of particular people might not be 
accurately judged while they respond to questions. Furthermore, responses of the 
informants are highly influenced by their relationship to the company at that particular 
time, keeping in mind the scope of responsibilities and political tension. Choose the right 
time, although cannot be foreseeing, is important.
A major role of the researcher during the interview process is to narrow the expert - 
researcher divide in order to better orchestrate the conversation and manage perceptions. 
Nevertheless, the interview stage is still an artificial construct (Myers & Newman 2007), 
whereby the interviewer is actively constructing knowledge (Fontana & Frey 2000) and the 
interviewees are constructing their own stories in a way to come across as knowledgeable, 
rational and consistent. At the same time, while they are constructing their stories, they
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reflea upon issues that they may not have considered so explicitly before (ibid). Hence, 
conveying trust is an important issue while they are construaing their stories, specifically 
when keeping in mind that the majority of responses do embody the history of personal 
and professional relations with the organization. Another challenge was the different 
conceptualizations of the same themes among practitioners and academics (e.g., ‘strategy’, 
‘decision making’, ‘knowledge’, and ‘knowledge management’). After the first few 
interviews, it was clear that the researcher needed to ask for clarifications on definitions in 
order to create common ground Speaking the language of praaice is important because it 
determines the informant’s reaaions and the way they think about the issues.
In the search for meaning, language is another element that cannot be underestimated 
(ibid). Even if the native language of all aaors were English, there are still challenges of 
communication, and the issue of interpretation. As Fontana and Frey (2000: 645) argue, 
‘asking questions and getting answers is a much harder task that it may seem at first. The 
spoken or written word has always a residue of ambiguity, no matter how carefully we 
word the questions or how carefully we report or code the answers’. Nevertheless, the 
choice of words and explicit communication is influenced by many faaors that are difficult 
to detect and follow up on, in view of, for example, the underlying believes, values, and 
mind-sets.
Further, most of the second round interviews with the same people were different in 
regards to their responsiveness and openness. This may have been an issue of trust, 
changed perceptions about the subjea, time, or simply mood. At least, being willing to 
devote more time to the same research inquiry for a second time indicates that they had an 
interest in further discussing the subjea. An interesting observation and perhaps a 
frustration with interviewing senior managers was the ‘give-me-a-solution’ attitude in the 
first rounds, where they had hoped that the researcher would suggest unpublished statistics 
or findings. However, at the end of the hour of having them talk about their concerns, 
some interviewees acknowledged the value of insights they gained during the discussions.
4.3.3 Observation
Marshall and Rossman (2006) explain that observation may be used to discover complex 
interactions in natural social settings. Careful observation is a great supportive method to:
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• Make note of more subjeaive cues in aaions and behaviour that are hard or 
impossible to let emerge during semi-structured interviews, i.e. sudden reaaions to 
changing context, perceptions, body language, tone of voice, attitude, and so forth;
• It is also a powerful method to identify potential discrepancies between that what 
was observed and that which was claimed earlier in a different time and context.
Observations included asking the people involved to think out loud, listening to phone 
calls, observing strategy meetings, and observing daily strategizing and the use made of IS 
as part of the process. These allowed the researcher to look for cues while social actors 
were in their natural setting. It must be acknowledged that confidentiality was maintained 
throughout the empirical work, and in writing up. Furthermore, observation was used to:
• Take note of events that were difficult to grasp during an artificial expert-researcher 
interview setting;
• Overcome some of the language barriers during interviews, for example when 
informants’ priority is to be politically correct than truthful, and
• Grasp some aspeas that are hard to articulate in words, for example the 
perceptions and reaaions to emerging organisational events that shape the decision 
makers’ actions -  ‘people know more than what they can tell’ (Polanyi 1966).
Observation entails note-taking of events, behaviours and artefaas in a social setting 
(DeWalt & DeWalt 2001). The field notes were non-judgmental descriptions of what was 
observed. The process included carefully observing a pattern of the persons’ re-/actions 
and decisions over a certain amount of time and across various tasks while getting 
acquainted with their values, beliefs and priorities; having them articulate what is behind 
their thinking of a certain strategy and having them elaborate on the parameters that 
influence their line of thinking. Observing and most of all listening in a natural setting 
provided a set of interpretations that interviews alone would not have captured. At the 
same time, observation as a sole research method would not have been too subjeaive, 
given the feasible/limited boundaries between the researcher and the informants.
The researcher observed managers/advisors engage in their work across different scenarios 
and in different contexts, such as client meetings, office, formal and informal sessions, in 
teams and individually. This was not an easy task because while the researcher is looking 
for what really ‘matters’, at the same time, she herself is involved in the social process to 
some extent. The quality of data recorded improved over time as the researcher developed
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the sensory acuity to get a sense. Knowing the value of observation, this method also 
introduces discomfort, uncomfortable ethical dilemmas, specially being able to distinguish 
what is not being observed while keeping an eye on what is accessible. Notably, the 
research is not observing all team members every day at the same time. The time spent 
with each individual or teams is limited. Hence, the researcher only observed what is going 
on during her presence in a certain time and space. Such evident limitations as well as other 
rather complicated ones, such as the tensions in the socio-political setting, were noted in 
the analysis. The next section briefly sheds light on some more obvious challenges.
4.3.4 Potential Challenges
There are also limitations and challenges with regard to theoretical, methodological, 
philosophical and practical aspects of the research. While these will be discussed in the 
conclusions chapter, some more obvious considerations are noted here. There are inherent 
challenges associated with multi-theory and multi-method approaches in the social studjy of 
IS. Primary challenges are due to the ambiguous nature of theoretical concepts and the 
qualitative, interpretive nature of the endeavor. Interpretive ways to analyze data enhance 
the subjectivity of the findings, and hence, may be criticized for lack of concrete evidence. 
For example, one can never be sure how much the organizational context, history of 
organizations and their members, particular circumstances of informants, and their 
particular mood affect their perceptions to the questions and their responses. In order to 
overcome some of these challenges, multiple rounds of interviews and secondary methods 
were valuable supplements to complement any perceived gaps in findings. At the same 
time, the same challenges can be strengths of interpretive approaches. Interpretivism allows 
phenomena to be studied at a depth that quantitative methods would not allow, due to the 
inherent rigidity and concrete regimen of the latter. Many valuable findings would not have 
emerged had the research taken positivistic assumptions.
As a final note, this research does not expect any framework or methodology to reveal the 
truth about an organization or social phenomena. Indeed, it would be naive to believe that 
organizational complexity and ambiguous social phenomena may be reduced to simplistic 
findings and interpretations of a single researcher. The most this research can achieve is to 
understand a small comer of the chaotic social phenomena in fast changing and irrational 
organizations.
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CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter introduced the S strategizing framework (Galliers & Newell 2003), which will 
be used as a way to structure the empirical process and analysis. Two major components of 
the framework -  for the purposes of this research -  are the socio-technical information 
infrastructure and IS strategies. A background to the underlying concepts was reviewed in 
chapters 2 and 3. There are two general objectives in applying the framework in practice:
• to explore the messy and chaotic real world in a more structured way, and
• to reflect back on the framework itself in an attempt to add new insights on the 
basis of new interpretations from the empirical findings and supporting theories.
Furthermore, the research considers perspectives from two different cultural contexts, 
Germany and the US, which will be incorporated in the discussion in chapters 6 and 7.
Research Objective To explore the ways in which information and knowledge are 
leveraged through IS in the process of business strategizing
Theoretical Framework IS Strategizing Framework (Galliers & Newell 2003)
Philosophical 
Assumptions 
Mode of Analysis
Qualitative, Interpretivism 
- The Hermeneutic Circle
Research Strategy 
Data Collection
Qualitative Case Studies:
- Semi-structured interviews & written documents as supportive 
material
- Observation
Figure 4.6: Summary of chapter 4
Philosophical assumptions of this research are those of interpretivism. Here, the 
hermeneutic circle serves the iterative sense-making process, where the empirical findings, 
the theoretical framework, and supporting theories inform each another in an attempt to let 
new insights emerge and create a richer understanding. O f course, any understanding 
reached is not an absolute; however, it will be a reasonable one based on the choices of 
theory, philosophy and methodology. Two qualitative case studies are conducted with 
interviews and observation as primary methods to collect data. It is believed that more 
diverse data will have more analytic benefits than single case studies (Yin 2003). The 
findings for each individual case will be analyzed within their own context and similarities 
and differences among them will be noted.
The next chapter will give a background to the case studies and outline the initial findings.
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This chapter provides a background to the two case studies and 
presents the initial findings.
5 INTRODUCTION
This chapter gives an overview of the empirical work. The common ‘denominator’ of the 
two case studies will be the competitive bidding approach of each respective firm. The first 
section justifies the choices made and how access was achieved. Section 2 outlines the 
respective business strategies, and identifies characteristics of their IIs and IS as part of 
initial findings. These will be expanded and interpreted in chapters 6 and 7. The data 
sources include electronic and hard-copy material, e.g. company Intranet, brochures, 
business plans, and marketing material. Section 3 gives an overview of both cases to make 
explicit that which is being studied. A summary section follows.
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK
The period of data collection was spread between November 2001 and summer 2006. 
During the first year, the researcher conducted preliminary interviews at three companies: a 
strategy consulting firm, an IT and Engineering firm, and a global petrochemical firm. 
These were outlined in chapter 1. These provided the ground work for the rest of the 
research inquiry in fine-tuning the research questions, objective, and the researcher’s skills.
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The main analysis is based on two case studies, which are introduced in this chapter. Case 
study 1 is a hydro-power generation company, named HPC, with global headquarters in 
Germany. Case study 2 is a private bank, named PCS for private client services, with global 
headquarters in the USA. Most data were collected using semi-structured interviews and 
observation. Some document research and informal conversations were also conducted. 
Findings arising from the two case studies are presented in chapter 6 in the form of ‘raw 
data’ and are analyzed and discussed in detail in chapter 7. The box below gives an 
overview of the empirical work. In order to respect the confidentiality requests by the 
companies, details of interviewees will remain anonymous. This will not affect the quality 
of the interpretive study in any way. Throughout the thesis, the text will refer to 
abbreviations in correspondence with the cases and individuals, as noted in the box below.
Preliminary Studies: Interview-based (see Appendix) Nov 2001 -  Dec 2002
1. Strategy Consulting firm
2. IT & Engineering Company
3. Petrochemical Company
CASE 1: Hydro Power Company (H P C ) Apr 2003 -  May 2005
Locations:
• US Operating Unit (OU), also HQ to North-America
• German OU, global headquarters 
Data Collection:
• 33 Semi-structured interviews: on-site and telephone
• Also: Conversations and meetings; frequent correspondences via E-mail
• Other sources: Company documents: business strategy plans, marketing 
material, Intranet, Internet site, company publications
CASE 2: Private Client Services (PCS) Nov 2005 -  May 2006
Location:
• A US subsidiary of PCS 
Data Collection:
• 13 semi-structured and unstructured interviews
• 6 months on-site observation
• Also: Conversations and meetings
• Other sources: company documents: marketing material, Intranet, Internet 
site, public information
Figure 5.1: Overview on the empirical work
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Below, more details about the case companies are provided:
Case I: HPC (Private) 
US & Germany
Mechanical & Electrical Engineering -  
Hydro Power
Interviews at 
German & US HQs
Case II: PCS (Public) 
US
Financial Services firm -  
Private Banking division
Interviews & Observation 
at a US subsidiary
Figure 5.2: The case companies
The diverse nature of the case companies called for different ways to collecting data. While 
both include interviews as method, the investigation into Case 1 was spread over a two- 
year period and considered contextual factors. This involved several travels between the 
German and US offices. The investigation into Case 2, however, was conducted in one 
place and was more condensed. This involved everyday on-site observation for a period of 
6 months. Hence, these will affect the ways the data will be presented and analyzed.
In Case 1, semi-structured interviews were conducted in the German and North-American 
headquarters, requiring two trips to each site. Besides on-site interviews, members who 
were on business trips had to be interviewed on the telephone. While all interviews were 
conducted in English, conversations outside of the interview period were held in German. 
In addition to semi-structured interviews in Case 2, the opportunity to include observation 
proved to be valuable. This way, the researcher was able to collect first-hand empirical 
findings on what is involved in strategizing processes, rather than relying on theoretical 
assumptions from the selected literature. It helped to capture aspects of managerial 
activities, which are not naturally articulated in words during interviews, for example, how 
an advisor reacts to a sudden shift in a situation, and how this affects the use of IS.
In order to establish a common ground for the Cases, a ‘common denominator’ was set to 
be their respective competitive business strategies (i.e. business development activities). 
Hence, while the nature of managerial strategizing work is thought to be similar in both 
cases, the internal socio-technical contexts are different. On this basis, senior managers at 
HPC and senior advisors at PCS inform us in how they leverage information and 
knowledge in their respective business strategies, external competitive environments and 
internal socio-technical context. Before embarking on the details, the next section justifies 
the choices made and how access was gained.
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5.1.1 Case Selection
Several decisions had to be made in conducting the empirical work. These will be outlined 
below in terms of the choice of the companies, locations, and the group of selected 
interviewees.
1. Why companies with global presence
2. Why USA and Germany
3. Why the particular sectors
4. Why the group of interviewees.
1. Global Presence
Both companies have global presence. Fairly enough, while a global presence was not a 
requirement for this study, it was more an intellectual curiosity based on the following 
assumptions:
• Organizations with locations across the globe have more diffused resources, which 
need to be managed;
• The diffusion makes knowledge processes very complex;
• Hence, one would assume these companies would already have strategies to 
manage diffused resources.
The curiosity is in investigating how decision-makers in competitive and fast changing 
environments leverage dispersed intangible resources with respect to management IS. For 
example, to what extent do experienced managers see a need for comprehensive IS in 
direct relation with the complexities of their organizations? Literature suggests that the 
complexities of the nature of work increase the skill and knowledge requirement of top 
management, where the firms need more resources from both inside and outside 
(Knickerbocker 1973; Eisenhardt 1989b; Weick 1995; Gomez-Mejia 1997). Here, the 
literature argues that strategic IS are significant to decision-makers (Ancona & Nadler 
1989). Thus, one might think that such organizations find it necessary to put mechanisms 
in place to process and disseminate the information required for strategizing purposes.
2. Origin and Locations: USA & Germany
Interviews were conducted at PCS’s US location, and HPC’s US and German locations. 
Although this is not meant to be a cross-cultural study, shedding light on perspectives from
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German and US operating units may offer additional insights and contributions to the 
research inquiry". Much of the cross-cultural studies have treated IS under the Western 
companies’ umbrella. Although German and US-American cultures may be similar in many 
ways, the world views of managers are quite different, which have implications on 
strategizing, perceptions towards IS and the use thereof. In that sense, there is an attempt 
to capture the elements that influence the use of IS, which stem from different ways of 
thinking. The US and German locations were of interest because of the researcher’s 
background and experience in the respective cultures. While the researcher is familiar with 
the general thinking and cultural attributes of each place, she is not native to either culture 
and therefore is in a position to draw upon differences and similarities without a native 
bias.
3. Sectors and Business: Engineering and Financial Services
Business development processes in the hydro power and financial services sectors share 
similar criteria: both are knowledge-intensive sectors with the following requirements:
• Technical knowledge on customized products and services
• Business knowledge (on processes such as global sourcing and dealing with 
multiple vendors, marketing and sales /  customers)
• Management and organizational knowledge for operations, strategizing, planning, 
and sharing know-how across functions and units.
Furthermore, the business strategies of both cases are built on a competitive bidding 
model, where engineers and advisors apply their technical knowledge and commercial 
experience to build a business case and compete in their markets.
4. Selection of Interviewees
Primary interviewees are experienced members of business development teams, whose 
decisions carry considerable influence and responsibilities. These include front-end 
managers and those who work with them as part of the organizational information and 
knowledge infrastructure. Senior-level managers were chosen because the business unit’s 
profit is dependent upon the performance of these actors, who are in most need for 
effective corporate collaboration mechanisms. Additionally, conversations with a few 
members of the back office, i.e. assistants and analysts, were held to understand various
123
issues around specific work processes in more detail. Their reflections were valuable 
because they provided front-end managers with data and information in the everyday 
strategizing work.
The next section outlines how access was established and specific sources of data.
5.1.2 Gaining Access
Access was established through cold-calling, ‘cold-walking’ and network-building. Perhaps 
it should be acknowledged briefly that the post 9/11 period during 2001-2002 made it 
especially difficult for the researcher to gain access to upper managers in global 
organizations. While great interest was expressed, the timing made it challenging to have 
this research project approved. At the same time, management turnover was considerably 
high with unstable corporate governance. Nevertheless, the efforts turned out to be 
fruitful.
5.12.1 Case 1: Hydro Power Company (HPC)
Access
Following several weeks of networking, contact was finally established in spring of 2003 
with a senior proposal manager at HPC-US’ in Pennsylvania (PA). The researcher sent her 
research proposal to the contact person, who forwarded it to the Human Resources 
directors of the offices in PA and in Germany. The contact person was the head of project 
proposals for all North-American businesses, overseeing engineers and the director of that 
operating unit (OU). Upon their agreement to participate in the research, interviews were 
arranged in cooperation with the HR directors at these two locations. The initial stages of 
communication were through email and telephone until the researcher visited both OU.
Visits to the US and German Power Plants 
The researcher arrived in Pennsylvania in summer 2003 for a four-day meeting and 
interviewing with selected individuals. Managers and engineers were interviewed in the 
operations and management teams. In addition, many conversations were held with senior 
organizational members at lunch, and an extensive tour was given of the power plant 
facility. The researcher re-visited the US OU for additional interviews in November 2004. 
In the meantime, in April 2004, the German headquarters was visited for a three-day 
meeting, speaking with managers and engineers, and visiting the power plant facilities. The
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location was re-visited at a later stage for additional interviews. The traveling between 
offices allowed contextual distinctions to be made, which helped to enrich the analysis. 
This also helped eliminate initial biases that an outsider might have when entering a new 
organization.
Interviews started with open-ended discussions on general issues in relations to the 
managers’ roles, work processes, involvement with IS. Questions narrowed down to 
examine the type of corporate communication tools and their socio-technical 
environments. Each of these was explored in detail by asking interviewees to draw upon 
examples and their experiences. Despite the effort to follow a guideline of questions, in 
most cases it was not possible to maintain the sequence of questions. The researcher had to 
improvise to incorporate the comments and ideas of informants while maintaining 
momentum and focus. In most cases the result was a stimulating conversation as opposed 
to question and answer. In some cases, however, informants preferred a clear question to 
which they could give a concrete answer. Once the researcher picked up on their style, the 
approach re-adjusted. This is a valuable lesson with regard to interviewing technique rarely 
covered in research texts. The style also affected the duration of interviews. The range of 
interviews was between 30 minutes and 2 hours.
As indicated, English was the preferred language to conduct interviews to maintain 
consistency in responses. However, German was spoken outside of the corporate offices 
and in informal conversations. These added further insights to the responses. The roles of 
the interviewees were as follows: EVP (Executive Vice President) for Operations, Director 
of Human Resources, Manager for Manufacturing, Business Development managers, Sales 
manager, Regional Sales managers, Proposal manager, Director of Automation, Director of 
Project Management, Director for Field Operations, EVP of Technology, Corporate 
Controller, Proposal Director, Supply Chain Manager, President of the US operating units. 
See appendix for a list of interviewees.
5.1.2.2 Case 2: Private Client Services (PCS)
The second study was conducted at a private bank’s US subsidiary. The purpose was to add 
additional perspectives from different contexts to the research inquiry. Specifically, 
observation as method of inquiry allowed further insights to be gained into the micro-level 
analysis of the manager’s decision activities in the context of competitive bidding, which
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was not feasible at HPC. This was also an opportunity to closer explore the implicit 
dimension of the strategizing process.
Access
Access was established through cold-walking. In August 2005, the researcher approached 
the firm’s subsidiary in the US. Upon an introduction, the office’s director showed interest 
in the research. The researcher started in November 2005. Direct observation in 
November and December was rather slow because of the busy time of the year’s end. The 
researcher used the opportunity to learn the nature of the business and get acquainted with 
the overall information processes. The engagement picked up in January and lasted until 
end of May 2006.
In the 6-months involvement, data was collected based on accessibility through (1) 
observation of day-to-day operations of advisors, and participation in company events, (2) 
unstructured and semi-structured interviews. Specific sources include:
• Interviews with advisors between 2-30 years of experience at the firm
• Conversations with their assistants to learn about information processes and 
systems
• Team meetings, knowledge sharing meetings, strategy meetings
• Having advisors ‘thinking loud’ while engaged in tackling emerging challenges
• Company documents such as marketing and business development strategies
• Public information and publications on the company.
Besides interviewing individuals (e.g. advisors, office director, specialists), it was necessary 
to use observation and limited participation as a way to better understand the business, as 
well as understand some of the unspoken rules of the culture. Had the findings been based 
on interviews alone, many aspects that are taken for granted by interviewees, but significant 
to understanding the dynamics, would not have been captured. While observation provided 
more richness to the interpretive inquiry, there were also some obvious shortcomings, such 
as inter-subjectivity of data, limited involvement of the researcher, and not being 
completely aware of the history of advisors and associated organizational memory. Further 
details on method and methodology were discussed in chapter 4.
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5.2. CASE STUDIES: INITIAL EMPIRICAL MATERIAL
This section describes the case companies in terms of their business strategies and 
identifies their general socio-technical characteristics. First, the study explored the 
strategizing work to identify the types of information and knowledge to get the job done. 
Then, it looked at the socio-technical environments which are assumed to be either
enabling or disabling in what they entail.
German US
Hydro Power; manufacturer of 
turbines & generators
Financial services firm: private 
banking
Private/family-owned 
Centralized, hierarchical 
governance 
- Substantial bureaucracy
Public
Centralized control on 
operations, decentralized 
operational strategies
Corporate headquarters in 
Germany
North-American headquarters in 
Pennsylvania, USA
A US subsidiary
Business Development, cross­
functional involvement with the 
project leaders
Business Development, cross- 
divisional involvement with 
the financial advisor; primary 
activity is sales & marketing.
Competitive bidding 
Transition from old to new 
strategy: Design-Bid-Build 
approach -> Alliance approach 
Company motto: To provide 
complete power plant products 
and services to global clients at 
lowest cost’
Competitive bidding 
Transition from old to new 
strategy: Transaction-based 
business activities-^ Fee-based 
& annuitized, Integrated 
advisory approach 
Company motto: To provide 
broad range of products and 
services to individuals and 
corporations’
Figure 5.3: Details of the case companies
Discussions on outside interaction with suppliers and competitors will be limited due to the 
limited scope of the thesis.
5.2.1 Hydro-Power Company (HPC)
HPC is a hydro power division of the holding company, here called the H-Group, 
headquartered in German. The H-Group was founded by a German family in the 1860s 
and has grown into one of the largest family-owned companies in Europe. The company
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possesses over 130 years of technical know-how and established management style. Upon 
successful executions, the founders expanded the turbine business by acquiring other 
power technologies. The family has been steadily and consistently growing to become a 
leader in the global hydro market.
HPC underwent a joint venture with the hydro-electric division of another global company 
to join forces to meet increased competitive market demands. The venture’s mission was to 
provide complete set of advanced technology products and comprehensive services to a 
larger global client pool under the motto ‘the entire is more than the sum of its parts’ 
(company document). Upon the venture, the H-Group maintained the majority of 
corporate governance, operational and strategic control over HPC. HPC has employees 
across production and marketing & sales facilities in Europe, UK, central - and south 
America, North America and Asia. With the combined knowledge pool, HPC seeks to 
exploit on the organizational expertise and experience on the electrical, mechanical and 
commercial sides to create synergy among operations, marketing and sales. All managers 
have long-standing engineering and project management experience; most of the 
individuals interviewed have been with the company for over 10 years (with some well into 
30 years).
HPC North-America and USA (HPC-US)
In the US market, hydro owners have been looking to increase energy production by 
upgrading their hydroelectric plants built in early 1900s through the mid 1980s, while the 
Canadian market is looking to construct new hydro facilities and modernize existing ones. 
Upon its joint venture, HPC-US has full range of power plant capabilities and seeks to 
meet market demands more competitively. Its position in the US and Canadian markets is 
to help customers evaluate, optimize and implement hydro modernization as well as in 
construction of new hydro plants. The headquarters of North-American operations is in 
Pennsylvania (PA), which possesses one of the most advanced power plant facilities 
manufacturing generators and turbines for large scale projects. The engineering is 
specialized in turbines, automation and balance of plants, turbine model testing and 
manufacturing, project management and field operations. Although all HPC operating 
units specialize in their respective markets, they are still under the management and 
corporate governance of the H-Group, the holding company. The case study focuses on 
the US-based operations, while perspectives from the German headquarters are also
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incorporated. Interviews in both locations attempt to provide a richer and less bias 
perspective.
HPC’s Competitive Strategy
As with any hydro power supplier, HPC competes in its market to provide customers with 
the best possible customized products and services at the lowest total cost. Considering 
how the competitive environments of the business have changed over the past decades, 
HPC has been lagging behind its operational capabilities and management styles. 
Traditionally, offers from customers would flow in. As a leader in sound technologies and 
‘engineered reliability’ (a company slogan), business development was not a major challenge 
as it is today. In response to the North-American hydro demand and the expanding 
organizational know-how, the HPC-US developed a business strategy to leverage its 
potential across the full range of hydro power plant businesses to increase efficiency and 
productivity. A new competitive bidding strategy has been devised to move away from the 
traditional to an alliance-based approach (see figure 5.7). A new approach to business 
development was especially needed upon the joint venture the hydro-electric division of 
another global company. The expanding client base called for new ways to organize 
internal and external competencies such that they could be exploited more efficiently, as 
well as new ways to explore new sourcing to accommodate growing and specialized 
customer needs. The remaining of this section will outline the business strategy and its 
context in an attempt to identify the information and knowledge diversity that goes into the 
strategizing processes.
Change in Strategizing: Towards an Integrated Approach
The HPC competitive strategy was developed in an attempt to move away from traditional 
approaches of competitive bidding towards a new integrated approach to winning 
businesses and providing products and services. Traditionally, the approach to generating 
new business cases was based on a series of pricing activities where plant owners and their 
consultants set the criteria of supplier selection. The result of this approach has been a 
‘win-lose’ or ‘lose-lose’ situation, according to a HPC-US project director. The ‘old’ way is 
outlined below:
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Traditional approach: Design -  Bid -  Build Concept
Design
•  Project evaluation
• Seek initial approval
• Planning & controlling -  develop required bid specifications -  competitive inquiry, bid 
and evaluation
• Final approval
Bid
• Contract awards
Build
• Equipment supply & project implementation.
Figure 5.4: Traditional business strategy (Source: Company document)
Here, it was primarily the customer (plant owner), who made most of the decisions in the 
supplier selection process by working with an independent consultant. This consultant then 
works with multiple suppliers to develop a pilot concept. In most cases, the consultant has 
most of the power in driving the selection process forward, where most often, according to 
the managing director at HPC-US, an average rather an the best concept would be 
developed, upon which negotiations would take place. This process was time consuming 
and dissatisfying to HPC, where additional costs to both sides would incur. This approach 
was perceived as win-lose’ or ‘lose-lose’ situations for the customer and selected supplier 
because of the lack of cooperative environment. The third-party involvement was creating 
additional tension and conflict in interests between the parties. For example, the desire to 
be selected as the primary supplier would foster a ‘win the bid’ attitude rather than making 
a sincere effort to understand the customer’s technical and commercial needs. The process 
of competitive strategizing would become one filled with frustration and ineffective way to 
present the core competencies to the customer. Moreover, a company presentation 
characterized the stages that managers typically go through while building a business case:
1. Euphoria
2. Disillusionment
3. Panic
4. Search for the Guilty
5. Punishment of the Innocent
6. Recognition of the Uninvolved
Figure 5.5: From control to drift - Phases o f a strategizing process (Source: Company 
presentation)
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Notably, these reflect the type of phases managers face in the process of strategizing, as 
they progress from a state of control to complete drift from the initial strategic intent (e.g. 
Ciborra 2000). Despite a step-by-step strategy, there was a lot of going back-and-forth in 
negotiations and ‘gaming’ with consultants, as well as among the team members at HPC. 
During the down-ward spiral, managers would go through frustrations and muddling 
through conflicting demands from customers, standard requirements and resource 
allocation. The new strategy was implemented to overcome the unnecessary hurdles and 
the psychological stir in the process and take the focus on synthesizing core competencies. 
Below is a list of the range of services covered under the new business strategy of HPC-US:
• Plant condition • Equipment monitoring • Project identification
assessment • Site inspections • Feasibility studies
• Remaining life analysis • Spare parts supply and • Power purchase
• Up-rate evaluation management agreements
• Operational optimization • Installation and • Project financing
• Environmental commissioning
considerations
• Economics Analysis
• Equipment supply
• Outage planning and
management
• Financial concepts
Figure 5.6: Scope o f servicing and managerial work (Sources: Company document)
The new strategy is communicated as a ‘philosophy’, which involves a ‘parallel cooperation 
with the customer from the very beginning’ all the way through the implementation and 
maintenance phases. The crux of what make the strategy competitive lies more in its 
process than intention. Hence, a reconceptualization of the processes was hoped to lead to 
the desired outcome. This ‘Alliance Approach’ is a comprehensive multi-phase process 
from project initiation to the final bidding stage.
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Alliance Approach: Design -  Build Concept 
Design
• Preliminary scoping & project or system evaluation, producing modernization reports 
and a business case
• Evaluation of criteria and consultation with plant owner
• Optimizing energy evaluation & scope development; final pricing and business case 
Evaluation o f criteria and consultation with plant owner
Build
• Final design & implementation phase, equipment delivery
• Installation.
Figure 5.7: Steps of new business strategy (Sources: Company document)
The focus is to create a ‘win-win’ situation, whereby the customer and supplier form an 
alliance and work together towards the common goal, to provide the ‘Lowest Total Owner 
Cost’ (source: company document). This involves ‘streamlining processes where both 
owner and supplier are focused on the same goal -  Lowest Total Ownership Costs’. On 
the business strategy side, this is considered a ‘unique concept’ which provides customers 
with tailor-made optimized products and services from single components to complete 
plant management under one umbrella. What it means is that the separate phases of the 
bidding process become integrated into one which involves working cross-functionally in 
teams to make decisions, and more client interaction to evaluate criteria, review progress 
and adjust their approach.
The difference between the traditional and new approach is to improve the chances of 
supplier selection by moving the selection phase up the process and basing it on evaluation 
criteria set with the customer together. The director continues by arguing what the new 
strategy should be about:
| •  Integrating the owner’s operating knowledge with the supplier product knowledge to j
j  produce the optimum project results or Lowest Total Ownership Costs
| • Reducing surprises, overruns and conflict
• Trust, common goals and long-term focus j
j •  Working with one supplier to reduce hand-offs and risks. j
Figure 5.8: Intentions o f the new business strategy (Source: Company document)
Here, apart from cost savings, the streamlined process handling steps (versus the series 
steps) allows an estimated time saving of approximately one year. The manner in which the 
time and cost savings are planned is quantified in detail through various graphical and 
numeric optimization analysis (incorporating risk variables). Decisions at every project
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phase involve a large diversity of data, information and knowledge to be incorporated in 
the process. The activities that go into developing the bidding agreement are at the centre 
of the strategizing process. Specifically, a scorecard has been developed by which their 
performance is evaluated by the customer. This makes the final evaluation not based on 
price alone, but on delivered core competencies of the HPC team to customer’s specific 
needs. These ‘Evaluation Criteria’ are set by the customer and supplier in an alliance 
agreement, which include:
1. Technical capability |
- Internal capabilities vs. outsourcing !
- If outsourcing, then does Alliance exist? |
- Engineering, Plant Assessments, Project Management, Environmental, etc. j
2. Experience j
- Quantity and quality of experience j
- Knowledge on Plant Assessments, Turbines, Generators, Automation, Supply, j
: etc I
3. Commercial approach j
- Financial Strength (History, credit rating, etc.) j
- Proposed Pricing Mechanisms (Process, Innovation, Simplicity, Openness to j
share data, etc.) I
- Terms & Conditions j
- Bonus/Penalty Performance Measures (i.e. risk sharing) j
- Insurance |
4. Management approach j
- Management Commitment !
- Dedicated Team ]
- Identification of Executive sponsors j
: - Demonstrated understanding of Design-Build Philosophy |
j - Define customer/supplier interface process j
5. Quality/Environmental/ Safety j
j - On-site safety record, certifications, and so on j
| 6. Sample project approach j
J - based on sample project criteria: explain processes and approach for project[0]. j
I |
Figure 5.9: Evaluation Criteria - HPC
These steps in the strategizing process indicate required forms of data, information, and 
knowledge. The philosophy behind an agreement with these criteria is to integrate 
competencies with the customer’s common goal early on in the process. It allows the 
company to exploit on its technical and managerial capabilities while exploring new 
opportunities and risks directly with the customer (plant owner). The US-based 
headquarters has been successfully using the alliance approach with the view to deliberately 
enable internal processes and create a collaborative customer-supplier relationship. The 
leading person involved is the Executive Vice President (EVP) of Sales & Marketing of
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HPC North America. Under him are the proposal manager and director who orchestrate 
the fit between customers and three further divisions: proposal engineering, estimating, and 
business development. Proposal engineering consists of mechanical, hydraulic, automation, 
operations, design, and support. The proposal manager works in conjunction with senior 
executives who manage regional business development and marketing.
Having portrayed the key processes, the next section sheds light into some of the IS 
elements as part of the organizational socio-technical II, which would create and enabling 
or disabling strategizing environment.
Information Infrastructure & Systems
HPC is a global leader in hydro power technology and was one of the first in its industry to pursue 
international projects and expand beyond its national borders. Surprisingly, it gave an unexpected picture 
in regards to the available IS/IT for management information and knowledge. Having described the 
integrated approach to business strategizing, one would expect that this is supported by an enabling II to 
allow information and knowledge sharing and exchange between managers across units and national 
borders. However, the organization-wide II and IS did not seem to have developed in line with 
strategizing ambitions. One reason is that while each OU may devise its own strategy, allocation of 
corporate resources still lay with German headquarters. It was striking to find three things1 in the US and 
German OUs:
1. Most of the project-specific data and information, and experience-based knowledge of 
project managers have not yet been converted to electronic formats to be stored in 
databases for future re-use. ITs and systems are available for the purposes of engineering 
data and information, not for management information.
2. While corporate governance and power of authorization are centralized, the centralized IS 
platform is slow, out of date and lacks integration. This seems to inhibit knowledge 
workers to access, share and exchange management information. Each location has their 
own legacy systems in line it with local management styles and cultures, despite centralized 
command and control.
3. The inconsistency between strategizing processes and available H/IS left experienced 
managers create their individualized subsystems to support decision-making. These 
subsystems consist of relevant data, information and knowledge from deliberate IS and 
emerging everyday sources.
Figure 5.10: Initial Findings -  HPC
It was surprising to find that a successful organization with such massive amount of data, 
information and know-how about its products, management experience, alliances and
1 All data in this research refer to the year 2002-2004. Although the writing is in present tense, the 
information infrastructure may have changed in the meantime. Findings refer to the time the research was 
conducted only.
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competitors did not have a digitalized IS, not to speak of an integrated knowledge 
platform. Most of the information on clients and projects had not yet been codified into 
systems and exist in manual format. Of course, on the operational level, there are 
standardized engineering software systems that the company uses in most locations, such 
as engineering and financial data, special engineering software to work with engineering 
drawings, project management and such. The majority of management information and 
specifically experience-based knowledge is in the heads of the managers. The engineering- 
centered IS are not surprising, considering that the company (meaning the H-Group) has 
been traditionally describing its core capability as being reliable engineering.
To that end, the majority of the content on projects and management information has been 
kept in filing cabinets, in hard copy manuals, paper archives etc. Even these were found to 
be dispersed across various locations/offices. The components of the electronic II are 
basic systems such as Intranet, the Internet, Email system and basic search engines 
providing general references. A big problem was the lack of electronic means to manage 
and oversee the ever growing volume of information, knowledge and experience in making 
new decisions on new project proposals. For those available IS, there is a lack of 
convergence of the media, IT and telecommunications technologies towards integrated 
ICTs. The only means one can get access to certain information is through the company 
phone book to find a specific person, emails, or personal networks. A lack of a common 
information platform has implications on many aspects of managerial work, leading to 
much inefficiencies and frustrations, especially at locations away from the German 
headquarters, where most of the business knowledge resides.
Furthermore, colleagues in the US OU complained about frequent misunderstandings and 
lack of communication with the German senior managers. Among them, very few thought 
this was due to the lack of ICTs and made reference to the gap in building consensus as a 
result of different ways of thinking. A frequent example, which was draw upon frequently, 
was the difficulties of the centralized command and control leadership but little means to 
collaborate when making joint decisions. This introduced a host of bureaucratic 
procedures, policies and regulations imposed by the German headquarters as a way to 
monitor OUs performance. These however, would come in the way of the natural 
strategizing process at the US OU. A major hurdle was the too frequent, tedious and 
inefficient way of the performance reporting system. During the period of the case study, 
there were no standardized systems to complete lengthy reports on projects. Writing
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detailed essays and descriptions of project phases were mandatory and ‘extremely time 
consuming’ with ‘little feedback’ back to the OUs (according to the proposal manager.).
A lack of strategic IS, or MIS, to support managers on the strategic management affairs was 
stacking up the inefficiencies and putting a halt to the level of individual productivity. As 
opposed to US managers, managers at the German OU did not perceive the same 
problems as major, however. They were less willing to suggest a solution to the system 
inefficiencies and focused on working with what is available. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, this more ‘accepting’ attitude among German managers versus a more ‘solution- 
oriented’ attitude of US managers has much to do with different cultural assumptions, 
which affected the leadership and the corporate culture to some extent.
Addressing the IS Challenge
Furthermore, the lack of an integrated II has implications on organizational memory could 
be significant as the company expands and transforms its strategizing approaches. With 
limited systems or common knowledge base in place to hold on to the experience of 
managers, the knowledge remains in the heads of the people, specifically senior members. 
As a result, the company is keen to hold on to its senior managers for as long as possible in 
order to retain the experience and the knowledge that cannot be stored.
Until recent years, the approaches to organization information through systems and 
technologies were consistent with the traditional approach to business strategizing, i.e. 
focus on engineering and organic growth. However, the pressure to join the bandwagon of 
ICT adopters has been increasing because of several reasons, e.g. the exponentially growing 
volume of expertise upon the joint venture, the expanding client pool, more 
comprehensive customer demand, and growing competition from other suppliers. The 
company claims to be the provider of whole power plants and comprehensive consulting. 
With its new strategy to become a leading provider in world, there are tremendous 
implications on the knowledge pool, socio-technical context, and transparency. The 
increasing depth and complexity of the work processes and the growing client base have 
increasingly led to growing demand for corporate IS and evolving business strategies.
As an initial step towards a solution, the CEO called for the need to implement an 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system to streamline operations and business 
processes. Streamlining business processes was thought to help to synthesize the many
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legacy systems and improve organizational strategizing capabilities. Notably, subsystems 
were still another layer of IS, other than legacy systems, which were not meant to be 
addressed by the introduction of the ERP system (perhaps because of the lack of attention 
to the existence of these systems). The goal with integrating systems was to create long­
term benefits for the efficiency of business operations and effectiveness of business 
decisions. This would make the company to become more ‘fit’ and compete better. This is 
significant because as a family-owned company, most decisions and control are centralized.
Nevertheless, the company conducted a pilot study in the Asian OU. This, however, had to 
be disrupted due to incompatibility of the local culture with the systems requirements, 
according to the IT project director and HR director, Germany. According to the IT and 
HR directors, the reason that the pilot study failed in Asia was less a question of the ERP 
system itself, but rather one of management style of the local culture which had its own 
legacy system engrained in across all work processes. The ways in which information and 
knowledge were used was so different such that they could not adapt to the new system. 
According to the HR director, the next step after the disruption was to introduce new ways 
of management thinking through training before a second attempt to systems 
implementation could take place. In the meantime, the process of implementing various 
modules of the ERP system has been continued, with vaiying successes. Unfortunately, the 
period of the case study ended before this serious of attempts took place.
Having described the scope of the first case study, this is the point of departure to 
introduce the second case within an interesting contrasting context.
5.2.2 Private Client Services (PCS)
The case study took place at one of the PCS’s US subsidiaries. PCS is the private client 
banking leg of a global financial services firm. It provides proprietary and third-party 
wealth management products and services to individuals and businesses. The business 
model is based on the firm’s network of thousands of advisors around the world. PCS 
subsidiaries function in highly decentralized fashion, such that they are organized in 
bundles, or ‘complexes’, in each US State. Each complex has a number of offices 
depending on the size and population of each state. Each complex is a profit center and is 
run under a complex director. The performance of each office and advisor is highly
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monitored and so is the performance of each complex by the headquarters. The rest of this 
section familiarizes the reader with context and scope of the inquiry.
Private Client Business Strategy
PCS operates in the US wealth management market which has been under continuous flux, 
specifically in the past 10 years. As a result of the fast changing fluctuations, financial 
advisory firms have changed their market strategies and structures accordingly. Specifically, 
in response to changing client demand and growing competition in the supply market, PCS, 
like many other firms, moved away from a traditional transaction-based approach towards 
an integrated approach. In other words, the wealth management business transformed 
from a mere transaction based brokerage towards a fee-based holistic advisory business. 
This transition meant an emphasis on re-structured products and aggressive sales and 
marketing services. Above all, the focus on customization of service offerings meant a shift 
in core capabilities from structured products to comprehensive advisory strategies to target 
all aspects of the clients’ financial concerns. Implications on the role of advisors, their 
strategies and work structures were multifold. For example, whereas transaction-based 
tasks involved person-to-document mode of working (e.g. Hansen et al 1999) based on 
heavy use of sophisticated systems, the new role concentrated on the human capability as 
the driver of sales and business development. This means advisors are responsible to build 
consulting know-how and integrate entrepreneurial skills with financial analytical know­
how.
A paradox was noted. While advisory compensation was structured around individual 
performance (i.e. pay-per-performance), the competitive environments left little room for 
individual advisors to survive. Furthermore, while the director of each office was 
encouraging team work and ‘open-door policy’, the complex director (who manages 
bundles of offices) silently encouraged single business developers to increase the chances to 
increase the number of households. Nevertheless, the point which is being made is to 
highlight the conflicting demands and uncertain environments of the strategizing work 
Overall, the most successful advisors seemed to be those who managed to juggle two 
strategies at the same time: to expand their client portfolios through business development, 
while simultaneously service current clients’ comprehensive and ‘moody’ needs.
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At the particular location, most advisors had been with the firm long enough to reflea on
the changes in the past decade and their work processes, changing management
capabilities, and organizational memory and culture. A senior advisor refleaecL*
Many years ago, the way this business was operating -  the way the industry was 
operating -  was you get a mutual fund and you sell it. A new MF [Mutual Fund] 
comes through to the unit, you have a sales meeting allocating who will sell how 
much ... and you go and sell it as ‘the best product’ out there. There were times 
when a unit wouldn’t get the latest MF and salespeople where out of business. Now  
the business has taken a consultative role, where you are supposed to care about the 
client, understand them, understand the different products and find the right fit in a 
fair manner’
Above all, the model is based on expanding the firm’s network through aggressive business 
expansion and development. The implications of supportive and enabling collaboration 
mechanisms are significant.
As already mentioned, revenue generation of PCS depends on developing new businesses 
and retaining old ones. Within this subsidiary, the researcher focused on the business 
development strategy of a particular team in relation to other teams, called the A-team. 
This team, one of the largest at the firm, works with individuals as well as institutions. 
Competitive bidding strategizing is what senior advisors do on daily basis to win clients.
The business development strategy consists of investment strategy and client relationship 
management strategy. While there are experts dedicated to take care of the investment side, 
the business developer may also aaively participate in designing investment strategies for 
clients, but not in all cases. As the front-end person, he/she has multiple integrated roles 
which encompass the following:
j • Investment knowledge:
} - tactical and long-term asset allocation
| - Equity, Fixed Income, Akemative investments
knowledge about structured and proprietary products
• Knowledge about the HNWI (high net-worth individuals) market
| • Ability to communicate this knowledge with the HNWI clients (who tend to be more
\ difficult to manage than regular clients)
• Experience in portfolio management
• Commercial knowledge
• Creating new and maintaining old relationships
• Managing external supplies, i.e. money managers.
Figure 5.11: Knowledge work at PCS (Source: Company document)
Within a comprehensive IS platform, advisors coordinate relationships with a wide range of 
attors, such as:
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• Trust & Estate lawyers
• Tax accountants
• Investment/portfolio managers
• Property risk management brokers
• Life insurance brokers
•  A range of bankers and lenders
•  Mortgage brokers
• Private money managers
• Secretaries.
Figure 5.12: Areas of expertise - PCS (Source: Company document)
Each of these areas is a specialist body functioning in PCS to serve all advisory teams. 
Teams work in conjunction with them to provide customized solutions. Unlike the case of 
HPC, there is a sophisticated information infrastructure in place to serve the needs of each 
individual function and body of exerts.
Socio-Technical Context
While there is no one single approach to business development strategy, there is a uniform 
corporate II at the center of all strategies and operations of the firm. The comprehensive 
organizational II is primarily ICT-driven and based on proprietary IS to support the teams’ 
strategies. This is not surprising, as the company’s survival depends on speed to market 
response. Specifically, the centralized II is driven by the ‘Global Infrastructure Solutions’ 
and ‘Global Securities Research and Economics Group’. The former delivers the firm’s 
technology services including global operations, client services initiatives, business process 
outsourcing, technology infrastructures and applications development. Other organizations 
provide it with legal, regulatory and compliance guidance, management of employees, 
orchestrating the firm’s communications activities to key audiences, and so on. At the same 
time, the corporate IS are the primary channel for employee surveillance and heavy 
monitoring of every work process. Every business transaction and communication to and 
from their computer stations is monitored.
Nevertheless, the centralized II and systems are at the center of organizational learning and 
memory. Through the comprehensive Intranet, advisors have access to unlimited data and 
information on external markets and internal organization, ranging from virtual learning
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programs to platforms for investment strategies and client management systems. The 
Intranet, telecommunication and Email systems are the primary communication sources 
for corporate news, policies and market updates. There is also an employee call-center, 
which is used very often to answer employee’s inquiries, for example how to track the 
status of a particular transaction, information on policies. Additionally, the firm promotes 
its proprietaiy management IS, where specialists from various areas (e.g. insurance, mutual 
finds, hedge funds), travel between regional offices to introduce the latest management 
software systems that may help advisors do their jobs better. The heavy reliance on a 
person-to-document approach to IS, however, means that the natural working structure 
leaves advisors to spend more time in their offices than person-to-person interacting. 
Specifically, this work structure leaves little incentive for new hires to leam from 
experienced advisors. All training, communication and learning take place through the 
firm’s Intranet platform.
Furthermore, advisors are monitored and rewarded for businesses developed on an 
individual basis, regardless of whether they are part of a team. Hence, the reward system is 
encourages to some extent internal competition. At the same time, it is almost impossible 
for advisors to operate outside a team and still ‘make the numbers’ (meet the quarterly 
requirements of assets under management). Contrary to how the IS are designed around 
work structures, namely top-down, knowledge sharing and cooperation among advisors are 
seen as important because of the wide scope of tasks and activities. The success of each 
subsidiary depends on advisors working together in the same market. To encourage 
collaboration and team-work, the corporate culture of ‘open-door policy’ is enforced.
These contradictions as of working together and competing against each other at the same 
time, establishing new business on their own while expanding their business in teams, have 
been a source confusion and ongoing political tension at the firm. Nevertheless, the 
contradicting conditions provide interesting findings in how high producing senior 
managers (according to rate of business development) use IS to juggle deliberate demands 
with emergent pitfalls to survive the fierce and unpredictable competitive environments. 
Having described the relevant scope of the business strategy and the socio-technical 
context, some interesting observation surfaced:
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1. Despite the comprehensive IT-driven II, there was limited use of the centralized
information and knowledge resources by senior managers. Primary users of corporate IS
were junior advisors. Senior manager applied corporate resources only where these were 
associated with compliance related issues, for example formal procedures with clients.
2. Despite an ‘open-door’ policy corporate culture, there was a surprisingly high resistance to 
knowledge sharing and transfer.
3. Experienced advisors were seen to use subsystems that hey had created on their own to
organize, and manage key data, relevant information and knowledge. The manageable and
flexible systems allowed them to work at the level of desired efficiency and speed. This was 
especially evident at the A-team.
Figure 5.13: Initial Findings - PCS
At first, it was surprising to find that, relatively, a very small fraction of what is available in 
the comprehensive II is actually used by advisors to support their strategizing processes. 
The majority of these business development support tools are not even known to most 
advisors. A reason for the limited use of centrally promoted IS was the sheer information 
overload. Advisors, even experienced ones, had found it difficult to find relevant 
information in the highly structured II. While the user interface of the Intranet, for 
example, provided many shortcuts to navigate the various links easily, still, it takes time to 
find and remember them.
Another contradiction was found in regards to the use of non-technological means as 
potential support in strategizing processes, such as social networking platforms. 
Surprisingly, there was limited use of centrally available social networks and non-mandatory 
socialization meetings and seminars. One might think that advisors would exploit the large 
and open organizational social network. In the contrary, senior advisors used a narrow and 
specialized aspect of the organizational social network. Moreover, it was found that senior 
advisors had found ways to exploit central IS resources and explore new sources of 
information that matched their particular ways of strategizing. Despite the wide array of 
corporate resources and comprehensive II, subsystems were the primary source of 
management IS. These resemble pools of files of data, information and knowledge cues, 
which are organized in a particular way, and updated on continuous basis. The next 
section summarizes initial findings from the two case studies.
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5.3 O VERVIEW  O F IN ITIA L F IN D IN G S
The context of the research has been the competitive business strategizing domains of 
HPC and PCS. The researcher explores the manners in which strategic actors leverage 
corporate information, knowledge and systems in decision making, and how they cope with 
exploiting corporate resources while coping with unexpected challenges. HPC and PCS 
were found to share to the following similar characteristics, which makes them suitable case 
studies:
Commonalities
Nature of 
Work
Scope of 
Business 
Strategies
Figure 5.14: Common characteristics of both case companies
are knowledge-intensive organizations applying technical, 
commercial and management know-how
Advanced technologies take a central role in product production and 
innovation
Both companies underwent a transition in their business strategies for 
aggressive growth: Both moved away from product-centric business 
strategy to focus on integrated services in order to lead the way for 
differentiation and growth. HPC provide integrated services across the 
full range of the hydro business, and the PCS moved from transaction- 
based business to advisory services.
The new business strategies are a result of corporate decision to move 
away from traditional approaches to new ways to compete more 
effectively
Innovative marketing strategies and trust building initiatives take the 
central focus of managers/advisors
Strategizing work concerns the local markets but depends on the global 
collaboration networks
Strategizing activities involve cross-functional know-how, and cross- 
divisional communication e.g. marketing & sales, operations and 
product specialists
Diverse set of data, information and knowledge from various sources 
about past, present and future developments of their markets, target 
clients, and competitors
Building social networks and alliances with key individuals and suppliers 
(i.e. as part of global sourcing) inside and outside the firm 
Negotiation with directors as to who gets involved in the deal; 
collaborating with key people in the organization and compete for 
resources
Knowledge workers are under heavy corporate surveillance and regular 
performance monitoring
The commonalities of the financial services and hydro power cases are that both are in 
knowledge-intensive and competitive markets. Managers need internal and external 
information about markets, clients, suppliers, networks as well as experience-based 
knowledge and business judgment in order to win deals. The common goal at both cases is 
to compete in their markets to be selected as the primary supplier and professional services
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provider as part of a long-term business development strategy. Furthermore, while the 
research inquiry concerns activities within the business development divisions, these 
activities concern cross-functional, inter-organizational and cross-cultural communication, 
which will be accounted for to relevant degrees.
The main differences were in their corporate IIs and IS resources. The table 5.15 below 
outlines these differences:
- Private, family-owned - Publicly owned
- German top management, - US-American top management
Top-down / command and centralized standards,
control leadership decentralized leadership
- Traditional business model: - Traditional business model:
Slow organic expansion based Moderate growth, transactions
on engineering reliability and structured product-based
- Primary approach to IS: seems - Primary approach to IS:
to be on bottom-up learning top-down, centralized person-
and social networking, i.e. to-document IS resources
traveling across OUs - Emphasis on deliberation and
- Knowledge and experiences on speed of information
projects and products reside processing
within the minds of senior - Overabundant IS platforms,
managers technologies and corporate
- Electronic repositories store support systems in terms of
engineering related data and 
information, e.g. drawings; no 
uniform/standardized IS 
- Limited ICTs for MIS
proprietary tools
Figure 5.15: Differences in their IS and infrastructures
Putting together comprehensive proposals requires the integration of experts’ technical and 
business know-how from different areas. With the new philosophy of the alliance 
approach, HPC needs a common II platform so that engineers and managers together can 
exploit internal organizational resources as well as external suppliers and global network. 
However, HPC has a limited standardized information and knowledge platform to enable 
such strategizing approach to expand beyond its US OUs. The majority of corporate 
information and knowledge are dispersed across the global offices in the form of paper 
documents or in the minds of the senior managers (most of which were located in 
Germany). HPC has been relying on emergent approaches to business strategizing and so 
the evident IS strategy seems to be based on social networking. The lack of technological 
means in the strategizing context may have contributed to an increased level of social
144
interaction through traveling, working offshore in teams and frequent referral to the firm- 
wide social network.
In contrast, PCS has centralized and sophisticated IIs in place to allow advisors to use 
technological means to create, communicate and share information. As of the integrated 
servicing strategy, the most important part of the advisor’s job is to have the tools to find 
prospective clients and building a growing customer base. Many advisors also contact 
potential clients by giving seminars or lectures or meet clients through business and social 
contacts. Work begins with a consultation with the client, from whom the advisor obtains 
information on the client’s finances and financial goals. While it should be acknowledged 
that the study might not have captured the full range of knowledge work due to feasibility, 
the most common and relevant knowledge work processes that could be identified for the 
purposes of the research are outlined below:
HPC
Goal: Up-to-date information on
market/customers demands, which involves
exploiting experiences and technical-know how to 
innovate and meet customization requests, 
covering every aspect of the power plant business
Core activities revolve around creating customized 
business cases for the final bid decision:
• Preliminary scoping
• System evaluation
• Producing technical reports
• Tailor evaluation of criteria and consult with 
plant owner: continuous communication 
between the proposal manager, 
organizational system (IT as well as the 
network of knowledge workers) and the 
client
• Global sourcing
• Ensure operations are in line with 
corporate rules and standards
• Evaluation and feasibility study
• Creating engineering plans and drawings 
to assess feasibility
• Pricing negotiations
• Finalize business case
Creation of the business case involves:
• Technical know-how on the products
• Project Experience
• Commercial know-how
• Management capabilities
PCS
Goal: Up-to-date financial data and
information on markets; meeting client 
demands involves exploiting corporate IS 
resources and incorporate new changes; 
marketing & sales, forecasting, referral-based 
businesses, etc.
Core activities include creating a series of 
customized portfolios for prospective clients:
• Allocating responsibilities for specific 
stages of client communication
• Within team collaboration on prospective 
clients’ information, e.g. financial status as 
well as potential social link among them
• Maintain business with established clients: 
Continuous knowledge gathering from 
various sources; e.g. on changing financial 
circumstances and strategies;
• Competitors and markets analysis, 
forecasting and maneuvering strategies; 
assess and forecast financial needs; identify 
investment trends, etc
• Consult with internal and external 
specialists
• Preparing reports, letters, forms
• Managing external money managers
Creation of trust and highly customized 
marketing material (i.e. before and after 
scenarios, forecasting, financial planning, etc) 
depend on:
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• Quality/Environmental and safety : • Specialty knowledge
know-how • Investing experience
Emphasis on communicating with the customer on « Reputation of advisor
continuous basis. : playing the role of a ‘trusted advisor’ .
Figure 5.16: Sample of knowledge work (Sources: Company materials and documentsy 
publications, interviews, observation)
Some of the characteristics may be attributed to a number of factors such as different 
industries, competitive intensity and regulatory environments, national and corporate 
cultures, and management styles. A main difference, however, that is to our interest, is the 
establishment of the IIs, IS and the attitudes of managers towards the use thereof. 
Nevertheless, at both places, the nature of work is most of all entrepreneurial, where each 
team and manager is responsible for meeting corporate requirements and goals (i.e. sales 
targets). While the details of work processes differ, the overall nature of strategizing is 
similar in both cases; where this strategizing process requires the synthesis of technical, 
organizational and managerial know-how. What is striking is that each case seems to have 
almost contrasting design of II and strategies towards IS. However, the manners in which 
managers/advisors leveraged top-down and bottom-up IS in strategizing were similar in 
both cases on the individual levels. The next chapter will unfold these findings further and 
elaborate on possible implications on the organizational system as a whole.
CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter justified the choices made with regard to the case selection, and explained 
how the empirical materials were gathered. The two case companies were then introduced 
in terms of their business strategies and their II/IS. Initial findings were obtained from 
company documents, interviews and observation. The qualitative design of this research 
was neither very loose nor completely tight and pre-structured (Miles & Huberman 1984). 
This allowed the researcher, working in an interpretivist mode, to search for findings while 
keeping momentum on conceptual grounds. The last section brought together both cases 
and outlined relevant characteristics in terms of commonalities and differences, and 
knowledge work, as ingredients of strategizing.
The next chapter illustrates the main empirical findings in turn.
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This chapter revisits the theoretical framework 
and outlines the findings for each case study. A  summary o f the findings 
with an initial interpretation follows.
6 INTRODUCTION
Before presenting the empirical data, this chapter revisits the theoretical framework to 
highlight the common components of analysis. Section 6.2 presents the findings in terms 
of the following:
• Approaches to business strategizing
• Determine an enabling or disabling socio-technical context
• Managerial IS in strategizing
• Organizational dynamics and challenges.
The overall purpose is to explore the dynamic interaction between socio-technical elements 
of IIs and the predominant forms of IS. Notably, the terms managers, advisors, human 
agents, and strategic actors will be used interchangeably, all referring to the decision-makers 
in the organization. In this context, two elements of unintended consequences will be
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identified that seem to affect the dynamics between managerial IS and the organizational 
systems. These are cross-cultural conflict at HPC, and political tension at PCS. Finally, 
section 6.3 brings together the two cases to summarize the key findings. These will be 
interpreted with respect to relevant literature in chapter 7. The section also revisits the 
supporting theories that will supplement the hermeneutic interpretation in reaching 
explanation.
6.1 REVISITING THE FRAMEWORK
This section briefly revisits the key theoretical underpinnings of the IS strategizing 
framework, which were introduced in chapter 4. It also makes explicit the common 
components of analysis for both case studies.
This research resides in the organizational context, where strategic actors use IS while 
engaging in the process of competitive strategizing. Organizations and their socio-technical 
characteristics are viewed as information and knowledge bearing entities, in which humans 
and technologies dynamically interact, collaborate and compete with their respective 
business development strategizing (e.g. Ciborra 1997, 2000). This research adopts the view 
of strategizing as processes of decision-making, which drive or shape most subsequent 
actions (Coyne & Subramaniam 1996). Decision-making is viewed as a mixture of 
processes by which social actors and organizations assimilate and process information, 
interpret their environments and imitate/differentiate themselves from others (Wilson 
2003). Drucker (1999), for example, points out some of the differences prevalent to 
different cultures as being management paradigms, length of time to come to decisions, the 
why of making a decision, why make a decision now, depth of analysis, the depth of factors 
encountered, analysis based on logic or interpretations, and so on.
In this context, IS/IT are often used as technological tools to make this process more 
effective (Newell et al 2003). At the same time, technological tools have led to the 
production of massive amounts of prescriptive material (ibid). To overcome some of the 
challenges in relation to the effective and efficient use of information and knowledge in 
decision-making processes, the IS literature reviewed in the context of this research 
suggests creating an enabling socio-technical context through IIs to provide the necessary 
platform to communicate, share and exchange information and knowledge (Galliers & 
Newell 2003; Alavi & Leidner 1999; Davenport & Prusak 1998).
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As presented in chapter 3, there are different views on what constitutes IIs with varying 
emphasis on the social or technical elements. In this research, and according to the 
conceptual framework, infrastructures are seen as heterogeneous and socio-technical in 
nature (e.g. Hanseth & Monteiro 1997). The socio-technical attributes signify the need for 
flexibility (Avison et al 1995; Galliers & Newell 2003) in response to fast-changing (external) 
competitive environments and the need for ongoing (internal) organizational learning (OL) 
(e.g. March 1991; Senge 1992; Robey & Boudreau 1999). Here, OL and memory play an 
integral role in how information is used and decisions are made. Creating a socio-technical 
environment was argued to have an enabling role in key processes such as knowledge 
creation, accumulation, sharing, and transfer are supported (Galliers & Newell 2003).
Along these lines, the IS literature suggests that appropriate IS are significant to enable 
supportive IIs. Specifically, the strategic IS (SIS) literature suggests the use of deliberate or 
emergent IS strategies -  as illustrated in the framework One way to look at IS is to 
conceptualize them as socially constructed technical and social artefacts, which are used by 
strategic actors in knowledge work The purpose of an IS strategy is to help improve 
organizational efficiency and flexibility, two outcomes that traditional organizational theory 
suggest as incompatible (Newell et al 2003). As part of an IS strategy, while some 
companies adhere mostly to the technical nature, such as databases and networks, others 
try to integrated the technology to management issues, such as decision support systems 
(DDS) and management information systems (MIS) (ibid). The codification and 
personalization strategies (Hansen et al 1999) were shown as one example in which 
information and knowledge may be organized and managed (ibid). The success of an IS 
strategy, once again, was argued to be dependent upon an enabling context which fosters 
the culture of cooperation (Avgerou 2002).
Nevertheless, this research is about identifying available IS and the manner in which these 
are used in strategizing by experienced actors. This is the point of departure to apply the IS 
strategizing framework in practice. As discussed in chapter 4, the framework is thought to 
be suitable because it encourages an interpretive mindset and gives the researcher the 
flexibility to openly explore the practice while staying focused on solid conceptual grounds. 
While the framework originated in the SIS field, it is used here to explore how various IS 
are leveraged in business strategizing by strategic actors. The framework argues that an 
enabling socio-technical II is important in facilitating a supportive environment. It further 
conceives IS strategies as part of a collaborative business strategy (Galliers & Newell 2003).
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‘Collaborative’ refers to internal matters in conjunction with matters of external 
partnerships, customers, suppliers, etc.
The various IS refer to tools and techniques that are designed by the corporate IS to be 
top-down or bottom-up. These are illustrated in the framework as the conceptual 
dichotomies of exploitation and exploration IS strategies. Top-down, or deliberate 
approaches are those IS that are constructed to serve the exploitation of information. 
Bottom-up, or emergent IS are those that either serve the process of knowledge creation i.e. 
brain storming, or those that are created whilst knowledge workers explore new 
opportunities. Examples are of the emergent nature of IS are learning from ‘below’ 
through improvising, social networks and organisational learning.
Collaborative and 
Competitive 
Environment
Collaborative Business Strategy
t
INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY
Socio-technical context
- IT, standards, data, architecture
- Information services (sourcing)
- Human resources (skills, roles)
EXPLOITATION 
STRATEGY (Deliberate)
- Codified ‘solutions’
- Standardized procedures 
- ‘Knowledge Management ’*CHANGEMANAGEMENT
STRATEGY
EXPLORATION 
STRATEGY (Emergent)
- Communities of practice 
Flexible project teams 
Knowledge brokers, sharing, 
and creation 
- bricolaee/tinkering
ON-GOING 
LEARNING & REVIEW
Figure 6.1: IS strategizing framework (Galliers & Newell 2003)
The change management strategy is related but they are discussed as they become relevant. 
For example, the ‘change management’ component is an inevitable and ongoing part of 
organizational and managerial reality, which will be treated as an inherent part of the 
discussion. The consideration of on-going learning and review will also be considered, as
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relevant. As a further note, while the framework labels refer to IS as ‘IS strategies’ and 
‘Information Infrastructure strategies’, this research does not take the strategic role of IS 
and II for granted. Instead, it takes an interpretive view on the forms of IS identified 
without assigning a ‘strategic’ attribute to IS.
For further clarity, the researcher uses the following table as a guide to distinguish between 
deliberate and emergent forms of IS. This makes explicit the nature of IS as document-to- 
person and person-to-person, which (cf. chapter 3) has been partly adopted from the work 
of Hansen et al. (1999). Whiles this thesis does not advocate KM per se, the distinction is 
seen as relevant to IS and as a way to categorize the data.
Exploitation-based IS
e.g. document-to-person interaction
Exploration-based IS
e.g. person-to-person interaction
Information is codified for reuse and to achieve 
economies of scale: ICTs and electronic 
document systems store and disseminate 
information & codifiable knowledge; connect 
people with corporate resources; train people 
through computer-based distance learning, etc.
• corporate intranet
• email, blackberry, telephone, video 
conferencing
• data warehouse, repositories
• decision support tools
• groupware to support collaboration
• social and virtual networks of 
knowledge workers
• online learning
• sources of internal expertise 
knowledge-based products/services.
Resources to channel individual experts; 
networks for linking people and facilitate 
sharing of tacit knowledge. The goal is to 
facilitate conversations and information 
exchange.
• Strategy Training sessions
• Face-to-face
• Knowledge sharing teams
• Periodical Meetings
• Conferences
• Social networks
• Working in teams
• Visiting foreign offices.
Figure 6.2: Exploitation a?id exploration-based IS. Partly adopted from Hansen et al (1999) 
to identify forms o f IS
In each case, interviews were carried out mostly with senior managers, responsible for 
business development with respect to their competitive strategies. The common 
denominator for both cases is the competitive strategies at each respective firm. The cases 
are analyzed within their respective business strategies and the involvement of front-end 
managers/advisors. The table below highlights the key similarities of the two cases:
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HPC PCS
Objective Win more businesses/clients 
‘Become a one-stop supplier’
Win more clients, expand 
subsidiary’s business platform 
We do it all’
Context: Transition 
from old to new 
business strategy
Design-Bid-Build approach -> 
Alliance approach
Transaction-based business 
activitiesFee-based & annuitized, 
Integrated advisory approach
Strategic Actors Senior and operations managers: 
OU director, project proposal 
manager, Manufacturing manager, 
Global sourcing, utility suppliers, 
etc.
Senior advisors, subsidiary director, 
individual knowledge experts in 
Insurance, Pensions, Investment 
Managers, outside fund managers, 
etc.
Figure 6.3: Common base for case analysis
The main difference in the two case companies lay in their organizational IIs, where we 
want to see how human agents, as a part of the socio-technical environment, learned to 
leverage decision-relevant information and knowledge in their everyday knowledge work. 
IS components will be interpreted with respect to the characteristics of exploitation and 
exploration approaches - whether or not these are IS ‘strategies’ are not as relevant as the 
ways in which IS are used. The aim is neither to identify nor to assess specific technologies, 
systems, or decision models. Rather, IS encompass the whole notion of information and 
knowledge cues, processes or systems that are embedded in organizational structures, 
memory, and the minds and actions of strategic actors. The figure below gives a visual 
illustration of the framework applied in the context of the case studies:
Target
Customers
e.g. Corporate rules, standards, IS services, ICT 
resources, networks, etc.
Under investigation:
IS Strategizing of Strategic 
Actors
Collaborative business 
environment, i.e. Sourcing 
arrangem ents, etc
C om m on denominator: 
Business Development 
Strategizing
Enabling/Disabling Socio-technical 
Environment
Com petitors
Figure 6.4: The IS strategizing framework in the research context
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The area of exploration in this thesis is the dynamic interaction between the context, 
organizational IS, and strategic actors. The context is business strategizing process taking 
place within organizational IIs. The scope of strategizing concerns the level of management 
which engages in the customization and execution of strategies, and whose decision­
making bears considerable responsibilities on the senior management level. Strategic actors 
refer to groups of individuals responsible for business development. The focus is on front- 
end managers in the marketing and sales divisions, respectively.
The above illustration above (6.4) shows human agents as part of organizational socio- 
technical, political and multi-cultural environment, where they have certain IS at their 
disposal in order to get the job done. Human agents make (conscious or unconscious) use 
of deliberate and/or emergent IS tools, techniques and resources. The arrow towards the 
outside shows the connection with the external environments, where multiple suppliers and 
vendors bid for the same target customer. This scenario is consistent with HPC and PCS. 
Findings from the two cases are hoped to serve as complementing material towards richer 
explanation of the inquiry. The illustration below shoes the three components and their 
dynamic interrelation:
Collaborative
Business
Strategizing
Socio-
Collaborative II-Business 
Strategy
Traditional IS-Business 
Strategy Alignment argument
/  Technical \  f store, use, \
Information | manage and j
\ Infrastructure / I share
information & /
II -  IS link
. knowledge /
Figure 6.5: Interrelated Trio: Pointing out the dynamic interaction between collaborative 
business strategizing, organizational IIs, and IS
Exploring conceptual phenomena in the rather chaotic and subjective real world is not a 
simple task. As a result, it is sensible to consider relevant supporting theories and concepts 
to supplement the theoretical framework in order to draw a richer picture from the 
empirical findings. The supporting theories emerge during the investigation, rather than a 
deliberate consideration. For this reason it is sensible to present them at the end of this 
chapter. First, the main findings from HPC and PCS are presented.
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6.2 MAIN FINDINGS
HPC is a private family-owned company in the hydro-power market with top-down 
German-dominated leadership. PCS is a public US private bank in the financial services 
sector with decentralized organizational structure. The context within which both cases are 
investigated is their recently implemented competitive strategy. The consideration of a two 
case instead of a single case study provides a wider window for analysis. At the same time, 
the researcher has to adjust the depth of empirical materials that are in parallel to one 
another
The discussion is structured in the way the interviews were conducted. Notably, not all 
quotes from the interviews and conversations could be incorporated into this chapter. 
Chapter 7 compensates for this limitation and captures wider range of findings into the 
interpretation process. Nevertheless, an effort was made to include those responses which 
were perceived as central to the research inquiry and as most important to the interviewees. 
Individuals who had an input are listed in the appendix and are marked in-text by the 
corresponding number, i.e. ‘Interviewee 1*.
6.2.1. Case 1: HPC
As already mentioned, the IS strategizing framework was used to guide the data collection 
process. The questions start with the overall ‘collaborative business strategizing’ context. 
The researcher examined the perceptions of the interviewees towards some of the key 
concepts underpinning the research inquiry. An understanding of the nature of the strategy 
work itself was a necessary step towards identifying the forms of data, information and 
knowledge used. Since a conceptual comparison is not the main focus of this research, only 
a few relevant examples will be shown.
Once the research identified the nature of strategizing within the organization’s II, the next 
step was to investigate the resources used in that process. Then she explored what kinds of 
IS were used as part of managing business information and knowledge in the competitive 
bidding process. The scope of strategizing at HPC concerns their newly implemented 
competitive strategy outlined in chapter 5. The questions are related to the activities within 
that scope. In this process, many other challenges and problems emerged, which helped 
explain the manner in which managers behaved with regards to IS. These were primarily in 
relation to cross-cultural challenges between the US and the German operating units (OUs).
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The collection of various parts of the process helped to fill the gaps in areas that seemed 
cloudy and incomplete. As a result, it was difficult to put a structure around the empirical 
findings in this chapter because the sense-making process happened during a seemingly 
unstructured and reiterative process of exploring, interpreting, and writing. Interviewees 
include middle and senior managers in business development, engineering, manufacturing, 
HR, technology, global sourcing, marketing & sales, all of whom have substantial 
experience in the company.
6.2.1.1 Business Strategizing
According to Interviewees 3, 4, 7, 12, 20, ‘strategy’ was defined as follows in the US 
operating unit (US OU):
I see strategy as a vision or purpose of an action ... action steps to get a result, a desire
to support the actions Defined actions toward a purpose .... Internal and external
systems analysis and conceptual thinking.
A senior manager in strategic sourcing at the German operating unit (G-OU) stated 
(Interviewee 13):
Strategy is knowledge about your industry and who your competitors are, the 
markets... overall, strategy to me would be studying all those, the global economy, 
who your opponents are and what your capabilities are, matching your company’s 
capabilities and strength to how it would fit the market and competition, changing 
those things make you more competitive and more successful.
According to a senior manager in business development at the US OU (Interviewee 
9):
... Find the knowledge that would help you get there and collectively get together to 
come up with a plan or strategy... strategizing is actually collecting all that information 
and knowledge for your strategy. Not only in my own mind, but in a team 
environment working with expertise, once you identify your market and the 
competition, you start planning what to do to compete.
The Human Resources director at the US OU claimed that decision-making was perceived
to be 90% deliberate with ‘a splash’ of 10% emergent; ‘but 50-50 when using the ‘exploring
new ideas’ criterion (Interviewee 7). The HR director at the G-OU was also asked the same
question and responded (Interviewee 6):
Strategy is understanding the issue and getting confirmation of the issue at hand - the 
decision making on the issue must be structured and must consider key elements: cost, 
time, quality, safety, customers’ needs, and so on.
Interestingly, the definitions given by the ITR directors did reflea the overall perception of 
the managers in the respective OUs. While the US HR direaor believed that the ‘right’ way 
of strategy was to think and behave in a deliberate manner, the HR direaor in Germany
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was speaking more slowly and calculated about having to really understand the issues’ at
hand. The way the US HR director was speaking of the practice of strategy seemed
‘straightforward’, almost as if there was one best way to practicing strategy, which was
already a part of the corporate culture: in order to be successful, managers had to follow a
structured and deliberate strategy to ‘meet clear set miles stones’ by respective ‘deadlines’.
The different re-actions of the two directors to the same question were reflective of the
underlying mindsets and worldviews by which managers work. A senior manager in
business development reflected on his philosophy:
I would say decisions are based on 20% gut feeling and 80% information ... Look a lot 
at historical data: purchase volume, type of purchase, and so on. You got to have the 
key information before you can get the picture of what’s really going on.
The German HR director took some time to reflect on how he could verbalise this rather
ambiguous concept. He stated:
Most decisions are made by verbal communication here... We have many meetings, 
where we discuss long-term developments of our business and talk about broader 
aspects in the markets.
Notably, he naturally referred to ‘most decisions’ before mentioning the word ‘strategy’, 
implying that he views strategy really as ‘strategizing’, and an action-oriented phenomenon. 
He also referred to ‘verbal communication’ as an evident part of decision-making, which 
takes place in ‘meetings’, for the most part. Another reference was made on the ‘long-term 
development’ of the business, which indicates the kind of mindset around various aspects 
of business strategies. This becomes significant in relation to decision-making with the US 
colleagues.
Thus far, the role of IS in strategizing and decision-making was not mentioned. The 
researcher attempted to bring out the key words ‘information systems’ and ‘systems’ to see 
how the interviewees would react. At both OUs, IS were immediately perceived as ITs in 
relation to engineering, not as management information systems (MIS). Interviewees spoke 
of ITs and ICTs as important for all the activities concerning technical data, engineering 
drawings and technological innovation. A manager in manufacturing stated (Interviewee 
17):
We have procedures and processes that support our business strategy, however, we are 
still working with an out of date business system, that does not allow for real time cost 
or time data. We have spent a lot of effort in engineering software, scheduling software, 
etc. but nothing yet that has addressed the strategizing side of the business.
Generally, many of the interviewees were not certain as to how ICT systems would serve 
them to manage business information without problems inherent to ‘packaged solutions’. A
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direaor of field operations who oversees large scale projeas across various regions said 
(Interviewee 17):
Our strategy is to be the major player in new hydro projeas. The IT landscape is a 
basic prerequisite to reach that goal. ... IT tools support communication, decision­
making and controlling ... However, perhaps not problem-free. I do not believe that 
face-to-face meetings can totally be replaced. We are using IT tools to collea data in 
order to be able to make better strategic decisions. We still need human knowledge to 
combine the data colleaed.
The sentiments in the above statement were confirmed by the majority of managers. 
Notably, the lack of elearonically available information, and most of all, integration thereof, 
did not leave much other option than to communicate in person or on location to access 
the widely dispersed information and knowledge. Basically, much of the content on the 
corporate intranet and reference documents is inappropriate to support business strategies. 
One thing they have struggled with is to access key information efficiently such that 
managers do not have to reinvent the wheel for every new projea. There is no platform on 
which lessons learned may be captured and distributed, other than filing cabinets 
containing manual files of past projeas.
For this reason, it was widely believed that a culture of sharing must grow, naturally. 
According the proposal manager (Interviewee 12):
We do a good job colleaing them for single projeas but we do not share well with the 
rest of the organization.
As a result, senior managers spend a lot of time travelling between subsidiaries, and new 
managers are sent to headquarters for at least one year at the beginning of their careers to 
become acquainted with the ways the company does business. This is meant to help 
managers to overcome cultural issues (between US and German headquarters) and work 
closely with senior managers in Germany, learning from their experience on past projeas 
and their rich social networks. As one German senior manager acknowledged (Interviewee 
2):
I have been with the company for 30 years and I know a lot of the fellows and key 
individuals and a lot of the projeas over the years. So typically I can find somebody 
who has some knowledge of a given projea or customer, but that’s just in my head.
As a result, those senior mangers interviewed did not perceive IS to be of great use to them 
and did not insist on introducing MIS. The direaor of field operations in the US-OU saw 
this kind of socially-embedded and unstructured knowledge as problematic when it comes 
to exercising strategy in their own more deliberate way, which in turn affects the desired 
performance of the OU (Interviewee 17):
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I think it’s important to share more tacit knowledge with the strategy folks... This 
allows for more knowledgeable discussion on feasibility. It also allows top 
management to get early buy-in to our proposed strategies, in lieu of jamming it down 
an organization’s throat...
While executive managers at the US OU have negotiable influence over business strategies
in the North-American markets, the German headquarters still have to approve their
strategies, their intentions, and execution strategies. Similarly, the authority over long-term
decisions and processes at the US OU are subject to the approval by the German
dominated top management team. Sometimes this gets in the way of the US managers in
pursuing what they see as most appropriate strategy. Managers are conscious of different
strategizing approaches and ways of thinking. According to a sourcing manager in the US
OU (Interviewee 16):
I sometimes wonder why we don’t approach other markets with more rigor. Plant 
maintenance programs, non-hydro manufacturing and Engineering, etc.... our strategy 
in North America comes from top-down; there may be a small percentage of folks 
other than the German top management that have a direct influence in the direction of 
our strategy.
Managers in the US agree that more knowledge sharing is necessary in order for the top 
management to get a clearer picture of the actual local markets in North America. To this 
end, the company was said to have monthly and quarterly management meetings, where the 
strategic direction and challenges are discussed. There are also semi-annual executive board 
meetings, and various other meetings called on an ad hoc basis. However, managers in the 
US OU complain that most meetings are not as productive as they could be due to a lack 
of consensus between the German headquarters and the US managers. While there are 
knowledge exchange-meetings, ‘the problem is that a lot of the initiatives from meetings 
are not pursued’ (Interviewee 7). Furthermore, detailed quarterly performance reports to 
headquarters are mandatory, but these are not used to constructive ends either. The idea is 
that these are reviewed and key issues incorporated in the next meeting’s agenda. However, 
OUs do not receive the expected feedback: ‘nobody knows what happens to all the reports 
-  we do not get to seem again once they are in’ (Interviewee 12). Whether it is an II 
problem, clashes of mindsets, or management thinking, was not clear. Most often, all of the 
above were blamed for the lack of synergy between the US and German teams. We 
explore these areas further below.
6.2.12 Socio-technical Elements of HPC
Infrastructures are seen as means to provide structure, improve communication in 
decision-making and the overall quality of the projects. The infrastructure is managed by
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local IT departments that are centrally controlled by HPC. The current IIs consist of 
standard applications which are stored and maintained centrally, such as Outlook-based 
communication systems, engineering drawing software tools and references. The Intranet 
provides general information, technical standards and procedures; also forms, templates, 
policies, but they are scattered, not updated regularly and not transparent. Just in the past 
two years, the company implemented central databases, where managers can file all their 
documents in a central location. These applications include a cost database, projea data 
management, and engineering handbook (with standard forms, check lists, uniform projea 
and cost reporting, manufacturing, estimating, etc.). The main database is the global 
engineering drawing and projea management database PDM, ProCS, CFD. The 
information in these databases is shared globally (Interviewee 23).
The apparent problem lies in the lack of an elearonic version of business information, as
well as a lack of integration. About 85% of organizational data is stored in an unstructured
format. Unstructured data complicates transparency, access, identification, management
and control (Interviewees 6, 13). Thus, the II was not seen as ready' to support the business
and decision-making processes in the process of business growth. According to one
manager (Interviewee 18):
Providing hydro power is a complex process. Different components and systems may 
be designed, manufactured, delivered, installed and commissioned by multinational 
HPC operating units. In order to be able to do this cost effectively, having a 
supportive corporate information infrastructure is a must... which we currently don’t 
have.
A general need for an integrated II was well recognized organization-wide (Interviewee 17):
International projeas can only be handled efficiently by using uniform tools ... 
Integrating components to a plant needs systems integration ... an IT infrastructure.
Many managers advocated the idea of integrated platforms to facilitate information transfer
in strategizing processes (Interviewee 18):
... [IS are] very important, because information is key; time is a key element [and] 
these kind of systems [ERP or KMS] collapse time. Instead of 1000 people gathering 
information in their little red book and ask questions, it’s all done elearonically and 
digitally, so you get - if the systems are designed well - information that you need to 
help make decisions, to help validate strategies, to help evaluate parts of the strategy 
quickly. So it’s absolutely an essential part.
The problem on the management side was believed to be a lack of overall information 
integration and transparency (Interviewee 8). It seemed that for every business proposal, 
they had to reinvent the wheel. Managers would lose a lot of time trying to access the 
dispersed information. According to a projea manager (Interviewee 20):
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The current IT systems that contain information on customer status are slow and not 
user-friendly. They are not well designed. So we utilize and assemble multiple inputs to 
track projects and [this] puts us sometimes several months behind.
IT systems are used in engineering, cost accounting and marketing to support quality, cost,
and delivery. Gathering information and knowledge regarding commercial aspects,
however, has been on a person-to-person basis (Interviewee 19):
We currently don’t have a management system.... All IT systems are for our 
engineering folks. Knowledge is in people’s heads. It’s gathered through shared 
conversations, always way after the fact, however. Frankly, I’d be interested to know 
how a management system can help me make better decisions.
The overall IS seems to face many inefficiency problems organization-wide, which make
the jobs of managers somewhat more difficult. For example, a major problem lies in the
discrepancies among current business systems, where the individual systems ‘do not line
up’ (Interviewee 22), e.g. discrepancies between scheduling and sourcing systems. This
makes it frustrating, when manager try to gather together information for particular
decisions (Interviewee 13):
Many business systems can’t talk to each other. Our decisions depend on the 
infrastructure ... for example sourcing issues and global prioritization is very difficuk 
in our organization, because we can’t quickly get the global picture ... there are many 
conflicts among the current systems. So what do you do ... you try to make the best of 
it.
It seems that before the systems can be integrated, first, there need to be the right systems
in place. A manager from strategic sourcing commented (Interviewee 15):
From a global purchasing standpoint, the exploration strategy is fairly informal, and we 
have strategic purchasing teams that have participants from all the HPC OUs. So we 
are working to generate an IT-structure to give us purchasing volumes and forecast 
purchasing needs -  once we get the forecasting volume, then I see it as being a 
formalized structure, to exploit that knowledge, to leverage that. You always have that 
exploration [possibility], where you define the supplier the other person doesn’t know 
about. You can’t separate those.
The inefficiencies are often related to time and productivity. Many senior managers 
expressed their frustration by referring to the reporting and performance monitoring 
system as an example of inefficient IS in getting anything management related done 
(Interviewee 3):
Producing management reports is very time consuming. We spend days in pulling 
together data from different places and put them on Excel sheets to produce reports.
We need to streamline the process of gathering information and generating reports: a 
database to pull all the data together from various systems and automating these 
reports.
Generally, the process of accessing the right information and pulling them from multiple 
sources is time-consuming, inefficient and bureaucratic (Interviewees 8, 12, 16, 17, 22).
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According to the German sourcing manager, at one point he was unable to prepare a 
company presentation based on the latest information, because several corporate reports 
were ‘lagging several months behind’ (Interviewee 15). For this reason, according to the 
strategic sourcing manager, relying on the top-down corporate system alone will not be 
sufficient to get their jobs done.
The lack of streamlined business processes and increasingly disintegrated knowledge 
sharing networks became more evident during the phases of the strategy process. When 
constructing a bidding agreement, team member from various departments come together 
and integrate their expertise. In these cases, the strategizing starts with thinking around a 
problem situation and suggesting solutions based on knowledge. These cases typically 
involve the matching between the customer’s needs, the company’s capabilities, and 
requirements of external regulatory bodies.
Hence, the various forms of information and knowledge needed to prepare customized
proposals came from the customers themselves and from collaborations with other
managers in the same or a different OU (Interviewee 12):
We make decisions based on the input from a series of managers and division, rather 
than solely based on information generated from ERP. I believe it’s much more than 
an IT system. Decisions need understanding. Systems can help, but that’s all about it.
One senior sales manager indicated the central importance of experience and knowledge
that go into work processes:
We provide highly customized products and services. We are not in the commodity 
business, where your margin is pretty much fixed. In the custom-built market, the fit of 
your product with the customer’s specification is paramount.
All the managers interviewed expressed the need for some kind of information profiling,
and reorganization across departments, so they could locate documents more easily. The
problem would not be solved automatically by implementing an IT system, however.
Interviewee 20 stated:
The problem is generating the information to support the database -  currently, we 
don’t have a totally integrated system, so a lot of the information is generated manually 
and the forecast and so forth, and so it’s a lot of work generating those forecasts...
Most of this dispersed information is on past projects, contacts, and experiences.
Nevertheless (Interviewee 23):
... The goal of having the whole company work with identical processes using 
identical tools is extremely difficult to realize.
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Overall, managers in different divisions expressed the need for a unified information 
platform and more open knowledge sharing. At the senior management level, the 
skepticism was higher because their work involved more knowledge and experience, which 
most of them already had, having been with the company for a long time.
The direaor of sourcing and marketing acknowledged that current IS are not adequate to 
cope with the diversity of the knowledge work and the demands of the new business 
strategy:
[We] are currently investing in upgrading the infrastructure. Our goal is to create a 
central database/data management system controlling the access and handling of 
decentralized stored information.
What was most desired among the projea managers was a system that was flexible and 
quick to integrate market and organizational changes. The lack of such system was 
hindering the organization to compete in its market.
The lack of integrated IS along with the wide dispersion of management information and 
know-how called for the development of person-to-person information transfer and 
exchange. As mentioned, because of the family-owned corporate structure, most know­
how and resources are centralized at the corporate headquarters in Germany. For this 
reason, in order to access information and knowledge resources, managers in the US OU 
have to keep close ties with German managers.
Having said this, conversations with executive managers in the US OU revealed a far more
pressing concern than problems of IS. These were in relation to building consensus with
German managers in joint decisions and strategizing processes. The repeated comment
why don’t they understand us’ (Interviewees 1, 2 and 12) refleaed a series of problems
stemming from different ways of thinking and interpreting strategic issues. This is a
significant issue when the primary opportunity to come to consensus is in meetings.
Interviewee 10 stated:
Whether it’s information systems, management, or culture, everything seems to take a 
little longer. For example there are too many meetings that we go to, but most are not 
as effective... most end up in frustration instead of solving a problem. We think it is a 
consensus problem. Everybody has a different view on one thing and a different way 
they want to have problems solved. Perhaps it’s all of it [information systems, 
management and culture].
Interviewee 9 commented on working with members across cultures and functions.
We tend to be more informal than the Germans are [in sharing expertise]. The 
Germans perhaps are more for the grandiose database tools and generating info for
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information’s sake. I think you need a limit, otherwise it’s diminishing returns and you 
can’t afford the cost of the system either. Getting information is easier here; it’s more 
top-down than in Germany. It’s [leveraging information and knowledge] a problem yes, 
over there. I suspect operating units in the US are more efficient than in Germany - 
because of less formality and systems.
The different thinking was equally noticed at the Germany OU. According to a German
manager (Interviewee 12):
Sometimes the US quickly sees through the information and wants to take action 
quickly. But Germans remain in philosophical debates. Sometimes facts don’t seem to 
matter if the boss wants something else.
Differences in thinking and approaching strategies exist, and both OUs know this.
For this reason, it was mentioned that every OU has built their own knowledge base 
over the years (Interviewee 6, 12). Given the tight management control from 
corporate headquarters, but little guidance as to how to align global strategies with 
local cultures, each OU has been trying to cope with conflicting management 
demands and created systems that allowed them to do this coping. Hence, these 
systems are very individualized. According to interviewee 12, while there is little 
consistency in how decisions are made in the two OUs, the US OU has to find a way 
to follow the demands that come from the top. Overtime, this has led to somewhat 
disintegrated mindsets among mangers, and accordingly, to an increasingly 
disintegrated knowledge base. Managers at the US OU have developed their own 
knowledge platforms to enable them juggle the rules and policies coming from the 
top while keeping their local competitiveness in terms of innovating and exploring 
new areas for growth.
6.2.13 Subsystems: Managerial Advantage & Organizational Challenge
It was pointed out in the discussion that in response to the frustrations, over time, 
individual managers (particularly at the US OU) had developed their own information 
and knowledge systems, which are supportive of their particular ways of decision­
making. The particular ways, for example, depend on the evaluation criteria that were 
outlined in chapter 5. These criteria set the parameters by which managers measure 
their performance directly with the client. This requires the flexibility to exploit 
corporate resources and explore new ways to meeting these criteria. All of these lead 
to an ever ‘growing knowledge management base’ (Interviewee 8), which need to be 
managed continuously and individually. These individually created and managed
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systems are referred to as subsystems. The need for such systems was elaborated
above (Interviewee 7):
... people build personal files.... [they] have created too many Excel spread sheets -  
manual ones too .... Almost everything that has to do with information systems 
requires personal value-added effort.
The format of these subsystems is very specific to each manager, ranging from simple files, 
Word documents and Excel sheets to more sophisticated applications adopted externally. 
The purpose has been to create a transparent and flexible platform which contains relevant 
data, information and knowledge cues. These are gathered and stored during the process of 
various communication and business dealings. Hence, the nature of these systems is 
procedural and ongoing. Most importantly, according to Interviewees 3, 8, 9 and 20 
managers are able to incorporate changing requirements into their personal subsystems, 
which is critical in re-evaluating the status quo for future decisions along the strategizing 
process. This, specifically, is true considering the nature of the knowledge-based work that 
goes into fulfilling the evaluation criteria.
At this point, let us consider the theoretical framework for a moment. Upon the 
identification of subsystems in the case study, and the reasons for which these are used, the 
importance of an integrated view on the framework’s components become clear. While 
deliberate and emergent IS are important, it is the relevant combination of these in the 
particular strategizing contexts which brings value. Here, the use of subsystems reflects 
how managers leverage organizational resources and simultaneously incorporate new 
learnings from everyday coping with systems, technical and social challenges.
Nevertheless, while managers have been able to stay competitive, in terms of the 
organization as a whole, the collection of organically grown heterogeneous subsystems had 
led to further complications in creating integration and an organization-wide IS 
(Interviewee 7).
Furthermore, the individual subsystems contain a lot of projea expertise, experience and 
knowledge that are invaluable to other team members for future projeas. Several aspeas 
make the subsystems difficult on the organizational level, i.e. on an inter-unit level: first, the 
structure and content of the systems are very specific to the managers, as these are more or 
less their own creation. They rarely retain their value when they are transferred or shared 
with other teams or units. Secondly, and most specifically, there has been an increasingly 
‘them and us’ attitude in cross-cultural communication, which may be related to an
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increasing use of manager-based IS rather than organization-based IS (Interviewees 7, 12).
According to Interviewee 4:
There is lot of tacit experience in the organization at a very high level. It is difficult to 
communicate that tacit experience, so people hold back and don’t share as much as 
they should. This creates conflict... and misunderstanding.
In response to the question how much subsystems may have to do with the lack of sharing,
the HR direaor in Germany said (Interviewee 9):
I think it [subsystems] has a lot do to with it [resistance to share]. You need your 
knowledge systems to work efficiently. It becomes part of you.... You can share it 
with others, but they might not understand your way of thinking about strategic issues.
As I said before, the tacit knowledge makes it difficult to share.
He continued:
These manager’s systems are good if they help, but perhaps not very good when we try 
to operate from integrated systems... later in the future.
Furthermore, while it was not said direaly, is can be implied that due to the lack of
integrated management information systems, it has been to HPC’s best interest to keep
senior managers on board (Interviewee 6):
Each operating unit has its own [knowledge base] because they do things differently. 
Having said that, the company likes to keep senior managers. They form a major part 
of what this company is all about...
After all, there are no systems to capture their know-how. Senior manager are 
perhaps the primary source of organizational memory.
6.2.1.4 Towards Integrated Systems
The lack of an integrated knowledge and IS strategy was creating major opportunity cost. 
The CEO of HPC in Germany decided to go ahead with ERP systems as a systematic 
approach to mobilize, utilize and exchange the information dispersed throughout the global 
organization. ERP systems were meant to align strategies with operational processes, and 
enhance produaivity and insight throughout the organization. This integration would help 
to move away from a produa-based approach towards a top-down, customer-oriented 
strategy in order to prospea and bid more competitively in the markets.
Implementation of ERP systems was seen as a radical change with mixed views on how it
might improve the outcome of competitive bidding. The IT project leader said:
Because of the incremental efficiency, people think it’s not worth the cost and the energy to 
make the system work ... At the same time, the generic use of an ERP system is very well 
understood ... providing information that managers need to help make business decisions or 
helping one manager communicate to another manager, so that the team can function better 
in an orchestrated manner; so these systems are key to business success.
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It was not disputed that in the long-run, the subsystems and information processes needed 
to be integrated. However, whether this would dramatically impact organizational 
performance as a whole was questionable. Much concern was around the lengthy, costly 
and problematic implementation process, and whether it would be worth the investment in 
time, effort and money (Interviewees 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21). This scepticism had to do 
with the high risk of IT projeas associated with large budgets and late delivery. Research 
tells us that the reasons why IT projeas fail are complex and nuanced (Myers 1994; 
Avgerou 2002; Bostrom & Heinen 1977). Regardless, ‘at the end of the day it’s the IT 
direaor who’s held accountable’ (Interviewee 23).
According to the IT projea manager, there were a range of concerns that needed to be 
addressed at HPC, from the most basic to more sophisticated, for example:
• To raise awareness of the value of an integrated IS strategy
• The need to share knowledge systems and not withholding
• Need for profiling unstructured information
• Reorganizing strategic information across departments
• Defining best praaices and make them available to top managers
• Specification for implementing an Intranet to publish information such as forms, 
templates and policies that are currently scattered
• Creating document naming conventions
• Use meta data in documents (keywords)
• Appropriate technology to encourage users to store data in appropriate places
• Need of high level of cultural change: requires senior management buy-in.
According to the IT Director, the improvements would include a module that was able to 
produce comprehensive reports, based on information generated from the ERP, a major 
concern of the US managers. At the same time, he argued how difficult that process was 
because, over the past decades, each subsidiary in each country has developed its own 
legacy systems and subsystems, in line with local cultures and working methods. Hence, 
massive amounts of information were held in heterogeneous formats around the world.
Furthermore, once the systems were integrated, there was the concern about flexibility 
(Interviewee 17):
... the IT infrastructure must be flexible and continue to evolve in order to provide real 
time information about changes in our business, such as spending, performance data 
and inventories.
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For decision makers, information generated and managed by ERP is to provide useful 
references, such as inventory level, input and output.
Generally, it was found that the way in which managers perceived the usefulness of IT - 
ERP in particular - in relation to their decision making activities was largely influenced by 
the specific strategy. Interviewees acknowledged that there was a wealth of knowledge 
embedded in people in the various divisions, and an integration of social and IT-based 
systems was paramount in the short-term strategies as well as long-term, when current 
managers leave the company. Most managers in Sales, Marking and Business Development, 
specifically in the German unit, were skeptical of the promises of the ERP system 
(Interviewee 2):
We need to adopt and integrate a business plan and make it work I understand SAP 
will happen in the next 5 years, however, I heard this same thing 10 years ago.
At the same time, the skepticism among German managers about IT-based management
systems was due to the widely dispersed propaganda associated with IT consultants who
market ICT ‘solutions’ to ‘fix’ management problems. This increased the adverse reaction
towards top-down systems such as ERP systems. One manager with substantial experience
in the company was especially critical (Interviewee 21):
Show me one that works and I will use it. New systems are rigid and time 
consuming [to learn]. The reality is that the systems are only as good as the people 
using them. Besides, given the infrastructure, people here have to adjust their 
[management] thinking first.
The benefits of integrating management information, according to a business development
direaor, are in theory great, but in praaice very difficult and problematic (Interviewee 2).
This, among other reasons, was because most managers did not stay in their offices long.
Most of their work was carried out in meeting rooms, traveling between OUs, to green
fields, power plants, and even playing golf with customers. The priority of managers in
business development was to get to know their customers, their needs and concerns. The
best way to achieve that was to gather first hand knowledge in person (Interviewee 10):
ICT systems could be useful, but not for me. I spend most of my time talking to 
people I like. To me, having a nice dinner at the house of my customer brings me 
[more] value than any system.
Later in the interviews it became evident that the comments on the role IT, such as ERP, 
were more based on their perceptions about new systems, rather than the actual potential 
of that IT. This perception, according to a senior manager, is a cultural and generational 
issue (Interviewee 8):
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I think with IT, it’s more generational. There is the generation of engineers in one 
culture that likes paper .... And then the younger generation uses the file systems, your 
age group, and your familiarity with using these newer tools, allows sharing more 
easily ... Some cultures are more protective, and things are kept in a drawer, in the 
filing cabinet, and not shared. Yes, there is a culture difference. That can change.... As 
generations change, the cultural experiences of one generation might not be the same 
as the [next]. The younger generation is more active, their culture is different with 
respect to information sharing. In using the latest ... technology, it’s all pretty new 
stuff, and the people doing that, whether they are doing it in China, or Germany, or in 
the US, they’re all pretty much the same. They have the leading edge of using that 
because they acquired this knowledge and this technology from a new techno arena 
that may have started in a year, they’re all the same they have the culture of IT.
Nevertheless, with the implementation of the ERP taking place, change was under way. As 
of the IT manager:
I think we’re going towards a highly consistent approach - aligned with business and 
strategy - for the next let’s say 5 years - which is necessary to establish a more 
profitable business. After the first couple of projeas are done and people are trained, 
we may be able to reaa faster to unplanned business.
While the ERP is planned to help operation related decisions, senior managers in business 
development may not benefit from it as much as they like to, because much of what they 
need is in the head of the people and under constant change. While exploiting IS is 
essential within the organization, ICTs do not automatically improve social relationships 
that are vital in winning the trust of new customers. Similarly, even though ERP can be a 
useful tool to generate best practices, much of the ongoing learning happens during the 
interaction between organizational members. In other words, while the management of 
divisional information can be centralized through IS, knowledge sharing across divisions 
can only be enabled through the establishment of social network (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 
1998).
6.2.1.5 Social Networking
The research investigated further in how the social system is leveraged by managers during 
various phases of a business case. It was found that the majority of managers in both 
locations preferred to use telephone, video conferencing or face to face meetings 
(Interviewees 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,10, 12,13,20). E.g. as of Interviewee 8:
Video conferencing, or face-to-face meetings... for me the best methods.
This is because from experience, they were aware of potential misinterpretations when 
using virtual means of communication. Specifically, the use of web-based applications and 
Emails were perceived as ‘inefficient’ and ‘inaccurate’ (Interviewees 1,2,11,12,14). 
According to a senior manager in business development (Interviewee 9):
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Email is terrible ... [it] slows down the progress. Email is too easy. It’s good for 
deciding on facts and data, but that’s all. Email makes us 80% less efficient.
Specifically, the use of Email was more frequent within the US OU than with
managers in other OUs, i.e. Germany, China or South America. According to a
senior manager in business development (Interviewee 8), the chance for
miscommunication on either part is almost for certain when communicating with
other cultures. According to Interviewee 8, it is difficult to read between the lines in
an Email communication:
When a colleague tells me what he thinks about something we are trying to decide on, 
then I don’t know whether he really understood what I meant... also, do I understand 
what he means?
The above section reflected on examples to show that managers are aware of continuous
miscommunication and misinterpretations, whether it is through the use of ICTs or
socialization. Above all, the determinant factor in the competitive bidding process was said
to be the element of trust and openness. An interviewee reflected on what he thought was
the most effective way to create these (Interviewee 8):
You can’t network blindly, you have to have some common experience with the 
people you are networking with. You got to develop trust so you can communicate 
efficiently. Do something together in teams to build this level of trust and 
understanding... After that, it’s much easier to have a veiy effective relationship ... so 
then you can use Email, but it’s only really effective if you are working with some basis 
of trust.
A senior direaor said (Interviewee 3):
If the subject matter is well known, you can communicate using technology, but if it’s a 
little less concrete, then you need more exposure, more mixing, more uniform culture, 
generating [mutual] understanding. Yes, I’m talking about strategy ... soft things, not 
hard things.
The premise behind social networking was elaborated in more detail (Interviewee 8):
It’s important to really know the person [customer or colleague]. If you feel 
comfortable with that person, if you feel comfortable in opening yourself, then we can 
share information effectively. I had to learn to trust this guy [a customer]; I had to 
learn about his background and his way of thinking and so forth, so I could interpret 
his words in communicating, because it's not words that are important - it’s the 
meaning behind the words. So you need a way to do that, you have to share meaning.
He was asked to reflea on some of his experiences on social networking with HPC. The
following example highlights several aspects: creating an enabling context, an enabling
organizational memory, and the role of integrated management thinking:
One example in this area, I lived in Germany for five years. One of my jobs there was 
to integrate technologies that were developed in Brazil, Japan, and the US. It’s an 
amazing thing because you are not trying to integrate technologies, but rather how 
people use these technologies, so you have to get the users to some kind of level of
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experience, some kind of level of trust. So what we ended up doing, which was very 
effective, was that we brought in users from each of the locations together and formed 
a team to create an integrated technology, and they are all members of the creation of 
these technologies and of the product that we created. That team worked together, 
partied together, had common experiences together. Over a period of 6 months to 2 
years, now ten years later, that team functions perfectly -  they’ve been together 
working in a specific group projea for a while, each of the group members reaches out 
to talk with the other group members. If they have a new projea, they communicate 
extremely effeaively; they come from a basis of shared experiences.
The interviewee continued talking about social networking with regard to customer 
relationships:
It could be just a dinner. If you are working on a more in-depth projea, you need that 
shared basis of experience to have effeaive communication. So all my networking 
members that I use, we have a history of those -  some of them go back 30 years - still 
you need something.
So, what is the solution in HPC? How can managers create these shared experiences?
According to Interviewee 7:
The answer is mix, mix, mix... keep mixing people, have them work abroad and learn 
about the thinking and mindsets of the folks over there... this is the best way to learn.
The mixing of people seems especially important due to the lack of a common knowledge 
sharing system. Furthermore, the majority of senior managers have been working in HPC 
for 30 years. A strong collaborative culture has been built among this group of individuals. 
Having the opportunity to tap into their knowledge, the source of organizational memory 
apparently, is invaluable to prevent reinventing the wheel.
Interviewee 9 speaks of differences in cultural backgrounds and mindsets as a source
problem in building consensus:
It’s largely a mindsa issue, in my opinion. You need common ground on which you 
develop effeaive communication. If you don’t have that, you guys can be talking the 
same words, but saying different things, and I watched this happen many, many times, 
because I spent enough time with ... these people, and I really knew what they were 
saying based on their backgrounds ... and the backgrounds were different.
We have most problems in dealing with contraas in foreign lands, where we try to 
communicate to our customer in a third language. Even when we are using an 
interpreter, it’s realJy difficult to communicate effeaively, because you’re working with 
totally different experiences, and the same words mean totally different things. Yes I 
hear what you said, but I am not sure I understood what you meant’. This is tme with 
customers as well as with our own folks [HPC managers] across borders.
The individually constructed subsystems mentioned earlier are organically grown 
repositories containing privately held bundles of knowledge and information. However, the 
drift towards subsystems has led to tensions among teams, especially cross-cultural^. The 
tension may also be a result of the perception that certain individuals have stronger
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business relations with senior managers at headquarters that are the experience ‘backbone’
of the firm. A US senior manager elaborated further on the difficulties in reaching
consensus with senior managers in Germany during meetings:
Differences in culture are huge. I say 80% of Germans are much more rigid in 
their method, they aren’t so open, so innovative -  not all of the Germans are that 
way but 80% of them [have] a certain kind of cultural behaviour. It’s really 
different... my colleagues here are much more used to a more open kind of way to 
develop a business plan ... the Germans are much more rigorous in their ways ... 
sometimes they’re far too rigorous. It takes them 6 months to develop a strategy 
that should only take 6 days on our part. So you have to learn to estimate to be 
able to reach conclusions, and they seem to have a hard time doing that. I would 
say in the time that I was in Germany, people I was dealing with, 80% of them had 
a cultural behaviour that had a tendency to dig very deep, not be in touch with 
how to get there, whereas here [in the US], my colleagues are more time-driven, 
and you do what you have to do to meet your time line. So it’s a cultural issue.
A manager implied that the German-dominated management thinking sometimes gets in
the way of taking fast actions and makes the units with more potential to grow less efficient.
The lack of access to organizational know-how, transparency, and widening cultural gap
between Germany and the US led to further political tension (Interviewee 9):
... corporate politics plays a strong role, that’s a cultural kind of issue. That’s where 
it starts, at least. If I look back over my 30 years, in this company, there were more 
political and less political times. I can say that the more we grow and have to work 
with other cultures, the more political decisions get because different incentives 
come into the game. How does it related to IS? Well, how can they not be related?
It can be one of the biggest business strategy blockers.
The above quote was acknowledged by many senior managers at the US OU during 
interviews and informal conversations, where they attributed the different worldviews 
among the units for the culture of resistance to knowledge sharing -  and for the creation of 
subsystems. Thus, it would seem that the physical and cultural distance inhibits them from 
building closer social networks with experienced executives, who have control over 
resource allocations. This distance has fostered increased cross-cultural communication 
problems and increased political tension among younger and more senior managers, and 
among German and US managers.
The lack of IT-driven systems, but the presence of human-driven socialization, meant that 
knowledge sharing was happening within units, but not as much across the units. Within 
OUs, managers were able to collaborate eventually. But when it came to cross-cultural 
communication, inter-unit level conflict was almost always something to deal with. 
Whether this was more a culture issue or a lack of systems integration, or a corporate 
governance issue, the responses varied. Those who advocate an integrated IS argued that IS 
platforms would help managers to communicate more effectively on the basis of a
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common knowledge base. That way, they would be less tempted to operate from their own 
subsystems. On the other hand, the use of integrated systems themselves calls for a 
collaborative mindset in the first place.
This is the point of departure to summarize the key findings. Notably, there are findings 
that could not be incorporated in this chapter due to lack of space and the difficulty to 
structure them. These will be integrated into the analysis in chapter 7.
62.1,6 Case Summary
This section portrayed a raw picture of some of the key issues investigated at the German 
and US OUs in HPC. The components were most of all in reference to strategizing, 
exploitation and exploration strategies for using IS, enabling or disabling IIs, and attitudes 
towards change. The following could be identified, specifically at the US unit:
• The ‘Alliance Approach’ to strategizing requires the synthesis of a wide array of 
data, information and knowledge from across functions and OUs, i.e. US and 
German units. This includes exploiting organizational engineering experiences, 
managerial experiences, as well as the innovation ability in customization processes.
• The lack of electronically available MI, and lack of integrated systems do not seem 
to provide an enabling knowledge sharing environment for strategizing.
• At least initially, there seemed to be a drift from relying on organizational IS (i.e. 
social networking) to individually constructed subsystems. Subsystems seem to 
provide managers with some degree of flexibility when they try to be efficient. A 
closer look may real that the subsystems may have always existed, but they may not 
have been used in a strategic manner. This is because the nature of these 
subsystems is very simple and can be created anytime. It remains open for further 
analysis.
• Compared to their US counter parts, most managers in Germany seemed to have 
an easier (or more accepting) attitude towards coping with the lack of ICTs and 
systems integration. The organizational IS seemed to be better suited to the ways in 
which managers in Germany work.
• A ‘side effect’ of the subsystems was that they seemed to have contributed to a 
widening cross-cultural gap, where managers relied heavier on their systems and 
networks, and relatively less on making an effort to make cross-cultural knowledge 
sharing flow better.
172
Due to the entrepreneurial nature of their work, US managers performed best when they 
had the room to improvise while adhering to the top-down strategies from the German 
headquarters. In order to cope with changing environment, the approaches to strategizing 
involved simultaneous exploring opportunities and exploiting resources. Personally 
managed IS were found to enable them to do their jobs more efficiently. As of the IS 
strategizing framework, the interplay between the II and the IS strategies, as well as 
between top-down and bottom-up IS strategies, became evident. The findings will become 
meaningful in chapter 7 when they are compared with the second case study and discussed 
in relation to the literature. The next section showcases the second study.
6.2.2 Case 2: PCS
The presentation of the empirical information will be different with this case study due to 
the different nature of investigation. Apart from interviews and conversations, a six-month 
observation in one of the firm’s US subsidiaries complemented the study. The first two 
months were spent learning about the business and the organizational systems. The focus 
was on the manner in which strategic actors, i.e. individual financial advisors and teams, 
leveraged information and knowledge in strategizing processes. This was in relation to 
winning larger accounts and expanding the subsidiary’s business portfolio. The idea of this 
case study is to provide an interesting case with different contextual settings. Furthermore, 
due to the interpretive nature of investigation, many of the findings make more sense as 
part of the interpretive analysis in conjunction with referring to the literature. This is found 
in chapter 7.
The majority of interviewees were senior, mid-level advisors, with some junior advisors. 
Emphasis was put on senior advisors because they have more experience with strategizing 
activities and are able to see beyond the organizational IS. Specifically, the study considered 
a particular team consisting of eight members, called the A-Team. This team, a high 
performer, attributed their success to their strategizing approaches and the ways they 
leverage information and knowledge. Their strategy was most of all based on meticulous 
individual research, cohesive team work, and being deeply involved in every strategizing 
process. Other teams at the same subsidiary were also considered who were less successful 
in their competitive strategizing (as of number of assets under management).
The below sections relate to the parts of the IS strategizing framework, where it illustrates a 
two-way interaction between the collaborative business strategizing with the firm’s socio-
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technical information infrastructure (II). The, the questions explore the link between socio- 
technical resources and the various systems to support strategizing processes. Many other 
aspects unveiled in the discussions, for example how managers cope with everyday changes 
of the internal and external environments, how these affect the on-going learning process 
and what the consequences are as a result of the status quo.
6.2.2.1 Strategizing Work
The researcher first investigated the nature of managerial work before attempting to make 
sense of the ways in which IS were used to support those strategizing processes. The ability 
to leverage corporate resources and IS are determinant parts of decision-making processes, 
and winning competitive bids (Interviewees 1, 2, 6).
At PCS, while overall strategic directions come from the headquarters, business strategies
are devised and executed locally. This way, each office in its respective complex is
responsible for business performance of that complex. An enabling entrepreneurial
environment is essential to allow strategies to form and be executed within and among
teams. A senior advisor (Interviewee 7) commented on the ways in which strategies coming
from the top are combined with those at the subsidiary level:
There is no grand business plan or strategy coming from the top telling you how 
things are done; you figure it out yourself with your local businesses and clients. This 
makes the organization extremely adaptive to change.
Previously in chapter 5, section 5.2 described the work that goes into competitive
strategizing of financial advisors. Advisors work together with their social networks and use
the IT-based corporate information resources to create customized marketing material for
clients. A VP senior advisor, who has been with PCS for over nine years, commented on
his strategy (Interviewee 1):
Most definitely, structure drives strategy. We have unlimited resources and we 
strategize around them. Within the different structures you also have different 
strategies. For example, Sam is strategizing around Equity structures, John around 
Fixed Income and so on. Mark and Tim are at the top and we drive the strategies.
We strategize as a team.... We trust each other.
The foundation of the knowledge work, to a certain extent, is consistent over time and for 
each business case: the putting together of a business case involves the integration of 
various forms of data, information and knowledge about the markets, internal 
competencies, products and services. This involves interaction with external suppliers, 
exploiting existing cooperative arrangements and creating new alliances with other financial
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services firms. It involves networking with prospective clients through multiple channels, 
such as cold calling and referrals. Undertaking these tasks require putting together 
extensive research on many levels. The outcome will be a customized financial and 
marketing document for prospective clients.
An interesting finding was the slight discrepancies between attitudes towards a strategy and
the actual strategizing in action. When interviewees were asked about deliberate and
emergent approaches to strategies, it took some time for advisors to make conceptual
distinctions between them. At first, most senior advisors claimed that their approach to
strategy is always ‘most definitely deliberate’, and so was their use of IS (Interviewees 1, 2, 7,
11, 13). With one particular interviewee, his posture and voice changed to more deliberate
and authoritative state and said (Interviewee 1):
Strategy is what I do evety day -  it’s all top-down, we don’t improvise, otherwise 
the team and the client will be in trouble. We have to decide as a team what to 
do and take into account interest rates, client’s plans, and so on.... [Mark] and 
[Tim] are owners, they set the structure and we strategize in teams.
This was quite indicative of the corporate culture of PCS, which encouraged people to
speak in deliberate terms when it came to strategy, decisions and information. Yet
observations over several months revealed a different picture. During discussions on
different occasions, interviewees were asked again about specific steps they take during
strategizing (not just about strategy). Interviewee 7, for example, said the following while
reflecting on a recent client case:
Structure, strategy and response to change - very interesting how they work 
together... you got to work with the goal to be ahead of the curve, respond 
locally and lead globally. ... Management has to incorporate changes everyday.
It’s both, you have the top-down strategy and then the action is always bottom- 
up. Everyday things change and they change so fast, you have to incorporate all 
changes in your decisions.
A top-down mentality may be attributed to the corporate culture, which rewards advisors 
on monetary outcomes, not necessarily how much they learn and share with the rest of the 
firm. Interestingly, there was a slight different culture among senior advisors -  one which 
focused on every step of the process rather than a definite outcome. While this may seem 
somewhat obvious to the reader, this finding made a major difference in managerial 
mindsets, and the ways in which they leveraged information and IS. Interviewee 1 
commented after a conference call with other team members on the status of a prospective 
client:
You’ve got to focus on the process, .... the activity, not the outcome. If 
everyone focused on what has to be done, the outcome will show itself.
Armstrong focuses everyday on watching what he eats, exercising, training etc;
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he doesn’t focus on winning the race all the time. Strategy is just the same, focus 
on the process.
This statement came from the senior advisor who earlier had defined strategy as ‘definitely
deliberate’ and that ‘there isn’t room for improvisation’. When he was interviewed again,
while he was engaged in the strategizing work, his response was more reflective. Despite
the conscious effort to plan and structure chaotic processes in a day, observations indicate
that as soon as the first step was taking in a strategy, several elements shifted, client or
market related information changed or some other issues emerged which had to be dealt
with immediately. The cycle of revising the (old) strategy would begin the next day.
Needless to day, strategizing in everyday action was unstructured, and advisors had to
juggle with unexpected events, despite the amount of preparation and prediction. These
changes that could not be planned for in advance ranged from dealing with consequences
of under-performed client portfolio, to managing external money managers, emerging
competitors, changing client demands, and even changing team members. Each of these
affects a series of other activities and decisions.
Interview 7 confided:
I am usually paranoid about what kind of information I am getting. It takes time to 
develop a sense for what’s the right information... you are overloaded with 
information from all angels... it can be very distracting.
Here, the challenge is not as much about having the right IS as it is to be able to use the IS 
in the right way. This ‘right way’, comes from experience and certain managerial skills, 
according to Interviewee 13. Here, the manner in which information is scanned, filtered 
and processed is part of the doing of the strategy, whereby a serious of different tools may 
be used.
On the client side, what is most critical to win businesses, besides the financial know-how, 
is the nature of communication with clients. Compared to HPC, advisor-client relations are 
more critical due to a higher level of scepticism of clients on the role of a ‘trusted advisor’, 
and due to more fluctuating external markets (relative to the more stable hydro markets). 
Hence, the success of business growth depends much on exploiting organizational tools 
while incorporating personal and commercial knowledge (Interviewee 1). Knowing this 
makes the manner in which IS are used more evident.
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62.2.2 Information Systems & Socio-Technical Context
A major part of the business development work is to continuously scan the environment,
examine possibilities, and identify new opportunities for winning accounts and growing the
team’s business. The organizational infrastructure is rich and well aligned with the way the
firm’s overall businesses are structured In the initial interviews, the advisors indicated their
appreciation for the richness of the II, and expressed the value added of corporate IS to
advisors’ performance compared to their competitors in the industry (Interviewee 7):
Because of our research and market know-how, we are one year ahead of everyone 
else in the market. [Company X] is one step down and at least a year behind because 
they don’t have the richness of information infrastructure and research in place. Our 
research can’t be beaten in the industry. [Company Y] is at least 6 years behind, 
mainly because their organizational structure is too rigid and top-down. They are 
told what to do, what to say, what to sell - very much monitored
Subsidiaries seem to be well equipped with centralized IS. The Corporate IT-driven 
information infrastructures (IIs) provide comprehensive analysis tools, and various other 
platforms. An advisor, who has been with the company for eight years, states (Interviewee 
8):
The information is there; it’s up to them [teams] how they use it; their business 
strategy depends on how well they leverage the resources... interesting how it 
works...
The centrally controlled person-to-document IS platforms were seen as vast, rich and 
sophisticated (Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13). Advisors log-on the company’s global 
Intranet site and gain access to massive data and information, specialized and financial 
applications, knowledge platforms, educational courses, information forums, white papers, 
optional daily teleconferencing, and so on. Individual offices are continuously informed 
about corporate updates and market information through internal use only emails, notes 
and post. They are informed on organization- and market-related news, compliance issues, 
and regulations on regular basis. The network of resources is linked globally. The search 
engine allows advisors to connect to employees, and information on products and services.
Further observation revealed that those who used the corporate IT resources most 
frequently were junior advisors, who lacked experience and the social networks. Most of 
their time was spent on educational programs. A primary role of the top-down corporate IS 
was to educate advisors, monitor their, behaviour and performance, and so determine their 
compensation. While at times it seemed that these IS were controlling the decisions and 
action of human agents, there were other times, when human agents had to find ways to
177
manipulate the top-down and also rigid organizational system in order to stay competitive 
in their business. This was primarily observed among senior managers. Hence, while it was 
recognized by advisors that the top-down IS were valuable resources, they also sometimes 
were big, heavy and not transparent (Interviewee 9). There was a general struggle to learn 
how to use the systems in a strategic manner while engaged in strategies. This determined 
how efficient they could be.
Hence, two challenges were identified: first, there was little time and little guidance to
navigate the systems; and secondly, there was relatively very little person-to-person enabled
IS. According to a senior advisor (Interviewee 13):
[PCS] has so many resources... the question is whether you use the resources.
[PCS] is such a big organization and there is so much information disseminated 
across all levels. They are so dispersed, though, it’s impossible to know 
everything.
From the outset, it many not occur that the sheer amount of data, information, tools and 
applications on the system may actually have a diminishing return on the level of systems 
usage by advisors. Surprisingly, the investigation indicated that indeed there is relatively a 
small percentage of the IS used by advisors in their business development activities - 
relative to what is available and the exploitation potential of the resources. Interviewee 9 
stated:
It takes time to learn how to get all the information and resources that are 
there ... and to make the most of it. I could sit down and brows for as much as 
I like -  but that’s not my job.
The highly structured IS networks make it hard to find key information fast. Once
information is found, people were hardly able to track back the route on which they found
it -  so most of them did not use the system again, and instead referred to the firm’s
employee support services via the telephone to find more information on their inquiries. In
order to effectively exploit the IT-enabled information, advisors have to be very precise in
what they are looking for (Interviewee 3, 4). Interviewee 1 stated
We all have the same amount of time - 24 hours. You’ve got to be efficient.
How efficient you are is up to you I don’t have time to search the system. I 
often call up someone on the team.... I can be efficient because I know people 
who know what I need to know. That’s the difference between us and other 
teams...
The effort to manage the investment strategies and relationships with current clients, and at 
the same time bidding for new clients on an ongoing basis, hardly left time to explore what 
is available on the system (Interviewees 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 13). Furthermore, ongoing internal 
rivalry made most senior advisors hesitant to using centrally available IS, which were readily
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available to all members. This gave a sense of diminished return of the IS, ironically, 
despite its vast scope and scale. Last but not least, senior advisors were silently aware of the 
extent to which top-down IS were basis of corporate surveillance, and monitoring the 
performance and activities of all employees. This had substantial affect on how and how 
much these IS was used.
The strategizing work requires the advisors to be able to exploit relationships and while
exploring new opportunities at the same time. Interviewee 1 said:
At this level you don’t need a distinction between IT and business; depending on 
which capability you want to focus on, you structure around it.... You can use IT in 
your strategy, it can help, but it’s ultimately you and your strategy. IT is just IT.
Building business based on trust in the face of internal rivals, market fluctuations and
external competition cannot be based on purely deliberate strategizing, or on the use of
deliberate forms of IT/IS. A senior advisor reflected on a long day of work before a
meeting with a major prospect client on the next day (Interviewee 2):
I know everything there is about the client and yet I feel I’m never prepared 
enough. I always prepare for all that could possibly go wrong.
The advisor had a meeting on the next day to present the business proposal to the
prospective client, for which he had conducted meticulous research on the case. The
client’s customized business case, which was going to be presented, encompassed at least
three month of in-depth research and strategizing work. This included all the information
that could be retrieved from the corporate IS to prepare the documents. A large team had
been preparing information, graphs and presentations on alternative investment strategies
for that client. This information had been based on the firm’s latest and comprehensive
research database in relation to the financial needs of the prospective client. Having
accumulated and created all the information for the content of competitive proposals, the
next step is to convince prospective clients of advisors’ capabilities and personal knowledge.
Based on conversations, all the work that goes into preparing the proposals does not
matter as much as the environment of trust and knowledge sharing that the advisor creates
while presenting the proposal to the client. For this reason, a lot of the knowledge that
determines winning the bid is tacit, experience-based, and dependent on the unique
personal knowledge of the advisor about the situation at hand At the end, the massive II
seemed to be only a basic supporting tool to advisors and not a determining factor in
winning more business (Interviewee 1):
I see IT as a tool. It’s like looking at a hammer .... to me, the shape of the 
hammer hasn’t really changed since Deming. You have to be prepared for all 
that can go wrong -  and there’s lots that can go wrong.
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According to the senior advisor, what determines the success of the meeting would be his 
ability to make decisions when the meeting does not go as planned. Hence, a lot of time 
was spent to develop scenarios for possible situations and the consequences of alternative 
decisions. While using the tools in the corporate system, the personal knowledge of the 
advisor on the client and the sense of how the client might interpreted the numbers, all 
played a major role in how the various IS were chosen and applied in the strategizing work.
Members of the A-team saw one reason for their efficient and effective performance, their
ability to judge what information is key, and which can be avoided (Interviewees 1, 12, 13).
According to a retired senior advisor, a significant managerial ability is to see the relevance
and risk in information before others do, and process it right away (Interviewee 10). Well,
that requires not only IS, but most of all the personal knowledge from experience while
being involved in the complexity of the situation (Interviewee 10). At the same time, it is
equally important to know what does not matter (Interviewee 1 and 7). This is significant in
being efficient and productive, given limited time, information overload and conflicting
demands. A senior advisor on the A team stated (Interviewee 9):
You’ve got to have a strategy to filter the noise. Filter the noise and get rid of 
the fat. I’m very efficient with my time. Just focus on what you need to know 
and leave the rest. That’s the only way you get to be efficient.
‘Filtering the noise’ refers to the information that comes from external (markets and 
competitors) and internal (information overload or competitors) sources, which may 
adversely influence an advisor’s decisions and focus. The role of IS was seen as neutral. It 
was the person who had to learn to use IS in navigating against the wind (Interviewee 10).
Advisors on the A-team had deliberately developed approaches to guard themselves against 
such ‘pollutants’ (irrelevant information, people, and resources) to minimize distractions 
and loss of time (Interviewee 1, 11, 12). While there were advisors, who welcomed in­
flowing information (Interviewee 3), the A-team was very particular as to what was relevant 
to their strategy. Some of these channels were email, telephone calls, visitors, external 
partners, visiting wholesalers, and so on.
It was evident that what was made available through the person-to-document corporate IS 
was not necessarily seen as supportive, or enabling. Besides IT-enabled corporate resources, 
the success of a competitive bid was highly dependent upon specific managerial skills 
(Interviewee 1, 7, 11). These would be further developed and fine-tuned through ongoing
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learning, conversations with specialists, internal investment strategists and external partners,
money managers, and so on. Interviewee 9 stated:
We [PCS] provide the information systems - intranet, Internet, proprietary 
software and so on -  the rest is knowledge driven, people driven. It’s about people.
Client demand is what drives the strategy.
The knowledge work involved in competitive bidding is not sequential and it is difficult to 
forecast when things might change (interviewee 11). In addition to the main document-to- 
person strategy, advisors used a formal social networking system, where they could reach 
experts in specialty areas (e.g., insurance or real estate). When senior advisors look for 
specific data or information, these are typically delegated to a junior advisor. For 
experience-based knowledge, they contact colleagues in closer social and professional 
circles, who have worked with a similar category of clients and are able to provide their 
personal know-how.
However, there were two difficulties in the past: finding the right expert, and obtaining the
knowledge they need from that expert. Experience has shown advisors that once they have
found an expert outside their region, the nature of the network takes on a different shape.
Individuals and work systems are organized in a different way in different regions,
specifically in different core businesses such as investment banking or investment
management. A major complaint about IS-based social networking was the massive
amount of information and knowledge hubs one needs to scan and identify. Most advisors
expressed the need to ‘Build shortcuts to experts and the overall knowledge networks’, as
the whole process of finding key information was overwhelming and time consuming.
Advisors 5 and 6 implied in a joint interview:
If you are trying to reach someone outside your region at PCS, you get lost in an 
ocean [of people]. All of a sudden you deal with a whole different network 
Communication is most effective in closer circles, so what you eventually get out 
of the [search] process are mixed messages. In the end, you have to decide what 
really matters to you.
This is one of the reasons most senior advisors make limited use corporate IS and instead, 
constructed their own subsystems as a flexible knowledge base to enable more efficient 
strategizing processes.
6.2.23  Personal Subsystems & Knowledge Networks
In action, advisors used deliberate and emergent forms of IS in an intermingled fashion, 
according to the situation and the nature of information. For example, chapter 5 outlined
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the type of knowledge work that goes into business development. The nature of data and 
information ranges from highly technical to information about client’s past and future goals. 
These can be collected from the combination of PCS’s systems, calling other team 
members, meeting with the clients themselves, or reading the client’s biography, for 
example (Interviewee 1). All this information about the client need to be stored in a place, 
processed and developed to help build a competitive business case.
It was observed that, among senior advisors, the use of IS was more private and secluded, 
i.e. in the form of subsystems. Subsystems are personal platforms on which advisors store 
filtering data, information, as well as cues on experiences and ongoing learnings from 
particular situations. These are continuously updated and expanded. Just as it was the case 
with HPC, these subsystems, more than anything, reflea the ways in which advisors 
strategize, i.e. simultaneously exploit corporate resources and learn from emerging 
challenges (Interviewee 1, 7, 10, 11). These are synthesized and stored in files or 
incorporated into processes according to the advisor’s ways of approaching strategic issues. 
It was difficult to identify them because these are quite integrated into processes and into 
the doing of the everyday work.
Subsystems allow advisors to make faster adjustments to changes. The reliance on 
corporate IIs would not be an optimum strategy if one wanted to respond swiftly to 
environmental and organizational changes. The company’s infrastructure, due to its size 
and wide range of specialty areas, sometimes lagged in response, or did not capture changes 
in information most relevant to some advisor’s work. In competitive bidding, conveying 
the perception that advisors are ahead of the competition is another determining faaor in 
gaining prospective clients’ trust (interview 1, 2, 10, 13). Response to change and adjusting 
the strategy accordingly are ongoing for advisors.
The use of subsystems can be conceived as of a strategic use of IS, whereby these helped 
advisors to remain flexible and change with competitive environments. While the corporate 
IS had personal pages for advisors to manage and develop their strategies, these still 
seemed rigid and not the preferred way of working (Interviewees 3, 9, 4). Their subsystems 
provided a flexible structure around their emergent and chaotic strategizing work. They 
have to be created manually, they provide focus in terms of very specific information, and 
they provide flexibility to enable individuals to adjust their strategies according to changing 
circumstances or perspectives.
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What makes them valuable is that they are path-dependent, context- and relationship- 
specific (Ray et al 2004, Ciboira 1993); path-dependent because the content consists of 
information and knowledge that advisors have created over a long time, rather than just 
data that is readily available to everyone on the corporate IS. The information is based on 
the experience of the advisor who has worked on the specific business case, built trust with 
specific people in specific situations and networks. Furthermore, the relationship specificity 
of the subsystems makes them difficult to transfer to others, meaning that if a rival gets a 
hold of it and attempts to use it, unless they are attempting to get specific information on 
specific clients, the subsystem is not as valuable to them. It can be implied that subsystems 
are as valuable as the strength of the relationship between the advisor and the social 
network therein.
Another problem was the resistance to knowledge sharing. While advisors are dependent
on the cooperation and trust of other organizational members to provide expertise, the
sense of competition and possible distrust was a pressing issue. The level of trust and
openness had a large influence on their choices of IS use (Pauleen 2003; Wilson 2002).
Hence, subsystems also seemed to be a result of a culture, which did not want to share and
collaborate. Or, the subsystems were the result of a culture, which never was willing to
collaborate. As mentioned earlier, the A-team was an exception. In any case, all advisors
agreed that cooperation in teams was essential, very little knowledge sharing and
cooperation actually took place (Interviewee 3):
The problem is not our strategy or structure, it’s the people who divorce 
themselves from human contact, go to their offices ... and close their doors.
Interviewee 1:
Trust - is lacking! When people don’t trust each other they don’t share. Within 
our team, capabilities are very well aligned, high cooperation. It’s a swat team 
within PCS; we never slow down. Others [advisors within the subsidiary] don’t 
want to participate [to expand the team].
Another advisor stated (Interviewee 12):
What’s lacking here is more face-to-face interaction, not just emailing or text-ing.
When you talk [face-to-face], it’s a different dimension of communication. When 
you don’t get that level, over time, then people distance themselves instead of 
collaborating more. This isn’t the best way to operate in a team...
Hence, interviewees mentioned that they often referred to the social networks they had 
created for themselves (on the basis of their subsystems) across various locations, functions, 
and organizations (Interviewee 2). They would get to know these individuals very well 
through frequent person-to-person interaction, and then maintain communication through
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Email and telephone. Many of these individuals were experts in one area or another, with
whom they shared at least one aspect of the strategizing process. This way they were more
certain that when knowledge sharing takes place, it will be based on relevant information
and experience, rather than standard information (Interviewee 11).
I have my group of people who tell me what I need to know. I know I can rely 
on them. Saves me time, especially when I am on the road.
Most of all, among the advisors and the selected network of expertise, there is a shared 
mindset and similar ways of thinking about emerging issues. This way, it is easier for senior 
advisor to delegate certain processes of competitive bid. Interviewee 1 stated with utter 
conviction:
We trust each other and communicate very openly. When I say something to 
[Tim] he doesn’t get offended. He knows what I mean and trusts that I can fix a 
problem... Our relationship goes back 10 years. I know what he’s talking about 
before he finishes his sentence.
Similar ways of thinking among members in the same social network was essential, 
especially in areas were uncertainties and changes were inevitable. Here, one can see how 
the individual subsystems have emerged.
On the other hand, subsystems seemed to have encouraged further resistance to knowledge 
sharing and increased internal competition. This inhibited the open-door-policy corporate 
culture that was encouraged. Instead, individual advisor had crated their own circle of 
experts from inside and outside of the company which whom they shared long experience. 
The implications of contradicting demands (compete - collaborate; share - build new 
business) were also adverse towards building organizational memory, where organizational 
culture drifted from collaboration towards one based on exclusivity and individual reward 
systems.
6.2.2A Case Summary
PCS is different from HPG in its socio-technical context and IS richness that it already 
possesses centralized and market-specific global infrastructures and tools. Notably, all of 
the IS resources were based on a person-to-document basis. The study found that the use 
of IS had been shaped according to advisors’ strategizing needs, which had been 
manifested in subsystems. The following are the findings:
• The nature of strategizing is characterized as turbulent, where decision-making 
about a particular target client and information undergo constant changes. For
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example, while deliberations seems to be an engrained element of the corporate 
culture and mindset of advisors, in reality, the process of the overall action of 
strategizing from the beginning to the end of a project had a great deal of emergent 
properties on the micro-level. Apart from the nature of the work itself, contextual 
factors played a large role. For example the degree of involvement of advisors in a 
team changes fast because of the tension between that member and an external 
party (client or money manager). There are changes that need to be constantly 
incorporated into the old strategy, where it is revised and communicated as a ‘new 
deliberate’ strategy under up-to-date circumstances. A senior advisor reflected:
I use the example of a boat in the ocean as synonymous to change.
Sometimes the ocean is turbulent, sometimes it’s calm. The boat [strategy
of the team] is designed to navigate through storms and during calm times.
Furthermore, despite the analytical content of work, the dominant form of 
knowledge in competitive strategies was highly tacit and experience-based. The 
information provided by the global II alone would not be enough to win higher 
profile bids which require more client interaction than a standard client case.
• While the rich IIs seemed overwhelming in terms of scope and scale of information, 
ironically, these were perceived as diminishing return because of the organization- 
wide access and team competition. It was observed that the knowledge work was 
predominantly gathered through personal relationships, rather than from any 
particular IS strategy. The amount of time advisors spent on the phone talking to 
team members far exceeded the amount of time and level of use of other ICTs 
(email being an exception). While this was not measured formally, it certainly 
emerged from observation, conversations and interviews.
• Although social systems at PCS were immense in scope and scale, these were not 
much help to advisors, unless they had met the person in circumstances, where they 
had similar situations to share (Interviewee 8, 9). The lack of face-to-face contact, 
and thus the opportunity to build professional networks within the firm made the 
use of corporate social networks difficult. Hence, the value of the social networks 
was bound to the condition and process in which they were created. For example, 
the difference between the social network of senior advisors to that of junior 
advisors was that the former had built relationships through many years of 
collaboration and trust building, where the latter relies on the II and a wide 
network of experts who provide them with information -  information that is not of
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specific enough to provide competitive value (with some exceptions). This finding 
makes the inherent value of relationships, and similarly knowledge, context-specific 
in the area of business development.
• As a result, there appeared to be a drift from an organization-wide (primarily IT-led) 
IS to individual subsystems, consisting of key information, contacts and knowledge 
cues that were gathered over many years.
• At the same time, we saw indications of political tension and a culture of resistance 
to knowledge sharing. Could these be a result of the culture fostered by the 
subsystems or are these tensions inevitable and personal IS strategies allow advisors 
to perform in their own way? This remains to be seen as we interpret the situation 
more deeply.
In this context, the IS strategizing framework helped to make the distinctions between 
elements of IIs and top-down versus bottom-up IS strategies. The elements of ongoing 
learning and continuous change management were highlighted. Furthermore, as much as 
the interview questions were about IS, the findings re-directed the researcher towards the 
users, i.e. advisors, and their dynamics with socio-technical issues of the everyday coping. 
Nevertheless, these will interpreted with regards to the literature in chapter 7 in an attempt 
to understand these dynamics better.
6.3 SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS
The findings from the two case studies are summarized briefly before continuing with their 
interpretation in the next chapter. Furthermore, the supporting theories that will be used in 
chapter 7 are revisited. The boxes below summarize the problem situation. First, the IIs 
and IS are described as they were found on the organizational level; second, the use of 
subsystems are noted on the managerial level; and third, potential long-term effects or 
consequences to the organization as a whole are noted. Hence there is a tendency to move 
from a more descriptive to interpretive explanation as we move from the ‘whole’ to the 
‘parts’ and back to the whole.
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At HPC, we can imply the following at this point:
Characteristics of Information Infrastructures and Systems:
Question: Problem Situation or a form of IS Strategy f
• Information is hard to find; most project files are still in paper format and stored in 
filing cabinets. Information in electronic format is limited to engineering data, drawing 
software and basic search engines.
• Decentralized and unstructured information; disintegrated legacy systems
• Weak level of person-to-document IS lead to increased the reliability on person-person 
communication. Dominant corporate IS resembles that of a personalization strategy, 
where knowledge is shared through person-to-person communication.
• Most business knowledge, i.e. experience, is embedded within the heads of senior 
managers who spent most of their time at the German headquarters. These have 
become a major part of the organizational memory (OM) and are the main source to 
transfer the learnings to new managers.
Emergence of individual subsystems:
Question: A  solution to or consequence of the problem situation f
• Managers compensate for the lack of an enabling IIs and integrated services
• Subsystems contain relevant key data and information, short-cuts to difficuk to find 
information, knowledge cues, etc.
• Constructing their own information platform and knowledge-base to support 
strategizing activities and so be in control
• To create flexibility by being able to incorporate internal and external changes faster 
than the corporate IS would.
Unintended consequences o f subsystems
With most of the OM residing in the heads of senior managers and in the widely dispersed
and individualized subsystems across OUs, the following difficulties were identified:
• The use of subsystems as a political tool for bargaining power, inhibiting inter-unit 
knowledge sharing, transfer, and organizational learning
• Widening cross-cultural gap and problems in consensus building; Frustration over 
hidden information and knowledge due to limited access to knowledge workers
• Differences in mindsets and management thinking drift OUs further apart.
Figure 6.6: Overview of initial findings HPC
While HPC seemed to lack solid IIs, compared to PCS, the frequent exchange of 
knowledge workers across global offices (as a form of deliberate socialization strategy) 
helped to foster the knowledge sharing culture that PCS seemed to be lacking.
Interviews and observation from the second case company revealed the following:
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Characteristics o f Information Infrastructures and Systems
• Uniform, centralized IIs and standardized systems
• Dominant corporate IS strategy resembles that of a codification, i.e. person-to- 
document approach. All data and information are available on the corporate Intranet, 
electronic filing systems and many other proprietary systems.
Perceived problems by advisors:
• Lack of transparency and information overload, leading to inefficient use of the 
corporate IS
• Perceived ‘diminishing return’ of that which is available centrally to all advisors (IT- 
based as well as social networking events)
• Lack of open knowledge sharing environment, culture of distrust and limited use of 
social networks.
Subsystems: Managerial way of using IS
• Senior advisors compensated for the lack of a knowledge sharing culture and rigid IIs 
by constructing their own information and knowledge platforms, which took a primary 
role to the corporate systems as the subsystems matured over years of advisors’ 
experience
• Advisors were able to incorporate internal and external changes faster to their own 
systems than the corporate IS was capturing these and informed them
• Subsystems would become repository for relevant and key data and information, short­
cuts to difficult to find information, and specifically knowledge-based experience.
Unintended consequences o f subsystems
• These systems seemed to encourage further resistance to knowledge sharing, i.e. a 
culture of distance subsystems were used as a political tool for bargaining power for 
more unique knowledge resources, i.e. hidden knowledge or links to key individuals
• Adverse effects on OM and on-going learning of junior members.
Figure 6.7: Overview o f initial findings PCS
It would not be easy, nor appropriate, to formulate absolute conclusions in this interpretive 
study. The way in which the whole process is interpreted affects the way in which one 
views the emergence of the subsystems. Whereas the drift from corporate II/IS towards 
individual subsystems and knowledge platforms may be interpreted as a managerial 
solution to an organization-wide II problem, it may also be seen as part of an ad-hoc or 
emergent IS strategy which needs more structure and resources in order to play a more 
supportive role organization-wide. Subsystems may be seen as an unintended consequence 
of the broader corporate IS strategy which could not be captured in the research. 
Nevertheless, as of the interview data, we can prematurely imply that from the managerial 
perspective, subsystems seem to be a micro-level IS solution to the organization-wide II 
inefficiencies, where they seem to provide the efficiency and flexibility aligned with those 
micro-level managerial knowledge needs. At the same time, they seem to have some 
adverse implications on the internal organizational dynamics, i.e. organizational memory 
(OM) and knowledge transfer across units and cultures, which make a top-down attempt to
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systems integration via ERP systems very problematic. Chapter 7 will embark on these 
questions using the conceptual underpinnings of the IS strategizing framework and the 
supporting theories to inform the practice.
Generally, it was evident that a combination of high level analytical information and tacit 
knowledge is required to create a business case and establish long-term relationships. Also, 
while junior managers/advisors were the predominant users of formal IS, experienced 
senior managers/advisors were found to rely heavily on tacit knowledge and their own 
social networks -  or informal IS (Land 1991). Furthermore, it became evident that the 
latter group, who was the heavy user of subsystems, had the capability to reinvent a 
structure around the chaos and muddling through of everyday work. These actors would 
involve themselves less in formal processes and more in integrating themselves into the 
strategizing at the corporate management level to further expand and enrich their 
involvement on the level were more exclusive information resides. At the same time, this 
would foster increasing cross-cultural and political tensions (i.e. internal competition), 
which seem to lead to adverse long term OM. The research thus could also prematurely 
imply at this point that, most barriers to knowledge transfer and sharing in decision-making 
processes stem from a lack of integrated social system and clashing mindsets, which led to 
misinterpretations of information, distance and resistance.
The below section revisits the supporting theories to inform the findings on conceptual 
grounds.
6.3.1 Supporting Theories
Besides the concepts pertaining the theoretical framework (i.e. II and IS strategizing, 
change management, ongoing organizational learning, and collaborative business strategy), 
several other elements stood out during the empirical work. These are in relation to the 
integrated use of IS resources and the roles of and the strategic actors:
Supporting Concepts To address
• The ‘ambidextrous’ organization Efficiency and flexibility in strategizing. 
(Adler et al., 1999; Zi-Lin He and Wong 2004;
O’Reilly & Tushman 2004)
• The ‘involved manager’ as a mode Managerial mindsets and a situated mode
of the strategic actor (Introna 1997); of the manager.
• Managerial mindsets (Gosling & Mintzberg 2002)
Figure 6.8: Supporting concepts and theories
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The notion of ambidextrous organizations is especially helpful in explaining the position of 
subsystems. The underlying assumptions of the involved manager, as well as the 
characteristics of managerial mindsets (see chapter 2), will be especially interesting to 
investigate the reasons for the using IS in an ‘ambidextrous’ manner, which could have led 
to the creation of subsystems. Notably, the emphasis on the strategic actor emerged as part 
of the sense-making process towards the end of the first case study. The researcher 
identified that the level of subjectivity depends much on the managers’ interpretation of the 
world while they are involved in their particular context. More specifically, strategic actors 
are viewed as carriers of personal knowledge (Polanyi 1966) and considered in an attempt 
to explain the why’ behind the ‘how’ in strategizing. These preliminary interpretations are 
illustrated in the figure below (a simpler version of the figure was shown in the beginning 
of the chapter). The bold indicate the elements that appeared to be dominant in the 
findings.
©Collaborative II-Business Strategy 
Potential cross-cultural conflict 
affecting knowledge transfer and 
sharing
Competitive 
Strategizing: 
Ambidextrous 
Approach
. <A) Socio-Techmcal
II:
Strategic 
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Bottom-up vs 
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Managerial 
Subsystems
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Traditional IS-Business Strategic 
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Incorporating change 
management in managerial 
IS
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II -  IS link 
Organizational memoiy affecting on­
going learning on the managerial level
Figure 6.9: Initial interpretation - Dynamic interaction between the key components of 
analysis, and what they could mean
The figure highlights (A) the strategic actor as an explicit component in the socio-technical 
II; (B) the simultaneous and ambidextrous approach to deliberate and emergent strategizing; 
and (C) the use of IS in line with the ways in which strategizing was conducted, where 
subsystems mirror an ambidextrous use of IS. Furthermore, (i) the dynamics between 
strategic actors (as regards political tension and consensus building), and the ambiguous 
strategizing context, seem to affect the use of IS, and ultimately, the environment for 
knowledge sharing, on-going learning, and ultimately the organization’s memory (ii). In 
order to mitigate challenges stemming from the contexts (A) and (B), and in order to cope
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with conflicting IS managerial subsystems emerged to maintain ambidextrous strategizing 
demands and the shortcomings of corporate IIs (iii).
Chapter 7 interprets the findings in light of the IS strategizing framework and the 
supporting theories.
191
CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS & DISCUSSIONS
7.1 Analyzing the Case Com panies................................................................193
7.1.1. HPC-Analysis............................................................................ 195
7.1.1.1 In formation Systems in Strategizing............... 196
7.1.1.2 Integrated Approach to IS and
Business Strategizing......................................... 199
7.1.1.3 Subsystems....................................................... 203
7.1.1.4 Conclusions - H P C .......................................... 204
7.1.2. PCS-Analysis ....................................................................... 205
7.1.2.1 Strategizing & Information Systems............... 205
7.1.2.2 IS Approach of the A-Team..........................209
7.1.2.3 Conclusions - PCS........................................... 211
7.1.3. Reflecting on Both Cases........................................................... 211
7.2. Information Systems in Strategizing........................................................ 216
7.2.1. Decision-making & Information Systems................................217
7.2.2. Ambidextrous IS-Business Strategizing.................................. 221
7.2.2.1 Revisiting the Practice.......................................234
7.2.3. Strategic Actors.......................................................................... 227
7.2.3.1 IS and Mindsets as Immanent to Strategizing ..233
7.2.4. Summary.....................................................................................245
7.3. Unintended Consequences........................................................................ 246
7.3.1. Managerial & Organizational Disintegration...........................247
7.3.1.1 Knowledge Sharing & Transfer.......................248
7.3.2. Wider implications ..................................................................251
7.3.2.1 IS & Organizational M emory.........................253
7.3.2.2 Subsystems as Bargaining Power..................................258
7.3.3. Towards Integration.................................................................. 260
7.4. Summary & Implications............................................................................266
This chapter critically discusses the findings in light o f the IS strategizing 
framework and supporting theories. It also brings out potential contributions to the 
framework and identifies further research possibilities.
7 INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes the empirical findings in light of the IS strategizing framework and 
supporting theories to explain the manners in which IS were used by strategic actors and 
what this meant to the case organizations. The explanation derived from the analysis is
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then divided into two arguments: (i) the emergence of the subsystems is explained by 
arguing that IS is immanent to strategic actors’ mindsets and their involvement in 
strategizing, and (ii) the ways in which the subsystems feedback into the organizational 
whole affects organizational learning (OL), organizational memory (OM), and a knowledge 
sharing culture. The figure below illustrates the structure of the discussion in this chapter.
Section 7.3 Main argument 
Organizational Challenge:
Unintended consequences of 
subsystems
- Disintegration between 
organization-wide and 
managerial knowledge-base,
- Affecting ongoing collective 
learning and organizational 
memory overtime
Organizational 
Socio- 
Technical 
Context
'7.3  ' 7.2
Strategic Actors
Mixed use of 
D/E IS: 
creation of 
subsystems
Section 7.2 Main argument 
Managerial Advantage:
Attempt to integrate top- 
down and bottom-up IS for 
ongoing efficiency and 
flexibility leads to subsystems.
The situated involvement of 
strategic actors in strategizing 
leads to the use of IS to 
become immanent to the 
strategizing process; 
suggesting an integrative IS 
mindset in strategizing
Figure 7.1: Structure of the arguments (Preview)
7.2. Indicates a drift from formal organizational IS towards integrated use of deliberate (D) and 
emergent (E) IS to create efficiency and flexibility in strategizing.
7.3. Indicates how subsystems may affect the organizational systems and infrastructures as a whole 
in the long-term, with specific reference to knowledge sharing and transfer, OL and OM..
Specifically, section 7.2 aims to achieve a richer understanding of the findings in reference 
to exploration and exploitation in IS strategizing in the theoretical framework. Strategic 
actors are viewed as an explicit part of the information infrastructure (II) who use 
deliberate & emergent IS in an intermingled manner in business strategizing. Here, we find 
the notion of ambidexterity adopted from O ’Reilly and Tushman (2004) especially useful in 
explaining the co-existence of deliberate and emergent approaches to business strategizing 
(cf. Mintzberg & Waters 1985), and the mixed use of various forms of IS in a congruent 
manner. We argue for ambidextrous IS strategizing, where managers adopt personal ways 
in reconciling exploitation and exploration information and knowledge requirements in 
their work. Here, the focus is not on a specific IS strategy to meet a business objective, but 
rather on using the most appropriate resources at hand which provide key information and 
knowledge, in other words, the strategic use of IS.
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To this end, the notion of the involved manager (Introna 1997) complements the 
explanation. The author’s conceptualization of strategic actors as finding themselves 
embedded in the strategizing work, or ‘thrown’ in the world, is congruent with our findings 
that IS are immanent to the strategizing work and the managers’ mindsets. We argue that 
deliberate and emergent forms of IS were used in an intermingled manner while being 
involved in the strategizing world (i.e. the ambidextrous use of IS for the strategic use of 
information and knowledge). The literature that informs this argument is found in chapter 
2.
Nevertheless, managers do not exist in a vaccum and their approaches to using IS have 
unintended consequences (Robey & Boudreau 1999). Section 7.3 informs the dynamic 
relationship between the IS and II components of the ISS framework. Literature that 
informs this section has been outlined in chapter 3. It sheds light on how the 
organizational communication dynamics may have been affected by the use of subsystems 
in terms of their OL/OM. The section argues that the drift towards subsystems, although 
important on the managerial level, may also have an adverse effect on the sharing and 
transfer of information and knowledge, and consequently, become the source of problems 
in building consensus and cohesive teams, specifically in the cross-cultural communication 
context.
The interpretation moves from the whole to the parts, and back to the whole. The 
discussion in this chapter will provide a foundation for the discussion regarding the 
contribution of this research to the IS strategizing framework in chapter 8.
7.1 ANALYZING THE CASE COMPANIES
The first two sections analyze findings from the two case companies separately, and 7.1.3 
refleas on both. The manners in which experienced strategic actors used information and 
knowledge in the business development divisions in both cases were similar, in the sense 
that both construaed managerial subsystems regardless of the predominant form of II and 
organizational IS strategy. The arguments derived from the analysis in the light of new 
findings are the following:
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• Strategizing involves simultaneous use of top-down and bottom-up approaches in 
exploiting corporate resources while exploring new possibilities, i.e. ambidextrous 
strategizing (O'Reilly & Tushman 2004);
• IS were used in a congruent manner, where deliberate and emergent properties co­
exist in line with information and knowledge needs in the strategizing process. IS 
could be conceived as immanent to the strategizing process (Chia & Holt 2006);
• Along these lines, the involvement of strategic actors determined the manners in 
which IS were used and leveraged. Moreover, we acknowledge the notion of the 
‘involved manger’ (Introna 1997) and argue for an integrated IS mindset in the 
strategizing process.
7.1.1 HPC - Analysis
Based on HPC’s philosophy of ‘Engineered Reliability’, its strategy has been to provide 
complete power plant solutions through highly customized products and services to 
customers in the hydro power maiket. The joint venture in the year 2000 was a strategy to 
provide full service solutions to global energy producers. Increasing competition has 
introduced a second element to the ‘engineered reliability’ philosophy, namely services and 
trust-based collaborations between HPC and customers. Hence, the success of the 
company depends increasingly on continuous work with current customers as well as 
establishment of new businesses in a more aggressive manner than traditionally. This 
requires managers to possess expertise in highly advanced engineering and technologies for 
continuous product innovation, as well as an intimate understanding of customers’ needs. 
Similar to PCS, the success of competitive bidding projects is highly dependent upon 
commercial knowledge and the ability to build long-term relationships based on trust and 
quality of delivery.
The process of competitive bidding is led by the proposal manager and the customer-front 
marketing manager who orchestrate the relationships between the technical managers, 
corporate executives, customers and other business partners. Their role requires efficiency 
in communication to gather, learn and share knowledge across functions and operating 
units. In this position, it is critical to maintain control of the big picture (i.e. the direction in 
which the relationship with the potential customer is going) as well as being flexible enough
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to respond fast to micro-level changes and unforeseeable potential pitfalls that may lead to 
project delays and future complications.
The organizational II is one which grew organically throughout the years; one which was 
congruent with the emergent approach to strategizing of a family-owned German 
company. Traditionally, key knowledge components revolved around two elements: the 
product side and the business side. Traditionally, the product was indeed the business of 
the company and that is where the competitive advantage lay. The business followed a 
‘scientific’ approach: extensive technical analysis involving engineering data, information, 
facts, evidence, research and development. Since the determinant parameters of decisions 
were based on technical facts and engineering performance, communicating those and 
coming to consensus was not problematic. Furthermore, decision making and negotiations 
took place on a face-to-face basis, on the telephone or via email. The company’s well- 
established reputation in Europe for quality and delivery did not appear to require a change 
in their business or management strategy. The focus was on cutting-edge, engineering- 
based technologies.
7.1.1.1. Information Systems in Strategizing
Understandably, the predominant IS approach has been also that of an emergent, or 
personalization strategy, whereby managers use the company’s organically grown social 
network to gather and process facts, information, knowledge, and wisdom. Hansen et al 
(1999) suggest that companies pursuing a personalization strategy should have a moderate 
electronic document system that supports people in providing background materials on a 
topic and guiding them to experts who can provide further advice. The social network 
consists of highly experienced knowledge experts (senior executives, managers, engineers) 
who have been involved in projects at the company for a long time. These individuals 
provide the knowledge backbone and are hence very valuable to HPC. They provide advice 
to junior managers and educate them around new business cases, products, the markets 
and suppliers. They are the primary -  perhaps the only -  source of knowledge and 
experience repositories since there are no formal organizational memory or knowledge 
systems in place.
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Technical information is central to the firm and is embodied in designs, drawings, tools, 
equipments and blueprints (Teece 1992, 1998). Fundamental engineering and technical 
knowledge are held by engineers. The person-to-document information repository, most of 
which is in hard copy, consists of huge files of drawings, technical specifications, and 
books and other references engineers refer to. However, the ‘how’, where’, and when’ of 
applying them to customized projects requires the commercial experience of engineers and 
managers. This is where the person-to-person IS becomes most significant to the teams, 
enabling them to communicate effectively and make appropriate decisions at every step of 
the project. Interactive human-based approaches to knowledge management, such as 
informal networking and face-to-face meetings (Berry & Oakley 1994), are seen as 
predominant social networking strategies.
The most preferred method of sharing knowledge in strategizing is on-site meetings or 
video-conferencing. The personalization strategy, as the primary IS strategy, is based on 
exchanging knowledge workers among the operating units (OU) and between the OU and 
the headquarters in Germany. While the study took place at the US and German OUs, 
interviewees confirmed that this knowledge exchange strategy has taken place across all of 
their offices to varying degrees, depending on the level of project interaction. Interestingly, 
e-mail is the least preferred method of communication among senior and experienced 
project managers. Electronic means and tools are used to communicate facts and figures, 
engineering drawings, and to follow up on collaborative work processes (Interviewees 
1,2,8,9,10,13,15, 16).
During the meetings, US colleagues are invited to headquarters where they review their 
performance and share their experience from their home markets. Individual experiences 
become a source of great advantage when the team is discussing a common bidding 
strategy for an international customer. When managers from different functions and 
nationalities sit together in a meeting, the biggest challenge is reaching consensus: tapping 
into the minds of individual managers and linking together appropriate pieces of 
knowledge and experience, (i.e. in regards to design, environmental and commercial issues, 
etc) to arrive at a competitive strategy and highly customized product plan. As part of this 
process, knowledge about personal connections and relationships with potential business 
partners is critical (Malhotra 2003).
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The growth and further internationalization of the company as a result of the joint venture 
have introduced organizational and managerial challenges to the business and IS strategies. 
While competing globally, knowledge workers become dispersed around the world and 
establish themselves in their home markets. Two main problems were identified: regional 
competitive strategies were still closely monitored by the home office in Germany, 
preventing local flexibility and fast changes to market needs. This implies that the strategies 
incorporated a headquarters mindset. This introduced contradictions and inconsistencies. 
Second, the development of the II did not follow the business growth strategy. After all, 
HPC is ‘not in the business of information technology’ (Interviewees 15, 16, 17, 22) -  
hence there was perceived to be no need to invest much attention and capital in ICTs. As a 
consequence, the conversion of management information into electronic format has not 
been completely fulfilled and the traditional personalization strategy has been maintained as 
the best way to communicate. The lack of an IT-based information repository and the 
integration of information and knowledge platforms have led to increasing problems. 
Information disintegration and cultural distance raised challenges of consensus building in 
decision making, devising and execution of strategies. Lack of electronic-based 
information, standardization and systems integration led to problems of:
• Lack of transparency and hidden information
• Dispersion of information and knowledge: There is no single complete 
repository of information and knowledge is in the heads of senior mangers
• Bureaucracy, corporate surveillance and inefficiencies in decision making
• Difficulties in cross-cultural consensus building and understanding one 
another’s mindsets.
One example of such problems is progress reports and approval of strategic decisions. 
According to many US-based managers, there is much ‘unnecessary’ reporting and 
paperwork involved in every management decision. From their perspective, German- 
dominated top managers adhere to a top-down, command and control management 
approach to decision making, and often inhibit an entrepreneurial culture in which 
managers materialize their insights. This rather traditional approach and the lack of a 
balanced socio-technical infrastructure was a hurdle to many US colleagues in leveraging 
information and knowledge resources from the headquarters and in establishing an 
independent strategy for their own OUs in North America.
198
7.1.1.2, Integrated Approach to IS  and Business Strategizing
Already having a solid foundation in competitive product designs in the market, HPC’s 
new strategy is to compete on the basis of service and customization. This indicates a shift 
from product-based competition to a combination of a product- and knowledge-based 
strategy. HPC’s integrative competitive strategy developed at the US OU is conceptualized 
on the basis of a set of evaluation criteria. These criteria encompass the fulfilment of a 
series of initial services and know-how upon which HPC will be accepted or rejected as the 
primary provider in the competitive bidding process. This process is aimed to save about 
one year of work compared to the traditional way of winning contracts. As a major part of 
this process, sales managers work together with prospective clients from the outset on a 
one-to-one basis, and participate in every decision-making stage to provide them with the 
most customized product and build long-term relationships. This involves constant 
communication with project members (especially between sales managers on the client end, 
and engineers on the product end -  the proposal managers orchestrating this 
communication) through efficient means to tap into technical data and project experiences. 
Inside the firm, this interaction requires a strategic integration of IS, business strategies and 
organizational competencies. The US OU managers are aware that the current II is not fit’ 
to meet new demands (Interviewees 1, 7, 8, 23, and 27). Part of the problem outlined above 
is that competencies and relationships are widely dispersed (Teece 1992) and disintegrated, 
where managers need a strategy to leverage them efficiently to reap consistent benefits.
One could argue that the fulfilment of new strategies depends on two elements: an 
alignment between the new business strategy and a new IS strategy (Sabherwal &Chan 
2001); and a right balance between emergent and deliberate IS strategies. Both elements are 
associated with considerable challenges (Katz 2002). In this case, top-down strategies 
would make managers less competitive because in order to benefit from past and current 
knowledge, they need to know the logic behind the previously reached solutions; ‘cookie- 
cutter’ solutions would easily make them less competitive (Interviewees 7, 23). At the same 
time, the process of continuous learning from below and knowledge sharing is costly, time- 
consuming and slow - and sometimes political as to who gets to spend more time with 
experienced managers.
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Providing a unified platform to organize information and foster transparency has been 
recognized as requiring a conscientious approach to integration (Interviewees 12, 20, 22). 
The success of the strategy will depend on further standardization of methods, socio- 
technical platforms and a knowledge sharing culture among teams and OUs. Being aware 
that the company cannot compete without an integrated IS strategy, the CEO made the 
decision several years ago to invest in an ERP system. ERP systems have built-in processes 
based on ‘best practice’ industry models, where a company is forced to adapt the processes 
to the ERP software (Newell et al 2003). However, existing data and information are held 
in paper-based or electronic formats. There is still a large portion of HPC’s knowledge-base 
that is not looked after, for example unpublished ‘knowledge’, research reports in formative 
stages, specific technical knowledge gathered through working with customers, customer- 
and process-specific business knowledge, etc. Their unstructured and heterogeneous 
formats make their integration problematic.
In the past five years, the company has had pilot projects on individual modules of the 
ERP system in selected offices, such as in Shanghai, which has a relatively low degree of 
legacy systems in place. The pilot project did not succeed because of differences in 
mindsets and management thinking at the Asian OU. When organizations expand across 
national borders, a host of conditions emerge that differ from those of their domestic 
operations (Katz 2002). These include, for example, national culture, competitive strategies, 
information sharing processes and worker expectations (Shore & Venkatachalam 1995). 
According to the IT and HR directors in Germany, there was a need to adjust management 
thinking before implementing standardized IS.
In general, managers are under increased pressure to integrate and coordinate country 
operations (Shore 1996). Ensuring that managers at every OU have sufficient resources and 
accurate information is a daunting task for IS managers. In the long term, not only are the 
information and knowledge requirements different according to the local markets into 
which the company has expanded, but increasingly, new knowledge workers bring their 
own mindsets and ways of working from their local culture. The level of difficulty and 
range of challenges depend on the function and scope of responsibility. For example, 
potential clashes may occur between senior managers and junior managers who engage in 
higher level strategizing activities. Whereas senior managers have substantial experience 
with the organizations’ history and nature of processes, junior managers may bring new
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capabilities, conceptual knowledge and experience from their respective cultures that may 
be in conflict with the traditional ways of management and business strategizing within the 
company. Traditionally, the emphasis on world-wide standards and allocation of budgets 
for IT, and other resources supporting the business, have been in engineering-related 
functions, manufacturing and operations -  less so in functions such as marketing and 
R&D. Specifically in business development, the core competence of the organization has 
been the richness of experience of its people.
Whereas product-related information is highly technical and can be codified, the process of 
competitive strategizing is heavily based on tacit knowledge and managers’ social networks. 
This knowledge includes scientific expertise, operational know-how, insights about 
customers, business judgment, and technological expertise. For sales managers in 
particular, articulation in writing is used for formal matters and the rest is person-to- 
person. There are already inherent problems with knowledge sharing in relation to the tacit 
nature of knowledge, which cannot be solved by technology and ‘best practices’ alone. The 
embedded character of knowledge is hard to capture, store, or transfer (Bladder 1995).
In an attempt to capture at least some parts of this knowledge, literature argues for a 
culture of sharing as an enabler (DeTienne et al 2004; Alavi & Leidner 2001). While a 
knowledge sharing culture is best when it grows naturally, it should not be left to chance. 
Leadership and some top-down initiatives are imperative to guiding the overall attitudes 
and mindsets of human agents in the organization (DeTienne et al 2004). For example, 
reinforcing principles of guiding myths and Gnostic rituals driven by some key players in 
the organization help to enculture open business values (see chapter 3) in organizational 
members. These, overtime, should expand into a supportive social network, e.g. knowledge 
workers who share common values and experiences (Morosini 2000). Integrated leadership 
[researcher’s emphasis], is a key element to overcome human barriers associated with 
knowledge creation, transfer and sharing, for example through cooperative involvement 
and managing incentives (DeTienne et al 2004).
In the contrary, if there is no culture for sharing, then ICTs will become repositories over 
time, regardless of their perceived usefulness (Galliers 1991). Documents languish and 
gather electronic dust because the resources remain unused. Nevertheless, deliberate forms 
of IS do little for sustainable competitive advantage on their own. The standardization of
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processes and commoditization of IS may be at the cost of innovation, flexibility and may 
limit the bottom-up emergence of ideas (Newell et al 2003). In order to benefit, strategic 
alignment (Henderson & Venkatraman 1993) advocates claim that there has to be an 
organization-wide fit between IS and business strategies and processes (Porter & Millar 
1985). Like the majority of companies, this has been a challenge at HPC for the past several 
years.
The ongoing challenges, as we have seen in the case studies, are not only multi-fold, but 
also sometimes re-enforcing one another. This gets to a point where the actual cause for 
the problem situation becomes camouflaged in the everyday coping, such that the old 
problems evolve along with new emerging problems. HPC faced the challenge of IS and 
business strategy alignment, at least from the outset. While some blamed the lack of a 
supportive II (i.e. technological aspects of IS) in the everyday decision-making, others 
blamed differences in thinking that come from different cultures (hence, social-cultural 
aspects of IS). While managers in the US OU were keen to follow more aggressive 
strategies in their decisions, German senior managers exercised more caution with higher 
level of analysis and evaluation, which require many discussions at meetings. US managers, 
however, would not necessarily choose to spend much time discussing and rather take a 
trial-and-error approach to test for feasibility (Interviewee 3). Furthermore, the choice of 
topics to be discussed and their appropriate depth and breadth was evidently different 
between US and German managers. This led to the perception that meetings were not 
efficient and sometimes even pointless (Interviewees 1, 5, 8, 11 and 12). A senior project 
manager at the US OU expressed frustration about having to follow so many rules and 
comply with bureaucratic processes from headquarters as to how to go about bidding in 
their home markets. The tight bureaucratic control demanded work processes from 
business development managers that were not related to their jobs. In many cases, a lot of 
information is gathered and created, yet a very small fraction of this is used in the 
strategizing process. Feldman and March (1981) argue for possible reasons other than 
making decisions for which information may be gathered and used;
• Incentives for mere production, not necessarily for its use; sense of security; 
information becomes the way to bridge the gap between the rational and 
‘involved’ manager (Introna 1997)
• Information as surveillance; relevance is determined by the context
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• Strategic information as a method to persuade someone; basis upon which 
conflict is resolved
The rigid policies, in addition to a lack of integrated IS, would foster inefficiency and less 
productivity in the jobs of the US colleagues, hence making the OU as a whole less 
efficient.
7.1.13 Subsystems
Despite an IS strategy based on socialization, the process of accessing, gathering and 
putting together documents for competitive bids has been very difficult, especially at the 
US OU. Differences in management approaches, limited access to the tacit knowledge of 
senior managers, and the lack of an integrated infrastructure led to the gradual creation of 
subsystems by teams and individual sales managers. The subsystems consist of electronic 
repositories of information and knowledge that they consider to be directly relevant to their 
own projects and day-to-day decisions. These documents contain technical specifications, 
historic data, marketing information, and especially a repository of personal contacts and 
details on their personal networks. These documents emerged over the years in response 
to the need for flexibility and transparency, and as a way to cope with changing business 
conditions. They help managers to organize information and knowledge in accordance with 
the manners in which they go about strategizing in competitive bidding processes.
Since these systems have been constructed based on the experience of individual managers 
and teams, they are highly path-dependent in nature and specific to the creator of the 
systems. For this reason, they cannot be easily transferred to other members in case the 
system creator retires or leaves the company. In reference to this, the ‘stickiness’ of 
knowledge is specifically discussed in the literature as making the transfer of implicit 
knowledge difficult (e.g. Szulanski 1996). The competencies produced at one location 
cannot be easily used in other corporate units’ business context because the information 
was developed within the unique network and interaction of those who created them. 
Competence development is not only context-specific but also relation-specific (Lane & 
Lubatkin 1998). The more context-specific the systems are, the more difficult and costly to 
transfer the knowledge. This means that subsystems (their content and use) are as valuable 
to the company as they are connected to the individual manager who created them. At the
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same time, the subsystems introduce substantial bargaining power not only to specific 
teams within the subsidiary but also the subsidiary as a whole. On the downside, this has 
led to potential enhanced political tension among the OUs due to an increased rent-seeking 
behaviour and internal competition. Last but not least, managers at HPC face a continuous 
dilemma: the need for streamlining cross-functional knowledge processes as well as a 
flexible structure. The implementation of an ERP may improve organizational level 
processes, yet it was expected to introduce restrictions and rigidities that may set limits on 
the managerial level in the use of subsystems.
7.1.1 A. Conclusions - HPC
The HPC case has been an interesting example of a traditional, well-established company 
that had been excelling in its product delivery until it fell behind due to globalization and 
ICT advancements. The management style refleas a philosophy based on long-term 
relationships rather than a focus on quantity of deals, quick growth and short-term 
business relations. Socialization has been viewed as the best way of building a knowledge 
sharing culture and of facilitating a cohesive team environment. This has been facilitated 
through frequent exchange of knowledge workers between offices, mixing people in teams, 
brainstorming sessions in meetings, videoconferencing, conference calls, telephone calls, 
and email. Face-to-face meetings require trips to headquarters and transferring people 
between offices to consult with senior managers with a view to tapping their experience 
from past projects. Among senior managers, there is an already established network and 
social system both inside and outside the organization.
Despite the traditional non-IT approach to information management and knowledge 
creation, sharing and transfer, the company has been growing and its core competencies 
have been maintained -  thus far. Over time, however, a lack of an enabling II has led to 
organizational and managerial problems that may have a bearing on the core competencies. 
Notably, the study of one single subunit might not reveal this problem because they already 
have established their own woik systems and structures around their strategizing 
approaches; it is in the interaaion of the units where IS challenges surface. In order to 
compensate for the shortcomings in the corporate II, managers construaed their own 
subsystems as their prime IS strategy. Although the company is now well aware that in the 
long-term this shortcoming may well lead to loss of control and competitive advantage, it
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may also be a lesson that having the most advanced ICTs and IT-led II may not 
automatically lead to competitive advantage, or more effective management and efficient 
strategizing.
7.1.2 PCS-Analysis
The case study examines the use of IS strategies by senior managers in decision-making 
processes in competitive bidding, the area which is most in need of corporate support 
systems. The findings argue that it is not enough to focus on the level of sophistication of 
IT or an ‘alignment’ of IS with business strategies. Rather, due to the unstructured 
characteristics of strategy and the embeddedness of tacit knowledge in decision- and sense- 
making, IS should be seen as an integral part of the strategizing work itself). Furthermore, 
it argues that the managerial capability of an integrative IS mindset in strategizing processes 
plays a key role in overcoming that ‘stickiness’ of knowledge such that IS can be leveraged 
better to meet objectives and overcome organizational hurdles (Szulanski 1996, Jensen & 
Szulanski 2004). The discussion will suggest a possible integration of IS components 
proposed by the IS strategizing framework (Galliers & Newell 2003), which already 
assumes an integrated IS mindset in strategic activities on the part of strategic actors.
7.1.2.1 Strategizing & Information Systems
PCS, a US-based private bank, has many characteristics contrary to HPC. While there are 
clear objectives set by headquarters, individual branches of the bank are held responsible 
for meeting sales targets and expanding their business. Advisors have the flexibility to 
strategize in their own way in an entrepreneurial environment to meet those objectives. 
Generally, advisors at PCS strategize around providing investment advice and offer 
standardized solutions based on the company’s products. The central focus of advisors is 
twofold: i) building a channel for high net-worth clients, and (h) building an open and 
flexible record-keeping and decision-making platform for improving offerings, CRM, 
speed-to-market, new products and strategies: ‘By the time the products go through 
compliance and to us to market them it’s already too late” (Interviewee 2).
The corporate IS is centralized, top-down, and aligned with the overall business goals of 
the business divisions. Here, top-down IS refers to designed IT-driven platforms and
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imposed proprietary person-to-document applications which are maintained centrally'. 
There is a rich IT-led information infrastructure (II) providing tools for MIS which are 
aligned with business operations and strategies. It also focuses on web serves, security, 
outsourcing and mobility (i.e. Blackberries). For example, some of these are various 
proprietary IT software and services such as Client Relationship Management (CRM) 
applications, Supply Chain Management and Human Resource Management Systems, and 
very specific systems for the purposes of clients’ financial assessment, market data analysis, 
and so on. Client data is the backbone of the MIS and decisions, and hence, there is intense 
focus on the security of such platforms.
The central II connect hundreds of offices around the world, providing knowledge workers 
with the latest market updates, proprietary systems, products and access to a worldwide 
social network. Likewise, the dominant IS strategy is deliberate, or person-to-document, 
with person-to-person being limited to formal presentations and meetings. Practical 
knowledge is in its explicit form and codified (cf. Nonaka 1994) for future reuse. The 
majority of data and information are on the company’s Intranet and come from the 
corporate offices and the company’s large research centre, which distributes the latest data 
and information (e.g. benchmarking data, information regarding prospects, market analysis 
and forecasting) to the global network of advisors.
Advisors are encouraged to use the IT-led IS strategy to exploit the corporate II on already 
existing knowledge and solutions in order to achieve scale in knowledge reuse, with a view 
to growing their business. Generally speaking, junior advisors rely more on the global 
information platforms and top-down IS than experienced advisors. Documents in the 
repository are, for example, prospecting sources, business process checklists, different 
forms of documents for specific needs, as well as various proprietary assessment software 
that is used to assist the advisor in putting together presentations to prospective 
clients,(such as marketing material, extensive industry research and analysis, including 
forecasts).
The structured system fosters a self-organizing environment where knowledge workers 
access the global network to gather, share, and transfer information, and establish new 
contacts. One would assume that an IS well aligned with overall business strategies would
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foster an enabling environment for strategizing and decision-making. The findings provide 
a different picture, however.
In relation to competitive strategizing, despite the comprehensive corporate II and IS, the 
majority of advisors at PCS had the opinion that the system was not contributing much to 
their efficiency and job performance. Two reasons were most prevalent among the 
interviewees:
• Lack of transparency and information overload, combined with difficult-to-find 
information;
• A perception of diminished returns from what was available in terms of 
information and IS.
First, many advisors had difficulties finding their way through the maze of information on 
the II. Particularly, junior advisors were frustrated trying to find specific information in the 
vast system, given the limited time and even more limited training and mentoring. It was 
not that the II was not providing meaningful information, on the contrary, the sheer 
amount of analytical data and information went beyond managerial needs, and sometimes, 
advisor competencies and ability to judge what they actually needed to know.
While the accumulation of data and information was attributed to the quality of corporate 
IS, the strategic filtering of key information was attributed to the ability of the manager to 
judge what is useful based on their personal knowledge about the subject and the context 
(Interviewees 1, 3, 4 and 10). According to senior advisors, most of what is on the system 
remains unknown to most advisors, even to senior level advisors (Interviewees 1, 3, 5): 
‘few people know the sort of information [that’s] there [on the Intranet], if they had 
known, they would probably run their business differently’. Generally speaking, most 
advisors found it time consuming to find and retrieve new information from the system. As 
a result, either the job of seeking information was delegated to junior advisors, if a team 
had any junior advisors on them, or to assistants. In most cases, though, senior advisors did 
not have junior advisors on the team, and those who did, did not have the time to explain 
exactly what was needed. A more efficient way was in most cases to refer to the firm’s 
social network which would be just a phone call away (Interviewees 2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13). 
Social networking did not prove to be effective on a consistent basis, though, for different 
reasons depending on the position of the advisor ( i.e. VP or junior analyst). It was difficult
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to find the right people with the right kind of knowledge (Interviewee 7). Specifically, in 
trying to find an expert outside their own core business, they felt that ‘another world of 
people networks opens up which gets very confusing’, if there is no direct referral 
(Interviewees 5 and 7).
A number of advisors described that learning the shortcuts to finding the right information 
would be a ‘job in its own right’ (Interviewees 5, 7, 9). One interviewee, a senior advisor on 
the A-Team, revealed that the reason he had been more efficient than other advisors was 
because he knew more shortcuts to access information in the system than others. Others 
who had been working at that office for over 10 years had not yet worked with the majority 
of the available IS and proprietary systems - and investing time to learn how to efficiently 
use the systems was not a top priority.
Second, in contrast to the intention of centralized information systems (e.g., to support 
decisions and strategies through data, information and experts’ knowledge), it was found 
that the sheer availability of data and information to all advisors and employees 
simultaneously would diminish the perceived value of the IS as a competitive source which 
would differentiate the team’s strategies from others. This perception led most advisors, 
especially those who had become conscious of the perceived shortcomings of the II, to 
limit their use of corporate systems and constmct their own private subsystems. The 
perception that ‘there is information already out there for everybody’ -  regardless of how 
much of it is actually known -  had created an attitude that it must not be valuable if it is 
already there. It must be noted that this observation relates to senior advisors who have 
been with the company for a number of years and have been pursuing their business 
aggressively. For example, this was prevalent among two teams that were relatively more 
successful in their business development performance than the rest of the teams at the 
office under study. There is recorded evidence that relates the degree of IT centralization 
to its contribution to business value. For example, Capella (2006) argues that the right 
amount of IT centralization adds business value, but too much throws off the balance 
between efficiency and responsiveness, leading to diminishing return of ICTs.
Many advisors were seen to use the Web-based customer relationship management (CRM) 
application, SalesforxE.ccm. This system - an IT-enabled information sharing and management 
platform -  can be easily integrated into the corporate IS and customized by each user.
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Among many functions, the platform allows teams to create, share, store and manage 
information about clients. The teams who used this system expressed their satisfaction with 
it. However, upon tracking the actual use of the system over three months, it was noted 
that information was not regularly updated. Since the majority of advisors already had their 
private files on clients, the use of such shared systems was not common or seen to be 
urgent. This implies that the limited use of any centralized and standardized IT system, 
whether internal or external, is indicative of the need for flexibility and the fact that what is 
provided by IT systems is data, not knowledge (Galliers & Newell, 2003). In order to meet 
their knowledge needs, advisors engaged in intense social networking.
Social systems include the expanded network of experts within and outside of the firm who 
are sources of information and points of contact for further referrals. The link to this social 
circle is based on mutual trust, where the strength of the relationship is bound to the 
circumstances under which it was initiated, and to the nature of business relations. It is the 
relationship between the advisor and the social network that is valuable, not necessarily 
recorded information about the relationships on a computer system. This implies that the 
social networking links on II subsystems are valuable as long as they are in the hands of the 
advisor (or their trusted team). This makes the transferability of the subsystem from one 
advisor to another difficult, given that it is person, time and context specific -  ‘sticky’ to 
use Suzlanski’s (1996) term once again.
7.1.22 Information Systems Approach of the A-Team
At PCS, working in teams allowed advisors to leverage their expanded network and 
collective knowledge. However, most teams at PCS seemed to either overly depend on 
corporate IS resources as the primary source, or on their subsystems, which did not always 
have the quality of knowledge, information and social networks necessary to support their 
strategies sufficiently. During the study, this point was observed in a team consisting of 
experienced advisors who pursued an aggressive strategy for business development in their 
respective region. Their strategy was reflective of the new goals of the company for fast 
and services-oriented expansion rather than the traditional transaction-based focus of the 
business and slower growth. The team conveyed two characteristics that contributed to 
their high level success in devising and executing their competitive strategies: first, each 
member possessed their individual subsystems which they maintained in isolation. They
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were not shared within the team, but they were a basis on which each advisor informed 
him/herself prior to personal conversations with team members. The subsystems were 
organically grown, path-dependent information and knowledge, captured over several years 
according to the career track and performance of each advisor. The subsystems were meant 
to accomplish the following:
• Consolidate information, knowledge and social networks from corporate 
resources in organized manners in order to access and exploit them more 
efficiently;
• Provide flexibility in incorporating changes into strategy processes.
They were heavily reliant on experience-based tacit knowledge on internal and external 
matters. The subsystems were not expected to be shared, as each advisor had their own 
way of collecting and organizing relevant information and knowledge, and their own way 
of giving meaning to the information that had been gathered (cf., Checkland 1981).
Notwithstanding, there was an evident ‘open business value’ culture (Morosini 2000) and 
open knowledge sharing attitude in the A-team. From initial observations and interviews it 
became evident that most of the success of the team was due to an enabling social network 
they had created amongst themselves over the years. This network of experts, consisting of 
trusted members across several functions and core businesses, provided access to relevant 
information. Direct communication among them took place through continuous emails 
and several hours of phone calls each day. Since the chosen IS strategy depends on the 
level of abstraction of that information and knowledge which is shared, multiple sources 
were used in an intermingled way in communicating critical information. The reliance on 
corporate IS, or on a document-to-person strategy, was most useful as it provided objective 
data and information with the exclusion of ‘unnecessary noise’ (interviewees 1, 2). The 
subsystems gave advisors the flexibility to exploit corporate systems and explore new 
opportunities through the network of experts in an intermingled manner while being 
involved in the strategizing work. They did not view IT or an IS strategy as a separate entity 
to be used, but rather applied various forms of top-down and bottom-up IS across a wide 
range of strategizing practices as the need emerged. The knowledge sharing mindset 
allowed each advisor to be efficient with their time, to make decisions quickly, and to act 
on them before their competitors -  both inside and outside the firm.
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7.1.23. Conclusions - PCS
PCS emphasizes speed, ‘doing’, and efficiency in decision-making. Advisors were clearly 
operating from a mindset which was performance- and reward-driven. At the centre of 
their focus was building new channels for high net-worth customers. At the same time, 
there was a need for a flexible and efficient IS strategy to keep records and manage a 
platform of clients and their status (not just their financial information, but also their life 
history, needs, and future plans). Where the strategy process could have been supported by 
the corporate information and social system, it was up to the strategic actors to make the 
most use of the availability of IS resources and the ways in which various tools could be 
combined. The ways in which information and knowledge were exchanged and put into 
action fluctuated highly with the type of the client (as to their size and goals, expectations, 
level of difficulty or ease to work with, etc), the time of the year, the status of the markets, 
and so on. These are some of the factors that determine the level of aggressiveness and the 
use of IS accordingly.
Generally, the more aggressive advisors were about winning a case, the greater the reliance 
on tacit knowledge of experienced members within the teams rather than on the corporate 
social network or other forms of top-down IS. Only a small portion of the vast amount of 
information held in the corporate II was used by experienced advisors. A senior advisor 
mentioned that the marketing book ‘is not as important as the gut feeling they will get of 
me’ (Interviewee 1). Personal contacts were kept brief and effective, in line with the ‘I’ve 
got it all under control’ culture. Subsystems helped advisors to create personal knowledge 
repositories through continuous path-dependent learning and competence building, making 
them efficient as individuals and effective in teams. The combination of subsystems and 
social networks provided a strong basis upon which the observed advisors had the tools to 
develop and execute strategies.
7.1.3 Reflecting on Both Cases
Overall, both case companies provided products and services requiring similar managerial 
capabilities in competitive strategizing. The core competences lay in services (e.g. 
managerial, commercial, technical marketing and decision-making capabilities). At both 
companies, strategizing processes were highly dependent on human-network-based IS and
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knowledge sharing. At HPC, project coordination was necessary in the strategizing process 
and communication as to how best meet new customers’ technical specifications and 
commercial demands. At PCS, mutual adjustment and reciprocal communication were 
essential in order to stay on the same page during devising and execution of strategies.
PCS is an advocate of MIS and the strategic influence of IS on operational activities. Its 
top-down centrally controlled and IT-rich IIs provide IS and MIS, which are aligned with 
business strategies. However, a supporting social system and a knowledge sharing culture 
are lacking. In addition, the vast amount of person-to-document resources were found to 
be overwhelming and seemed to have led to diminishing returns among senior advisors 
rather than to greater efficiency. At HPC, social networks were the dominant form of IS, 
primarily because of a lack of IT-based IIs. However, the growing size of the company and 
the accumulated know-how of a multi-cultural management made knowledge sharing, 
exchange and transfer ineffective. Cross-cultural differences made consensus building 
challenging, which were indicated by frequent misinterpretation of information, and 
frustration between the German and US colleagues. Furthermore, the top-down 
strategizing approach dictated by headquarters, tight control mechanisms and lack of 
enabling IIs widened the cross-cultural and political gap among the two major units. Much 
inefficiency in organizational processes affected the work of managers and the successful 
use of already existing resources.
The research implies that IS were as useful in strategizing as strategic actors were willing 
and capable of making them useful: ‘ICT tools are as good as the people using them’ 
(Interviewee 12). The rich IT-enabled data and information platforms at PCS were only 
useful to the users who had learned how to work the system such that when the need arose 
to extract relevant data and information, they would do so swiftly. Considering that 
advisors received no training and were under time pressure to grow their businesses, there 
was little time to explore the possibilities that the socio-technical II may have provided to 
improve their performance. A similar case with social knowledge networks: Advisors had 
access to a network of thousands of employees worldwide through the person-to- 
document social system. However, this avenue was used marginally because, according to 
an advisor (Interviewee 7), ‘often it’s difficult to get hold of the right persons who can 
actually help you ... don’t get me wrong, everybody wants to help, but not everyone knows 
what you want to know... so finding the right person takes time -  if you get lucky.
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Sometimes it’s not worth the time although it might pay off if you persist.’ (This concern 
was echoed by Interviewees 1, 4, 5, 9, 12.)
The case studies revealed that leveraging information and knowledge for effective decision­
making requires an integrated and interactive approach, whereby ICTs may act as a 
powerful facilitator if used in a congruent and integrative manner within strategizing 
processes, thus reflecting the socio-technical nature of the IS strategizing framework 
(Galliers & Newell 2003). When teams work together, they are part of the wider 
organizational context as they coordinate various elements involved in putting together a 
competitive business case. At HPC, teams are essential to tapping into the tacit knowledge 
of senior managers (as the primary source of organizational memory). The majority of 
senior managers are German and have been with the company for over 30 years. Notably, 
the approach to strategizing is also predominantly German, despite the global presence of 
the company. HPC did not find IT-based IS strategies as effective ways to communicate 
when it came to decisions that depended on the accuracy of that communication. 
Frustration and lags in decision-making were usually a result of not being able to 
communicate face-to-face with colleagues around the world.
Main frustrations arose around a perceived cultural gap when they participated in meetings 
to build a business case: We speak the same language, but aren’t communicating’ 
(Interviewees 2, 8, 12, 13). A main goal was to reduce the socio-cultural distance between 
the knowledge workers such that they could communicate more effectively long-distance in 
the future. As part of the social networking strategy, HPC exchanged managers among US 
and German OUs to encourage the development of contextual problem recognition and 
solving, and participate in collective sharing. However, each knowledge worker had already 
developed deep and specialized knowledge in their particular area of expertise. Although all 
managers have an engineering background, the knowledge structures in their respective 
areas had become highly individualized, task- and relationship-specific. This is where the 
drift towards managerial systems seemed to have happened.
Due to structural and managerial inflexibilities, most managers constructed subsystems to 
support strategizing processes on an individual basis. With this attempt, management 
seems to have shifted towards an opportunistic attitude and as a way to incorporating 
continuous changes from the environments into their strategizing. On this note, Ciborra
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(2001) argues this shift from centralized IT platforms towards less formal and more flexible 
systems as drift. In both cases, the content of subsystems was generated organically 
through path-dependent learning (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). The type of knowledge that 
was most valuable was that which could not be ‘captured’ or ‘codified’, but shared and 
understood through social interaction (Kogut & Zander 1992) and sense-making (Weick 
1995; Wilson 2003). This level of embeddedness of know-how made sharing difficult even 
through extensive interaction between group members. This is in line with the nature of 
strategizing which involved both approaches at the same time (top-down and bottom-up); 
IS were used in a congruent manner.
In both cases, managers/advisors drifted from the corporate systems towards constructing 
executive (or individualized) subsystems which would meet the needs for efficiency and 
flexibility. Subsystems emerged as a result of the:
• Need for flexibility as well as efficiency
• Limited or lack of transparency and knowledge sharing culture -  regardless of 
a centralized or decentralized IS strategy
• Widely dispersed managerial competences and relationships (e.g. Teece 1992) 
and the need to integrate them
• Need to incorporate change fast
• Need to safeguard personal knowledge from already existing cultural and 
political tensions.
Deliberate and emergent forms of IS were used in ambidextrous ways of strategizing, such 
that IS were integrated within the business strategizing process rather than as a separate 
tool. Here, ambidextrous means the skilful handling of multiple tasks simultaneously. 
Specifically, these tasks refer to the ways in which available resources are exploited while at 
the same time new possibilities are explored, new knowledge is created and new 
connections are made in the organizational and collaborative business networks. The 
concept of ambidextrous organization is postulated by Tushman and O ’Reilly (1996) to 
address the organizational challenge to gain efficiency and innovation simultaneously. This 
concept is relevant in the use IS in strategizing. It is further related to the findings in 
section 7.2.
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Furthermore, multiple conflicts of interest seemed to have contributed to a drift from top- 
down systems towards improvisation and tinkering (e.g. Ciborra 1994; 2002). The drift 
towards dispersed subsystems not only limited the reliance of users on the wider corporate 
IS but also created a ‘them and us’ mentality, fostering a culture which resisted knowledge 
sharing and organizational learning (cf. Senge 1990). A senior advisor at PCS explained that 
although the effort towards the new competitive strategy (i.e. expanding the ATeam across 
subsidiaries) was a strategic decision, as long as there was no coherent culture and the 
social and organizational infrastructure to act in an integrative manner, many of the efforts 
would not come to fruition. This environment was not allowing the consistent leveraging 
of the ‘knowledge links’ between teams that was required in what were vast projects 
(Badaracco 1991). Below is an illustration of the arguments which will be further discussed 
in the rest of the chapter.
Section 7.3 Main argument
Organizational Challenge:
Unintended consequences of
subsystems
- Disintegration between 
organization-wide and 
managerial knowledge-base,
- Affecting ongoing collective 
learning and organizational 
memory overtime
Figure 7.2: Structure of the arguments (clock-wise)
In the figure above, the link A to B indicates a drift from formal organizational II towards 
integrated use of deliberate & emergent IS on the managerial level, which led to the 
creation and use of subsystems for the sake of efficiency and flexibility in strategizing. 
Section 7.2 will argue that this drift is due to the ambidextrous nature of strategizing, which 
led managers to construct subsystems which met the flexibility and efficiency needs on the 
personal level.
Organizational
Socio-
Technical
Context
Strategic Actors
Mixed use of 
D/E IS: 
creation of 
Subsystems
Section 7.2 Main argument 
Managerial Advantage:
Strategic actors as part of the 
organizational context using 
deliberate (D) and emergent (E) 
IS in the form of managerial 
subsystems. Arguing for:
- Ambidextrous IS strategizing
- Situated involvement of 
strategic actors
- Information, knowledge and 
systems become immanent to 
strategizing processes
- Suggesting an integrative IS 
mindset, which is immanent 
to the strategizing process
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The link B to A, on the other hand, indicates how subsystems may affect the organizational 
system and infrastructure as a whole. This research identified problems of information and 
knowledge sharing and transfer at HPC and PCS which were associated with the use of 
subsystems. It will be argued that these may have inhibited ongoing learning (OL) on the 
organizational level and hence the organization’s memory (OM). The next section reflects 
on the literature introduced earlier in the dissertation, with a view to relate the findings to 
extant theory.
7.2 INFORMATION SYSTEMS IN STRATEGIZING
‘Management is rooted m tacit knowledge at least as much as in explicit knowledge, which means that much o f it
cannot be codified and tough formally, Management training aside’
-Mintzberg (2001)
The initial analysis in the first section elaborated the rather obvious reason for the existence 
of subsystems, which was discussed to be the need for flexible IS to facilitate efficient ways 
of working. This section unfolds the findings to explain why subsystems emerged and what 
our interpretation means to the IS strategizing framework. The interpretation will reveal 
that subsystems are a result of for ambidextrous IS strategizing with an already integrated 
IS mindset. Specifically, the ways in which IS were used at the case companies will be 
attributed to underlying assumptions of the involved manager (Introna 1997). This 
particular ontology will serve as a complementary lens to provide further distinctions of the 
parts which make up a richer whole.
Mixed use of data, information & 
personal knowledge in sense- and 
decision-making; understanding is 
reached during interpreting, using 
and acting
Figure 7.3: Representation of the findings and basis for interpretation: strategizing, IS and 
human agents are parts of the same involvement whole
Exploration /  
Exploitation IS 
/  strategies
Strategic Actor 
i.e. The involved 
m anager
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The interpretation is based on the following arguments:
• IS are not separate but immanent to the ambidextrous ways of strategizing
• the use of IS itself is ambidextrous
• we attribute this ambidextrous strategizing to strategic actors’ natural working 
processes as being an integrated part of the strategies and strategizing process 
itself, where IS are used as extensions of human agents’ thinking and acting in 
the world.
Implications of this argument to the IS strategizing framework will be:
• a reconciliation of the deliberate and emergent IS strategies as ambidextrous 
and as:
• integrated in the strategizing process itself because of (iii) the involved 
mindset of the manager in the process
But first, let us revisit the context in which IS and the human agent are considered.
7.2.1. Decision-Making and Information Systems
Decision-making processes rarely happen on a one-time basis in a meeting room with all 
strategic actors. Strategic actors in this study were senior managers and advisors with 
substantial experience. Strategic decision theory describes the role of executives as 
organizing, coordinating, commanding, and controlling agents (Fayol 1949). As a result of 
increasing dispersion of knowledge workers and knowledge resources, however, the role of 
managers in strategizing has become even more elusive. The expertise in multinational, 
knowledge-intensive firms overlaps in complex and shifting ways, where business 
developers have to assemble knowledge from cross-functional areas, often including 
communication with foreign subsidiaries. Here, IS become significant.
IS are highly contextual and depend on the user and the purpose of their reuse (Markus 
2001). At PCS, competitive strategies are devised and executed in an entrepreneurial 
environment. The firm’s II is heavily based on IT applications and a person-to-document 
IS strategy. The knowledge that is found in these applications is explicit, embedded in 
procedures, documents and databases, and can be transferred with reasonable accuracy. 
Specifically, most of this explicit knowledge can be referred to as knowledge of rationality’
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(Nonaka 1994). Knowledge of rationality is formed through formal education and training 
to obtain certified qualifications, and is associated with standardized knowledge, which is 
applicable to different contexts. This is in line with developing a ‘best practice’ of a 
profession which is generic, highly rationalized, and internally coherent, and which is 
context free and easily transferable (Walsham 2001). However, it is the experience-based 
tacit knowledge that has competitive value to the strategizing process. In both case 
companies, managers/advisors did not make a distinction between information and 
‘codifiable’ knowledge per se. At PCS, as well as HPC, knowledge was synonymous with 
experience, embedded in the minds of senior managers who have been with the company 
for a long time.
The controversy with knowledge is that its ambiguous nature makes its processing (sense- 
making and sense-giving) complicated (Weick 1995; Wilson 2003). Polanyi (1966) and 
Nelson and Winter (1982) remind us that a large part of human knowledge is context 
bound, highly firm specific and tacit in nature -  hence these set limits to which it can be 
effectively articulated and transferred. The way this ‘tacit’ knowledge is organized, used, 
and coordinated is task-specific and individually-based (Lam 1997). With operational skills 
or know-how, learning is achieved through practical experience and observation, rather 
than formal learning (Lam 1997). This learned knowledge is organized around a set of rules 
and a myriad of relationships specific to the situation of that firm and its organizational 
memory (OM). The meaning given to the knowledge depends on its context-specificity and 
personal interpretation of the human agent from different cultural views (unconscious 
factors) or personal incentives (conscious factors) (Holsapple & Joshi 2001; Hansen et al 
1999; Walsham 1993).
Barley (1996) refers to this as ‘the distributive nature of contextual knowledge’ within 
communities of practice (e.g. Lave & Wenger 1991), where knowledge-in-use is embedded 
in specific routines and operating procedures shared by members with common experience 
and values. When it comes to knowledge sharing, knowledge workers are not able to give 
an explicit explanation of the procedure and rules due to the underlying tacitness of that 
knowledge. Chapter 3 outlined the process of extemalization and socialization as strategies 
to communicate knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995). This argument, however, has 
faced considerable controversy due to a possible misinterpretation of the nature of tacit 
knowledge (Wilson 2003), which inherently is not communicable. Agor (1986) and
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Scharmer (2001) take the matter deeper and argue that decision makers often rely on 
intuition when there is a high level of uncertainty, such as when facts are limited, 
ambiguous or incongruent with events, when variables are not scientifically predictable, 
when time is limited, when several alternatives seem plausible, and when the cost of failure 
is large. Recognizing the value of experienced-based intuition in decision environments, 
situational factors compel managers to focus more on this ability (Agor 1986; Behling & 
Eckel 1991; Wally & Baum 1994).
Given the diversity of information and knowledge, organizational systems and their socially 
embedded nature (Lam 1997), it is no wonder that knowledge workers experience 
problems in synthesizing these into a meaning that they can apply in their strategizing, 
specifically across cultures and functions. One may look at the incompatibility in 
knowledge structures and work systems in addressing the problem. The next sections 
reflect on such problems. We speculate that the aim to improve sense-making in 
strategizing and managing ambiguous information and knowledge led strategic actors to 
construct systems through which they may be able to better manage and control 
unexpected events. A PCS senior advisor states: ‘Change is inevitable and you’ve got to 
think ahead of everybody else ... there’s little time for searching [for information] 
(Interviewee 1). The attitude called for systems which would be rich in relevant 
information, and easy-to-use, such that advisors could integrated such systems as carriers of 
information and (explicit) knowledge into their sense-making process which happens 
outside of the formal meetings. Such systems needed to be especially flexible such that they 
can be updated quickly to accommodate continuous changes from the external 
environments as well as the continuous development of the manger’s personal knowledge. 
At this point we may remind the reader that most advisors did not like to admit that their 
work involved improvisation, or any action that had to do with the reactionary-mode of 
being. However, observation of the day to day working processes showed that while 
deliberation could be seen in moments in time (i.e. in a snapshot, or episodic), when a 
course of decision process was followed, the process was guided by informed 
improvisation, tinkering, frustration and battling contradictions in on various levels of the 
organization.
We can imply that the self-constructed subsystems, as a form of IS, were interwoven into 
the strategizing processes such that these would support the process of improvisation and
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tinkering in a way where improvisation became withdrawn from the immediate 
consciousness/awareness of the manager, hence giving advisors the perception that they 
are acting from a point of deliberation and top-down intentions. This way, managers could 
keep focusing on their target goal while unconsciously let themselves be guided by their 
subsystems. Subsystems can be seen as vehicles which would make the muddling through 
and irrational micro-level decisions and actions of managers seem disappear, such that 
advisors can maintain the rational executive image, who is all knowing and in control of the 
processes. There have been studies on understanding the link between how senior 
managers make sense of information and how they act to influence organizational 
outcomes (Weick 1995; Nystrom & Starbuck 1984). The way knowledge is interpreted, 
used and shared is subject to a mix of interrelated dynamics that shape human perception 
and the way meaning is created.
As introduced in chapter 2, Daft and Weick (1984) and Milliken and Lant (1990) argue that 
sense-making comprises scanning, interpreting and responding. Scanning refers to 
searching the external environment to identify important elements and gather information. 
Some of the environmental forces are competitors’ products, services and workforce of 
specialized skills, customers, technological capabilities, level of government influence, etc. 
Scanning and filtering the critical information is a crucial and time consuming process, as 
top decision makers typically have access to far more information than they can actually 
use (Mintzberg 1975) and need to select critical information specific to developing and 
interpreting strategic issues (Daft & Huber 1987). Hence, many decision makers usually 
scan according to their perceptions of the necessity for information.
The differences in sense-making are significant to successful social networking in 
strategizing. For example, as some managers regard a strategic issue as an ‘opportunity’, 
others may consider it as a ‘threat’ (Dutton & Ducan 1987). Jackson and Dutton (1988) 
discuss three dimensions that differentiate the interpretation labels: whether decision 
makers evaluate an issue in positive or negative terms, whether they see it as representing 
potential gain or loss for their organization, and whether they see it as controllable or 
uncontrollable (Thomas et al. 1993). Nevertheless, the ways in which the world is 
interpreted and made sense of determines the logic behind strategizing and so the ways in 
which information and knowledge are used. In the two cases, subsystems were used as 
predominant IS, which consisted of the accumulation and integration of relevant data and
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information from various sources (e.g. formal corporate IS and informal social networks) 
into their personal knowledge over the course of their involvement with the organization. 
This way, strategic actors were able to work efficiently with considerably flexibility at their 
own discretion.
From a holistic IS perspective, we take the opportunity to reflea on the definition of 
strategizing as ‘consistent pattern in a stream of actions’ (Mintzberg 1978) and argue that 
subsystems emerged as a consequence of spontaneous human aaions rather than human 
designs, or as an ‘unintended order’, which appeared in the absence of deliberate intentions 
(Mintzberg & Waters 1985: 271). While there was little ‘intention’ to develop separate 
systems, a consistent pattern of actions emerged in the process of knowledge sharing, 
sense making, and decision making that were distinct from other forms of organizational IS 
and aaivities. In the next section, we elaborate more specifically on the form of IS 
identified in strategizing.
7.2.2 Ambidextrous Information Systems and Business Strategizing
Hansen et al. (1999) argue that companies should focus on either strategy to manage 
information and knowledge, personalization or codification strategy, and using the other as 
a support. Likewise, from an outside-in perspeaive, we noticed that HPC seemed to rely 
predominantly on a personalisation strategy. As a pioneer in hydro power engineering, 
most knowledge of HPC was in the heads of senior managers and not systematically 
integrated into the wider II such that other managers could benefit from this wealth of 
experience. Ways to share and transfer such know-how were heavily person-to-person 
oriented, resembling the ‘bottom-up’ IS strategy which was not necessarily supported by a 
common corporate culture. On the contrary, PCS by nature revealed a predominant 
codification strategy in how the IS was structured around work processes (or vice versa). 
Despite a sophisticated IT-based global II, senior advisors stated that the highly centralized 
and structured II and person-to-document IS was ‘inefficient’, ‘time-consuming’ and ‘not 
transparent’ in terms of finding key information quickly which are already adjusted to the 
changing context.
A closer examination of the two cases revealed that neither adhered more to one strategy 
than the other. On the contrary, the presence of subsystems suggests that in praaice,
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managers/advisors used both approaches in an integrative manner to managing 
information and knowledge. More specifically, the manners in which information and 
knowledge were used via IS were reflective of the manners in which actors engaged in the 
process of competitive strategizing itself. The manners in which they gathered and 
processed information and knowledge from sources characterised by exploitation and 
exploration IS took places in an intermingled and ambidextrous fashion.
The notion of ambidexterity has been used in the strategic management literature, where 
O ’Reilly and Tushman (2004), as indicated earlier, postulated the notion of ‘ambidextrous 
organization’ (also He & Wong, 2004) to suggest ways in which organizations may create 
competitive advantage through tightly integrated units at the senior management level, 
where they can simultaneously engage in radical innovations while protecting their 
traditional businesses. The underlying assumptions of this notion are based on the 
exploration and exploration strategies. As illustrated in chapters 2 and 3, the conceptual 
distinction between exploration and exploitation has been used as an analytical construct in 
a wide range of research areas, including strategic management (Mintzberg & Waters 1985; 
Winter & Szulanski 2001), organization theory (e.g. Van den Bosch & Van Wijk 2001).
Research in various areas has shown that each of these requires different structures, 
strategies, processes, cultures and capabilities. While the former is associated with 
improvisation, organic structures and loosely coupled systems, and emerging technologies, 
the latter is associated with mechanistic structures, path dependence, control and 
bureaucracy, and stable technologies. Furthermore, the exploration aspects of strategizing 
are also associated with situated learning and drift against control (Ciborra 2000). The 
illustration below suggests an integration of the two IS strategizing components in the 
spirit of ambidextrous IS strategizing:
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REVIEW
Figure 7.4: Suggesting link between the two forms of IS strategies (also Galliers 2007)
Interestingly, managers could not explicitly identify where their top-down and bottom-up 
IS strategies lied Strategizing processes could be described as ambidextrous in that 
strategic actors found themselves occupied with coping with micro-level challenges while at 
the same time exploiting already established structures and systems. Managers/advisors in 
the cases found themselves in the muddling through (cf. Lindblom 1959, 1979) of the daily 
work - not because they chose to, but because that is how things turned out to be 
(Interviewees 1, 6, 12, 12 - PCS). These things are, for example, unexpected outcomes of 
events, where managers were forced to improvise and re-evaluate the parameters of an 
original intention. Experienced managers/advisors (in contrast to less experienced 
managers) tended to incorporate the possibility of things going wrong into their time-line 
(Interviewees 1 and 6 -  PCS). The process of incorporating these possibilities was rather a 
mindset, or an attitude, which seemed embodied in the natural ways of thinking, deciding 
and acting. This attitude resembles an ambidextrous manner towards strategizing, where 
human agents juggle information based on old certainties and those based on future 
uncertainties in continuously changing contexts.
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The need to be prepared and act (in an ambidextrous manner) raised the need to foster a 
flexible structure around change and disorder in order to meet emerging needs on a daily 
basis. The ambidextrous manners relate to the use of IS directed towards simultaneously 
exploiting organizational resources and exploring new knowledge links and business 
opportunities. In this way, knowledge workers have various forms of IS at hand which they 
find themselves using as part of strategizing processes. For example, while senior 
managers/advisors needed to retain current customers and clients, they were at the same 
time involved in aggressive expansion of their businesses. Furthermore, the process of 
client penetration and acquisitions at FIPC and PCS was based heavily on building trusting 
relationships and effective social networking (Sambamurthy & Jarvenpaa 2002; Davenport 
& Prusak 1998). The process was often prone to many unforeseeable elements. For 
example, it was not unusual for prospective clients to change their minds shortly before 
they closed an agreement with their advisor, or signed an agreement with HPC. For this 
reason, managers/advisors needed to be prepared to meet unexpected events and 
incorporate changes in their long-term strategizing processes. Change is an inevitable part 
of strategizing (e.g. high level of turnover, new structured products being introduced, and 
the changing working dynamics among subsidiaries and their respective directors). This is 
where suitable IS become key to managers’ decision-making processes. According to 
Interviewee 9 at PCS: W e’ve been in this business before most of our competitors ... but 
the nature of competition has changed... we can’t wait for customers to knock at our 
doors anymore ... you’ve got to have a strategy and the tools to stay ahead.’
As one requires a system that supports a stable and predictable rate of growth in client 
retention, the other calls for flexible systems to be prepared to act in an informed manner 
while the environment and client expectations change. This meant a different kind of IS to 
support both goals simultaneously, in other words, a mix of IS in deliberate and emergent 
forms was crucial in gathering critical information and incorporating them from the 
organizational and external sources more efficiently. Furthermore, growing the business 
calls for cross-cultural and cross-functional communication, introducing organizational 
challenges in addition to external competition. The subsystems can be explained on the 
basis of the need to be efficient and flexible on their own terms, to have IS which would 
enable a work structure around ambidexterity that is flexible and efficient. These 
subsystems were an integral part of the strategizing process. For those who used such 
subsystems well, these were a major source of competitive advantage where they were able
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to rest on distinctive processes and path-dependent knowledge cues gathered by 
coordinating and combining information and knowledge. Also, these would put them in a 
privileged position in their team, enhancing their bargaining power with outside clients and 
internal organizational hierarchy.
7.2.2.1 Revisiting the Practice
The traditional view of IS management has been project-based rather than IT portfolio- 
based (Tinaikar 2006). One may think of each project in a portfolio separately, but it is the 
synergistic combination of the overall portfolio that creates business value in the long run. 
A traditional IT-business alignment model, for example, may constrain innovation because 
it looks at technology in terms of exploiting IS to reduce costs, as opposed to combining it 
with an innovative and open mindset to search for possibilities beyond the capability of the 
IS itself. Tinaikar (2006) argues that IS should be less about the role of an IT function, but 
rather should permeate the organization, embracing the organization and its knowledge 
workers more broadly. Perhaps due to this project-based mentality of introducing MIS to 
advisors across the firm, senior advisors who already had an established platform did not 
see a fit between the new IT and their IS portfolio (this being the various parts of the 
subsystems). Instead, advisors were continuously integrating the most relevant 
management information (Ml) and synthesized them with continuously developing 
personal knowledge.
The purposes of these were multi-fold. On the one hand, the always present subsystems 
created the perception that advisors are ‘better prepared’ to face unforeseeable 
circumstances in some of the political gaming with internal and external competitors 
bidding for the same prospective client (Interviewee 1, PCS). On the other hand, while the 
PCS continuous introduced high-level IT-based data management and analytical tools, 
advisors most of the time adopted the idea from these systems as to how to manage and 
use their client information for certain purposes instead of adopting the IT as a tool. This 
would save them the time to learn and manage the systems itself. Most often, they would 
say: ‘this [an newly introduced IT tool by the company] is good but not for me’ 
(Interviewees 1, 6 and 9), but in the process, they would incorporate the idea or the format 
of the systems into their own subsystems in the form of an excel sheet, for example, or 
creating a roadmap through which they could navigate the corporate portals.
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Hence, the assumption that one IS strategy brings more effectiveness than another is rather 
normative. In the A-Team, while each individual had their own systems, they worked in a 
cooperative manner. Hence, it was important that the mindsets of all members were 
aligned with one another such that when they met in person, there was no hesitation in 
sharing information and then IS and ways in which these were used would become 
embodied in the process of sharing and appropriated accordingly. This team was further 
led by a few determined leaders who reinforced a culture of team-performance and 
rewarded those who mastered the retention of current and acquisition of new clients. At 
PCS, the A-Team was self-organized but yet dependent on one another as a whole. The 
combination of using personal knowledge with corporate IS made it one of the most 
successful advisory teams at the US-based firm.
While recognizing that any interpretation of research such as this is highly context specific, 
the notion of ambidexterity (Tushman & O'Reilly 1996) seems appropriate in explaining 
the manners in which IS were used in strategizing in our two cases. As for the interviewees, 
the subsystems seemed to provide them with a flexible and personal platform, which 
consisted of information and knowledge cues specific to their context, time, space, 
relationships, mindsets, incentives, and personal experience. This way, IS were not used as 
a tool to support a decision, but were already integrated in the whole sense-making process 
as managers/advisors moved through the up and down phases of strategizing processes in 
the socio-technical and political organizations. These may not have been a matter of 
choice, but a matter of dealing with uncertainties and constant flux inherent to the 
strategizing work. In this light, subsystems may be conceived as reflections of the specific 
attitudes and management practices of strategic actors encapsulated in the form of 
management IS, rather than a MIS which serve the making or execution of a strategy. In 
this light, we argue that the ambidextrous use of IS essentially goes back to the user, the 
human agent, who uses IS in such a way as to achieving flexibility and efficiency 
simultaneously. The interpretation of the who’ will serve us to better explain the 
ambidextrous phenomenon better. Two alternative perspectives on the human agency will 
be argued. The first perspective is rooted in the strategic management literature and is in 
line with the work of Gosling and Mintzberg (2003) on managerial mindsets as outlined in 
chapter 2. Within this argument, Tinaikar (2006) acknowledges that managers who leverage 
IS well share certain attributes stemming from an integrative IS mind-set. The second 
argument will refer to the conceptualization of human agency by Introna (1997), which is
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based on Heideggerian ontology. The next section expands on these two perspectives to 
interpret the who’ (the strategic actor) in order to better explain the why’ (use of 
subsystems) behind the already identified ‘how’ (ambidextrous IS strategizing).
7.2.3 Strategic Actors
Thus far, we have seen that the unpredictable and unstructured nature of strategizing led 
managers to use IS in a similar manner. Then we argued that in order to be in control of 
these processes, strategic actors constructed subsystems which would give them a platform 
to exploit corporate resources and explore new ones, and so remain responsiveness to 
change. Now, it has not been clear whether these subsystems were deliberately constructed 
with the ‘intent’ to create separate executive IS, or whether these have been a result of an 
unintended, unconscious ‘drift’ while managers were concerned with the everyday coping. 
Thus far, we have assumed a little of both, but it is still not clear. Most academic research 
which explores various IS strategies often assume that the human agent is consciously 
aware of strategies in choosing a particular approach to getting the job done. This provides 
the opportunity to address two contrasting arguments:
1. The top-down or bottom-up argument, where we imply that strategic actors either:
• Deliberately constructed strategic subsystems to exploit them in times of 
uncertainty, or
• Subsystems emerged out of the need to fill in the gap of that which was missing 
on the organizational level, e.g. person-to-person or person-to-document 
knowledge platform (Hansen et al 1999).
2. Arguing that subsystems already existed in the everyday coping and strategizing of 
managers (Introna 1997), but they were not as explicit to the managers’ awareness as 
during times when the organizational II failed to meet their needs. Subsystems always 
already existed, but were perceived as withdrawn until they were made explicit (ibid). 
Managers made sense of ambiguous situations by using their personal support systems 
as part of thinking which contained information in their specific sense-making 
language.
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The consideration of different ontological perspectives (which we argue below are 
complementary to one another) helps explain possible discrepancies between responses in 
interviews, where actors spoke of the idea of strategy and IS, and between observation and 
informal conversations during the action of the strategizing processes, where the actual use 
of IS (not the idea of it) was observed. There was the perception by the interviewer that 
interviewees had a strong inclination to come across as rational and being-in-control 
strategic actors, who post-constructed a rational reality from recollection of past actions 
and decisions. This was particularly revealing at PCS, where the corporate culture 
encouraged an analytical mindset and deliberate actions. The remainder of the discussion is 
in relation to these arguments.
The consideration of the human agency as decision-makers is significant in this context 
because they form a major part of the dynamic organizational system. The underlying 
assumptions of the first argument are based in the knowledge-based view of the firm 
(Grant 1991, 1996), where human agents are knowledge assets who are capable of creating 
strategic advantage through some strategy. These strategic actors continually learn about 
shifting business conditions and balance what is desired and what is feasible in accordance 
with organizational requirements and their managerial competence. Managerial competency 
may be defined as a collective ability of managers to lead and organization’s competence 
building by sustaining their own coordinated deployments of managerial resources, 
managerial knowledge, and managerial capabilities in ways as to help their organization 
achieve its near-and long-term goals (Sanchez & Heene 1997). This perspective 
understands managers as rational human beings who are aware of their choices and can 
learn certain capabilities to exploit them in the future and reach their objective. The 
underlying assumption is that intentionality is accepted as a top-down and deliberate 
phenomenon (Introna 1997). This argument is in line with the literature which advocates 
strategic IS (SIS) (see chapter 3) and the topic of strategic alignment of IS and business 
strategies (Henderson & Venkatraman 1993; Sabherwal & Chan 2001; Kearns & Lederer 
2000).
Gosling and Mintzberg (2003) propose that the manners in which managers engage in 
decision making is ultimately a mindset issue. They suggest a work structure that would 
encourage synthesis rather than separation, where they base their argument on five aspects 
of the managerial mindset outlined in chapter 2. Here, Gosling and Mintzberg propose that
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managers should e a balance between action and reflection mindsets in order to function at 
the point where reflective thinking meets practical doing. Hence, it is up to strategic actors 
to use IS in a way as to creating synergy with other resources and opportunities in the 
strategizing process. Only this way would managers be able to make a connection between 
the conflicting demands of organizations, i.e. innovate new processes and exploit on 
current resources.
We may consider that the ways in which IS were used by managers/advisors were reflective 
of the characteristics of the managerial mindsets. At HPC for example, subsystems were 
most prevalent in the US OU rather than in the German headquarters. Considering that 
managers in each location have different mindsets, management practices and resources, 
this may be indicative of the need for more flexibility, efficiency, and discretion in 
managerial practices in the US OU than their German counterparts (cf. Weick 1998).
The ‘alliance approach’ outlined in chapter 5 has been an initiative of the US-based top 
management with the aim to facilitate an integrated involvement between managers and 
various organizational functions and teams, as well as with clients throughout all phases of 
the competitive bidding process. The approach allowed individual managers to improvise 
and apply their personal knowledge specific to their local markets in the competitive 
bidding processes. Traditionally (and prior to the strategic initiative), the US OU had to 
follow a top-down and rigid approach dictated by the German headquarters. This allowed 
little room for an integrated client involvement as well as more frequent and informal 
cross-function collaborations.
The traditional top-down approach, however, was indeed preferred by senior managers in 
Germany. While the structured and hierarchical system seemed to be appropriate for the 
operations and engineering, on the managerial level, such environment was not enabling to 
the innovation and exploration of new management information (MI) and knowledge on 
the organizational level. Every decision and consideration for a change in decisions was 
subject to lengthy authorization and approval processes. The bureaucratic structure made 
processes time-consuming, slow, and inefficient. This would become evident every time a 
manager would propose a new to the traditional way of doing things. With regards to the 
alliance approach, this was only used at the US OU after a lengthy approval process from 
the headquarters. The different managerial practices, cultural and mindsets were a starting
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point to create subsystems on which each manager could accumulate key constituent parts 
of their strategizing approaches in their particular situation.
Notably, the subsystems in the German and US OU were different. Managers in the US 
OU developed the alliance approach strategy in order to prevent reinventing the wheel’ for 
most project they undertook (Interviewees 3, 12, 16, 17). This involved being responsive to 
the changing environments and focus on action, rather than reflecting on consequences. 
This reminds us of managerial mindsets (Gosling & Mintzberg 2003) reviewed in chapter 2. 
The market environments of the US OU would not allow managers not to be action- 
oriented. Change was not something to be managed, rather, it was an integrated part of 
being and strategizing. The action mindset refers to managing continuity rather than 
change (ibid). This attitude, per se, was not an urgent requirement in the German 
environment and hence subsystems served that particular purpose in a more subtle way.
Part of managing continuity is fostering an environment where informal knowledge sharing 
can flourish, and that in such a way where each contributor’s input becomes integrated to 
the everyday coping. Gosling and Mintzberg (ibid.) refer to a collaborative mindset, where 
relationships are managed from the bottom to allow responsibility flow naturally among 
self-managing teams. Stepping into the PCS study briefly, the collaborative mindset was 
particularly evident in the A-team. The differentiating factor was that each advisor carried 
responsibility for managing their own know-how (on the basis of their subsystems) within 
their particular role. The already established network and social systems within which they 
worked enabling an environment in which exploration and exploitation of information and 
resources could flourish.
In HPC, while the US OU’s philosophy was to operate from this mindset, the continuous 
interaction with the German OU, where responsibility was coming from the top, made 
consensus-building and decision-making very difficult. Overall, the higher concentration of 
experience-based knowledge workers in the German headquarters (i.e. the heart of the 
organizational memory) called for different kinds of subsystems. While in Germany, the 
subsystems were influenced by past performance and relationship with the company’s long 
history, in the US OU, managers tended to be future-oriented and hence directed towards 
predicting future markets and moving forward with acquiring more market share. 
Consequently, the nature of the subsystems were influence by these different ‘moving-
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towards tendencies in managerial thinking, doing and seeing (i.e. Mintzberg & Westley 
2001).
Notwithstanding, the different ways of using IS associated with different ways in thinking, 
interpreting, sense-making and working had created alienation between knowledge workers 
in the German and US OUs. A US-manager stated (Interviewee 8): ‘When we speak we 
aren’t on the same page... We speak the same language, but aren’t communicating... this 
makes meetings not very effective.’
The majority of interviewees attributed the conflicts and problems in reaching consensus to 
be rooted in cross-cultural differences among top management more than anything else 
(e.g. a lack of integrated MIS). While the cultural argument is not denied, we also consider 
the following possibility: Had there been integrated knowledge platforms and collaborative 
mechanisms in place (Zack 1999; Zander & Kogut 1995; Kogut & Zander 2002), which 
were in line with a common corporate culture, then an environment of trust and openness 
could be fostered which would mitigate consensus-building problems to a large extent 
(Davenport & Prusak 1998; Tsai 2001). A major challenge associated with this 
consideration is how to bring together the different mindsets onto one page and build an 
integrative corporate IS mindset conducive of sharing (cf. Weick 1998).
Nevertheless, it was not the purpose of this research to study mindsets, but rather to be 
aware of such distinctions help us identify different ways in using IS in decision-making 
processes. At the same time, the manners to wards using IS can be seen as a reflection of a 
mixed set of attitudes deeply embedded in particular contexts. We perceived mindsets as 
intermingled, interacting and overlapping in practice depending on the changing context 
and on the persona managers reveal on the surface when communicating. At the same 
time, this is not surprising, considering that the process of strategizing involves cross­
functional and cross-cultural communication. This observation confirmed again the 
ambidexterity characteristics associated with strategizing and use of IS. To this end, 
Tinaikar (2006) argues that managers who leverage IS well share a certain mindset. He 
argues that these managers (i) do not make formal distinctions between IT and business 
management, an integrated view across IT and business, in other words; (ii) use technology 
that is not always leading edge, and (iii) have an enabling processes and governance in place 
to make the best use of these technologies. The mindset as to ‘how technology should be
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managed’ is a barrier in itself (ibid). The focus on how much it will cost, which IS to use, 
how to use them, how they should be managed, and how much these help the bottom line, 
is not an appropriate mindset.
Notwithstanding, the embeddedness of managerial mindsets in knowledge processes is a 
question of level of abstraction. While some knowledge may be routine and automated, 
others may be tacit at higher abstraction levels which cannot be accessed via computers or 
consultation with colleagues (Wiig 2004). We imply that the higher the level of abstraction 
(i.e. use of personal knowledge, and experience involved in getting a job done), there is an 
increasing need for flexibility in order to create more room to maneuver. This increases the 
tendency to use information and knowledge resources in an ambidextrous manner. It is on 
this basis that the notion of ambidexterity becomes significant in IS use.
Referring to the first argument above, if the available information infrastructure (II) and 
work structure are rigid and not transparent (hence, not allow ambidextrous ways of 
strategizing), then there is higher probability to improvise (yet still within the frame of 
formal rules and procedures) and drift from centralized mechanisms towards flexible and 
informal (Land 1991) structures. This drift may be a deliberate decision to serve one’s own 
needs, or the result of incrementally built files and networks which accumulated to become 
managerial subsystems over time.
Based on this interpretation, the different ways the subsystems have been shaped in the 
German and US OUs is not surprising. While US-based managers were described as 
‘doers’ (Interviewees 1, 8, 12, 15), the Germans were self-described as the ‘analyzers’ 
(Interviewees 5 and 15). We infer that while US managers at HPC seemed to have 
deliberately built systems around their work structures, subsystems at German headquarters 
emerged from the bottom with characteristics specific to the more bureaucratic work 
structures and experience-based strategizing approaches of the family-owned traditional 
company. The US OU also had a more aggressive, yet short-term approach to strategies, 
with heavier customer-orientation than their product and engineering-oriented German 
colleagues. A German manager said: ‘my colleagues at our US office decide and just go for 
it. Here, we keep analyzing as to ‘why’ we should decide on something ... ’. US managers 
were more eager to emphasize relationships and take risks, expand networks with business 
partners and work closely with potential customers throughout the bidding process. This
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philosophy was reflected on the recently devised competitive strategy initiated at the US 
OU, which was not welcomed at the German headquarters to be adopted globally. While 
both had the same goal - winning more customers -  their approaches were often in conflict 
with one another and limited by not understanding one another’s languages (as of 
mindsets). This was a major frustration, which led to further political tension. 
Consequently, a lack of collaboration meant further separation rather than synthesis, more 
politics and less knowledge sharing, further drift towards individual subsystems rather than 
leveraging social networks more thoroughly.
The connection between mindsets in strategizing and the use of IS was also revealing at 
PCS. The success of the A-Team was attributed to its members having a well-integrated 
mindset combined with a cohesive culture reinforced by team leaders. The combination of 
individually nurtured subsystems plus an open and trusting culture among team members 
provided an enabling strategizing environment. However, when team members had to 
work with members of other teams, which happened frequently, there were problems of 
reaching consensus and coming to an agreement about a series of decisions because they 
operated from different knowledge bases. A similar situation was observed in HPC on the 
inter unit level, in the German and US OUs. It can be implied that the manners in which 
teams used IS were reflective of their overall strategizing approaches, and again reflective 
of the predominant mindset they applied in day-to-day knowledge working and decision­
making.
In the case of HPC, managers struggled to foster an environment where knowledge sharing 
through IT-based or human-based social networking could permeate the organization 
across OUs. While senior managers did not favour the use of ICTs in managerial affairs, 
more recently, employed managers could not be efficient without the use of IT. This 
created a divide in consistent communication. In PCS, although interviews with senior 
managers indicated that they favoured a deliberate approach to IS rather than 
improvisation (Interviewees 1,11 and 12), all emphasized that the strength of their strategy 
was based on personal knowledge and the ability to sense when to reveal information and 
how much information (Interviewees 2, 3, 4 and 5). Creating an environment where 
improvisation can occur for the sake of innovation and learning is also referred to as 
playfulness by Ciborra (2002).
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Observations supported the responses from interviews that various forms of IS were so 
embedded in the playfulness of strategizing processes such that strategic actors rarely 
noticed them while they used them. This discussion relates to Polanyi’s (1966) argument of 
embodiment of tools’ in the work of strategizing. It is argued that, since sense-making is 
an embedded part of the human agent and specific to particular strategizing contexts, the 
use of information and knowledge, as well as the use of supporting tools in the process are 
also embedded in the work process. Furthermore, the ways in which these are combined 
and used are also already embedded in the process of deciding and acting, whether users 
are consciously aware of it or not.
This is the point of departure to elaborate on the second argument we made earlier in this 
section. While the first argument assumed the manager to be rational and somewhat in 
control of his/her destiny, the following alternative perspective counters the underlying 
assumptions of the rational manager. While keeping in mind the idea of deliberation and 
goal-oriented mindset, we found indications of situated-ness of these goals where managers 
seemed to have the perception of being-in-control in particular moments in time. Over the 
course of strategizing, however, many elements of the initial plan did not later fall into 
place as first desired. In action, managers/advisors found themselves coping with surprises 
and emerging conflict on the daily basis while, in their minds, adjusting to changes but still 
thinking in deliberate terms that they are moving towards the desired destination. The 
understanding of this mode of strategizing has implications on the use of IS. In this light, 
the conceptualization of the involved manager (Introna 1997) with underlying philosophies 
based on Heidegger are especially insightful in explaining the discrepancies between what 
was observed in action and the responses from formal and semi-structured interviews.
7.23.1 IS and Mindsets as Immanent to Strategizing
Thus far, we have argued that information and knowledge were used in an ambidextrous 
manner as part of the process of creating flexibility and efficiency. Furthermore, we found 
the existence of subsystems which allowed this ambidexterity to take place in a more 
structured manner. To explain this further, this section interprets strategic actors as 
immanent to the strategizing whole, implying that the IS that they use are part of their 
existence, which become an extension of themselves, and hence immanent to the
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strategizing process itself. Notably, implicit to this interpretation is Polanyi’s (1966) 
concept of embodiment of tools.
Subsystems essentially consist of deliberate and emergent forms of information, knowledge 
and systems, including personal knowledge, which were used in a way to meet the particular 
need of a situation. The ambidexterity characteristic of the use of IS does not make sense 
when we consider IS and strategic actors as separate entities, or when we consider each in 
vacuum (outside of the strategizing context). Hence, it is argued that the ambidexterity 
characteristic exists because of the situated manners in which IS are used in connection with 
the situated human-ness of the strategic actor. Notably, we refer to the situated-ness as a 
‘manner’ or ‘the ways in which’ IS are used in order to get a job done; we do not refer to IS 
as an object separate from the user and the context which need to be strategically aligned to 
one another. This can be observed whilst the ambidexterity is being created during the uses 
of various IS tools in action. Hence, while conceptually we distinguish between exploitation 
and exploration strategies and then suggest a link, in reality, the ambidexterity (i.e. the 
manners in which IS are used) itself is immanent to the process of strategizing as an 
extension of the users’ mindsets and being in the world
The figure below illustrates the assumptions behind this second argument. The figure was 
introduced earlier in this chapter where the A-B-C elements were separate entities and 
linked to one another through arrows. The modified version illustrates the concept of 
immanence, where elements A-B-C exist simultaneously in the same involvement whole. It 
is not to imply that one argument presents a more real explanation of reality. The aim is to 
present alternative understandings of the whole by observing the conceptual elements at 
play, and reflecting on the IS strategizing framework for possible amendments.
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Ambidextrous Strategizing (the involvement 
whole)
Subsystems extensions of subsidiary awareness
Strategic Actors Information
(part of the Systems (part of
strategizing the strategizing
whole) whole)
Figure 7.5: Alternative interpretation: strategic actors, information systems and strategizing 
as part o f one involvement whole
Specifically, the conceptualization of strategic ‘intent’ as ‘dwelling’ (Chia & Holt 2006) and 
the explicit focus on human agency as the inuohed manager (Introna 1997) provide 
especially useful supporting theories to developing the IS strategizing framework and add 
insights into:
• The why’ behind the ambidextrous strategizing and the congruent manners in 
which IS were used. Here, we examine the idea of IS as immanent to strategizing, 
as well as the exploitation and exploration IS approaches as integrative. This 
discussion is directly related to the components of the IS strategizing framework.
• The ‘who’, where human agents are seen as immanent to the strategizing process. It 
is argued that the use of information and knowledge cannot be separated from the 
human agent’s involvement. This will be an additional argument to the IS 
strategizing framework.
These points will be further highlighted in chapter 8 in suggesting contributions to the IS 
strategizing framework as well as ideas for further research.
Introna’s (1997) conceptualization of the strategic actor is used as an opportunity to 
compare two ontological perspectives on the human agency: the involved versus rational 
manager. The purpose is to explain the ambidextrous use of IS, which had manifested 
itself in the existence of subsystems. Chapter 2 gave an overview of major concepts behind 
the involved manager; we revisit the table below:
236
Involved Manager Rational Manager
Mode of being Available Occurrent
Comportment Getting the job done Effectiveness & Efficiency
Purpose of information Sense (re)making and 
alliance building
Decision-making and 
problem solving
Action imperatives Local logic and ‘bricolage’ Plan and control
Doing-thinking Thinking then doing
Opportunistic Calculated and reasoned
Knowledge resources Tacit knowledge Representations
Key assumptions Thrown-ness Autonomy
Networks Linearity
Table 7.6: Two ontological views on the manager (Introna 1997: 173)
The underlying assumptions behind these ontological positions are in relation with the 
conceptual dichotomies of exploration versus exploitation approaches to strategizing and 
to IS strategizing. The essence of involvement lays in the ontological form of ‘in’, which 
implies concerned absorption, an existential statement (Heidegger 1962). While the 
‘involved’ manager is shown to focus on ‘getting the job done’ who used information in 
order to make sense of the issues at hand, the ‘rational’ manager’s goal is to achieve 
effectiveness and efficiency in decision-making through deliberate planning and problems- 
solving. When we consider the manager as his/her existence in the world without isolating 
this from actions and decisions, we are able to understand the use of subsystems. The 
‘being’ mode of the manager tells us that actions and decisions were not separate from the 
manager, but part of his/her existence and being in the context. The use of IS is not 
something they decide to do, they are already using information and systems which already 
are immanent to the strategizing process. This is where the ambidextrous use of IS would 
make sense, when we consider that information and knowledge are already part of the 
strategizing whole and associated with managers/advisors’ concerned involvement with the 
world.
Interviews at PCS revealed that advisors were portraying a role as rational managers who 
‘cannot afford to improvise’, who ‘must be efficient’ in decision-making, take calculated 
risks and show enormous autonomy in problems-solving (Interviewee 1, 2, 5, 7, 9). 
Observations and interviews at later stages showed that although the rational presentation 
of advisors is crucial to the corporate culture, the act of strategizing itself put advisors in 
situations where their actions and decisions were similar to the characteristics of the 
‘involved’ manager as outlined in the table above. On the daily basis, advisors spent time 
making sense of the information (overload), struggling to filter the noise and interpret the
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mixed messages of the environment. When considering a decision scenario, advisors 
coUected considerable amount of data from the corporate database in order to prepare a 
presentation based on hard facts and calculated risk. However, and according to all senior 
advisors, what is perceived as most valuable (and what is most valued by senior team 
members and clients) is the personal judgment and knowledge of the advisor rather than 
the data and facts provided by IT/IS.
This ability was perceived as competitive advantage relative to less experienced. According 
to a senior advisor, in order to develop this ability, ‘you have to always be there’ [i.e. in the 
involvement whole] to develop the sensory acuity as to what information to filter in the 
changing dynamics of a situation. This ‘being there’ was meant in a holistic way, which 
included formal meetings as well as ‘office chats’ with subordinates - which were in some 
way directed to collecting certain information. While this may seem to state the obvious, 
we also cannot take for granted the micro-level and informal activities that concern the 
human agent in the day to day dealings with the world
The value of subsystems lied on the basis of managers’ personal knowledge developed in 
the local context over a long time. Managers make finer distinctions of events and of 
management information (MI) in the process of understanding. Furthermore, this 
understanding may be conceived as an autopoietic process (Mingers 1995), whereby 
coherence is established and related to the environment (Introna 1997). Subsystems, as the 
personal information and knowledge (cues) repositories, were used to help managers in the 
process of making further distinctions in MI and in what things mean based on their tacit 
knowing and doing. This process is also associated with relating these distinctions with 
other autopoietic systems or individuals through explicit language and communication, 
which then becomes part of the social change.
The reliance on personal knowledge was seen as a more reliable source in decision-making 
because he/she is able to understand how other players may react in the dynamics of 
changing situations. According to Introna (1997), it is the tacit knowledge and the process 
of ‘bricolage’ (cf. Levi-Strauss 1966) that enables managers to take those risks in a 
‘calculated’ manner. The compass, if one were to use this analogy, is more the tacit sense 
for what is right or wrong that comes from experience, than any IT or system. Similar 
findings were found at HPC. Recognizing the value of an integrated approach to
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strategizing, with the new business strategy ‘alliance approach’, managers were able to apply 
more of their personal knowledge while working directly with clients at every phase of the 
competitive bid (as opposed to letting the prospective client to decided for the HPC from 
the outside).
In both cases, managers/advisors used deliberate IS when they found themselves as 
rational beings, but at the same time they could not escape the Vomrteile as part of their 
existence which influenced the interpretation of that data and information which were 
gathered. We explain this mode of strategizing through dwelling and the mode of manager 
through his/her Dasein in the world. At the same time, the rational manager who desires 
strategic intent and objectives is always in the background, where these become more or 
less explicit depending on the situation the human agent is in, e.g. they are immersed in the 
involvement whole, but behave rationally when this mode is triggered through a surprise 
visit of the managing director or a client to the office.
Dasein exists in the world by dwelling in it, where the immersion of human agents in the 
world is due to the fact that he/she is concernedly involved in the world (ibid) - like a fish 
dwelling in the water where its immersion becomes so complete that the water is always 
already ‘disappear’ (Introna 1997: 30). The conceptualization of strategy as dwelling is 
explicitly emphasized by Chia and Holt (2006) in understanding consistency in action 
without the existence of purposeful strategic plans. This is in direct contrast with strategy 
as ‘intent’ or intentionality (Introna 1997).
In the context of this thesis, the involved manager may be seen as being dwelled in the 
world where his/her immersion in the strategizing processes is due to the fact that he/she 
is already involved In this being involved, decisions and subsystems (as equipment at 
hand) disappear into the overall involvement whole as being already available (ibid). It is 
this togetherness of the involvement whole where subsystems in strategizing are bound the 
managerial mindsets and the strategizing context. The easy-to-use nature of subsystems 
become withdrawn (disappear) into the whole such that managers can focus on the 
problem at hand instead of focusing on how to use an IT/IS. This contradicts the 
interpretation that subsystems were consciously constructed with the intention to facilitate 
conditions for ambidextrous strategizing. In the dwelling mode, however, subsystems were 
not constructed consciously, but rather, they always already existed as an implicit part of
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the practical coping. However, they become explicit over time when they had become 
developed and had to be managed, shared, or used as bargaining tools.
What is prevalent in the management discourse is the notion of formulated objectives and 
intentions. From a Heidegerrian perspective, the traditional ontic concept of intentionality 
which directs our minds through various states and attitudes are refuted. Instead of 
referring to mindsets which the rational manger can adopt in specific situations, the 
phenomenological Weltanschauung uses ‘comport’ to explain attitudes towards some 
decisions or action in order to move towards to a goal (Introna 1997). It implies that 
‘towards’ are already directed by being in the world, i.e. we comport (Verhaltm) ourselves 
towards beings (Heidegger 1988). This concept is related to addressing the manners in 
which managers used information and knowledge to move towards a closure of a 
competitive bid. According to Heidegger (1988: 58): ‘Comportments have the structure of 
directing-oneself-toward, of being directed-toward’. Introna (1997) highlights the notion of 
comportment to emphasize that managers do not select comportments; rather the 
intentionality is already the existence of Dasein. Heidegger (1962) calls the situated use of 
equipment Zeug, where things become meaningful in the process of using them associated 
with the context and purpose of their directed use. According to Introna, ‘... comportment 
is the concerned involvement of an immersed Dasein interacting with an always already 
present whole; a whole that has significance only in its whole-ness (Introna 1997: 30). In 
this sense, the strategic intent, so prevalent in management discourse, is argued to be 
merely a post facto construction to articulate the comportments which already exist in action. 
The below table illustrates the two ontologies on the same reality:
Intentionality Comportment
Based on Mental content (models) Being-in (world)
Directed towards Objects (ontic world) Equipment (tools)
Relationship Intention
Models Objects
Comportment 
Being-in Equipment
Table 7.7: Intentionality and comportment (Introna 1997:31)
From this point of view, we doubt that managers/advisors strategically planned their 
subsystems and argue that these have always existed in one form or another in the 
strategizing process, however with different levels of abstraction and richness. Instead of 
rational managers/advisors intending to create strategic subsystems for flexibility and 
efficiency, the involved manager does not notice the already existing subsystems (the
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specific way in which IS are used) because these are extensions of the manager’s everyday 
coping. This is where their inherent value lies and facilitates efficiency. Managers find 
themselves so immersed in muddling through of everyday hurdles and opportunities 
(Lindblom 1979), such that they are not aware of the tools they use. When they were asked 
to reflea on the IS resources they used during a specific course of aaion, they could not 
put into words a sequence or consistency of aaions or tools they used because first, they 
were not aware (or did not feel the need to be aware ol) a specific aaions, and second, the 
intermingled use resources made it difficult to remember what was used to what extent and 
for what purpose. The statement by interviewee 1 at PCG confirms this by saying, ‘IT is 
just a tool, I don’t think about it, I just use it whenever I need to’. There were many 
instances where advisors were speaking loud while ‘moving-towards-to’ a goal (Introna 
1997). Here, every time they referred to a data and information on the systems, they always 
had their own interpretation and comments attached to them as to how that data and 
information was relevant to their particular situation. Here, their experience, personal 
knowledge and Vonarteile played a key role in interpreting the data and information.
The discussion implies that not only does the manner in which IS are used affea 
strategizing, but also the manners in which strategizing is pursued affea the use of IS. We 
argue that both are interrelated and mutually inclusive. Keeping in mind the involved 
manager, we may take the opportunity to reflea on the three approaches to decision­
making by Mintzberg and Westley (2001) mentioned in chapter 2. Here, the being-in 
perspeaive would not make a distinaion between ‘thinking first’, ‘seeing-first’, and ‘doing- 
first’ as Mintzberg and Westley proposed, but rather to view them as already integrated and 
situated within the manager’s existence in the world
Although one approach (i.e. ‘thinking first’) may seem to an outside observer to stand out 
more than the other, arguably, the other modes may be conceived as already there, yet not 
evident to our immediate awareness. For example, if a manager claims that he/she relies 
more on faas and deliberate aaions than on experience and insight, as interviewee 1 at 
PCS did, then it does not mean that the ‘thinking first’ was the preferred or the right way of 
being, but rather the ‘doing-first’ and ‘seeing-first’ were either so developed that they 
‘disappeared’ in the concerned involvement of the sense-making process (Introna 1997), or 
they were not as developed to be explicitly considered consciously by the human agent 
relative to the requirements of a particular matter. The unawareness of the other two
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approaches does not necessarily mean that they were not available, only that they were not 
in the focal awareness (Polanyi 1973) in the doing of decisions, or using of information. 
The question becomes then if the three approaches to decision-making are so integrated 
that strategic actors do not notice they are being already used in some way, then doesn’t 
this make human action ‘mindless’ practical coping, as Chia and Holt (2006) imply? The 
level of self absorbed involvement of the manager is a relative and philosophical question 
which goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
Whereas strategic IS theory puts the IS itself and its ‘strategic-ness’ at the centre, the 
consideration of the strategic use of IS highlights the human agent and his/her capability to 
use IS in a moving-towards way to get a job done, i.e. in a strategic manner. Hence, the 
referral of the human agent as the strategic actor in this thesis shifts the strategic-ness to 
the actor and the use of equipment (or Zewg) by the actor, rather than on the nature of the 
equipment itself. Along these lines, the assumptions behind the embodiment of tools 
(discussed in chapter 2) can be related in explaining the use of IS in strategizing as 
ambidextrous by relating the strategizing as focal awareness (foreground) and the use of 
subsystems as subsidiary awareness (background). This discussion expands on the 
discussion of the involved manager being ‘dwelled’ in the involvement whole by accepting 
a certain set of presuppositions and using them within his/her interpretive framework 
(Introna 1997): in other words, we ‘dwell in them as we do in our body’ (Polanyi 1973: 60).
The implications of this in understanding the use of knowledge in strategizing is that the 
collection of data, information and knowledge to build models and employ them as 
procedures for aaions is not just a rational aa. Rather it is rooted in our subsidiary 
awareness where we assimilate certain particulars as extensions of our body to form a 
coherent focal entity. In other words, the way subsystems came to be about were such that 
they could be withdrawn from their equipment whole such that it becomes the way we do 
things -  and don’t have to think about the use of IS consciously. This way, managers were 
able to use IS strategically while focusing on performing, rather then deciding to use a 
strategic IS. This is why behind the rational manager there is always an already involved 
one.
The discussion in this seaion explains the manners in which IS were used (i.e. the use of 
subsystems), as a result of managers’ being-in the world, which came to be through an
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extension of their subsidiary awareness into the world. Most often, the sense-making 
process also involved the referring to corporate portals, personally created files, calling 
colleagues and experts, and sending messages on the Blackberry. Once managers/advisors 
had adopted a way of using IS, over time, they would not think about them as IS tools 
anymore, rather the various forms of IS would be used as an integrated part of knowing, 
sense making and sense giving, and decision-making in the strategizing work (Weick 1995). 
In this sense, the use of IS, information and personal knowledge by strategic actors may be 
seen as part of the strategizing process itself. In this context the equipment is explained as 
if it were withdrawn from the consciousness of the human agents. Subsystems can be seen as 
a directed practical orientation, which remains withdrawn in the immediate perception, 
unless managers/advisors become explicit confronted with it. According to Heidegger 
(1962), only when equipment has withdrawn will it be available authentically. If managers 
were consciously aware of their ways all the times and act from the intention mode, then 
this would be artificial since the only authentic basis for understanding is being involved in 
the world, according to Introna (1997).
For example, it was during unexpected events, i.e. when PCS advisors had to rethink their 
strategy and incorporate changes accordingly, where they would become aware of that 
which was perceived as withdrawn at first. An IS would jump out of its ‘equipmental’ 
whole such that the managers became consciously confronted with it. This is where the 
traditional intentionality comes into play, when the referential whole is broken and 
subsystems, as equipment, stand out and become an object. In this moment, IS are not 
withdrawn anymore, but become significant vehicles in the moving-toward-to goal. It was 
then when the deliberate use of IS became more relevant. Referring to the concept of 
comportment (ibid.), we imply that deliberate and emergent approaches to IS (also called 
equipment here) are already embedded in the strategizing process, where the relationship 
between the manager (as the being-in-the world) and the IS (as equipments) is explained 
through comportment rather than a conscious intention to use IS as strategic objects to 
make a strategic decision. This is the manners in which the involved manager would use IS 
in strategizing. Fairly enough, this is where the distinction of the exploitation and 
exploration strategies in the IS strategizing framework become meaningful. However in the 
practical doing, they are perceived as part of the whole involvement where we imply the 
ambidexterity characteristics.
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The playful combining of data, information and personal knowledge in strategizing 
processes while coping with conflict and adjusting for discrepancies is thus better explained 
through the dwelling mode. It is from this dwelling mode where subsystems developed to a 
point where they manifested themselves as the main IS strategy, per se, of 
managers/advisors. Heidegger argues that this concerned use of equipment should fit into 
a context of meaningful everyday activity, i.e. fitting in involvement whole. Hence, the 
subsystems make only sense in an involvement whole, where human agents use it in 
congruent contexts in order to get a job done, or for the sake of moving towards a goal 
(Heidegger 1962), or the initial intent of the strategy. At the same time, this Dasein already 
has a sense of having a plan and where one is going towards, for human agents are already 
part of an involvement whole that has a for-the-sake-of-which implicitly there. These 
explain our original arguments that (i) the unstructured process of strategizing is practiced 
in an ambidextrous way, (ii) that human agents are dwelled in the process and part of the 
process, and that (iii) IS, specifically subsystems, as equipments, become part of the 
strategizing and part of the human agents’ being dwelled. We discussed this in terms of 
integrated IS mindset in the previous section.
In this light, the being in the world perspective, helps explain the more normative oriented 
‘managerial mindsets’ argument (Gosling & Mintzberg 2003) on a deeper level, which 
provides an explanation to ambidextrous strategizing on the conceptual grounds of 
strategizing as dwelling mode. Furthermore, viewing the manager as involved and dwelled 
in the situation imply that subsystems may always existed in that particular mode, but they 
were withdrawn and hence not perceived as ‘strategic IS’ per se. These subsystems revealed 
themselves as useful and as ‘something in order to’ (Heidegger 1962: 97) in everyday 
dealings, and in the concerned involvements with the hurdles.
In both case companies, managers/advisors reflected characteristics of the ‘rational’ 
manager when talking about their strategies and aaions, but during the process of everyday 
decision making, attributes of the ‘involved manager’ were more relevant. According to 
Introna (1997), when the involved manager is refleaing on past decisions and actions, they 
are likely to reconstrua a rationality behind them in order to portray the picture of a 
rational being. In the interviews, specifically at PCS, advisors almost always used words 
such as ‘exploit’, ‘bottom-line’, and ‘strategic decisions’ when speaking of their strategizing 
approach. These sounded quite deliberate. According to Introna (ibid.), deliberate
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vocabulary is used to justify their seemingly irrational aaions. This explains the rational 
behind the involved manager, that although managers start with a deliberate intention, or 
intentionality to solve problems, decisions, aaions and use of IS become all part of the 
being-in-the-world and the so called rationality becomes subject to its changing 
environment.
Introna argues that the primordial sense of knowing is a default position, and aaions do 
not have a global rationality, only a local or situated rationality. Once again, we believe this 
explains why strategizing is ambidextrous and why subsystems emerged as part of the 
involvement whole in order to get the job done. It may be implied that behind the rational 
manager is always the involved, manager who is already thrown into the situation at hand and 
works his way through the maze of information, noise and unintended consequences trying 
to make sense of what sounds ‘rational’ while using his alreadty embedded references and 
experience in the state of mind he is in already. It is through his already being in the world 
where the certain rationality makes sense. When situations change (e.g. referring to a 
different national culture), the same rationality may not apply to the particular 
circumstances because the ‘being’ of the strategic aaor in the new context becomes 
influenced by the ways in which he perceives his thrown-ness in the world in relation to the 
references he has from the past. So, while one has the desire to step back, use deliberate IS 
to make rational decisions, at the same time, one cannot really escape the situated-self and 
step outside a world in which things already are embedded. At this point, it is not sensible 
to separate human agency, strategizing work, and IS, they are all part of the same whole. 
The consideration of personal knowledge in addressing IS in managerial strategizing work 
has implications on the conceptualization of MIS. The application of Heidegger and 
Polanyi as underlying assumptions may provide the basis for alternative interpretations.
7.2.4 Summary
Seaion 7.2 analyzed the manners in which IS were used in strategizing at the case 
companies. It identified that the existence of subsystems were well-refleaive of the ways in 
which managers engaged in strategizing processes. We then introduced the notion of 
ambidexterity to describe the manners in which IS were used by strategic aaors. This 
ambidextrous manners towards IS use was bound to the strategizing context. Furthermore,
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section 7.2.3. sought explanation to this finding by focusing on the human agent. Two 
possible interpretations of human agency were presented.
The first argument advocated the top-down and/or bottom-up strategies prevalent to the 
IS -business strategic alignment model (cf. Henderson & Venkatraman 1993). The 
underlying assumptions imply that agents are rational beings who decide which mindset 
and IS to adopt in order to find the right information and apply it at the right time. The 
second argument touched upon a profoundly different ontology to view the manager, 
information, knowledge and systems as situated and all parts of the same involvement 
whole. Special reference was made to the involved manager (Introna 1997), which viewed 
human agents as Dasein who is already dwelled in the strategizing world and uses 
management information and personal knowledge as extensions of the body. On the basis 
of Polanyi’s (1966) embodiment of tools concept, we explained the use of IS in the form of 
subsystems which have always already been existent, yet not explicit to one’s awareness. 
Along these lines, we argued that the use of IS is immanent to strategizing while managers 
are involved in using information and personal knowledge in getting the job done. It is 
during the involvement of ongoing learning and managing change where personal 
knowledge is developed and becomes embodied with the use of IS.
Having considered the world of the manager and the use of subsystems as ambidextrous 
IS, now we consider the manager and subsystems in the world. The next section reflects on 
what it means to the organizational dynamics in terms of unintended consequences.
7.3 UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
‘There is impmisation, drift, and mintmded (resequences3
(Monteim 2004:129)
Section 7.2 identified the emergence of subsystems as tools that support the strategic use of 
information and knowledge in strategizing processes, highlighting the need to behave 
ambidextrously and use IS in according manners. Over time, however, this way of using 
information and knowledge posed challenges on the organizational level. This section 
identifies some of the implications of subsystems in the organizational whole. In both 
cases, it was identified that while subsystems achieved IS and business strategy integration
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specific to the managers’/advisors’ needs, the reliance on them led to a degeneration of the 
formal IS at organizational levels. The (unintended) consequences included: (i) the
fostering of a ‘them and us’ culture and political tension between teams, which would (ii) 
have an increasingly adverse effect on knowledge sharing and effective transfer, and in turn 
affect organizational ongoing learning (OL) memory (OM) in the long-term (cf., Monteiro 
& Hanseth 1996; Robey & Boudreau 1999). OM was referred to the information, know­
how and experiences stored from past projects with the purpose to reuse some of these in 
future decisions and projects (Walsh & Ungson 1991). Unintended consequences is a 
major area discussed in interpretative studies of IS (Orlikowski 1996, Walsham 1993, 
Ciborra 2000). The section will unfold these factors to address the connection between 
managerial IS and the organizations’ larger socio-technical II. But first, a few words on 
knowledge sharing and transfer in general terms before embarking on a discussion of the 
subsystems and their potential consequences.
7.3.1 Managerial & Organizational Disintegration
Initially, the HPC experienced difficulties in cross-unit communication for reasons 
including lack of an integrated II and IT-led tools. Furthermore, German and US OUs had 
difficulties in transferring knowledge as a result of the knowledge being too specific to 
individuals’ strategizing approaches, and also being culturally and locally bound, making it 
difficult to transfer. Despite continuous attempts to foster an enabling environment 
through frequent personal exchange and person-to-person communication, the lack of 
integrated social networks across the units and lack of technical facilitators, did not foster 
the desired level and quality of communication among units. Structural difficulties of 
information and knowledge flows between teams and units had led to lack of transparency 
and a struggle for key resources globally. As a result, we saw that experienced managers 
constructed their own subsystems in order to exploit what was available to them in terms 
of organizational resources and at the same time explore new opportunities within their 
professional circles, exploiting their own know-how in line with their strategizing 
approaches.
Over time, however, this way of using IS in strategizing across the organization (which 
could be characterized as dispersed personalized bundles of knowledge), had led to a 
structural and cultural disintegration between the use of corporate top-down IS and the
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manners in which managers organized and used management information and knowledge 
in decision making processes, namely in subsystems. These had implications on the sharing 
and transfer of information and knowledge among teams, and between units. The next 
section will elaborate more on this consequence.
73.1.1 Knowledge Sharing & Transfer
Transfer of knowledge was largely influenced by socio-cultural and institutional distance 
between the subsidiaries of the foreign and home country (Adler 1995). Furthermore, there 
is a rich structural hierarchy of information and knowledge within the case companies and 
their environments: divisions, functional areas, product lines, professional specialties, 
project teams, etc., all interact with each other across various levels of the organization. 
Most often decision makers at HPC communicate long-distance and efficient means to 
transfer and communicate knowledge become significant. In order to filter the kind of 
information and knowledge that managers/advisors needed in their decision-making and 
everyday strategizing, they created subsystems in their own working spheres. While these 
seemed to be appropriate solutions on the individual level, managers/advisors do not exist 
in vacuum.
There are unintended consequences associated with using isolated IS, such as these 
managerial subsystems. These consequences became evident when strategic actors found 
themselves working in the organizational socio-technical system in the process of 
knowledge sharing and transfer during a strategic bidding process, for example. It was 
during the times when managers moved between various managerial and organizational 
strata where it become evident that managers operated from self-constructed subsystems 
rather than from the overall organizational II with all its rules, procedures, rigidities and 
politics.
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) provide categorization for knowledge transfer and flows 
which make clear the abovementioned point about moving between organizational strata. 
Knowledge flow refers here to the sharing and transfer of decision-specific knowledge and 
information between managers across functions, OUs, and countries. Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) refer to knowledge flows from (i) parent to subsidiary, (ii) subsidiary 
to parent, (iii) location to subsidiary, and (iv) subsidiary to location. The flow from parent
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to subsidiary is the traditional flow where the subsidiary exploits home-based corporate 
resources. The reverse is the flow from subsidiary back to parent, where headquarters are 
able to exploit local competencies. This seemed to be a main problem at HPC (i.e. transfer 
between the US and German headquarters).
The predominant challenge was described by the EVP in the US OU as the difficulty to 
build consensus with the German-dominated executive management due to differences in 
mindsets and cultures. At the same time, we observed that managers at US OUs relied 
predominantly on local subsystems which were constructed on the basis of their 
strategizing approaches and strategies in their own market. While these created supportive 
systems for strategizing, something they very much needed, it also contributed to managers 
operating on different knowledge platforms based on more differences than similarities in 
terms of underlying beliefs, parameters and criteria (to use their language). This implies 
that the larger the gap in the accumulated knowledge base between two OUs, the more 
difficult it is to transfer knowledge effectively. This was seen to be at the cost of the 
absorptive capacity - the speed and quantity by which organizations absorb knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal 1990) - of the OUs. In order for knowledge flows to be effective, the 
absorptive capacity of the subsidiary is crucial.
The flow from location to subsidiary implies that the subsidiary may exploit local 
competencies and resources by exploring opportunities, assessing, filtering and choosing 
information. Communication and knowledge transfer are easiest in face-to-face 
communication between two units that have the same culture and speak the same language. 
Problems emerge when there is little proximity in geography and culture, which is to imply 
that there will be a larger gap in mindsets and ways of working. A major frustration at HPC 
was the perceived disconnection from the knowledge network and information resources 
held at headquarters. Not being fully able to become involved in the thought processes of 
senior executives at headquarters in strategic decisions created alienation and political 
tension between the units. This in turn affected the degree of absorptive capacity during 
knowledge transfer efforts. The reverse flow from subsidiary to location is termed 
‘spillovers’, referring to flows both into and out of the firm (Mudambi & Navarra 2004). 
This was a significant part of HPC’s and PCS’s competitive strategy: constant two-way 
communication and learning about emergent customer needs while providing education 
and consultation services to them. Spillovers also include intended and unintended
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elements. Examples of intended flows are to suppliers and customers, which are largely 
planned. However, flows through employee mobility or imitation by competitors are largely 
unintentional (ibid).
In this context, the IS literature argues that integrated knowledge networks and platforms 
may enable knowledge to be transferred effectively (Hustad 2004; Tsai 2001). According to 
Boland and Tenkasi (1995), it is through dynamic interactions between knowledge workers 
and communities that new configurations of knowledge can emerge. Here, ICT-enabled 
platforms of ‘communities of knowledge’ (Hustad 2004) can stimulate these processes. 
Hustad argues that in an inter-organizational context, where multiple communities have to 
communicate and collaborate, as we have seen at HPC, there is increasing complexity and 
difficulty for knowledge transfer and sharing enabling mechanisms. As has been noted, 
Szulanski (1996) explored factors that impede inter-unit knowledge transfer by referring to 
a firm’s ‘internal stickiness’. He identified two such factors: motivational factors and 
knowledge-related factors. The former related to the subsidiary manager devoting sufficient 
time and resources to teams and knowledge transfer. Although this was a dominant 
approach at HPC, advisors at PCG did not have that leadership to provide the motivational 
factor (except for the A-team). The knowledge-related factor concerns the tacit and 
context-specific nature of experience-based knowledge. Szulanski points out that this 
process requires considerable time and effort. This second factor was seen as one of the 
main reasons contributing to the need for subsystems as a way to make strategic use of 
personal knowledge while exploiting organizational IS resources.
Many companies recognize the need to improve organizational structures around 
knowledge, and show willingness to develop a knowledge sharing culture alongside 
knowledge sharing technologies (Hiebeler 1996). From a social network perspective, Tsai 
(2001) argues that inter-unit knowledge transfer in multi-national companies occurs in a 
shared social context in which different units are linked to one another. In our case 
companies, while the existence of subsystems allowed managers to build close 
interpersonal networks, they also inhibited the diffusion and creation of new knowledge 
across units (Tsai & Ghoshal 1998; Tsai 2001). While this was an organization-wide agenda 
at HPC, advisors in PCS had to create this environment by themselves through personal 
knowledge sharing strategies.
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When addressing IS, or knowledge sharing strategies, the level of abstraction of those 
strategies is an important consideration. For example, suggesting a certain social 
networking strategy with the inclusion of appropriate IT-enabled tools may seem plausible 
on the surface. Yet, at the micro-level, problems and challenges emerge which may or may 
not be worthy of intervention. The discussion below will elaborate on these challenges and 
argue that subsystems - although created to support managerial decision-making - may have 
an adverse affect on OM, OL, and cross-cultural communication.
7.3.2 Wider Implications
We have identified that one of the reasons subsystems emerged in HPC, besides structural 
insufficiencies, was difficulties in cross-cultural communication and consensus-building 
(HPC interviewees 1, 4, 6, 7, 13, 15 and 18). National cultural differences play a major role 
in information interpretation and sense-making, particularly in strategizing processes, due 
to the heavier reliance on tacit, path-dependent, and learned knowledge. Most managers 
believed that they would not get the desired quality of knowledge through electronic 
means, exacerbated by differences in mindsets, national and function-specific languages. 
According to Hofestede (1984), what is appropriate knowledge in one country may not suit 
the needs of firms in other countries. This is due in part to factors such as language, 
business culture, and local ways of working. At the same time, subsystems did not improve 
organizational level communication and quality of knowledge transfer between units. The 
subsystems, we have argued, led to greater resistance towards knowledge sharing and 
transfer, which would inhibit effective and on-going organizational learning (OL) and the 
transfer of managerial know-how into the OM.
During the study, the US OU was especially involved with their colleague engineers in 
Germany and Canada; and Germany was heavily engaged with Brazil and Shanghai. The 
challenge for HPC lay in the fact that the majority of business strategies were devised 
centrally from headquarters: from the US for all of North America and from Germany for 
global operations. However, each subsidiary had its own legacy systems and approach to 
business development. This made not only electronic communication difficult, but also 
face-to-face meetings because the mindsets of managers from different locations ‘are not 
on the same page’ (Interviewee 1). The effect of such problems expands across a wide 
range of engagements and makes the overall communication time-consuming and
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inefficient. In this context, computer systems and virtual communications offer limited 
capabilities for capturing the essence of what is to be communicated between a manager in 
Germany and the US, or between the US and Brazil. The interpretation of that information 
is closely linked to the receiver’s mindset, experience and a set of references. In HPC, a 
senior manager reflected: ‘people are used to communicate in a certain way in their own 
culture; the way they interpret things and the way we interpret things over here isn’t the 
same ... sometimes it’s difficult to tell whether you’re on the same page or not’ 
(Interviewee 7).
The difficulty in understanding the meaning behind spoken language is greater still when 
communication takes place through virtual means. On this note, Interviewee 9 added that 
virtual communication has not been helping in mitigating cultural distance. This concern 
was especially prevalent among sales and marketing managers who use a combination of 
technical data, commercial and experience-based knowledge, most of which is tacit. This 
form of knowledge, combined with different ways of communicating, makes interpretation 
and consensus-building time-consuming and difficult. HPC interviewees implied that 
managers in the US employed more formal rules while being less formal in behaviour 
(Lincoln & Guba 1985). German colleagues, according to the HR director in Germany, had 
a more labour intensive approach to information processing, which surfaced in demanding 
frequent reporting and detailed recording of projects from OUs.
Furthermore, managerial perceptions were different. While the US managers preferred a 
top-down strategic plan to an informal execution process in an entrepreneurial 
environment, German managers would behave conversely. Strategic plans coming from 
corporate headquarters can be considered top-down, yet they usually resulted in long 
negotiations and analysis before a decision was made. However, once a decision was made, 
the typical process of execution was relatively prescriptive and rigid While either strategy 
can function well in its own context, the interaction of strategic actors introduces conflict 
and difficulties in consensus building.
Besides differences in culture and management thinking, generational differences in the 
perceived value and use of IS differed among the senior German executives and younger 
international managers. As one manager mentioned, ‘IT is a generational issue’ (Interviewee 
7). The use of the email system and other IT-led methods for information exchange was
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significantly higher in the US OU than in the German OU. There is a clash between the 
older generation managers who perceive knowledge as tacit and values socialization as a 
way to transfer experience, and recent management thinking about leveraging ICTs for 
further speed and competitiveness.
Implications on the intra-subsidiaiy level were more evident at PCS, for example when 
different teams work together on a competitive bid. It was found that the same reasons had 
major consequences on building cohesive teams within the offices and an enabling OM. 
However, internal competition and resistance to open sharing fostered an environment 
which inhibited OL and future collaborations. On the contrary, advisors at PCS did not 
have HPC’s structural problems or those associated with differences in national cultural 
distance. However, the ways of working -  in other words the structure and system around 
working -  had created a disabling team environment due to embedded memories and lack 
of trust. This lack of trust led to an increased use of subsystems and expansion in their 
network outside of the subsidiary (Davenport & Prusak 1998). Evidently, the sophistication 
of the IT-led II and lack of sufficient leadership from the office’s director did not provide 
an incentive to foster an environment in which tacit knowledge and experience could be 
shared for further organizational learning.
73.2.1 Information Systems and Organizational Memory
This section discusses the role of subsystems in decision-making with respect to the already 
embedded information and knowledge in the organization. When information is shared in 
and between groups, it becomes embedded within systems, and OM becomes both an 
individual and organizational level construct (Walsh & Ungson 1991). The authors argue 
that when confronted with a situation, decision makers recall memories of past 
performance and experiences that seem most relevant. This recollection acts as a reference 
and consciously or unconsciously influences the current perception of the problem 
situation and subsequent behaviour. The information processing perspective implies that 
those who use much information are more likely to emphasize the positive aspects of an 
issue (Thomas & McDaniel 1990). However, since the information is stored in the OM 
and is interpreted by people in their particular context, the re-use of organizational IS has 
significant bearing on the validity of the information and on future decisions.
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In practice, the ways in which IS and OM affect one another are complex. Technology may 
have the potential to support the building of relationships and facilitate the exchange of 
ideas. Certain technologies, such as relevant decision support systems (DSS), may be 
supportive to a fraction of decisions that involve analytical processing of capturing the 
structure of the real world data in the form of multidimensional tables (MIS) and statistical 
systems specialists (West &Hess 2002). Manipulation and presentation of such information 
through graphical displays can provide valuable support. Data modeling, symbolic 
modeling and what-if’ analyses are phases of DSS. Advocates argue that the role of these 
technologies in OM is to convert and store expertise into databases, build a collective 
corporate memory that permeates processes, products, and services in digital networks and 
to facilitate its diffusion among users (Hackbarth & Grover 1999).
At the same time, IS heavily based on ICT may foster an e-culture where the prime means 
of communication is ICT. Limited face-to-face interactions may be at the cost of a learned 
human ability to communicate knowledge in a way as to enable a dynamic and effective 
socialization process. Given that knowledge is highly context-specific, while experience is 
both time- and context-sensitive (perceptions in a specific time under certain conditions), a 
major downside to ICT-based IS strategies is that once knowledge has been simplified and 
converted (assuming for a moment that this is possible in the first place), users do not tend 
to question the underlying assumptions of the coded knowledge anymore. Furthermore, 
the apparent convenience of referring to electronic documents, as opposed to making the 
effort to meet with people, may encourage a less reflective and a more action-oriented 
attitude towards strategizing - perhaps with diminishing consideration of long-term 
consequences of such approaches to IS and business strategies.
Hence, one can argue that IT-based IS may increase the risk of misinterpretation and 
misperception, specifically across cultures. Furthermore, while it is clearly inefficient to 
reinvent the wheel every time a decision is made, the ever-changing environment requires a 
more critical view on information and knowledge, and a more open-minded approach to 
consider issues anew. In this case, organizational IS based on IT, as we saw in PCS, may 
pose further unnecessary limits, biases, and rigidities in strategizing. Conversely in HPC, 
organizational memory was predominantly embedded in the circles of senior mangers. 
There was the belief that as long as experience is communicated person-to-person, there 
was no need for ICT: this would lead to unnecessary investments and further confusion as
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to how to use the system. There was scepticism on the part of senior executives in 
Germany as to the promise of ICT. Despite their leading position in cutting-edge 
technologies, IT-led IS for the purposes of strategizing seemed not to have captured their 
imagination. This sceptical attitude towards ICTs may also be attributed to a generational 
issue, as noted previously. One interviewee in HPC mentioned: ‘IT is a culture which is 
not yet established here’ (Interviewee 9). This indicates that an IT mindset has as yet to be 
cultivated before IT can permeate organizational knowledge processes. At the same time, 
the IT project manager at HPC stated that the attitude of younger managers was more 
open towards using IS/IT and would adapt relatively easier to the introduction of 
standardized systems, such as ERPs.
The pressing concern was on the managerial level, as senior managers were retiring and 
being replaced by IT-literate and multinational generation. Organizational knowledge-based 
competencies are in a vulnerable position when individuals leave the firm. Unless 
advisors/managers deliberately transfer their experience and connect individuals with the 
already established social network, the knowledge-base embedded in subsystems would be 
lost. During a period of six months, three PCS advisors with substantial experience left the 
firm. In HPC, one key senior manager left HPC for the reasons of lack of information 
transparency and difficulties in consensus building. As asserted above, there was no culture 
or system as such to capture the know-how and experience that knowledge workers had 
developed over more than a decade. This called for more deliberate strategies to IS through 
an IT-enabled II. Furthermore, as senior managers are replaced by younger generation 
knowledge workers, the value of their subsystems would not be transferable. Since the 
attachment of subsystems to the managers make them more valuable knowledge assets 
overall, with the departure of some senior managers, the organization loses the not only the 
person but also a major base of experience and know-how.
Similar to HPC, during the study, several senior and junior advisors in PCS retired or left 
the firm voluntarily. Upon their departure, all of their personal contacts and experience 
built over many years were lost. Despite the intensive investment in educating new hires 
and integrating them into the global II, there was no system to capture the intangible assets 
created by knowledge workers. Notwithstanding, all forms of data and information about 
advisors’ performance and decisions were stored on the basis on which they were rewarded 
or punished. However, the personal knowledge that is the driver behind the advisor’s
255
performance - ‘making the numbers’ - were not integrated in the II, and hence these were 
not part of the OM. According to a senior financial advisor: ‘The only thing that remains 
[in the firm] after an FA [financial advisor] leaves, are the accounts -  and those I can take 
with me should my clients decide to follow me.’
At this point, what can companies that already have architectural tools and systems in 
place, such as PCS, tell us about supporting managers’ decisions as well as capturing some 
of the knowledge and experience built over the years? PCS seemed to have a rich IT-led II 
in place with relatively more IT-literate knowledge workers. Among these IS were also 
proprietary applications for managing massive data and information, specifically for 
transaction-based business which depended on the exploitation of ITs. The various forms 
of MIS were designed to work on a person-to-document basis, similar to the characteristics 
of the codification strategy illustrated by Hansen et al (1999) in chapter 3.
At the same time, organizational reward structure and culture dictated the manners in 
which advisors worked. Generally speaking, the culture, as well as the nature of the 
industry, fosters a mentality that is short-term oriented, focused on speed, on ‘doing’, and 
on social networking. More negatively, this was associated with a very high turnover rate. 
To this end, the manner in which the II is organized at PCS is well aligned with how the 
reward system is structured, namely around aggressive business development which was 
measured every week as of ‘assets under management’ and ‘the number households 
annuitized’. Advisors faced a dilemma. Working in teams and exploiting the firm’s socio- 
technical network was a risk and an opportunity at the same time. Historically, the 
probability of winning larger prospects is higher for teams than individual advisors, or 
when several teams work together towards a common goal (interviewees 2, 4, 5, 7, 9). At 
the same time, the culture of lack of trust and high turnover rate led teams and individuals 
to isolate themselves from other teams, sometimes also within the same teams. We 
identified the resulting political tension as another factor which encouraged advisors to 
build their personal subsystems as their knowledge base. The development of such 
systems in a competitive internal environment only encouraged the erosion of an open 
culture.
Stata (1989) defines openness as the partners’ willingness to put all the cards on the table 
and eliminate hidden agendas. This is exactly what was happening between advisors when
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working together, with an exception of the A-team who claimed to be always open in 
sharing key inside information and personal knowledge. Badaracco (1991) states that 
openness is paramount in knowledge sharing, (i.e., when the parties are trying to learn from 
each other). A lack of openness would be seen as a major constraint in hampering learning 
the knowledge embedded in the culture of the organization, specifically in the minds of 
senior/experienced managers. Subsystems seemed to have given the opposite message on 
the subsidiary level. The perceived lack of openness would lead to deteriorating level of 
trust among actors (Tsai 2001; Davenport & Prusak 1998). Hamel (1991) argues that the 
penetrability of the social context among strategic actors is perceived as important in 
determining the degree of openness and trust.
The channels through which actors interact have large implications for the perceived 
openness among companies (Von Krogh 1998). For example, the richness of media 
determines the extent to which knowledge is successfully transferred (ibid.). Media richness 
is discussed in two dimensions: the variety of cues the medium can convey and the rapidity 
of feedback it can provide (Daft & Huber 1987). When actors face ambiguous situations, 
face-to-face interaction presents the least possibility of misinterpretation of a message. 
According to Trevino et al (1987: 557): Meaning must be created and negotiated as 
individuals look to others for cues and feedback to help interpret the message’. Where 
strategic actors are exchanging ideas based on personal knowledge, their communication 
was always based on informal meetings or telephone conversations. Emails were used 
marginally by senior managers/advisors (i.e. to schedule the time and place of a meeting or 
to follow up with data or information on a previously discussed topic in person). 
Misinterpretation is less likely to happen in face-to-face interactions than in less closed 
forms of social relations.
It is questionable whether it is possible for personal knowledge of experienced and well- 
networked advisors to be captured’ and ‘codified’ in the OM and re-used, as most are 
deeply path-dependent and relationship-based (Hitt et al 1999). Nevertheless, there would 
be a potential advantage in the possibility of their reuse, since all advisors operate under 
one company brand name and a new advisor could continue the relationships were the 
senior advisor left off. Being aware of this desire on the part of the organization (i.e. the 
managing director of the relevant OU or complex), individual managers/ advisors guard 
their personal knowledge based systems and use these as bargaining tools to get ahead
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(Bennett 1998). The section below sheds light on the use of subsystems as tools for 
bargaining power. This is seen as an unintended consequence of subsystems from the 
organizational perspective.
73.22 Subsystems as Bargaining Power
With regard to the role of IS in competitive strategizing, one cannot disregard the 
consideration of subsidiary power and its potential in rent-seeking behaviour (Mudambi & 
Navarra 2004). Specialized information and knowledge that has been created through path- 
dependent networking is key to individual and subsidiary bargaining power (Foss & 
Pedersen 2004). In this light, Foss and Pedersen conceptualize subsidiaries as pursuing 
rent-seeking behaviour within multinational companies (MNC). They argue that these 
managers are able to influence the distribution of resources to their own advantage. Two 
reasons are outlined that feed into this competitive behaviour: external reasons for 
maximizing shareholder value aimed at maximizing profits, and internal reasons for 
increasing subsidiary bargaining power in order for divisional managers to have access to a 
large portion of capital allocations from headquarters (Mudambi & Navarra 2004). The 
latter reason is the object of interest within PCS.
At PCS, despite the comprehensive II and richness of data and information, there was clear 
resistance to knowledge sharing between teams, and limited knowledge exchange within 
teams. Sharing knowledge on an everyday basis and during meetings was resisted to a large 
extent such that direct contact with colleagues was kept to a minimum to avoid sharing. 
Information exchange between advisors on the status of a shared account was conducted 
via email. Although this seems unsurprising among other firms in the financial services 
sector, the overall nature of communication and interaction was contrary to the stated 
open door policy’ and ‘teams-based’, or ‘one company, one culture’ company philosophy. 
The practice of open business values (e.g. Morosini 2000) was largely inhibited by the 
structure of the performance control and reward systems. This structure fostered a highly 
reward-driven culture and prescribed what decisions were given priority. Such systems set 
the parameters around trade-offs and the levels of risk that were tolerable (Wilson 2003). 
While this encouraged the emergence of subsystems, the long-term consequences of such 
managerial reaction were not in the best interest of the organization as a whole 
(Interviewee 1, PCS).
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Another factor that led to a disabling knowledge sharing environment was the role of 
‘gatekeepers’ (Lam 1997; Starbuck 1992) as key experts who limit the scope and range of 
knowledge shared and transferred. Starbuck (1992) argues that professional expertise 
entails ‘perceptual filters’ which could keep experts from noticing information and 
knowledge outside their specific domains. The subsystems at both companies are reflective 
of this phenomenon, where individuals became owners of knowledge within the firm and 
inhibited its transfer across functions and units in order to maintain their bargaining power. 
These ‘perceptual filters’ are no secret among knowledge workers. The assumption that 
others may know more than oneself led to over-dependence on individualized subsystems. 
Simultaneously, this escalated any sense of suspicion among knowledge workers and hence 
to an erosion of trusting working relationship (Lam 1997; Hamel 2000).
During the study, it became evident that a major factor that led to the creation of 
subsystems and their use as bargaining power was embedded within the subsidiary’s OM 
concerning the past relationships between teams and the dynamics between them in 
competing for the same business. Over time, a learned resistance to share, and contact 
avoidance among the knowledge workers, had particular bearing on the success of the 
subsidiary as a whole, where the cooperation of high producing advisors was paramount in 
the client penetration process. In this context, Walsham (2005: 12) notes that situated 
learning is ‘inextricably interlinked to the context of power relations’. OM advocates claim 
that OM will eventually fulfil a control function, which gives it a political role. According to 
Walsh and Ungson (1991), ‘control of information creates a source of dependence with 
which individuals or groups in power are able to influence the actions of others.’ Whoever 
has the control over information may choose to filter particular information from memory 
to support their agenda and sustain or enhance power. As a result, subsystems may also be 
in a position to be (mis)used as political tools to widen the conflict gap that already existed 
One way is to use them as bargaining power and so influence the direction of resource 
allocation towards certain individuals, or subsidiaries. For these reasons, it seemed that 
teams or individuals had limited incentives to share and transfer their know-how, especially 
if it involved the time of their best people. By diffusing that knowledge, the subsidiary may 
lose bargaining power (Levitt & March 1988).
Furthermore, the FIPC case showed that information and knowledge were associated with 
increased bargaining power, often leading to politicization of strategizing processes and
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encouraging the growth of subsystems. On this evidence at least, the manners in which 
information and knowledge where perceived, interpreted and used had much to do with 
the dynamics among the strategic actors and their history of working relationships. On a 
final note, we identified that managers needed to interact with the rest of the socio- 
technical organizational system in order to remain updated and play the political game 
effectively in order to adjust their own strategies. While the culture had become very 
individualistic, at the same time, each individual tried to foster the perception in the 
organization that all members were working in a sharing environment such that they would 
participate in knowledge sharing. This process was a push and puli’ power play between 
advisors in teams, and a major determinant in the manners in which organizational IS were 
leveraged and the ways in which subsystems where shaped.
Let us now turn to address the organizational efforts to move towards integrated IS and to 
overcome at least some of the unintended consequences of the organizational and 
managerial IS ‘disintegration’.
7.3.3 Towards Integration
This chapter has been discussing possible reasons behind managers and advisors creating 
subsystems. Among them were the need for an integrated IS and business strategy to cope 
with unforeseeable circumstances and fast-changing environments. The chapter has also 
reflected on the long-term effects to the organizational system of socially constructed 
subsystems. This section reflects on some of the efforts on the part of the organization to 
reduce the disintegration of human intelligence from the organization’s intelligence. Choo 
(1995) and March (1999) argue that the ‘intelligent organization’ is one which is able to 
mobilize the different kinds of knowledge in the organization to enhance its performance 
in a changing environment. The intelligent organization is another conceptualization of the 
learning organization discussed in chapter 3 (cf. Argyris & Schon 1978; Senge 1990), where 
the organization depends upon information management to learn and grow. This learning 
requires the capacity to harness the organization’s information resources and capabilities 
(ibid.). Davenport and Prusak (1998) point out that many organizations believe that when 
they have the technology resource available, sharing will come, and that all one needs to do 
is have the resource available. But building trust throughout a company is a key to creating 
a knowledge-oriented corporate culture, a positive environment in which employees are
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encouraged to make decisions that are efficient, productive, and innovative (Jarvenpaa & 
Leidner 1999; Davenport & Prusak 1998).
Choo (1995, 1998, 2006) refers to the still widely-admired Japanese approach, where, 
instead of focusing on ‘processing’ objective information, the ways in which organizations 
learn, grow and innovate is by tapping the tacit and highly subjective insights of individual 
employees’ sense of identity with the enterprise and its mission (ibid). A holistic approach 
to organizational learning implies that the organization is capable of mobilizing that 
commitment and embodying the tacit knowledge of individuals into actual technologies 
and products (ibid). This tacit knowledge is cultivated through the organizational culture 
and a sense for a common purpose.
In PCS, while reward systems were based on individual or team performance, the success 
of the subsidiary as a whole depended on the richness and linkages among advisors and 
continuous collaboration and open business values of all participants. As we have seen, 
although there was a strong IT infrastructure, it encouraged a person-to-document 
interaction, or at the most, virtual communication among teams (Powell et al. 2004). 
Although advisors were seen to value a collective culture, it was difficult to consistently 
maintain strong team cohesion due to lack of person-to-person infrastructure, financial 
incentives, and contextual factors, such as high turnover rates among team members. To 
this end, various human resource practices (such as training, performance appraisal, 
promotion, compensation and communication) may have a positive impact on knowledge 
sharing (Davenport et al 1998). While none of these were used at PCS to enhance team 
cohesion, some were practised at HPC, where senior managers encouraged the exchange of 
managers between offices as an opportunity for training and improved performance.
In reference to HPC’s effort, or knowledge strategy, in fostering a socialization platform to 
allow the diffusion of knowledge and experience throughout the offices, this attempt was 
not seen as successful at all times. Two reasons are given for the limited success of the 
program: (i) different Weltanschauungen and unfamiliar ways of learning and sense-making 
in the foreign business environments would make it difficult to integrate mindsets in 
relation to strategic issues (Choo 2006; Levinthal & March 1993); and (ii) once managers 
returned to their home offices, there was limited interaction with German headquarters 
unless required for a project. The first point might seem ironic in that the whole purpose of
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working abroad was educational with a view to learning from each other. Yet, in order to 
learn foreign managers’ thinking, they first had to understand the other person’s 
perspective. Since the cultural attributes of actors and their ways of thinking are also 
embedded in organization’s memory, culture became a significant factor in the ways 
managers interpreted information and reacted to news or initiatives. The ways in which 
human agents made sense of information and the strategic issue at hand was largely 
influenced by Voruteik inherent to the respective national cultures (Introna 1997). Based on 
cultural attributes and personal Vomrteik, the way a strategic issue was framed may have 
mobilized or halted decisions and actions towards a particular direction.
According to Duncan and Weiss (1979), culture, as an organizational memory’s retention 
facility, contains learned cultural information that is stored in language, shared frameworks 
(Duncan & Weiss 1979), symbols (Pfeffer 1981), stories, and the like. Organizational 
culture is pervasive throughout an organization and has been seen to have effects on the 
way decisions are made (Ott 1989). Terpstra and David (1991) argue that organizational 
cultures are influenced by national culture, and the greater the cultural differences between 
countries, the greater the difference between attitudes and practices (Datta & Puia 1995; 
Kogut & Singh 1988). Due to different beliefs and paradigms embedded within cultures, 
managers tend to draw different meanings from any given information than would their 
counterparts in a different culture. Different cultures lead to different attitudes towards the 
past, present the future, and what people choose to remember. The challenge lies in 
‘meaningful’ interpretation, which refers to developing or applying ways to comprehend 
the meaning of information. It entails fitting information into some structure for 
understanding an action (Gioia 1986). Indeed, Daft and Weick (1984) make the point that 
organizations themselves can be viewed as interpretation systems.
Nevertheless, in HPC, the success of the program was seen to be on individual basis and 
cannot be generalized for all managers spending time abroad. Further to this point, Von 
Krogh et al (1999) argues that knowledge sharing and exchange requires the conditions of 
mutual (cognitive as well as technical) understanding and high levels of trust in a culture of 
openness and care. It requires certain attitudes and specific actions within the organisations 
(Gilbert 2000), such as internalising solid organisational culture, leadership, processes and 
infrastructures.
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HPC recognizes that its information and knowledge processes need to be streamlined in 
order to cut costs and avoid reinventing the wheel at each operating unit (Interviewees 1, 4, 
16, 23). Yet a pilot project to implement ERP in modules in selected locations (those with 
few legacy systems) posed many difficulties as a result of incompatibility between the IT 
infrastructure and managerial mindsets. On the organizational level, hundreds (if not 
thousands) of socially constructed subsystems made a corporate systems integration 
extremely difficult. According to the IT manager, technical problems are inevitable and can 
be overcome. The major challenge was to create a fit between new IT systems and the 
manners in which managers think about IS and strategies: ‘some cultures have more 
difficulties changing their [management] thinking to the [ERP] system than others’ 
(Interviewee 6). He added that, before implementing such systems, a change in thinking 
and attitude towards knowledge working was necessary, and that, ultimately, it is the user 
who determines the return on such investments. Having recognized this, HPC senior 
managers in the US OU emphasized the need for ‘synthesis rather than separation’ of 
functional departments and their work processes in the spirit of strengthening knowledge 
sharing and transfer. This was not only in relation to the ERP system the company 
intended on implementing, but also to cross-cultural differences in working and thinking. A 
synthesis of functions, cultures and mindsets was not an easy task. Soley and Padya (2003) 
suggest that certain cultural attributes could impede international operations of global 
companies. Recognizing that it is the individuals that acquire information in sense-making 
and decision-making activities, individual cognitive activities, as well as socio-cultural 
aspects play a central role in information interpretation and memory. As the home 
company has certain ways of interpreting, sense-making and decision-making regarding 
strategizing and business ethics, it usually does not consider the cultural aspects embedded 
in its international offices that make managers interpret their environment.
In international business dealings, ignorance of cultural differences is not just unfortunate, 
but it is bad business (Soley & Pandya 2003: 207). Comments such as ‘they all speak 
English anyway’ may hinder accurate understanding, waste of time, money, and most of all, 
a flawed OM systems that may lead to management conflict and a vicious cycle of 
inconsistent interpretations and decisions within the same (global) company. Considering 
that the frame of reference and personal knowledge in different locations has been 
developed in different ways, approaches to sense-reading and sense-giving are different 
accordingly (Walsham 2005). Hence, architectural requirements for building information
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and knowledge infrastructures should only be regarded as an enabler of a knowledge 
sharing culture -  not a solution. Nevertheless, a synthesis in mindsets was argued to be a 
first step towards creating an information and knowledge platform for better management, 
sharing and transfer. Hustad (2004) suggests taking a ‘glocal’ mentality as part of a global 
strategy. By linking the global and local concerns, an international company shows that it 
acknowledges the unique business tradition and local culture of each geographical site in 
the organization rather than standardization and homogenization (Hustad 2004: 59). This 
echoes Beck’s (2000) concept of globality. A ‘glocal’ mentality would have value for HPC, 
presuming other elements in place that facilitate the dispersion and sustenance of such 
mentality over time, for example an enabling infrastructure, culture and necessary 
leadership.
In PCS, there was also a conscious effort to change the culture and de-freeze resistance to 
share knowledge. During the time of the study, a senior advisor initiated informal 
knowledge sharing meetings in the subsidiary which took place once every two weeks. 
These provided an opportunity for the entire office to participate in sharing their concerns, 
experiences, and to support each other by brainstorming ideas, i.e. how to go about their 
bidding processes and build trust with prospective clients. At PCS, the open-door but 
closed-culture was a major setback in winning new business by the teams. This process was 
meant to support the practice of open business values, strengthen mutual trust, and create 
more ‘guiding myths’ during the meetings. The purpose was to provide advisors with the 
opportunity to create a common culture on which they could build an enabling 
environment to share knowledge and expand their capabilities. The senior advisor who 
initiated the team indicated: ‘I believe in leading by example. The key to success is 
motivated people who re willing to work hard .... what needs to be done is to allow that to 
happen.’ The meetings would start with a motivational speech by the senior advisor to 
spark interest, with him stressing the importance of collaboration in the competitive 
environments in order for the teams to excel. As part of this, a performance monitoring 
agenda was prepared for each individual advisor to follow up with their progress in 
advancing their goals, while sharing their view of obstacles in decision making with other 
advisors. This attempt lasted three months, but failed due to lack of participation.
At the first two meetings, the director of the subsidiary attended and so did the majority of 
advisors, with the exception of a team who politicized the initiative. From the initial
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meetings, the office’s director was ‘too busy’ to attend and the number of senior 
participants decreased, leaving the meetings attended by a few junior advisors who, 
nonetheless, seemed to appreciate the opportunity. The presumption of the majority of 
advisors was that people do not share that which is valuable. The lack of participation led 
to the meetings being discontinued. Clearly, there was an attempt to create an environment 
in which knowledge could be shared: the intrinsic value of knowledge sharing is well 
recognized for the individuals as well as the subsidiary as a whole. From observations and 
discussions, several reasons may have contributed to the disappointing results - lack of (i) 
leadership from the top, and (ii) immediate incentives. The first was weak leadership on the 
part of the office’s director who would not attend (‘in order to keep a neutral political 
position’). The latter may be a result of the already established subsystems which had 
rooted the work and minds of the advisors in their own networks -  which over time -  had 
become self-fulfilling entities. Hence, sharing information for the benefit of the 
organization as a whole, would also mean relinquishing power.
The long term goal was to create a subsidiary-based team and eventually integrate this with 
the already successful A-Team. However, lack of a cohesive culture and strategic 
leadership led to the termination of an undertaking which could have led to one of the 
most successful teams in the company’s US-based locations. The knowledge-based view of 
the firm views strategic leadership (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996) as an important 
resource. From this stream, the concept of paradigms and ‘managerial discretion’ emerge, 
which are linked with personal characteristics and influenced by organizational and 
environmental factors (ibid.). With regard to managerial discretion in decisions about 
knowledge as strategic assets, Amit and Schoemaker (1993) highlight forces that influence 
the decision-making task under uncertainty, complexity and conflict. They refer to 
psychological theorists (Kahneman et al. 1982), who suggest that discretionary managerial 
decisions are affected by a range of cognitive biases toward the handling of uncertainty and 
complexity, and that shape the strategic direction of multi-national companies in the global 
markets.
Different paradigms and attitudes influence the choices managers make (Dutton & Duncan 
1987; Daft & Weick 1984). For example, Hall and Hall (1990) suggest that, in certain 
cultures, people use information as an instrument of ‘command and control’. 
Consequently, the acquisition, retention and retrieval of knowledge from memory
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repositories influence subsequent individual behaviour (Walsh & Ungson 1991). While 
some managers want to learn from past mistakes and failures, others regard failures as 
distractions and choose to focus on new strategies. The subsystems gave 
managers/advisors the basis on which they could make sense of the situations based on 
their way of sense-making, working and being in the world. Specifically, with managerial 
mindsets and attitudes towards MI being different across functions and cultures, 
subsystems provide a standard basis to each individual.
A study' by Newman and Nollen (1996) at Georgetown University on Culture and Congruence 
highlights the importance of the right fit between management practices and national 
culture. Perhaps this has been a missing link in the case of HPC’s German and US OU. In 
other words, is management practices which are based on a common and integrated IS 
mindset, then cultural differences would not become a barrier to sense-making. A culture 
which fosters an IS mindset as part of its corporate culture may be less prone to the use of 
individual subsystems, or find a way to share the knowledge developed because of it 
instead of using these as tools for bargaining power. Nevertheless, central to the discussion 
is the appreciation of the dynamic interaction of many factors that influence the manner in 
which IS are used in the involved whole.
7.4 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
This chapter analyzed the findings and provided several interpretations in the light of the 
IS strategizing framework and supporting theories. The framework guided the analysis with 
particular emphasis on technical and social dimensions of IS in the spirit of fostering 
collaborative business strategizing. Based on the case studies, we argued that IS were used 
in ambidextrous ways. In his most recent work, Galliers (2007) has proposed the 
ambidextrous characteristic of IS strategizing to the framework through a link between the 
exploitation and exploration IS strategies. This thesis, apart from further acknowledging 
this point, explained the reasons for the occurrence of such phenomena via the supporting 
theories. While the framework’s argument is in the spirit of strategic IS (SIS), this thesis 
explained the ambidexterity phenomenon through the consideration of the human agent as 
the strategic user of IS, i.e. strategic actor. A shift of emphasis has been on how IS are 
made strategic by actors, rather than assuming IS as strategic in itself. The explanation was
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based on the underlying assumptions to view strategizing in terms of a ‘dwelling’ mode 
(Chia & Holt 2006), and the manager from a ‘being-in’ mode (Introna 1997). These 
supplemented a richer sense-making and interpretation of the use of information and 
knowledge through appropriate systems, and to show an important angle of ontology 
which has been underdeveloped in the IS literature with regards to strategy. The new 
insights gained through the consideration of the underlying assumptions behind the 
ontological position of the involved manager are argued to provide a solid conceptual 
grounding for suggesting an alternative view on the IS strategizing framework, which may 
be used as a basis for further research. These are further elaborated in chapter 8.
Section 7.3 argued that the trends with managerial IS showed implications on the 
organizational level by reflecting on some of the unintended consequences. For example, it 
was noticed that subsystems may have posed a risk to the ‘absorptive capacity’ among 
subsidiaries (Cohen & Levinthal 1990). Differences in cultures, mindsets, and difficulties in 
understanding one another’s languages limited the degree to which one subsidiary absorbed 
and exploited the knowledge of the foreign subsidiary. The exchanging of teams in HPC 
was an effort to increase the absorptive capacity of the US and German OUs over time. 
Yet, due to lack of integrated IIs and an appropriate IS culture, among others, it was 
difficult to sustain the level of cooperation built and to sustain an open culture. 
Furthermore, the small proportion of senior managers relative to larger number of younger 
managers, led to political conflict that inhibited an open culture. Unintended consequences 
at PCS were in the form of political tension, since the study was not cross cultural, but 
between advisors and teams. The more advisors were able to become efficient on their 
own terms, i.e. on the basis of the using IS their own way, the more independent they 
became and the less they would share with colleagues. An exception was the way the A- 
team was operating. The use of subsystem on the individual level and their collaborative, 
integrated mindsets, and open attitude made them among the best performers. The figure 
below summarizes the arguments, following an overview of the interpretations.
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7.3. Unintended consequences
Potential use of subsystems may 
have encouraged bargaining power; 
this may have inhibited effective 
sharing and transfer of information 
and knowledge, leading to:
culture of distance and 
resistance to knowledge 
sharing
adverse organizational 
ongoing learning 
adverse effects on OM in the 
long term
Organizational
socio-technical
context
Strategic use of 
information and 
knowledge via 
managerial 
subsystems
7.1 In tandem use of deliberate 
and emergent to meet 
information & knowledge 
requirements in ambidextrous 
strategizing
72 Integrated IS mindset: the
manager’s concerned involvement 
in strategizing implies already 
existent managerial systems as 
immanent to ongoing sense- 
making, using and acting
Figure 7.8: Overview of the arguments -  feedback loop between managerial and 
«iorganizational levels of IS use
Despite different emphasis on ICTs and designs of their IIs, managers/advisors in the case 
companies depended on traditional means of doing business: unique products, superior 
knowledge of products and customers, effective relationships, strong personal services 
(Galliers 2004). In the context of business strategizing and the role of IS, Galliers reminds 
us that the use of various collaborate IS may lead to organizational boundaries becoming 
increasingly porous in terms of communication and collaborations. Advisors at PCS, 
despite the rich internal resources, based their businesses to a large extent on formal 
alliances or informal collaborations with partners outside the firms, who would benefit 
from each others’ services in their business dealings. This process is driven on the 
individual level, separate from the organizational II. Likewise, HPC managers in the US 
OU had to build alliances in their home markets which were not provided or supported by 
the organizational II.
In the case companies, subsystems showed themselves as crucial to decision-making 
processes because they allowed managers to learn from ‘below’, to engage in tinkering and 
improvisation (Ciborra 2000) even without their conscious awareness. These were the basis 
on which the involved manager learned from and responded to unintended consequences 
through emergent coping and incorporating ongoing changes. We explained that this 
procedual and embedded nature of subsystems IS indicated that the nature of subsystems 
were equipment (or Ze&g) rather than objects, where managers comported in their being-in 
the world. Subsystems set the basis for ongoing learning and review, which had become 
already immanent to the whole and to the strategic actors’ sense-making processes. This led
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managers to get involved in improvisation as a natural way of coping. This enabled them to 
respond to the emergent and unintended consequences of their strategic decisions (Galliers 
2004) and elements beyond their control.
While accepting that findings in interpretive research can never be conclusive in 
themselves, the findings within the frame of this research inquiiy are summarized as 
follows.
1. Simultaneous use of deliberate and emergent IS in the form of subsystems to 
achieve flexibility and efficiency
Regardless of formal IS, managers/advisers across the cases referred to subsystems as a 
key basis of their decision-making. These consisted of a mix of deliberate and emergent 
forms of IS, which were adjusted to new incremental changes on an ongoing basis in 
the everyday coping. The analysis implied that (i) managers need both approaches to IS 
(i.e. deliberate and emergent), in order to be efficient and effective in the process of 
competitive bidding; and (ii) subsystems were seen as effective whenever practitioners 
were using them without explicit awareness and effort, i.e. IS become strategic when 
the are able to become immanent to the sense-making process itself. This way, 
subsystems became embedded to the strategic activity and human agents could 
‘mindlessly’ use them and get the desired results. Subsystems were perceived as flexible 
systems to cope with change and continuity, and specific to the managers’ ways of 
sense-making.
2. Integrated IS Mindsets
As an explanation to the above argument, the role of strategic actors was argued to be 
central to the use and usefulness (or the strategic attribute) of IS. It was argued that 
managers who leveraged deliberate and emergent IS simultaneously in the spirit of 
ambidextrous strategizing had an integrated IS mindset. The notion of the involved 
manager emerged to provide an enriching interpretation. This argument does not 
assume a drift, but rather that subsystems always already existed and were already used 
in one form or another by the managers. However, they were perceived as withdrawn 
from the focal awareness of the manager. While the rational manager was said to focus 
on strategic intentions and solving problems based on facts and data on the outset, the 
involved manager is not able to step out of the involvement whole, he/she just is.
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Underlying assumptions are based on Heidegger’s Dasein and Polanyi’s embodiment of 
tools, which support the explanation behind the ambidextrous use of IS and informs 
the IS strategizing framework as to why the use of exploitation and exploration IS may 
be conceived as immanent to the strategizing work. In the spirit of considering the 
rational and involved manager as co-existing, this research makes explicit the notion of 
the ambidextrous manager (Tushman et al 2006).
The following are suggested as secondary findings, since they were not the focus of the 
research, but emerged to be significant and inseparable from the key findings. These are in 
relation to organizational implications of managerial subsystems, which have been 
discussed in section 7.3.
3. Unintended consequences of subsystems back to the organizational whole
What was observed as unintended consequences were widening cross-cultural conflict 
and enhance political tension. The interpreted implications of these were the discussion 
on ongoing collective learning as of OL, and the consequences on the absorptive 
capacity of the OM as a whole. Furthermore, these systems were little benefit of 
organizational learning because they were rarely transferable. This was so because their 
value lied in their ‘being-in-use’ and their basis on personal knowledge developed in 
specific context, time and location, and mindset. Hence, subsystems were conceived as 
contextual, historical and perceptual (Introna 1997). While subsystems were used as a 
source of competitive advantage, at the same time, they contributed to unintended 
consequences in terms of inhibiting open information and knowledge sharing and 
transfer. The dispersed bundles of knowledge gradually created a ‘them and us’ attitude 
between units at HPC and advisory teams at PCS, which seemed to have widened the 
cross-cultural gap in the former and encouraged politically-driven decision processes in 
the latter case. The reliance on subsystems seemed be a major influencing factor in the 
OL and development of the OM. In order to make the subsystems ‘transferable’ to 
other managers/advisors, first there must be a common basis in terms of approaches to 
sense-making in the communicative context.
At the same time, we argued that subsystems could be the result of an already existing 
organizational milieu and lack of enabling IIs. The research argues for a circular dynamics, 
e.g. a feedback loop of ongoing consequences, between the organizational context
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(including the socio-technical II) and the ways in which IS were used by strategic actors. 
An interesting implication is that, although subsystems may enable the executive to act 
intelligently, these manners of using IS may not foster organizational intelligence (Choo 1995) 
in the long haul because these inhibit the diffusion of practical know-how. At the same 
time, subsystems were not really strategic IS (SIS), but IS, which sometimes (and often) 
showed themselves more or less of being ‘strategic’ while these were being used during 
sense-making processes across various contexts. As a result their unconscious (withdrawn) 
existence and use, the potential long-term adverse affects on the organizational level were 
not as explicitly noticed as their immediate and short-term benefits to decision-makers. By 
the time subsystems had manifested themselves as ongoing and integrated parts of 
managerial decision-making, the consequences on the organizational level had already been 
going on and shaping the socio-technical II.
Before arguing what this all means to the IS strategizing framework, some pointers as to 
how the findings attempt to contribute to an extension of the framework and expand our 
understanding in the social study IS. The figure below shows the integrated view this 
research has taken on strategizing, IS, and strategic actor’s involved mindset and being.
Ambidextrous 
Approach to 
strategizing
Strategic Actor as 
involved manager 
and integrated IS 
mindsets
iynthesis of bottom- 
lp and top-down IS 
Ambidextrous use 
of IS
(Hi)
Strategic actors dwelled/involved in 
the strategizing whole, i.e. socio- 
technical organizational context and 
external environments
©Business strategizing - Subsystems 
interrelation:
Use of IS and personal knowledge as 
embedded and embodied in strategizing; 
as parts of the same activity
Subsystems -  Strategic actor interrelation:
IS as embodied in human thinking/seeing/doing, i.e.
Integrated IS mindset
Figure 7.9: View on IS, strategizing and strategic actors as parts of the same involvement 
whole
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Figure 7.9 implies ambidextrous use of deliberate and emergent IS (C), as part of 
ambidextrous strategizing processes (B), by the involved manager (A). We explained ‘C’ 
exists because of the nature of strategizing in ‘B’, and because of the assumptions of the 
involved manager ‘A’. The human agent is dwelled in the strategizing whole (iii) where 
he/she uses various IS as part of the sense-making process (ii), while incorporating new 
information, interpretations and changes from the environment (i). Notably, the three 
concepts are meant to be seen as parts of the same whole, and as always already existing 
and interacting. The figure suggests a different ontology to the familiar debate, namely the 
use of SIS and strategic alignment of these with business strategies.
The crux of the argument has been that although managers had the desire to be rational 
and in control of their decisions, in actuality they were ‘thrown’ in the strategizing world, 
not because of choice or decision but by default. This perspective contradicts the 
conception that with all the right information and strategic IS, the rational manager will 
make the right decisions and increase his/her performance. The consideration of the 
strategic actor, with respect to the underlying assumptions behind the involved manager, is 
seen as enrichening and complementary to the debate in strategic management and IS. 
Most specifically, it proposes an integrated view on traditionally different ontologies with 
regards to the human agent at rational and involved in practice. The assumptions of this 
view are profound to the conceptualization to IS strategizing in general and to the 
framework. It is argued that the consideration of different ontological perspectives to the 
same problem situations provides a veiy powerful way to understanding the problem 
situation better, than applying different models and frameworks coming from the same 
world view, ‘school of thought’, or ‘paradigm’. While various frameworks may be insightful 
to a particular situation, even the most flexible framework might easily lose its validity 
when the context changes.
Chapter 8 will now consider the implications of these arguments on the contributions of 
this research.
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This chapter provides an overview of the main arguments, suggests contributions 
to theory, practice and methodology, and points out the challenges and limitations 
encountered. Based on new insights drawn, the researcher suggests topics for
further research.
8.1 THESIS OVERVIEW & CONTRIBUTIONS
A central argument of this thesis has concerned the use of IS in the context of competitive 
strategizing. The thesis has addressed the dynamic interaction between managerial work and 
the socio-technical organizational context. The literatures informing the research were taken 
from the fields of Information Systems, Strategic Management and Organizational Theory. 
These literatures helped to highlight the interdependence between IS, strategizing and strategic 
actors on the managerial and organizational levels. The IS strategizing framework served as a 
sense-making device to navigate this multi-disciplinary inquiry on conceptual grounds.
Managerial work was described as dynamic and hectic, consisting of constant interruptions and 
substantial exchange of oral information which have to be processed and made sense of in the 
face of changing organizational context and existing experiential knowledge. Managerial work 
was examined in terms of strategizing and throughout the thesis, different assumptions 
provided by the literature were examined in terms of intentions, emergent and dwelled. The 
thesis started with defining strategizing as a complex and unstructured process of decision-, 
sense- and judgment-making, involving personal knowledge (Polanyi 1966), management 
information (Introna 1997), and data. The conceptual distinction between information and
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knowledge was established Information was associated with the meaning imputed to data 
when it is evaluated from the human agent depending on their mindset, interpretive 
framework and contextual conditions (Sanchez 2001; Davenport et al 1998). The dominant 
view that was considered conceived management information as ‘management understanding 
in-the-world, in-order-to get the job done’ (Introna 1997: 156). Knowledge was discussed 
from multiple perspectives in chapter 2 and regarded as transient and a core ingredient of 
ongoing strategizing. A central and intrinsic argument in this thesis has been Polanyi’s 
assertion that we know more than we can tell’ (Polanyi 1966: 4) in order to draw deeper 
meaning from the human agent’s use of IS in strategizing.
In this context, decisions were viewed as building blocks of strategizing that play a major role 
in determining the strategic direction of organizations (Mintzberg & Waters 1983). 
Furthermore, these were said to being influenced by managerial Vomrteile and mindsets, as well 
as organizational dynamics. Managers were viewed as embedded parts of organizational socio- 
technical systems. Strategy and the role of ICTs as a source of competitive advantage have 
been criticized for being non-reflective and based on prescriptive managerialism. A holistic 
view on strategy was discussed based on Mintzberg’s work on the emergent characteristic of 
strategy. In the field of IS, Ciborra, among others, argued to put aside traditional views and 
look closer at the everyday life of managers, which is made up of ‘frustrations, 
accomplishments, gossip, confusion, tinkering, joy, and desperation’ (2004:19).
The research also considered the practice theory of strategy (Whittington 1996; 2003; 
Jarzabkowski 2005) as appropriate, as well as the situated view on strategizing (Suchman 1987) 
in relation to Introna’s (1997) application of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology to the IS 
domain. Emerging questions considered the use of various forms of IS by human agents in the 
messy process of managerial strategizing, which opened up the discussion on what makes an 
IS strategic, how can IS become more useful to the more tacit dimension of the strategizing 
process, and what are the organizational implications of the ways managerial IS are used? 
According to Orlikowski (2002), strategy as practice suggests that knowledge is an ongoing 
accomplishment, constituted and reconstituted as actors engage in the world While 
Mintzberg’s research on emergent strategizing is an important point of departure, it does not 
elaborate how a patterned consistency of action (despite lack of intention) emerges. This 
research attempted to address this gap by referring to supporting theories to reach an 
explanation (notably, not the only or a complete one by any means). Here, the explanation 
centred around the meaning of strategy as dwelling and as immanent in action (Chia & Holt 
2006).
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The research examined the relational interaction between the components presented by the IS 
strategizing framework. Furthermore, the significance of context in which human agents and 
IS are embedded was highlighted The relationship between context and knowing was depicted 
well by Blacker (1995), who claimed that knowing occurs via a combination of organizationally 
and biographically embedded contextual components, which demands a more sophisticated 
conception of context. The whole purpose of analysing the concept of strategizing was to 
better understand the role of IS therein. It was found that the use of IS and ICTs, as used by 
managers and advisors, could be seen as driven by a particular attitude towards problem 
solving, thinking and doing (Wittgenstein 1956). Inseparable from the structure they 
work/dwell in, infrastructures were regarded as a formative context which sets pre-existing 
institutional arrangements, frames and imageries that actors bring and routinely enact in a 
situation (Ciborra & Hanseth 1998).
The empirical work consisted of two case studies. A two- instead of a single-case approach was 
chosen to acknowledge and bring out the context specificity and embeddedness of the subject 
matter. While most research tries to isolate the object under study from other influencing 
factors for the sake of clarity, this research emphasized the significance of factors in the use of 
IS. A qualitative methodology based on semi-structured interviews enabled the collection of 
data, which informed as well as challenged the theoretical basis of the research inquiry. The 
empirical investigation considered the German and US-based operating units of a leading 
hydro-power generation company (HPC), and a US subsidiary of a private bank (PCS). In both 
cases, the ways in which IS were used were explored on the grounds of their competitive 
strategies, which concerned aggressive business development to improve sales growth 
performance. The theoretical framework was used to distinguish between deliberate and 
emergent IS, their interaction with elements of information infrastructures (IIs), and the 
integration of change management. On the organizational levels, while the dominant IS in 
strategy at HPC was centered on person-to-person communication, or socialization, the 
dominant approach at PCS was around top-down centralized IT-driven IS.
Several aspects made the comparison interesting. Both are leading enterprises in their 
respective fields, both are product-based companies that had moved into integrated services, 
and the knowledge work in both was cross-functional and multi-national (to limited extent). A 
closer look indicated the struggle with formal and informal mechanisms in the organizational 
socio-technical setting (Land 1991; Ciborra 1993; Orlikowski 1992; Bjoerkman et al 2004). 
Specifically, both showed a conflict in their managerial and organizational IS, which had led to 
managerial advantage, but to organizational consequences.
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On the organizational level, a major challenge in HPC was to tap into the knowledge locked in 
individuals’ minds through social networking initiatives designed to enable transfer of know­
how and ongoing learning between foreign units. On the managerial level, HPC had to juggle 
conflicting demands, and to coordinate decision activities and prioritization. Furthermore, 
organizational change was considered to be an inevitable and inherent part of strategizing 
processes. Despite different designs and compositions of organizational IIs, the manner in 
which senior managers/advisors leveraged information and knowledge through systems were 
similar. The following were found to be common in both cases:
• Managerial subsystems indicated ambidextrous use of IS in strategizing (Chapter 7.2)
• Unintended consequences of subsystems on the organizational level (Chapter 7.3): 
cross-cultural conflict in HPC and political tension in PCS.
The term ambidextrous strategizing was used to describe the way managers used information, 
knowledge and systems in order to get the job done in the daily coping. Here, IS was 
characterized as simultaneous use of deliberate and emergent resources to gather data, 
information, and knowledge to create, or make explicit, meaning and clarity in particular 
situations. It was argued that the ambidextrous ways of strategizing had overtime manifested 
themselves into subsystems, personalized repositories of filtered and relevant data, information 
and knowledge created or gathered from formal and informal sources. The subsystems were 
seen as personalized ‘toolkits’ to support managers in the process of sense-making and 
meaning generation of messy situations.
The identification of subsystems despite existing organizational IS suggested an ongoing 
conflict between managerial IS and organizational IS, two separate systems that would not 
‘talk to each other’ (Interviewee 4, HPC) and lead to ineffectiveness and inefficiencies on 
organizational levels. It was observed that despite existing strategies, the uncertainty about 
external and internal conditions, fast changing environments, technologies, and 
relationships would mean a constant reinterpretation of the meaning of any given 
information. This required constant readjustments of underlying factors that shaped 
decisions. This state encouraged a deep level of involvement of managers in the situation, 
(see chapter 2 for strategizing in dwelling terms), and so a need by managers to create some 
certainty in their daily coping. In response to this need, subsystems were perceived as 
vehicles to meet the need of being control over information, events, and ultimately their 
performance in the organization. This sense of certainty that came with the ownership of 
individual subsystems gave managers the perception that they are coping with uncertainty 
and chaos.
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The implication of such systems is significant to the field of IS as well as to practitioners. 
While corporate IS are designed to serve the organization as a whole, or ‘the common 
good’ for the sake of simplicity, these did not seem to serve individual managers.
Two different ontologies were considered in the interpretation of subsystems. While one 
interpretation implied that human agents act as rational beings and use IS as a strategic 
resource to meet a goal, the latter view interpreted the ‘strategic’ attribute or value of IS in 
terms of their immanence in the strategizing process in their particular context, time and their 
embodiments with human agents’ being, thinking and acting (Polanyi 1966). The meaning of 
immanent itself, from a phenomenological stance, implied an alternative (preferable 
complementary) meaning to ‘intent’ in adaptive action. As discussed in chapter 2, the dwelling 
view on strategizing resonated ‘an internalized disposition to act in a manner congruent with 
past actions and experience’ (Chia & Holt 2006:635).
It was argued that the usefulness of IS may be brought to surface through the ability of managers 
to use IS in ambidextrous manners while being involved with the problem at hand. Despite 
different organizational IS at each company, managers in both cases used subsystems to guide 
their decisions in strategizing processes. It was argued that the way of everyday coping had 
become manifested in the existence of subsystems over time. Thus, subsystems were 
interpreted as a reflection of ambidextrous ways of strategizing and a way to compensate for 
the shortcomings of the organizational IS. These seemed to be flexible in accommodating 
changing requirements of the strategizing context and process. While subsystems served 
managers to get the job done with perceived efficiency, at the same time, they revealed adverse 
consequences on the organizational level.
Nevertheless, the focus has been on interpreting and explaining subsystems as ambidextrous 
IS. This was interpreted as follows:
• Strategizing processes were described as unstructured, unpredictable, and continuously 
changing. Here, managers combined both emergent and deliberate strategies to meet 
top-down corporate demands and emerging challenges in the every coping.
• Most of the management information and knowledge were seen as immanent to the 
messy strategizing processes and context. Hence, managers used deliberate and 
emergent IS in ambidextrous manners. These were referred to as subsystems.
• The prevalence of subsystems was associated with the strategic actors’ integrated IS 
mindset. This research now refers to the already involved managerial IS mindset as an 
attribute of the ambidextrous manager (Tushman et al 2006).
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The analysis took further depth by examining the usefulness of subsystems in the context of 
competitive strategizing using Introna’s interpretation of Heidegger’s and Polanyi’s concepts. 
Subsystems were interpreted as situated use of equipment, or which are always already to 
hand (Heidegger 1962), or immanent, to coping with emerging challenges in strategizing 
processes. In contrast to what is prevalent in the management discourse, subsystems were 
suggested to be IS used through comportment rather than intentionality. This comportment 
shed light on the use of IS from a state of being-involved the context.
Central to this argument was the notion oiDasem (ibid). Human agents were seen as dwelled in 
the strategizing world, like fish in the water, and where these become one with their habitant 
and the just ‘is’ (Introna 1997:29). This level of submersion of the human agent in the context, 
and the level of embeddedness of subsystems in processes and their embodiment in the human 
agent, made them as if they were withdrawn from the explicit attention (or focal awareness) of 
the strategizer. This perceived withdrawn-ness, or their immanence in thinking, interpreting 
deciding, and acting, constituted the strategic attribute of the IS. Subsystems were not 
‘intended’ to be used as strategic IS, but showed themselves as strategic through the strategic 
ways in which they were used by the ambidextrous manager in particular situations. We 
implied that it is the actor who gives the IS its strategic-ness through his/her personal 
intelligent involvement in navigating the situated-ness of the moment. This is argued to be an 
attribute of the ambidextrous manager. Thus subsystems were interpreted to be an extension 
of the managers’ involved and integrated mindset -  hence a reflection of the manager’s 
capability to be ambidextrous.
The arguments are summarized below:
• Involved managers are dwelled in the situated-ness of the world and cannot step 
outside their own existence.
• In the dwelling, they simultaneously use deliberate and emergent IS in ambidextrous 
manners. These were interpreted through comportment instead of intentionality.
• The assumption behind comportment was to argue that personal knowledge is 
immanent to the person, and IS are immanent to business strategizing. Both became 
extensions of the body while being-in use.
This study acknowledged that, in the context of competitive strategizing, IS takes a meaning 
far beyond the deliberate use of ICTs. The prevalence of subsystems indicated that strategizing 
is ever changing, ongoing and processual, unpredictable and involves conflicting demands. It 
also implied that knowledge is generated and accumulated through action in specific context.
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This context called for flexibility in order to be efficient. Personalized systems enabled 
managers/advisors to leverage deliberate and emergent IS by filtering key information and 
combine these with their personal knowledge. Since this knowledge is tightly linked to personal 
knowledge, its accumulation and interpretation is dependent on individual actors (Daft & 
Weick 1984; Daft & Huber 1987). What contributes to the differentiation of managers’ skills is 
the tacit knowledge they develop over time. This is to some extent non-communicable and 
hence contributes to the ‘uniqueness’ of the opportunity of each individual in the firm 
(Penrose 1959:52-3). Hence, the path-dependent, context-specific nature of knowledge made 
subsystems very specific to the individual user.
Chapter 2 argued that communication involves the interaction of people with different 
approaches to sense-making and sense-giving, whose tacit knowledge has been developed 
differently (Hustad 2004). Sense-making is a largely tacit process and emerges in action while 
being involved in the process. There is a high degree of customization involved -  you’ve got 
to understand the process’ (Interviewee 5, HPC), and you need to have the right people on 
board’ (Interviewee 1, PCS). While subsystems seemed to provide competitive advantage to 
managers’ specific working knowledge, at the same time, these made it more difficult to share 
and transfer knowledge internally, leading to unintended consequences. For example, we 
talked about how subsystems discouraged the free flow of information and knowledge 
between teams and units, and so inhibited ongoing learning. The implication of such 
unintended consequences between the managerial and organizational levels were seen as 
mutually reinforcing, whereby managerial attitudes towards the use of IS would affect the 
future of strategizing processes as a whole. HPC struggled with knowledge transfer across the 
German and US units due to architectural and cultural challenges, and different management 
thinking. PCS lacked an enabling organizational culture for knowledge sharing, with the 
exception of the A-team which was actively involved in intense communication lead by strong 
leadership.
This ‘uniqueness’ of individual skills also led to political controversies and an ‘information is 
power’ attitude in the workplace, reinforcing resistance to sharing information with colleagues. 
Hence, subsystems had the potential to be used as bargaining power, not as explicit tools perse, 
but as a basis which supported the comportment of managers/advisors, which moved towards 
a competitive rather than a collaborative involvement. The emerging challenges affected 
ongoing OL and OM. For example, the culture that the use of subsystems encouraged was not 
friendly to openness and sharing, and promoted the use of information as political tools to
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enhance bargaining power for resources. Consequently, the rate of trust among colleagues 
diminished (Sambamurthy & Jarvenpaa 2002), and so inhibited OL in the long term.
Nevertheless, the centrepiece of the thesis turned out to shift focus from valuing resources (IS) 
towards valuing resourcefulness of human agents as a source of competitive advantage. The 
human agent was referred to as the ‘strategic actor’ - shifting the focus from IS as object (i.e., 
equipment), used as part of comportment, to human agent’s being and attitude towards 
strategizing. It was argued that managers, who leveraged IS in strategizing in ambidextrous 
ways, had an involved mindset (as of attitude or being) which allowed them to become more 
resourceful as environments changed and uncertainty grew. An involved mindset implies that 
IS/IT are not seen separate from strategizing, which can be aligned or even integrated.
This research viewed IS as they presented themselves in practice, where their strategic-ness 
became explicit only in the ways in which human agents used them while involved in the 
process of strategizing. An involved perspective implies that IS and strategic IS are just what 
they are. IS will have a strategic importance then, when they become one with the thinking and 
doing of human agents, i.e. when they become embodied with people and embedded with 
processes. Once they are part of the same whole (which is assumed that they already are), then 
the direction of the strategizing towards ‘success’ or ‘failure’would depend on the resomj^ ulness 
of the manager, not much on the IS (assuming IS are functioning are they are programmed). 
The implications of this stance are significant on the conceptualization of IS, specifically on 
the term strategic IS. The figure below relates the new arguments to the theoretical framework:
S = Subsystems as ambidextrous use 
of deliberate and emergent IS
Subsystems were conceived as an 
extension of human agent’s body 
while dwelled in the strategizing whole
Figure 8.1: Subsystems as a result of ambidextrous use of IS as involved in strategizing
Socio-technical
Exploitation IS 
strategies
Exploration IS 
strategies
Continuous
Change
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In the case studies, managers/advisors were not always consciously aware of the particular IS, 
but they used IS in manners consistent with the process of strategizing, decision-and sense- 
making as part of the involvement whole. The attitude of managers/advisors at PCS and HPC 
towards the usefulness of corporate and centrally available IS were alike. They implied that the 
sheer amount of information out here, and the uncertainty around managerial work and 
decisions would make it difficult to use standardized IS as the major resource on continuous 
basis. Regardless of corporate IS, whether top-down or bottom-up, centralized or dispersed, 
codified or personalized, managers/advisors manifested their knowledge gained from their 
personal involvement in praxis onto their subsystems, resembling personal information and 
knowledge repositories gathered from their unique networks. Managers constantly modified 
and updated their subsystems to accommodate daily changes in the internal and external 
environments. This was a process based on filtering and interpreting information to make 
sense of new environments. The implication of these arguments are that in order for IS to be 
effective, the consideration of the micro-level strategizing processes, the personal knowledge, 
and the mindset of the involved manager are determining factors, regardless of the quality or 
quantity of corporate IS. This also implies a shift in focus from strategic IS to strategic use of 
IS as part of the strategizing process.
Simply said, subsystems provided them with personalized toolkits, which they were so familiar 
with, at the level where the subsystems would become withdrawn’ from the immediate 
attention and the conscious effort of using them. Hence, subsystems formed an extension of 
the manager’s knowing, and became part of, or one with, the resourcefulness of the manager. 
The content of the subsystems was driven by the managers’ access to human and systems 
networks, experiential and praxis-driven knowledge (moreover the ability to generate meaning 
and value from any given situation). Here, meaning cannot be separated from context and the 
sphere of human interaction. It is along these lines where the research asserts that the 
‘strategic-ness’ of any given IS lies within the situated involvement and resourcefulness of the 
involved manager.
Consequently, it was explained that it was not appropriate to think of IS and business strategies 
in terms of separate entities which can be aligned. The ideas which were developed conceive 
the human agent and IS as parts of the strategizing process itself. The research concludes that 
regardless of the availability of ICT, or socially enabled networks, it is most of all up to 
resounefulriess of strategic actors and their involvement in the context which determines how IS, 
MI and knowledge are leveraged in the strategizing process.
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Nevertheless, as with any qualitative research, arguments drawn from this research are bound 
to the underlying assumptions of the theories adopted, the chosen methodology, the way it 
was carried out, the specific time and context of the research, and to the interpretive 
framework of the researcher. For this reason, this research has not necessarily been portraying 
‘fact’, but an interpretation of the identified problem situation through the chosen interpretive 
lenses, and in the spirit of making further distinctions to current understanding. The lessons 
have theoretical, practical and methodological implications. These are outlined below.
8.1.1 Contributions to Theory and the Framework
This thesis tried to avoid fixing definitions or isolate the components of analysis (i.e. 
information, knowledge, strategizing, IS and human agents) from each other and their context. 
Rather, it aimed to take an exploratory view on the shaping of the understanding on these 
concepts during the reiterative and hermeneutic interpretive process. Through the use of 
alternative perspectives, it was hoped to have bypassed the fundamental dualism, and 
moreover, to highlight the significance of interrelational consideration of phenomena, such as 
agency/structure, subject/object, micro/macro, individual/collective
From heuristic stand point, there can be no correct or final interpretation, only individual 
appropriations. By no means was there an attempt to form generalizations from the relatively 
small set of data. But instead, it hopes to have awakened curiosity and interest into an 
underdeveloped but valuable ontological perspective to the IS domain. The researcher takes 
the view that, specifically in the context of interpretive research, making generalizations based 
on subjective set of data would not be as meaningful as to communicate new distinctions made 
and the value they could have to the furthering of our understanding of phenomena.
This thesis has been one of the first to apply the most recently amended framework across 
different cultures and contexts in competitive strategizing. It goes some way in confirming the 
utility of the framework, and moreover, it proposes a new perspective based on the analysis. 
This new perspective is based on the inclusion of the alternative ontology and suggests an 
extended representation of the framework.
The framework was useful in many ways. It invited the exploration of emerging issues in a 
field that is dominated by objectivism and structurism. Interestingly, the focus of the research 
naturally shifted from organizational-level IS towards managerial ways of coping with the
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everyday challenges. One of the first realizations was that the framework does not seem to 
distinguish between various levels of analysis. This may be a limitation or a benefit, depending 
on the research inquiry. In this research, the framework proved to be flexible enough to allow 
navigation between organizational and managerial levels. At the same time, it must be said that 
while various levels can be distinguished conceptually, in practice, they are blurred and hard to 
delineate. In the case studies, senior managers perceived both levels as parts of the same 
context. This implies that the framework can be used on both levels to bring together the 
micro and macro levels of inquiry.
This research found the interrelatedness and integration of the components (rather than their 
separation) as a valuable feature of the framework (cf. March 1991; Galliers & Newell 2003; 
Benner & Tushman 2003). For example, IS was perceived by managers as most valuable when 
they were able to use them in ambidextrous ways. The argument is different from the view that 
knowledge and IS are ‘out there’to be aligned with business and change processes (Galliers & 
Newell 2003). The findings in this study put forward the role of the human agent as the 
ambidextrous manager, who has the desire for control, but at the same time, cannot escape the 
consequences that arise as a result of their own involvements. In both case studies, subsystems 
were meant to increase the performance of managers/advisors.
At the same time, this inhibited effective transfer and sharing of knowledge between teams and 
among business units due to a diminishing level of trust and open communication (Stata 1989; 
Badaracco 1991). This led to further cultural distance and disintegration between 
organizational and managerial IS. Although strategic actors viewed the subsystems as a 
necessary part of managerial competitive advantage, long-term unintended consequences 
(Robey & Boudreau 1999) will leave traces on organizational ongoing learning and how future 
actors leverage the organizational know-how. It is not argued that organizations do not realize 
the long-term consequences of dispersed subsystem (assuming they are aware of them, and 
care); rather it is that those who are aware have little incentive to move away from managerial 
level subsystems as long as these managers are meeting ‘the bottom line’.
Nevertheless, any contribution this research proposes will be within the research context and 
methodology. Theoretical contributions are directed to the IS strategizing framework by 
suggesting the following:
1. Ambidextrous use of IS: conceiving IS as already immanent to strategizing process and 
embodied to the users (managers);
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2. The central role of resourcefulness: the purpose behind the ways in which 
ambidextrous managers use IS.
1. Ambidextrous use of IS: Integrated exploitation and exploration IS
Due to unstructured nature of strategizing processes (Mintzberg et al 1976; 2001), a mix of 
emergent and deliberate IS were required to cope with emerging changes and conflicting 
demands. Accordingly, IS were used in line with particular approaches to strategizing. The 
figure below shows the IS components of the framework as overlapping, with the 
assumption that they are parts of the same involvement whole. Hence, a different 
ontological position is suggested. Instead of conceiving the IS components as strategic IS, 
the various forms of IS are seen as neutral, which however, may be used in a strategic 
manner, depending on the human agents who use them. Thus, the ‘strategic’ attribute is 
argued to be up to the actors rather than the IS themselves. At least in this study, it was 
found that subsystems showed their strategic-ness (the researcher’s emphasis) in the ways 
they were used. These ways were explained to be situated, embodied with the user’s being 
and attitude, and embedded within involvement processes (cf. Blackler 1995).
Collaborative Business Strategy
Organizational level implications 
of subsystems: Potential Cross- 
cultural & political conflict in 
knowledge sharing & transfer
Managerial level use of 
data, information, 
knowledge, systems and 
other decision-relevant
EXPLOITATION
STRATEGY
EXPLORATION
STRATEGY
‘Ambidextrous’ use of IS
INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
Organizational Socio- 
technical context
Figure 8.2: Towards an extended view
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2. From resources to resourcefulness as a source of competitive advantage:
This is an extension of the first argument. The ontological position of the involved 
manager was especially insightful in looking at the micro-level use of IS, which affect 
strategizing processes in a playful way (Ciborra 2000), for example how managers combine 
planned and chaotic (Wilson 2003) contexts in everyday coping.
Moreover, this point suggests that instead of refuting the rational view and accepting the 
involved view of the manager, the rational and the involved manager should be conceived 
as co-existing - with different levels of consciousness, however. In other words, behind 
every rational manager there is an already involved one. Introna’s application of Polanyi’s 
‘embodiment of tools’ and Heidegger’s phenomenology are seen as explaining the why’ 
and the ‘how’ behind the ambidextrous IS in strategizing
The new understanding in this research emphasizes the resourcefulness of the manager and 
suggests a new meaning of the term strategic in the context of IS in strategizing. What could 
now be conceived as ‘strategic’, considering the underlying assumptions of the involved 
manager, implies a shift of focus from any form of IS towards the human agent, and 
specifically, the form of relationship between the human agent, IS and their context. The 
discussion often referred to the strategic use of IS, rather than the use of strategic IS. 
(Notably, the term strategic actor was used to refer to the strategizmg actor, with no 
specific reference to the involved or rational mode of being).
This is the point of departure to assign a new distinction to this understanding of IS. The 
extension of the framework will centre on the human agent’s situated resourvejulness. The 
meaning of resourcefulness resonate a dynamic combination of personal and experiential 
knowledge as well as the use of data and information to generate new understanding, 
meaning and sense-making, which comprise the basis of decisions. Notably, the research 
recognizes the shift from the resource-based view on IS towards viewing IS as a vehicle 
used by mangers to become more resourceful while being in-the-world.
The incorporation of the seemingly contradictory ontology has implications on the 
understanding of IS and SIS, which is unfortunately an under-researched area. The figure 
below suggests an extension to the IS strategizing framework to include the new analysis:
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Figure 8.3: Suggested extension to the framework: Managerial Resourcefulness as the 
underlying drive for ambidextrous IS
Notably, the four components and the strategic actor are meant to be envisaged as parts of the 
same whole, rather than distinct entities. In practice, strategic actors were not conscious about 
IT as an object. Ambidextrous use of IS was rather an unconscious doing (at the centre of the 
figure below) while involved with coping, ongoing learning, and changing, rather than IS 
strategizing.
The inclusion of the concepts behind the involved manager attempts to contribute to the 
‘inside view’ on phenomena and from a more primal level of analysis. At this level, the 
contribution becomes less dependent on the prescriptive nature of the data gathered as the 
analysis sought to move beyond the obvious and find deeper explanation in the heuristic 
process. Acknowledging Introna (1997), more empirical data would have become counter­
effective and would have encouraged the reliance on more description, names and models, 
more abstractions and even more representations of representations in a discourse already 
saturated. Lastly, this calls for thinking through and pondering (Heidegger 1968), rather than 
thinking about phenomena.
Nonetheless, little attention has been given to this particular ontology in practice-based IS 
research. Along these lines, this thesis suggests an involved view on IS, human agents and 
strategizing, viewing them as existing in tandem. The research proposes that it is more the 
situated resourcefulness of human agents, which brings out the strategic-ness of IS.
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In addition to the main contributions, secondary contributions are suggested from the findings 
stemming from chapter 7.3, which addressed the implications of subsystems in the 
organizational context.
3. Cross-cultural differences and IS
It became evident in HPC, that managers in different cultures had different views on how 
IS can support their decision-making processes, and so had differing perceived value 
towards IS. While the literature makes distinction between ‘Western’ and ‘Asian’ cultures 
(e.g., Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995), it often assigns similar attributes to European countries 
and the US by categorizing them under the same Western’ culture umbrella. For example, 
German managers had very different world views on IS than their US counterparts, even 
to the extent of the use of online communication platforms, such as e-mail. This relates to 
the underlying assumptions and logic of the applicability and purpose of an 
equipment/object. The German way of working, sense-making and sense-giving was so 
different at HPC units that it became a central issue of organizational conflict. A key senior 
manager left the firm during this study as a result of long time conflict in reaching 
consensus with regards to ways in which particular strategies were handled. While there 
was limited room for an expanded discussion on cultural elements, future research could 
explicitly focus on the cross-cultural aspects towards using IS in strategizing, and to 
usefully explore the presence and practice of ambidextrous IS among senior managers 
across various business models and organizational structures.
Furthermore, social networks (Hansen 2002; Tsai 2001) work very differently in different 
cultural contexts due to different worldviews, mindsets and ways of communicating. The 
same assumptions about how social systems should work may not be applicable across 
cultures. This implies that universal models and conceptualizations of person-to- 
document, as well as person-to-person IS strategies may not be as relevant outside of the 
context in which they were developed. Despite continuing developments in ICTs, there 
remain challenges even among the more ‘simple’ and established technologies. Further 
research is necessary to encompass some of the taken for granted cultural elements that 
affect the attitude of strategic actors in the ways in which IS are used in strategizing.
4. Implication of subsystems on ongoing learning and organizational memory
One of the findings that emerged was that the manner in which IS were used by actors 
have consequences on the shaping of OM. In the two cases, OM was an important
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influencing factor in the ways in which messages were interpreted, and where a culture of 
openness and trust could be built and maintained. Ultimately, the ways in which OM is 
shaped potentially influences IIs to become enabling or disabling. This is a subject that 
needs to be examined in more detail in relation to individuals’ contribution to the shaping 
of OM through the ummscmts use of IS. As a stud/ of OM was not the centre of this 
research, it cannot be commented on it further. However, it was found that the use of 
subsystems on the managerial level affected the nature communication between actors in 
the wider organizational context in terms of open knowledge sharing and transfer. The 
implications would be seen in organizational ongoing learning from experienced members 
and how much of this learning becomes embedded in the OM over-time. Further research 
as to how managerial IS, such as subsystems, would affect the transfer of know-how and 
the absorption in the OM is an interesting field to be investigated.
As the research used the framework as a sense-making device (Weick 1995) to navigate the 
inquiry, it also helped to make contributions to research methodology.
8.1.2 Contributions to Methodology
This study employed interpretivism with qualitative data collection methods. Interpretivism 
was a challenging but rewarding choice. It allowed the researcher to go under the surface and 
research those aspects that the rigidity of dogmatic and quantitative approaches does not 
permit. The use of the IS strategizing framework in combination with interpretive 
methodologies and principles of the hermeneutic circle provided a powerful combination. It 
allowed the researcher to critically explore the chaotic disorder of practice, to inform and 
research relevant bodies of knowledge, and at the same time, remain focused within the 
parameters of the framework. The hermeneutic circle made the analysis a highly iterative 
process between text and praxis. This involved analyzing, questioning, sense-making, and re­
examining assumptions in the light of the IS strategizing framework, supporting theories, and 
findings from observation, formal interviews, informal conversations, etc. Although this 
seemed a never-ending process, it allowed the researcher to draw upon further distinctions and 
develop new insights, and make better sense of the complex dynamics of the conceptual 
concepts in their subjective context.
Although interpretivism does not provide ‘hard facts’, it accounts for the emerging elements 
that an objective research would dismiss. While interpretivism does not always fill the gaps in 
understanding, it helped to portray a more realistic picture of organizational realities. For
288
example, on the surface, the strategizing processes and the relevant use of IS seemed quite 
orderly to the outside observer. Until, however, observation unveiled the disorder underneath 
the work processes and muddling through the daily messiness (Ciborra 1997). In that sense, 
interpretivism allowed the researcher to embark on deeper levels of socially constructed order, 
the rationality behind layers of disorder and irrational actions. It can be implied that 
interpretivism is to some extent an attitude towards sense-making and a skilful approach to 
drawing meaning from externalities. Nevertheless, it is not only the methods or methodology 
that is important, but also the ability of the researcher to skilfully capture the essence from 
chaos and disorder. Having said that, this research appreciates the philosophical underpinnings 
of hermeneutics while being aware of the limitations.
In line with this, and despite the paradigm incommensurability argument (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979)the research found value in the integration of ideas from the strategic management 
literature as well as from philosophy (for example referring to phenomenological perspectives 
used in the social study of IS). Although traditionally opposing ontologies, the researcher 
found that combining profoundly different interpretive tools is a powerful way to draw upon 
new distinctions of the same problem situation. Again, the strength of interpretivism in this 
research was to allow this to happen.
8.1.3 Contribution to Practice
This research topic originated from an intellectual curiosity to explore practical concerns on 
solid conceptual grounds. It is hoped that the research was able to provide alternative 
explanations to the problem domain and spur more fundamental questions in future research.
The identified concern in practice was the confusion of senior managers as to why they cannot 
reach consensus in their organization when it came to strategic decision-making. Furthermore, 
due to the conflicting information coming from various sources (e.g., consultancies, industry 
reports, executive coaches and academic papers), senior managers seem constantly to find 
themselves at a crossroad of multiple ‘solutions’. However, it is increasingly difficult to identify 
the real source of the problems. As some blame the lack of consensus building on a lack of 
leadership (a source of frustration in PCS), others blame it on a failed attempt to integrated 
supportive technologies (ERP systems in HPC). Yet others see cross-cultural differences as the 
source of the problem.
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The contribution to practice has been to draw finer distinctions and create a richer 
understanding of the role of IS in strategizing. Practice-based contribution of this research 
suggest a new way of looking at the strategic attribute and usefulness of management 
information and knowledge systems used by senior managers in daily decision-making 
processes. Potential contributions can be outlined as follows (these should be seen as mutually 
re-enforcing):
• A more detailed cross-cultural consideration of how managers of different cultures 
integrate IS in strategizing may help to mitigate some of the socio-technical problems 
when introducing standardized IS, i.e. ERP systems across different locations. The 
case of HPC suggested that first it is necessary to foster common managerial practices 
based on integrated mindsets before embarking on IT investments.
• Hence, regardless of the sophistication of an IT system, it is suggested that the 
attitudes, willingness, and the situated intelligence of users are determining factors for 
the successful integration of an IT in organizational strategizing.
• This research suggests that in strategizing, IS shows its strategic value when it is 
perceived as withdrawn, i.e. hence the use of subsystems. In order for it to become 
withdrawn, it has to become one with the users mindset and ways of sense-making. 
Hence, the more tailored and flexible a system, the higher the probability for it to 
become withdrawn in practice, hence, the more strategic this would become.
• This research raises awareness that not only is an ‘IS mindset’ specific to, but also 
situated in the context, time and mood of the human agent (i.e. Ciborra 2001 on ‘In 
the mood for knowledge’). This consideration is significant when devising an enabling 
knowledge sharing context, i.e. through bottom-up IS.
Reflecting briefly on the cases, HPC’s decision to implement ERP modules was enforced by 
the CEO in order to keep up with the competition. Most German managers interviewed did 
not directly oppose this; however, they did focus more on potential problems than potential 
benefits. The decision was regarded as a heavy investment and they just ‘hoped’that potential 
benefits would outweigh the problems. On the other hand, US managers had been waiting 
‘too long’ for a new technology to ‘solve’ their strategizing and IS problems. Their focus was 
on the benefits rather than potential risks. Overall, among the US colleagues, there was the 
perception that once technology is successfully implemented, efficiency in consensus building 
follows automatically. There is plenty of research verifying that most often senior managers 
pay attention to IS when there are hard facts about measurable profits. What most general
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managers did not realize is that a strategic IS had already been existing in their involvements 
and embodied within their decisions and actions, i.e. managerial subsystems. Not being aware 
of the hidden power of subsystems, many of the organizational conflict could not be 
explained. Nonetheless, no one single element can be ‘blamed’ for existing organizational 
problems, as it is the interaction of many elements over time that shape the milieu.
PCS showed that even when ICTs were working well and aligned with core business processes, 
the lack of guidance about using the systems, and the sheer volume of information and 
applications led to a perceived diminishing return of IS. Eventually, advisors did not use much 
of the centralized IS in their decisions. Furthermore, IT-enabled social systems that attempt to 
connect knowledge workers did not work well without consistent reinforcement and the 
inclusion of leaders. While the corporate culture encouraged knowledge sharing, ironically, 
since knowledge is at the same time a source of bargaining power, the quality of that 
knowledge shared was compromised.
This thesis demonstrated that treating IS as an object outside the involvement whole highly 
undermines the power inherent to IS, which it already is having on strategizing processes, 
decisions and on strategic actors. The ways in which IS are used are far reaching in affecting 
decisions and the organizational dynamics. Furthermore, the unintended consequences 
springing from the use of IS have extended effects on an enabling or disabling information 
infrastructure, on reinforcing politics or collaboration, and eventually on ‘the bottom line’. 
Hence, IS from an always already involved ontology is seen as the essence of what the strategic 
management literature has been rationalizing and the practice has been objectifying. This 
study also demonstrated that the IS strategizing framework has been useful to practitioners in 
thinking about the interaction of various IS elements in their strategizing work. It helped them 
to step outside their involvement and reflect upon finer distinctions.
The findings and analysis inevitably lead to further questions. Some of them are as follows: 
How interdependent should executive IS and organization-wide IS be, given different 
information needs, requirements, and purpose of use? How could the usefulness of management 
IS be addressed to serve the daily strategizing work better? What comprises the strategic aspect 
of IS? To what extent should managers use personalized IS, separate from organizational IS? 
To what extent could standardization of systems encourage and facilitate information and 
knowledge transfer and sharing without compromising the personalized nature of IS? To what 
extent do different cultural values and assumptions shape the ways in which personalized or 
standardized IS are formed? Could there be some cultural attributes that allow complete
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personalization of systems but not at the cost of drifting away from a knowledge sharing 
mentality?
The next section covers some of the limitations and shortcomings of the research process.
8.2 CHALLENGES & LIMITATIONS
The researcher has been aware of several limitations inherent to conducting qualitative 
research in the social study of IS on theoretically, methodologically and empirically levels.
8.2.1 Limitations Due to Theory and Methodology
There were many challenges inherent in the complex nature of the topic itself. The literature is 
rich with perspectives and approaches, where different perspectives and definitions can be 
supported and criticised in various ways, depending on which lenses one uses. At the same 
time, theoretical concepts and generalizations have definitions, which are context specific and 
are subject to different interpretations according to different societal settings, histories, 
traditions, experiences, cultures, and practice. Although this research did focus on a certain set 
of definitions, it also agrees with the argument that the narrowing down of complex 
phenomena into single definitions would bind the researcher to a set of assumptions, which 
again, affect the conclusions drawn.
A theoretical challenge has been that the tacit, intangible and socially unconscious nature of it 
is never completely observed and objectified by either participants or observers. The intangible 
elements may never be completely accessible and the tacit may never be made completely 
explicit. People cannot step out of their worlds, or objectify them in a supreme action of 
reflection (McCarthy 2001). At the same time, a well-defined focus of the research scope was 
necessary in order to develop the sensory acuity for exploring complex social reality. 
Notwithstanding, the very meaning of knowledge has evolved throughout the course of this 
research. While the philosophical roots remained fairly consistent, modem conceptualization 
has been reconstructed as a way to fit in new topics and market new ideas business books. 
While emerging perspectives are credible in the context in which they are presented, it was 
important to keep a critical eye on the topic overall.
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8.2.1.1 The IS Strategizing Framework
The framework was used a way to structure the interviews and makes sense of the data during 
the empirical work as well as during the analysis. While the components of the framework 
helped to organize the findings and responses from the interviewees, it also revealed some 
limitations to the analysis within the particular scope of this research. For example:
• All encompassing, sometimes difficult to remain focused on specific components
• Seems to tackle organizational-level IS concerns
• Component-based representation of the concepts may be perceived as somewhat 
objective in the messiness of managerial strategizing
• The underlying assumptions encourage strategic management thinking, which 
may lead to a cause and effect based analysis.
The framework encompasses many concepts. One of the challenges during the interviews was 
the difficulty (on the part of the researcher as well as interviewees) to remain focused on the 
research topic and not drift towards related issues. There were instances, where the risk was 
high to drift into subjects that were important, but not part of the initial agenda of the research 
inquiry, such as power and politics in strategizing. Taking note of emerging issues as a result of 
the exploratory opportunity was a process of learning and growing as an interpretive 
researcher.
The researcher repeatedly encountered during data collection that managerial and 
organizational level challenges were interrelated in the organizational milieu. An associated 
challenge was the wide interpretive flexibility of the framework. While the framework seems to 
be explicitly concerned with organizational level IS, it does not distinguish managerial level IS, 
but does not dismiss their possibility either. Given that distinctions are also ambiguous and 
blurry in the real world, it was difficult for the researcher to relate the empirical findings with 
the framework as to what different levels are concerned. Having said that, this became rather a 
strength of the framework in the later stages of the interpretation process, where data and 
literature were explored on a deeper level, rather than structuring them into a pre-structured 
framework.
In the interpretive endeavour of this research, another perceived limitation of the framework 
was the component-based view on phenomena. While it insinuates an integrated view to 
overcome the traditional dualism and positivism, there is still some tendency to think of real
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world phenomena in terms of cause and effect, rather than as integrative or embedded. For 
example, managers were not really making conceptual distinction such as ‘exploitation’ or 
‘exploration’ IS strategies, they were merely using the tools in their work processes with little 
attention to them. At the same time, it can be implied that this limitation is just a 
representational one.
Related to the above, the framework: encouraged analysis based on concrete and objective data, 
for example how a specific IT may fulfil new business requirements. When the research 
encountered the subjectivity of dynamic managerial and organizational strategizing processes, 
data were not so concrete and clear cut. Thus, the research had to refer to supporting theories 
to explain the undercurrents (the why) of the findings. This became evident during the iterative 
hermeneutic process. The supporting lenses helped to make sense of the blurry and 
unstructured elements of managerial and organizational dynamics in praxis. For example, from 
the outset, senior managers seemed to be rational and the framework seemed to ‘fit’. However, 
as the empirical work matured, many elements emerged that did not make sense. In order to 
explain the discrepancies and the ever incomplete picture, the underlying assumptions of the 
involved manager helped to explain the image of the rational manager. Hence, only after 
understanding the involved manager, it was possible to understand the rational manager better.
Furthermore, the consideration of supporting lenses allowed the researcher to move between 
the more rational strategic management thinking and the relevant philosophically-based 
concepts. While very insightful, it was also a major challenge to combine the traditionally 
distinct views on the world into a coherent understanding of the ‘whole’. Nevertheless, it was 
found that the combination of profound different ontologies is a powerful way to gain new 
insights into the topics that seem to have already established themselves in the current 
literature. This allowed the researcher to leverage the framework even better and make a 
contribution along these lines. Lastly, it should be acknowledged that the application of the 
framework may reveal different strengths and weaknesses depending on the research scope, 
context, and the methodology used.
8.2.1.2 Methodology
There are inherent challenges to multi-method research approaches. Mingers (2001) points out 
four of them: philosophical, cultural, psychological, and practical. This research can relate to 
philosophical, cultural and practical challenges.
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Philosophical challenges related to the fundamental assumptions each paradigm brings to the 
research inquiry, especially where objectivist/subjectivist ontological and epistemological 
dichotomies are encountered. At the same time, Mingers argues that paradigms could be 
permeable and possible to connect their boundaries (e.g. ‘transition zones’). These challenges 
were faced while attempting to incorporate philosophical assumptions into the IS strategizing 
framework. The possibility of such connection highly depends on the context of the research 
and what the purpose of the analysis is. This challenge is directly associated with the practical 
aspects, which are discussed more thoroughly in the next subsection. The cultural challenge 
was in relation to understanding (i) the corporate culture of the companies before attempting 
to interpret the text, and (n) differences in national cultures. The underlying assumptions of 
each cultural setting highly affect the meaning behind the words of interviewees. The 
researcher’s familiarity with the German and US cultures (in the HPC case study) helped to 
largely eliminate most of the stereotypes and biases of each culture. At the same time, the 
researcher accepts that one cannot step outside the context and escape the subjectivity of her 
own existence.
There were also practical and theoretical challenges associated with hermeneutic enquiry. 
Although there has been an increasing interest in hermeneutics as a research approach in the 
field of IS, there is very little guidance as to what exactly constitutes a hermeneutic method for 
the investigation of social phenomena (Butler 1998). On a theoretical level, an apparent 
critique of hermeneutics is that it makes the assumptions that ‘text’ represents truth. As a 
matter of fact, the approach relies too much on the ‘text’ as mirroring reality. This critique has 
been put forth by postmodernists, arguing that humans exist within a linguistic play in which 
there is no absolutes, but an endlessly differentiating play of signifiers (Derrida 1982). Since the 
text does not bear intrinsic meaning perse, meaning is established by their differentiation from 
all the other terms in the language. As Introna (1997) notes, this cannot be absolutely true 
because no interpretation would be meaningful then. The reason we refer to the real world, or 
‘text’, to extract meaning is because in some sense, we are continually inspired by that which is 
beyond the representation, while at the same time knowing that we cannot escape language as 
a means to a higher level of being (ibid). Having said that, this research appreciates the 
flexibility and philosophical underpinnings of hermeneutics while being aware of limitations 
and trying to overcome them -  at least to some extent - through taking a more critical stance.
The multi-methodological approach helped to mitigate some of the associated limitations. 
Next to semi-structured interviews, observation, informal conversations and document review 
were used. Yet limitations were also associated with qualitative semi-structured interviews and
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observation. Chapter 4 reflected on some of the pitfalls outlined by Myers and Newman 
(2007), e.g. level of entry, artificiality of the interview, lack of trust, lack of time, elite bias, 
Hawthorne effects, constructing knowledge, ambiguity of language, and communication 
problems. As addressed in chapter 4, the interview stage is an artificial construct (ibid), 
whereby the interviewer is actively constructing knowledge (Fontana & Frey 2000) and 
interviewees are constructing stories to come across as knowledgeable and rational. At the 
same time, while they are constructing their stories, they reflect upon issues that they may not 
have considered so explicitly before (Myers & Newman 2007). Interpretivism becomes 
especially a powerful tool to capture emerging issues during the research process.
At the same time, the interpretive approach to data analysis enhanced the subjectivity of the 
findings, which may be criticized by quantitative researchers for lack of concreteness. To 
counter argue, quantitative approaches have shortcomings also and a lack of such methods 
cannot necessarily be a weakness, as all is relative. There are many ways to measure and analyze 
data and each way makes explicit a different angle, breadths and depth of real world 
phenomena. The method itself is just a tool, it is neutral. It rather depends on the goal of the 
research. This research argues that no methodology or method in and by itself is able to 
capture the true reality -  as any chosen methodology, at the end of the day, is a reflection of 
how we choose to make sense of our world. Along these lines, one should be open and not 
dismiss challenges and tensions to the background Given the nature of the topic and the 
context within what was possible, the choices made seem to have been appropriate and 
rewarding.
8.2.2 Limitations in Conducting the Empirical Work
Researchers conducting empirical studies in the social study of IS and strategizing face 
contradictory challenges (Balogun et al 2003). As already mentioned, there were general 
challenges due to the nature of the topic and the methodology. There were also limitations 
while collecting the ‘data’. It has become increasingly difficult to collect data on strategists and 
their practices within the fast changing context of global organizations. The work boundaries 
of strategic actors in both cases were broad and elusive as they undertook a range of activities 
and responsibilities. The inquiry involved the consideration of attitudes and actions of strategic 
actors within the subjective and embedded work of decision making, which made it 
challenging to capture what mattered to the study and what did not matter. Balogun et al (ibid) 
suggest that working with organizational members as research partners rather than passive
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informants is a helpful step to overcome many challenges. Nevertheless, two challenges that 
are difficult even for experienced researchers could not be completely overcome. These were 
encountered during the interviews and observation:
8.2.2.1 Power Structures & Managerial Biases
One considerable challenge was to see past the data and read more into the messages 
respondents attempted to convey (Van Maanen 1979). Managerial biases and strategic games 
were played out during the negotiation of deals. While the researcher was aware of existing 
managerial biases, it was difficult to identify them at all times. Given the limited access to 
insider information, evidence-based knowledge, and lack of complete knowledge about the 
relationships among the members and their personal agendas, it was difficult to identify how 
much ‘truth’ was in a response (especially during interviews with more than one member in a 
room). This was especially evident in the case of PCS.
The role of power structures (Klein & Myers 1999) is one of the determining factors in making 
sense of data. This refers to the social world in which actors dwell, characterized by vested 
interests and limited resources to meet the goals of various actors. The researcher attempts to 
‘read’ behind the words of the actors and identify managerial biases and personal agendas. As a 
way to overcome this challenge, Klein and Myers refer to the Principle of Suspension from 
Ricoeur (1976), or ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, to encourage critical thinking. Advocating the 
philosophy of Marx and Freud, the idea is to make explicit the effects of socially created 
distortions in certain circumstances. While aware of certain power structures in praxis, at the 
same time, this method (hermeneutics of suspension) would not have been appropriate 
because this research was more concerned with the interpretation of meaning rather than 
discovering ‘false preconceptions’ (ibid). Generally, interpretivist researchers are sceptical as to 
the extent to which research can or should be critical (Deetz 1996). Regardless of any biases 
and politically-driven responses, the mere fact that individuals tend to give their own 
perspective creates biases in itself, which leads to different interpretations. In that sense, there 
were aspects that the researcher could not capture.
Overall, interviewees in HPC seemed to be more candid and direct to reveal their challenges, 
frustrations and everyday battles than those in PCS. For this reason, observation was included 
as a complementary method in PCS, in the hope to overcome some of the biases and the 
rational image portrayed by advisors during the early stages of the interviews. While 
observation helped, it still did not completely overcome methodological challenges, due to the
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veiy limitations of that method itself. One inherent and evident limitation of such a method is 
that the research cannot observe everything at all times. The very presence of the researcher 
may have affected the manners in which managers conducted themselves during decision­
making processes. There were no hidden cameras to capture the activities when the researcher 
was not present. Nevertheless, observation was used as a supplement rather than a main 
method. Here, the principle of suspicion appears to be a promising method but quite 
underdeveloped in the IS research literature. Along with the suggestion of Klein and Myers 
(1999), the researcher sees the value of incorporating critical theory with interpretivism in 
future research.
82.2.2 Language Barriers
Another limitation may have been posed through language barriers. The interviews at HPC in 
Germany and the US were in English because this was the corporate language, and also for the 
sake of consistency. Although no significant barriers were noticed in that regard, it cannot be 
denied that had the interviews been in German at the German offices, then responses and 
impressions may have differed. The researcher overcame possible misinterpretations by 
confirming certain terms in German and English, and by having knowledge of the German 
culture while they reacted to questions.
Nevertheless, one may study the same phenomenon with similar assumptions but across 
different case studies, and the results become different. This research acknowledges that the 
data collected is subject to the specific time window and circumstances under which a certain 
set of subjects, objects and processes were studied. The results are subject to the chosen 
research scope, focus, case companies and interviewees - as they were selected in accordance 
to feasibility and accessibility. Having said that, more diverse data may have had more analytic 
benefits in explaining and reaching understanding (Yin 2003).
8.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS & SUGGESTIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH
The research tried to merge recent thinking from strategic management and relevant ideas 
rooted in a primal level of analysis (Heidegger 1962; Gadamer 1989; Polanyi 1973) as a way to 
improve our understanding of the role of IS in strategizing.
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Two views were illustrated which appeared to be in conflict, but were argued to actually serve 
human agents on the managerial level. First, the prevailing management thought emphasizes 
rational decision-making and is preoccupied with planning. Conversely, phenomenological 
understanding puts light on improvisation, the situated-ness of actions and on coping with 
unexpected consequences (Ciborra 2004). While the planned view regards improvisation as a 
tactic, or quick problem-solving, paradoxically, the coping is not a result of thinking and acting, 
but a medium within which activities take place (ibid). This is the place from which 
contributions of this research are meant to be perceived.
The analysis considered the world of practice as exploratory, uncertain and changing, which 
increased the need or desire of the senior manager for deliberation, intention and top down IT 
in search for certainty, predictability and efficiency. The case studies acknowledged this 
paradox to be the need for certainty through strategies, best practices and ICT and at the same 
time, the need for uncertainty in the form of path-dependent learning, improvisation and 
coping in search for new meaning, innovation and uniqueness (Ciborra 2004).
Subsystems were identified as the way in which managers dealt with this paradox. As with any 
paradox, there are associated unintended consequences. While subsystems served individual 
managers with control over information, these were not serving an open culture, knowledge 
transfer and organizational learning.
The research also emphasized the importance of context, actor and activity (as coping) as 
inseparable and parts of the same whole. IS was interpreted as a part of the meaning 
generation or manipulation of goals, as opposed to the assumption that human agents adopt 
the appropriate IT to meet their intention. A major contribution is seen in the attempt to 
show the relevance of traditionally competing perspectives on IS, strategizing and human 
agents in the mainstream IS and strategic management literatures. It showed that what 
appeared to be a conflict of assumptions at first was actually complementary, which also led to 
the suggested extension to the framework.
In this research, the circular and iterative process meant an ongoing analysis of the relation 
between IS and human agents on the managerial strategizing level and the organizational 
context. The organizational context was analyzed in terms of the observed enabling and 
disabling factors, and how these affected the behavior of human agents towards the use of IS.
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Chapter 1 set out the appropriate definition for strategizing, information and knowledge in the 
context of this research. The literature supporting the underlying assumptions of strategizing 
in this research defined this complex concept as processual in nature (Pettigrew 1995), 
emergent (Mintzberg 1987; 1994; 2000) and situated (Ciborra 1994; 2004). At the same time, 
the research did not refute the assumptions of the rational view on strategy (i.e. Porter 1985; 
1996), but argued both ontological positions co-exist and suggested to view them in tandem. It 
was argued that the difference between the different views on strategizing is more likely the 
level of analysis the researcher or practitioner chooses to focus on rather than assuming one 
paradigm holds absolute truth. It was in this realm where competitive strategizing in the 
context of this thesis was understood.
From this point of view, this research was not about tactics (or ‘tacticizing’). It was argued 
that if the senior manager cannot recall where a particular decision started and when it ended, 
or when an action started and ended, then what is tactical and what is strategic? The involved 
manager would not find this distinction meaningful, as what seems tactical today, may be 
strategic tomorrow (Mintzberg 1984). Hence, the manager finds himself in a constant 
hermeneutic circle, constant re-evaluation of information and continuous reshaping of his 
personal knowledge. According to Rumelt, ‘one person’s strategy is another’s tactics -  that 
what is strategic depends on where you sit’ (1979a: 197). According to the empirical evidence, 
this mode of being was argued to have resulted the existence or emergence of subsystems. 
Notwithstanding, the interplay between the subjective and almost phenomenological 
components of contextual mix make it difficult to delineate and categorize human behaviour 
as tactical or strategic in practice. An interesting distinction for further research is to explore 
the relation between strategic IS and the usefulness of IS with regards to managerial work (not 
technical requirements).
The kernel of the thesis was that the ways in which IS are used depend most of all on the users 
of the systems and the level of their involvement. Galliers & Newell (2003; 165) state that ‘it is 
the intelligent receiver (user) of these data, who will use his/her knowledge to interpret and 
make sense of the data in a specific context and for a particular purpose’. Findings in this 
research reinforced this particular angle and proposed a deeper consideration of it on the basis 
of concepts underpinning Introna’s involved manager concept. Contributions included:
• Acknowledging the integration of explorative and exploitative IS in strategizing: 
Emphasising ambidextrous ways to using IS;
300
• Proposing an involved perspective based on the ontological position, which perceives 
the rational and involved manager as already always present in the same involvement 
whole. The representation of the strategic attribute was shifted from the resource-based 
view towards resourcefulness, emphasizing the involved use of IS by human agents.
The first point supported the explanation that the use of deliberate and emergent IS taking 
place in tandem. Separating the two approaches are conceptually helpful in drawing upon 
distinctions, however, practically not relevant. In both case studies, deliberate and emergent IS 
were inextricably inter-linked because the process of strategizing itself is unstructured with 
heavy reliance on experience-based tacit knowledge. As the process of strategizing was 
conceived as coping, this called for a congruent way of using IS, i.e as ambidextrous and 
embodied. The study concluded that much of the ‘strategic-ness’ of IS depends on the actor’s 
resourcefulness. No IT/IS alone can add business value or outstanding performance in 
circumstances where tacit knowledge comprises the key element. Notwithstanding, while 
human agents cannot be studied in a vacuum, organizational IS cannot be studied without the 
consideration of human agents either.
The interpretation suggested that IS should be conceived as part of the knowledge activity and 
coping itself, as an extension of the knowledge workers themselves (cf. Polanyi 1966), in order 
for them to permeate the strategizing process. In other words, the strategic alignment 
argument between business strategies and associated IS/IT will not suffice to benefit from 
their potential without an involved view. As long as IS are treated as separate entities from 
strategizing and associated organizational complexities, they will not have a major impact on 
managerial strategizing activities, for example in enabling managers to develop new products 
or services while excelling at current businesses (Tinaikar 2006). According to Introna (1997: 
40):
Until this [personal knowledge] is addressed, information systems will never 
become part of the manager’s body. And thus they will not become part of the 
focal acts of judgements and other management action.’
The consideration of the involved manager may introduce the following questions for future 
research:
• Could the involved manager develop ‘situated intelligence’ [the researcher’s emphasis]?
• Comparing the involved mode across different cultures, would situated intelligence to 
some extent be linked to managerial practices inherent to certain cultures? In other
301
words, do managers in certain cultures have a more developed situated intelligence for 
using S in a way as to performing more effectively and efficiently in strategizing?
• Along these lines, does the ambidexterity (as an attitude towards using IS) apply to a 
variety of cultures? Can it be generalized as it is presented in the framework?
According to reviews on cross-cultural management research (Shaw 1990), many 
differences in attitudes, values and styles among managers from different countries have 
been found However, very limited research has been done to explain how multi-cultural 
differences have an impact on the behavior of individuals within organizations and their 
relationship with one another (e.g. Adler 1983). Future research may consider the 
prevalence of ambidexterity of IS strategizing across different cultures, which implies 
different priorities in strategizing, hence different sense-making and different forms and 
approaches towards IS.
The discussion around users’ ‘situated intelligence’ in strategizing and how IS may capture and 
integrate these are potentially fruitful extensions of this thesis. There has been research on the 
‘Intelligent Organization’ (Choo 2006), which addresses the relationship between the 
organization as a whole with its environment, and the organization with its internal processes. 
Along these lines, Menkes (2005), from the executive coaching field, addresses attributes of 
‘Executive Intelligence’ in relation to strategic-decisions in strategizing processes. It is this gap 
between organizational and managerial level competencies that need to be closed, however, 
not from the traditional rational view. In this context, IS may prove to be powerful tools, not 
as IT to enable data and information, but as enablers to link the organizational and managerial 
know-how in dynamic and synergistic ways.
An interesting area for further research is to consider the involved manager being-in different 
power structures of different national cultures. Considering the different rules, assumptions 
and perceptions to reality, one may explore the extent to which IS are integrated in the strategy 
processes, and in what ways managers use IS while having to cope with different set of 
structural and power constraints. For example, the ambidexterity of IS may apply less to more 
collectivist cultures than it does to the individualistic cultures of North America and parts of 
Europe. Perhaps it is not surprising that knowledge sharing strategies seem to be more 
successful in collectivistic cultures, and individual performance-based systems in individualist 
cultures.
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Figure 8.4: Summary of contributions
It can be implied that future applications of the IS strategizing framework will reveal 
different findings across a range of different contexts. However, the researcher speculates 
that if the strategic actor is considered through the lens of the involved manager, then one 
fundamental finding will remain consistent across different cases: this would be the way's in 
which IS are used depend on the practitioners’ perceived world, the ‘being-in’ or 
involvement in the world and the embedded elements in their world. If this thesis would 
make any generalization, then it would be the emphasis on the human agent as the involved 
manager, on strategizing as coping, and management IS as vehicles used to achieve certainty 
in the unpredictable and changing environments.
While reflecting on the arguments in a concluding remark, it would be interesting to briefly 
consider the following: Why are academia and organizations so interested in finding best 
practices, strategies and continuous amendments to established frameworks? What is the 
driving force behind the desire to have strategies that work better’? One obvious answer is to 
respond to the changing requirements of changing environments, to create certainty that one’s 
intentions will be realized, to increase predictability and lower risk of failure. A strategy and the 
relevant IT give organizations and managers the perceived certainty about achieving an 
outcome and, moreover, the perception of control over the direction of the company in the 
face of flux and unpredictability.
Consider for a moment this: what would happen to IS if internal and external environments 
would not change, events would be predictable and information would be transparent. What
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would this mean to strategy and IS? Let us assume that in predictable environments, strategy 
would become best practice and would work time after time. This would imply that the 
associated IT would also provide predictability and consistent value, given it is used 
appropriately.
Given this scenario, what would happen to the ways in which managers used IS/IT in such an 
environment? Would corporate IT still be as valuable? Would managers at HPC and PCS still 
make use of subsystems or soley rely on corporate mechanism as intended by the organization? 
From the analysis, we predict that even if the environments were stable, certain and 
predictable, still we would find subsystems to persist. The reason goes back to the idea that 
certainty does not provide competitive advantage in competitive environments (at least in 
endevear of this research). Once managers saturate the benefits of an existing IS, (still 
assuming the environments are stable), they would then find ways to differentiate themselves 
from their peers and their environment in order to become different and more competitive. 
This implies a different use of the same IS vehicles or the use of different tools/IS all together. 
Referring to the understanding of strategizing as dwelling-in and the fundamental role of the 
everyday ‘life-world’ (Ciborra 2004:18-19) of relevant agents, it makes sense to think of 
strategizing as the messiness and situated-ness of their coping. This challenges the idealization 
of the scientific method and emphasizes the strategic importance of heuristics and the involved 
mode of operations.
Having reflected on a series of paradoxes associated with underlying assumptions of IS in 
strategizing, the thesis concludes with the point that behind every rational manager there is an 
always already involved one, where the process of decision-making not only consists of hard 
facts and evidence, but also on intuition, tinkering, improvisation and mood (Ciborra 2004). 
The understanding is not only relevant to strategizing and decision making, but moreover, to 
technology, knowledge management. The research encourages deeper consideration of 
phenomenological ontology from a practice-based view on strategizing. This will have 
implications on the ways in which IS are viewed and developed in practice with the focus on 
allowing the usefulness of IS become immanent to manager’s being involved, and so to allow 
managers become more resourceful in their strategizing - as opposed to extensive use of 
resources for sake of the resources themselves. This is where the research found the strategic 
value of IS. Future research along the lines may serve towards bringing together cross- 
disciplinary issues into the dialogue of academic research and managerial practices.
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A. OVERVIEW OF PRELIMINARY RESEARCH & CASE STUDIES
As a preliminary research, 6 small scale pilot studies were conducted, 1 of which was more 
extensive in terms of number of people and effort put into. All are based on semi-structured 
as well as unstructured interviews.
Type
of
Study
Informants/
Location
Type of 
Company
Data Collection 
Method
Time of 
Study
Pre­
liminary
Studies
- Strategy Consulting 
Firm: UK
- Oil & Gas Company, 
Netherlands
- IT & Engineering 
Consulting, UK
- Executive Coaches, 
USA
- IT Strategy Consultant, 
Germany
- Industrial Goods 
Exporter, Germany
Private,
Global
Public, Global 
Public, Global 
Private 
Public 
Private
5 meetings, 3 interviews, 
email correspondences.
1 phone interview
6 Interviews, 1 strategy 
review meeting
2 interviews
1 interview
2 interviews
2001-2002
January
2002
Summer
2002
Summer
2003
March 9,
2004
April 8, 
2004
Main HPC: USA &  Germany 
Engineering, Hydro Power 
Generation
Private 
H Q  Germany
23 semi-structured 
interviews (not including 
repeated interviews with 
selected members) in 
Germany and USA
2003-5
Main PCS: USA Financial 
Advisory and Services, 
Private Client Group
Public 
H Q  USA
13 un- and semi- interviews; 
Observations over 6 
months
November 
2005- 
April 2006
Table A-l: Overview of the Empirical Work 2001-2006
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B. PILOT STUDIES
More details on the two most relevant pilot studies are provided below.
1. Oil & Gas Company, Netherlands 
Phone interview
Date: 23 January 2002 
Duration: 40 minutes
First, a semi-structured phone interview was conducted with a director at Shell Global 
Solutions in Netherlands. The questions were in relations to the perception of the executive 
HR manager on issues surrounding KM and management IS, information infrastructure 
strategies, corporate communication resources and corporate culture.
Question
Given the increasing global competition, I am interested in understanding how senior 
managers at your company use IS to their advantage. This includes IT and non-IT related IS, 
including Knowledge Management (KM). How is knowledge managed in different parts of the 
company?
Summary of the Interviewee’s response
First, the Interviewee pointed out the controversy in theory and practice, that there is no clear- 
cut definition for KM or management IS. Rather, ‘KM is understood, valued and dealt with 
differently depending on which part of the organization we are looking at’, and what roles and 
responsibilities the actors have.
The Interviewee made his comment in relation with his position and responsibilities as a senior 
manager and a member of the Technology Solutions project at firm. He mentioned briefly that 
one of his tasks is making sure that the corporate knowledge is transferred and taught 
effectively, efficiently, and quickly to all employees, especially to the new recruits, and to
ensure that the corporate culture and internal knowledge is understood and applied in
accordance to expectations. He emphasised that what matters is not the knowledge that is 
available to everyone, that which is explicit, but the continuous development and distribution 
of tacit knowledge within teams, so the sum (collective tacit knowledge of the team as a 
whole) is more than each individual member’s knowledge.
He speculated on the following issues that interested him:
• T o  what extent is knowledge considered an asset? And why?’
• ‘What types of knowledge are useful?’
• Tiow can I quickly on-board people? What can you do to make people learn more 
quickly’ and increase the collective tacit knowledge of the company?’
• Tiow do you teach new managers about the corporate tacit knowledge and at the 
same time let them maintain their individuality and innovative spirit?’
Example: Even if the best coach could give clear instructions on how to win the game of 
tennis, that does not make the listener a tennis player, by far not a good one to win the game. 
So, what does is take to share the tacit knowledge and apply/use it to its full potential?
The interviewee provided interesting issues and points of departure on the topic.
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2. Global IT & Engineering Consulting Firm, UK
At a later stage, another case study was arranged at a leading global IT & Engineering 
Consulting Firm, headquartered in Epsom, UK. The researcher interviewed 6 executives and 
one Strategy & Markets Analyst (the contact person). The study required several trips to the 
corporate offices. Interviews were semi-structured and notes were taken. Furthermore, the 
researcher was allowed to sit in a one-day strategy review meeting to observe and take notes.
Many conversations were held with the contact person who gave deeper insight into the 
company and the interviewees’ backgrounds, their roles and responsibilities. Interview 
questions were structured in accordance with the IS strategizing framework (Galliers & Newell 
2003), primarily in relation with existence corporate information resources and networks for 
the purpose of decision-making. Reference was made to business intelligence systems, ERP 
systems, decision tool systems, knowledge management systems.
This was an interesting case because the company was going through a challenging time on the 
corporate governance level. Certainly, there was tension that affected their attitudes towards 
the researcher during the politically unstable times. As some respondents were reluctant to 
share information, others used the opportunity to express their frustration and might have 
shared information that they would not have otherwise. Nevertheless, the responses where 
valuable because they raised issues that shaped the direction of the study and helped to fine 
tune the approach to the remaining interviews.
Interview Reference
1. Strategy & Marketing Analyst - Introduction Meeting in Epsom, Tues 22 August 3pm
- 4pm.
2. Strategy & Marketing Director: Epsom, Wed 11 September 11.30pm -12.30pm.
3. Strategy Review Meeting (Pre-curser to BU reviews): Epsom, Wed 11 September 2pm
- 5pm.
4. M & A team: Epsom, Fri 13 September 10am -1 lam.
5. International Business Development Director: Epsom, Fri 13 September 11.30am -  
lpm.
6. Managing Director of North American subsidiary Phone Interview. September 7pm - 
8pm.
7. Rail Strategy Director: London, Fri Sept lpm -  2pm.
8. Conclusions Meeting in London, October.
Summary of the Study
This study represents a brief pilot case study to fine tune the methodological tools for further 
studies at multi-national companies. The first interview was conducted with the Strategy & 
Marketing Director, who showed great amount of interest and talked about the organizational 
and governance structure at his company, and how IS and Knowledge Management Systems 
(KMS) related to his company’s strategizing processes. In regards to a need for a large scale 
MIS/KMS, he did not show an immediate interest or need due to the de-centralized structure 
of the firm. He was rather pessimistic about the success of such systems. Main reasons were 
the time require to implement the systems and train managers (who ‘do not have time for such 
things’), and lack of unified corporate culture. This behavior was justified by the nature of their 
jobs as busy managers who ‘are constantly juggle new issues’. Each division has the incentive 
to retain their tacit knowledge for own benefit as opposed to share them openly with the top 
management for the sake of improving organisational intelligence.
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Most divisions at the firm are designed to operate independently; therefore, managing directors 
(MDs) tend to adopt an independent strategy, accordingly. Hence, an integrated KMS seemed 
unrealistic and not reliable for corporate strategists under the given corporate structure, 
governance and changing circumstances at that point in time. As he concluded, a KMS [also 
referring to any kind of management IS] that supports the acquisition, storage and 
dissemination of knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, across divisions seem too idealistic 
given the current structure and culture.
Strategy meeting The Strategy Director led the meeting. Four other participants were 
present to discuss the performance of each of the firm’s business units (Bus). The director 
seemed to have a hard time to make sure that the BU managers were following the business 
plan that a strategy consulting firm had prepared for them. Each of the four participants was 
giving an analysis of their division and the performance of each unit was evaluated by a 
method developed by the strategy consulting firm.
An interesting observation was during a short break, when the director, also the strategy team 
leader, left the room to greet another colleague. The environment in the room changed from 
tense formality to ease and informality. Overall, the researcher speculates that participants did 
not seem to openly share their expertise on the problems facing their business units. They 
were more concerned with being politically correct and comply. There was a cultural divide 
between the participants who were on different teams. In a follow-up interview, the director 
articulated that most of the problems with knowledge sharing stems from political tension in 
the company, not because of a lack of IS.
Another interviewee openly talked about the political and cultural conflicts on the corporate 
level which are in the way of efficient knowledge sharing. From his experience, there was no 
corporate sense of unity, and consequently, people would be driven by compensation and 
reputation only. His view on KMS/IS was similar to the first interviewee, although he believed 
that with sufficient investments (which were not available) and sufficient remuneration, people 
would be willing to share more of their knowledge and open a greater possibility for a 
KMS/IS.
According to another interviewee in the London office, the challenge lied in the internal KM 
rather than external KM. The internal expertise is unknown, hidden and tough to access, 
assimilate and share. It is the ‘how’ that matters the most (how to leverage the intellectual 
capital). The difficulty is in the dispersed nature of the company, in terms of geography and 
specialization. Both of these express different human mentalities and cultures, which are 
controversial and difficult to manage.
The company was going through turmoil during the 6-week study, which created a lot of 
uncertainty on the part of the interviewees. The growing instabilities, changes in corporate 
governance and corporate strategies affected the responses of the participants, which may have 
produced biased statements to some of the interview questions. A major issue was the 
repeated emphasis on the ‘lack of trust’ in the corporate culture. Gradually, the contextual 
nature of the company drew focus away from the main topic of the thesis, shifting from the 
study of how knowledge is acquired, shared and used towards how to cope with organizational 
change and ongoing turmoil.
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C. HPC CASE STUDY
April 2003 -  May 2005
Sources of Data:
• 23 interviewees + 10 repeated interviews = Total 33 Interviews
• Many Email correspondences and informal conversations
• Company documents (these will be treated confidential due to the company logo and name 
appearing on the documents): Strategy plans, Strategy presentations, Engineering drawings
Four trips to German and USA, twice at each site:
• Interviews in the USA: 12 + 7 repeats (4 of which were phone interviews)
• Interviews in Germany: 11+3 repeats
• 4 Phone interviews
Trip 1: USA November 2003 10 Interviews
Trip 2: Germany June 2004 9 Interviews
Trip 3: USA October 2004 5 Interviews (2 new, 3 repeats)
Trip 4: Germany March 2005 5 Interviews (2 new, 3 repeats)
Interviewee 
In-Text Nr
Position of Responsibility 
(2-30 years experience)
Number of 
Interviews
Country of 
Interview
1. Executive Vice President 1 USA
2. Director in Project Management 1 Germany
3. Director in Field Operations 2 USA
4. Executive VP in Technology 1 USA
5. Director in Automation 2 Germany
6. HR Director 3 Germany
7. HR Director 3 USA
8. Sr Manager - Business 
Development
3 USA
9. Sr Manager - Business 
Development
1 USA
10. Sr Regional sales manager 1 USA
11. Sr Manager in Project 
management & Engineering
1 USA
12. Sr Manager -  Proposal 
Engineering
2 USA
13. Sr Manager - Strategic Sourcing 1 Germany
14. Sr Manager -  Contract 
Administration & Commercial 
Project Manager
1 Germany
15. Manager -  Strategic Sourcing 1 Germany
16. Manager - Supply Chain & 
Sourcing
1 Germany
17. Manager -  Facilities, 
manufacturing & Technology
2 USA
18. Manager -  Corporate 
Controlling
1 Germany
19. Manager in Group Controlling 1 Germany
20. Project Manager 1 USA
21. Manager in Manufacturing 1 Germany
22. Manager -  Field Service, 
Installation & Commissioning
1 USA
23. IT Project Manager, PhD 1 Germany
Table A-2: HPC List of Interviewees
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D. PCS CASE STUDY
November 2005 -  May 2006
Empirical material were collected based on accessibility through (1) unstructured and semi­
structured interviews and note-taking; (2) observation of day-to-day operations of managers and 
advisors, and some participation in relevant events.
Sources of data include:
Investment Managers and Advisors (years of experience at PCS ranged 2-30 years) 
Assistants to the managers/advisors to have them explain to me the details of some of the 
information systems that the advisors used (these were conversations and background 
information to interviews with advisors)
Team meetings, knowledge sharing meetings, conference calls 
Strategy meetings and preparation for the meeting with the team leader 
Managers/advisors ‘thinking loud’ in tackling emerging challenges 
Marketing strategy and business development documents 
Company documents:
Company intranet: Applications and programs for investment and client strategies, 
information sharing portals, data analysis programs, financial assessment programs, 
information resources, sources of reference, E-Learning and interactive courses, 
company forms and templates, etc.
Specific to teams: Marketing material and company publications, Business 
development and strategy plans.
Due to confidentiality, most of these documents were not allowed to be taken away from 
the office (e.g., ‘internal use only’ documents). Any relevant information has been extracted 
with permission and integrated in chapters 5 and 6. The material not presented did not 
affect the research.
Interviewee 
In-Text Nr
Interviewees’ Position of Responsibility [All in the USA] 
(2-30 Years of Experience at PCS)
1. VP & Senior (Sr) Advisor -  Business Development (BD) and Sales
2. Director & Sr Advisor - BD and Sales
3. Sr Advisor -  BD and Investment Strategy
4. Sr Advisor -  BD and Investment Strategy
5. Sr Advisor & Trainer -  BD and Sales
6. Advisor -  BD, Sales and Investment Strategy
7. Sr Advisor -  BD and Sales
8. Sr Advisor -  BD and Sales
9. Advisor -  Investment Strategy and Sales
10. Retired Senior Advisor -  BD and Sales
11. Management Director -  Manages 7 regional offices
12. Advisor -  Investment Strategy
13. Sr Advisor -  BD and Sales
Table A-3: PCS List of Interviewees
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Sources of 
Data
(6 months)
Participants Typical
duration
Description The research/er
Social Events 
(7 events)
Senior advisors, 
their assistants, 
occasionally the 
office director
30 Minutes -  
2 Hours
Socialization/ 
networking events, 
lunch and coffee 
breaks.
Researcher holds 
conversations on 
the work of the 
advisors, asks them 
to give examples; 
observing the level 
of interaction and 
knowledge sharing. 
Takes notes after 
the events on 
aspects of the 
conversations that 
seemed to be 
important.
Client/Prospect 
meetings 
(10 meetings)
Senior advisor, 
client, the 
researcher
45-70
Minutes
Meetings with clients 
either at the office or 
at the client home; 
Advisor discusses 
issues of concern; 
Meetings with 
prospects to negotiate 
the conditions of 
working together, 
brief on services, 
products and assessing 
the client’s options.
Researcher observes 
how advisors 
prepare for 
meetings, talks to 
them about what 
information they are 
considering and 
what they base their 
approach on; 
specific attention 
paid to the IS and 
IT used before, 
during and after the 
meetings. The 
researcher learns the 
company software /  
IS programs on 
client and 
investment 
strategies which are 
used daily by 
advisors.
Knowledge 
sharing meetings 
(8 meetings)
7-12 senior 
advisors
30-45
Minutes
Informal meetings to 
share concerns, 
lessons and references 
with regards to 
prospecting, business 
developing and 
devising new 
strategies. Discussions 
cover topics from 
what techniques to 
use, to what IS are 
helpful to manage 
information.
The researcher sits 
in the meetings and 
observes the 
dynamic of the 
interaction. After 
the meetings, 
informal
conversations are 
held with individual 
advisors on the 
outcome of the 
meeting.
Weekly Internal 
conference calls 
(sat in at 5 calls)
A lead senior 
advisor and the 
researcher, plus 
a large team (12 
people) based 
on the other
20-60 
Minutes 
depending 
on number 
of members 
and
To inform and share 
the latest information 
on the markets, 
company structured 
products and latest 
trends; to share
Record the IS used 
before, during and 
after the call; 
effectiveness of the 
call relative to 
expectations;
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line in New 
York
questions 
asked after a 
routine 
briefing on 
the financial 
markets
experience on certain 
client sectors; come 
up with ways to 
approach a prospect
reactions to new 
and relevant 
information; 
processing of the 
information/ 
knowledge using IS; 
etc.
Weekly supplier 
meetings (i.e. 
financial and IT 
specialists) 
(invited to 8 
meetings)
5 -10  senior 
advisors
45-60
Minutes
Financial specialists 
(internal and external) 
inform financial 
advisors on the latest 
structured products or 
specialised software 
systems in dealing 
with investment 
strategies or client 
relationship 
management 
strategies. The 
meetings become 
interactive in a Q & A 
session and informal 
conversations.
The researcher sits 
in the meetings, 
learns about the 
material and 
observes the 
participants. Takes 
notes on the 
observations; 
informal
conversations with 
available 
participants and 
financial specialists; 
takes notes.
Table A-4: PCS Sources of Empirical Material
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E. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS & GUIDES
The following section includes a collection of the material used in the interpretive research 
process. This includes notes, and unstructured and semi-structured interview questions 
used as a guide during the investigation. Also, the subsections are related to different times 
and places (Germany, USA and UK). Notably, there may be questions that do not seem to 
be directly relevant to the core argument of the thesis, at first. The questions reflea the 
learning process of the researcher and the process of fine tuning the research focus. Raising 
issues and topics indirectly related to the key terms often unleashed further insights, which 
served making sense of the research inquiry more holistically. Similarly, while some 
questions and sections may appear to be repetitive, the sense- making and underlying 
understanding of the formulated questions evolved considerably during the span of the 
research.
BACKGROUND TO TH E RESEARCH 
TOPIC
How are Information and Knowledge leveraged in decision making and strategizing in 
a cross-cultural working environment?
What resources, processes or strategies are used to share knowledge and how do these 
impact decisions and processes of corporate strategizing?
INTRODUCTION
Given that globalization and advanced technologies are continuously changing the way 
organizational resources and business strategies are chosen and managed, the speed and 
quality of strategic decision-making becomes critical to sustaining competitive advantage.
The purpose of this research is to investigate the ways in which decision makers use 
knowledge to strategize and compete, given the increasing complexity of differing 
paradigms, mindsets and process requirements across cultures.
The study takes a socio-technical approach in looking at socio-cultural, organizational 
and IS aspeas that shape (or are shaped by) decision making. Systems are tackled in their 
broader sense, including ICTs, people, tangible as well as intangible resources.
OVERVIEW OF THEORETICAL CONCEPTS IN OUTLINE:
1. Strategy for business development
2. Strategizing: managerial work and activities towards achieving the desired 
goal
• How do you define strategy and strategizing?
• What are the expeaations and what is important to you in order to meet them?
• What are the resources that are available to support your processes?
• What resources do you usually rely on consistently and randomly in order to assess 
and analyze a situation, a customer, or an event? Why? How often? Does this meet 
your needs?
• To what extent do these resources shape your decisions?
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• Do you usually reflea on the work process and re-examine things?
• To what extent do you use data, information, knowledge and wisdom?
• Where do you tap to get these?
• How are these organized and used?
• What are some of the issues you perceive as a challenge? Please reflect on how 
organizational resources affect your stratgizing processes.
• Please identify the gap (if any) between what you would like see/experience/use 
relative to current perceived deficiencies/shortcomings.
Influencing factors that support or hinder the decision making process:
• Organizational struaure and management styles
• Information Infrastruaure
• Information Systems (‘systems’ in a broad sense, e.g., technologies, people/social 
processes, networks, corporate resources)
• Cultural values, differing paradigms and mental models
• Politics and managerial discretion
COLLABORATIVE BUSINESS 
STRATEGY
COLLABORATIVE & 
COMPETITIVE 
ENVIRONMENT
INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE STRATEGY
Socio-technical environment
IT, standards, data, architecture 
Information services (sourcing) 
Human resources (skills, roles)
EXPLOITATION EXPLORATION
STRATEGYSTRATEGY
Deliberate
Codified ‘solutions’ 
Standardized procedures 
Knowledge Management
Emergent
Communities of practice 
Flexible project teams 
Knowledge brokers, 
Sharing, and creation 
Bricolage/tinkering
CHANGE
MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY
ON-GOING LEARNING 
& REVIEW
Figure: The IS Strategy Framework (Galliers & Newell 2003)
DISCUSSION AGENDA [used during interviews]
STRATEGY AND DECISION MAKING
• Conceptualization of strategy: perspectives & meanings, styles and approaches
• Decision making and influencing factors in Strategy creation:
1. Information Infrastructure
2. Information & Knowledge Resources
3. Technology
4. Culture
5. Change
6. Management styles and politics 
QUESTIONS:
II. Decision-making & Strategy:
• How do you define strategizing and how do you approach it? Could you think of 
an example?
• How do you approach decision making during strategy development?
• What are the most important elements/questions for you in strategy? Could you 
give an illustration from a current or past experience?
1. Information Infrastructure (II):
• Is there an Information Infrastructure in place?
• If yes, in what form? What does it consist of (components)? What are the
processes?
• What is the purpose of the II? (i.e. information coding, knowledge sharing, etc.)
• How effective is the current II? How does it support or hinder work processes?
• How does it support/hinder decision making?
• Is there a company-wide II or separate ones in each country? If separate, then are 
they linked (universal access)? Would you prefer a universal II or separate ones and 
why?
• How is the II linked with strategizing? What components of the II are mostly used?
• If you (the interviewee) were going to re-do the II of the firm as to support 
decision making processes, how would you design it? What components would you 
include/exclude and why? How feasible would that be?
2. Information and Knowledge resources
• What tools, processes or metrics do you use to capture knowledge throughout the 
company, generally?
• What resources do you use when you are making important decisions?
• What resources are lacking that if they were available, you would be able to make 
more effective decisions faster?
• Could you elaborate on using ‘experience’ and ‘technology’ in strategizing, first each 
Inividually, then both in combination.
• How do you define Information Systems? (i.e. focus on social system or technical 
systems).
• What is the role of IS in decision making?
• How much do you use your IS? How effective is it?
• If you could improve on the current IS, how would you like to design it to improve 
decision making?
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3. Technology:
• What kind of data, information and knowledge do you store?
• In what format are these stored (structure of format)?
• Can unstructured data and unpublished knowledge be useful? ( business
knowledge, customer knowledge, product and markets)
• Is there a stream focusing on KM?
a. Content /  Document management (data bases: pulling data 
together from various systems. A systems that streamlines 
processes of generating reports and running queries?)
b. Business Intelligence
c. CRM (Customer relationship Mgt)
d. KMS/SAP/ etc
• What kind of technology do you use for making decisions?
• Are these technologies well aligned with business objectives? In other words, is the 
technology built strategically to enhance decision making, or is it used on ad hoc 
basis?
• Are there any IT strategies in place that would support management decisions?
• Is IT used as a ‘problem solver’ or a ‘strategic driver’ of projects?
• How could the current technology be leveraged even more for better decision 
making?
• What challenges do you face when using the technology?
• What kinds of new technologies could you think of, that if implemented and used, 
they could act synergistically in strategy development?
• In your opinions, what is the best knowledge management strategy?
4. Culture:
• Given that the workforce comes from many different cultural backgrounds, could 
you elaborate on how the multi-cultural environment affects work processes and 
ultimately decision processes in Germany/US? How different is it in G. and US?
• What difficulties/challenges/benefits do you experience (a) on daily basis (b) when
it comes to making choices/ decisions and strategizing?
• What are the most disruptive challenges (i.e. language, mind-sets, technology, etc)?
• If this is a challenge, how does the management team get along trying to overcome 
cultural barriers?
• What does the company do towards facilitating a knowledge sharing environment?
• How do you deal with different management thinking in Germany and the US?
• ‘The most valuable portion of knowledge remains tacit, which is deeply embedded
in the person who performs the task’. How is this tacit knowledge captured and 
shared given different mindsets?
5. Change
• ‘If you miss the chance to change in your industry, you are not managing 
knowledge’. How do you manage knowledge during times of change?
• How are you expecting to capture the tacit knowledge as you change over time?
(i.e. organizational memory) How well is it working?
6. Management styles and politics
• Could you elaborate on management and decision making styles in Germany and in 
the US?
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• How are the different management styles among these cultures affect decision 
making?
• How are managers dealing with these differences?
• How much does managerial discretion play a role in strategizing?
• Do you see different politics among US and German managers? How does it 
influence (directly or indirectly) the ways information and knowledge are used in 
strategy meetings?
III. TOOLS/TECHNIQUES TO LEVERAGE KNOWLEDGE IN DECISION 
MAKING
ILLUSTRATION
Communication process, structure and strategy in decision making
(a) Spectrum of communication
Data Information Knowledge Wisdom Intuition
Explicit Tacit
 ►
Please use your own definition o f  these terms. The below definitions are not fixed  and open to 
consider your definition.
Data = Raw data outside any context
Information = Data + context. Meaningful and explanatory.
Explicit Knowledge = Information + experience. Leading to a wholesome understanding.
Can be communicated, documented and transferred easily 
Tacit Knowledge = Expenenced knowledge. Difficult to communicate and record. Learned by doing. 
Wisdom = Deep understanding through long-term experience.
Intuition = ‘gut feeling’
(b) Information Systems and Infrastructure supporting decision-making
ICTs Interactive Media Communication in Person
ICTs = Information and Communication Technologies
• In the above illustration, what do you consider as most significant and mostly used 
in your communication (a)?
• How is your response to (a) facilitated/enabled? Please refer to (b)
• How do you process different types of knowledge (tacit, explicit and intuitive) to
come to a decision on a corporate strategy?
• In other words, is there any strategy, system, process or structure in place that gives 
you what you need to know?
• What are the resources enabling you to make the best use of that?
• Which information and knowledge resources (data and facts, experience and
intuition, social networks, information technology and/or knowledge systems) are
used and to what extent?
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
If you were to provide guidelines to establish an environment with effective 
knowledge exchange and decision making, how would it look like (components)? 
What would you have to do (how would you have to organize your knowledge 
processes) in order to make more effective and quicker decisions?
If a knowledge network could help to create that common understanding among 
decision makers, how would it look like? (e.g. technological, cultural, etc.)
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR INTEREST AND COOPERATION. 
FOR FUTURE CORRESPONDENCE, PLEASE CONTACT ME AT 
A.HATAMI@LSE.AC.UK
318
Topic Structure I Presented this to selected interviewees as a visual guide for 
discussions, when appropriate]
Strategizing
a process c f  continuous
Decision-Making
leveraging  „ E m bedded within the
Intellectual 
Capital & 
Organizational 
Resources
Information
Infrastructure
(II)
Topics:
Define Strategy: Styles. 
Process.
Strate gy -Stru cture 
Debate: Ambidextrous 
structure
Decision-making:
Process. Resources. 
Styles. Context. 
Management roles. 
Leadership.
Info Systems & 
Infrastructures:
Competitive resources, 
tools, practices
Knowledge 
Management: Strategy, 
use, impact on 
Organizational learning, 
Org. Memory
Gap: Information 
Strategy and Business 
Strategy: Is an alignment 
possible? Define.
Beyond the Hype of 
‘Best Practice’
Management, 
Information and Power
Explicit: IT, Data, Systems, 
Standards, Sourcing, Forums, 
Documents
Dynamic integration and 
interaction of competitive 
resources: ICTs & intellectual 
capital in 
consensus building & decision­
making
Tacit: Negotiation, perception 
management, firm culture, 
management styles & paradigms, 
value system, mental models V
Strategy + Strategizing at global companies
X Z
How are decisions made by top managers company wide? 
A Macro view
X z
Specifically: What is involved and what resources are used to make 
decisions? Why & How?
X z
Focus on: Explicit + Tacit resources.
Info Infrastructure (II): Systems, Management styles, cultures, etc.
——  . . rr '. ,----------------a) How is the II designed to support c
---------- -----
b) How is knowledge shared? What works, what does not work?
 : ___ ,_____   a - 1
a) limits and benefits of an II in the context of strategizing
b) interaction of management, culture, politics. Knowledge as a source 
of power and rent-seeking behaviour that affect the ways II are used 
and decisions are made
Critical Analysis. Discussion of Implications and Limitations. 
Contributions. Conclusions. Suggestion for further research
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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS [Developed during the preliminary phase of the 
studyl
A complete list of questions was prepared as a guide to the interviews. Depending on the 
background of the interviewee, time, and the direction of the interviews, the most 
appropriate questions were selected and asked.
1. What is your approach in making a strategic decision?
[Identify the type/dimension of resources used to make a decision on a strategic 
issue /  develop a strategy -  data, information, knowledge]
2. What is the knowledge base which you use?
a. Social networks: meetings, internal networks, external networks, etc.
b. Technology: computer-based systems, expert systems, knowledge systems, 
information systems, etc.
c. Deliberate/rational plan (weighing and analyzing facts), emergent 
(subjective judgments), or ad-hoc?
d. Formal of informal?
e. Identify knowledge dimensions: explicit, tacit, intuition]
3. To what extent do you shape the context you operate to your benefit?
4. What are your strengths?
5. What are you weaknesses?
6. How do you know what matters most in making a strategic decision?
7. How do you capture and retain new knowledge/lessons?
8. How do you deal with the complexity and volume of corporate knowledge? How 
do you know which you should or should not consider in making strategic 
decisions?
9. What would you have to do (How would you have to organize your knowledge 
processes) in order to make more effective and quicker decisions?
10. How could more effective use of knowledge serve you better?
GENERAL QUESTIONS ON SELF-PERCEPTION & OVERALL 
CHALLENGES
11. [competitive business environment] How do you describe the nature of your
business? What is significant for the success of your firm in an 
entrepreneurial environment?
12. [internal capabilities] How do you see the fit between your internal capabilities and
external competition? What are your competitive advantages (inside the 
organization)?
13. [resource-based competition] How do you develop or sustain competitive
advantage? How do you differentiate yourself with internal resources?
14. [business strategy] what are some of the challenges you face in making a strategic
decision?
15. [organizational strategy] How do you see the role of technology contribute to
knowledge processes as opposed to culture and social networks?
16. [knowledge use in strategizing] How do you achieve alignment between knowledge
and strategic objectives/business strategy?
17. [Socio-technical environment] How do you see technology could play a role in
supporting your information processes? How would a technology-oriented 
information systems support knowledge creation (information +
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experience)? What are the non-technology-oriented resources you use to 
gather information? How do you create knowledge from the acquired 
information?
Relationship between data-driven (refine, choose, produce, select, implement, 
execute) and experience-based to interpret information and create 
knowledge (exploration strategy: search, experimentation, flexibility and 
playfulness, experimentation, etc.)
18. How do you explore new possibilities and exploit old certainties?
19. How do you know what you don’t know and how do you deal with it?
20. How do you deal with uncertainty?
21. [Organizational Learning] How do you capture lessons learned? How do you
convert tacit to explicit?
22. How do you take advantage of what you have how do deal with what you don’t
know?
23. How do you inform yourself about a strategic issue?
24. What are the challenges in dealing with what matters and what is important to
know? What is significant knowledge in strategizing?
25. How do you identify competitive knowledge?
26. What are the necessary resources, competences and capabilities to gather, share and
create the knowledge that you need to know?
QUESTIONS CONCERNING NEGOTIATION AT MEETINGS (cross-cultural 
challenges & diverse paradigms)
27. What are some of the challenges in communicating knowledge in a group?
28. How do you share ideas and expertise across the company?
29. What is the basis of a strategic choice? How do you make a selection among
alternative options?
30. Considering the knowledge overload, how do you avoid drifting away from
business objectives?
31. What are the components of a decision that you examine?
32. How do you evaluate a strategic decision to make a final decision?
33. What do you consider in making decisions?
34. How do you deal with what you don’t know in a group?
35. How are you differentiating yourself and conquer the market?
36. How do you use your knowledge to your advantage?
Mental guide to the 
relationship between 
management 
information/knowledge, 
organizational 
information/knowledge 
and IS
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